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PREFACE 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall all the Balkan countries have turned their 
direction toward the EU and NATO. During these two decades there have occurred 
very drastic changes in this region. Yugoslavia has been dissolved giving birth to eight 
different countries, for some of which the chirurgical “intervention” has been needed.  
Albania the country enclosed in the iron cage for five decades has reached a 
previously unbelievable place in the international arena with its NATO membership in 
April 2009. Romania and Bulgaria within one and half decades of the fall of the 
Communism in Eastern Europe, realized their NATO and EU membership dreams. 
Turkey, the biggest country within the region and a senior NATO member, has 
long been seeking EU membership gates by undertaking reforms. Greece, as the oldest 
EU member in the region, has played a very decisive role in the integration process of 
the region. 
Balkan nationalism and intrastate conflicts which have been always present in 
this region, have slowed down the process of integration. Corruption and governance 
deficits, although in decrease, have been other factors hindering the way to EU 
membership.  
In these developments Epoka University, in cooperation with Istanbul 
University, organized the Second International Conference on European Studies to 
assist the continuing processes towards integration and to bring solutions or suggestions 
to several problematic issues facing the Balkan countries. 
It is my hope that the articles in the ICES`09 Proceedings will help further this 
goal. 
Dr. Ferdinand GJANA 
Vice - Rector and Chairman of  ICES`09 
vi 
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Ylber SELA, PhD and Halim Bajraktari, M.A 
South East European University, Tetovo, Republic of Macedonia 
 
European Perspective of Kosovo 
 
1. Relations Kosovo-EU                                                                                                       
 
Kosovo's relations with the EU continued to intensify the darting steps, especially from 
June 1999, when Kosovo came under the supervision and administration of UNMIK, 
where the mission of the United Nations Interim in Kosovo was based on Resolution 
1244 Security Council of the United Nations. As of this moment, the European Union 
has been an integral part of the effort to build new relations with Kosovo.1 The EU as a 
united terse as its motto is "united in diversity" has given a great contribution to 
institution building and support economic, political, and this reinforces the continuity 
is increasingly in the years ongoing. European Union, together with member states, 
especially triggered by the European Commission played a role in the construction and 
permanent development of Kosovo, and this fact becomes more bested that offer 
more constructive and help Kosovo.2 Over 2 billion euros in aid, are provided to assist 
the processes in Kosovo by the European Commission from 1999 until the declaration 
of independence, it initially focused on support actions for emergency assistance and 
reconstruction in Kosovo, after stabilization of the EU, Concentrate on encouraging 
the development of stable institutions and sustainable economic development to 
ensure a European future for Kosovo.3 
  Relations began concretize especially on the opening of 17 offices since 1999 
by member states of the EU, which have representative offices in Kosovo and more 
established connection, relation are several thousand other soldiers from EU countries 
serve as a member of the forces in Kosovo (KFOR) led by NATO. These strengthened 
the relationship of a large number of nongovernmental organizations from EU 
member states that have been and are active in direct relations with Kosovo it clearly 
shows the strong ties between the EU and Kosovo. Seeing the number of these ever-
increasing commitments to the EU, which gradually in a continuous process of taking  
                                                 
1 See in: (Rapporture-Joost Lagendijk, Report on the future of Kosovo and the roulette of the 
EU (2006/2267 (INI), 22 February 2007, p. 5-7, Adopted by the European Parliament on 29 
March 2007. 
2 Mishael Alfons: “Of Standards and Status”-The Role of the European Union in Kosovo: From 
UNSCR 1244 to the Futuer Status Talks. SÜDOSTEUROPA, 54. Jg; 03/2006, pp. 1. 
3 Tomas Sezmler-Marie-Janine Calic-Tomak-Dusam Reljic-Peter Schmidt: The UE Presenc in a 
Post-Status Kosovo”, SÜDOSTEUROPA, 55. Jahargang, 2007. Oldenbourg pp. 145. 
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the main role in promoting reforms and meeting the standards as the basis for the 
future of Kosovo, and implied commitment to the further towards European co-
operative perspective. Special aim of the EU is investing a fair stability in Kosovo and 
the region.4 This relationship provide an environment of clear and stable along with 
the permanent states of the EU, which were within UNMIK, the Contact Group and 
Security Council as guarantor of Kosovo. By the lack of status of Kosovo was 
impossible to have direct official relations with Brussels as the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia, but this does not mean that the European Union has left out interest for 
this country, still without clarifying De Jure its status, Kosovo had several relationships 
and joint working continuously with the European Union. In 1998-99 the EU played an 
important role in resolving the Kosovo crisis it was a relationship of high political and 
military always growing. A connection with the EU, is using the Euro currency, Kosovo 
after the final split from Serbia after its currency was not as currency in the country 
entered circulatory Mark,5 as the German currency, and after replacing it with the 
euro, together with Kosovo the EU states, into using the euro, so Kosovo was 
introduced in the Euro6 zone and bring it forward a step closer mardhnjeve the EU.7 
This alloy give a guarantee, as Mike Todd said: "Kosovo is a much more secure than 
some other countries"  this currency  relationship was the fact that is also present a 
number of European and international personnel who use this currency, the other 
aspect is the fact that almost no home in Kosovo, which is not related in a way with a 
state of the EU,8 a large number of immigrants who move, work and live in exile, from 
which a much of the money mainly euros transferred to Kosovo all these constituted a 
terse relations with the EU.9  
             The introduction of Kosovo in the Euro zone is a strengthening of relations of 
Kosovo to  help build  a  strong and   sustainable  financial,  particularly in  combating  
                                                 
4 Tomas Sezmler-Marie-Janine Calic-Tomak-Dusam Reljic-Peter Schmidt: ”SÜDOSTEUROPA, The 
UE Presenc in a Post-Status Kosovo”, 55. Jahargang, 2007. Oldenbourg pp. 147. 
5 Euro-European currency is the appointment of which is introduced into circulation on 1 
January 1999 as a coin bank and on 1 July 2002 as the currency for all transactions within the 
EU, which to date duchesse replaced by money in the national Euro. See in: Vlatko Mileta 
"lecture of the European Union", Prishtina, 2006, pp. 83-86. 
6 On 2 September 1999 the German currency (Mark), becomes the official currency in Kosovo. 
7 How incises in this issue towards the introduction of Kosovo in Germany since the Euro zone 
was up before introduction of the euro as the main currency used was the German currency 
(Mark) and the many causes of time necessary. 
8 Rexhep Hoti: “Kosova përballë vetvetes”, Akademia Diplomatike Shqiptare. Prishtinë, 2004 
pp. 107. 
9 Tomas Sezmler-Marie-Janine Calic-Tomak-Dusam Reljic-Peter Schmidt: ”SÜDOST EUROPA, 
The UE Presenc in a Post-Status Kosovo”, 55. Jahrgang , pp. 158. 
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negative phenomena  as before black, informal economy,  organized crime, 
corruption, etc.  This increase  transparency  in  a  sense that is a condition for foreign  
investment, introducing  Kosovo. Kosovo euro zone  boost  optimism that brings a 
positivistic to incubi and undercut the long road towards the EU and increased 
relations in the future. Approximation of relations with other Kosovo and the EU do, 
especially the presence of various directly in Kosovo:  
 
1.  The presence of humanitarian aid Office (ECHO)  
2.  The presence of the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR)10  
3.  The EU in Kosovo through UNMIK  
4.  The current EU mission that began with the new schedule as knowledge 
that Ahtisaari 
 
EULEX   mission.11 
 
These forms make it more sustainable and more vital cooperation between Kosovo 
and the EU, Brussels and attitudes were always more concerned for the future of 
Kosovo. Especially after define statues Kosovo, which opened the routes without 
return how to address issues crucial to walk further steps towards the EU.12 This new 
reality of Kosovo relations intensify cooperation in areas other districts customs, fiscal, 
technical issues, information, training through various instruments such as TAIEX,13 (as 
a training plan). Kosovo after the declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, 
the EU as terse presented as a great achievement, relations with Kosovo and stability 
in the Western Balkans. Relationship between these entities is considered day by day 
more and more and now has all cooperation with the European Union increasingly on 
strengthening these mardhnjeve. Relations are scroll and joint collaborative projects 
with the EU, this determination clearly shows that these linked such projects will have 
long-term constructive and Kosovo.14 These relations will not yen at the end of them  
                                                 
10 EAR, was founded in 1999 by the European Council just because of Kosovo after the war had 
consequences that, with headquarters in Thessaloniki, Greece, and with operational centers in 
Prishtina, Belgrade, Podgorica and Skopje. 
11See in: The Ahtisaari package signed by the EU, in which the European will play the main role 
in Kosovo after the Status. 
12 Lisen Bashkurti: “Evropa, Ballkani dhe Sfida e Kosovës”, Tiranë, Geer 2006, pp. 59. 
13 European Commission Liaison Office in Kosovo. See in: Michail Raith: "Project Stability in 
Time of Crisis-The European Union's Responsibility towards the Western Balkans", 
SÜDOSTEUROPA, Mitteilungen, 2008, pp. 9. 
14 Through membership Instrument Pre (IPA), which was founded in early 2007, the purpose of 
which was dimming the Western Balkan countries including Kosovo and in this plan has 
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for a long time, even given the long road we have money towards the EU, and be 
understood as the necessity of strengthening mate these relationship in order for 
Kosovo to be on mutual cooperation and more understandable and more as a 
necessity of long-term future of Kosovo. Finally the arrival of the EULEX mission in 
Kosovo is clearly testifies cooperation towards the culmination of the relationship 
with the EU. 
  
2. The Stabilization and Association (Tracking Mechanism) 
 
The recent Kosovo have followed a series of positive activities by the EU, such as 
helpful, standardizes and accuse. Kosovo is the last state in the region which has not 
yet connected formal agreement with the European Union although it has very good 
relations, because he still had no clear its status, until 17 February 2008, and where 
eventually independence. With the adoption of the constitution and laws need to be 
provided with the final status, Kosovo meets the necessary conditions for making the 
Feasibility Study and the start of negotiations for Stabilization and Association 
Agreement with Brussels. Okay this is the overall stability is preserved and has 
continued to cooperate activities with the wider international community, the 
European Union in general and the European Commission within the framework of 
the Tracking Mechanism of the Stabilization and Association Process.15 Absence as an 
independent state was not an obstacle to linking Stabilization and Association 
Agreement. But before the war of 1999, with the deployment of the SAP process by 
the EU for the Western Balkan countries, aimed at approximation and perspective of 
this region towards the EU. This was an agreement for SAP to meet the Copenhagen 
criteria, for other than Kosovo, which would remain behind with the processes of SAP 
in comparison with neighboring countries. 
          Since it was not proclaimed independence of Kosovo to have implied that it 
could not link the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, but also from 
the absence in 2002, has benefited from financial assistance and policy advice through 
participation in the Tracking Mechanism the mechanism and Association (MPSA), a  
                                                                                                                                  
benefited over 124 million intended to help in the field of rule of law, and economic 
administration. 
15 European Commission proposes to achieve a feasibility study for Kosovo, to assess how 
Kosovo can best exploit the regional and European integration. The Commission also proposes 
to intensify the regular political dialogue between the technical and the Kosovo authorities and 
the Commission. In the progress report on Kosovo, the Commission estimates that some 
progress has been achieved in addressing the key European Partnership priorities. See in: 
www.delprn. ec.europa.eu. 5 November 2008. 
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reinforcement else came from the European Commission in 2003 that inaugural a 
matter of alternative Asocim Stabilization Process for Kosovo, in particular a kind of 
mechanism so, mechanisms Tracking (Tracking Mechanism). Where thought to enter 
Kosovo soon to have a mechanism, a form towards meeting the SAA (Stabilization and 
Association Tracking Mechanism) in the framework of the EU. This was originally a 
kind of insurance and showing the behavior of those states do not recognize Kosovo.16 
Following the introduction of Kosovo in the euro zone,17 the European Union as a step 
was to inaugurate the so-called Tracking mechanism for Kosovo, a step that was very 
important and necessary by the fact that Kosovo was outside any procedure that the 
EU was about that time with Union (Serbia-Montenegro). Kosovo is independent 
Stabilization and Association Process. In Kosovo, the main processes away go through 
offices that operate in Kosovo through the office as the so-called Tracking mechanism 
for Kosovo. The aim of the first (Tracking Mechanism) to STM-s (Tracking Mechanism 
for Stabilization-Association), 18 a period consisted of meetings between the European 
Commission, UNMIK and Kosovo institutions appropriate, the meetings had to do with 
doing these evaluations of along Kosovo, about the achievements of the ongoing 
situation in Kosovo. In June 2004, the Council of Ministers of the European Union has 
approved the first European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, including 
Kosovo, as set out by Resolution 1244 the UN KS. A new relates this kind meetings was 
that of January 2006, where Council has approved a new partnership which is adapted 
to the progress made during this time in Kosovo. Also among this year, held a second 
meeting of the EU involved in the SPA and the Progress Report in August 2006, where 
UNMIK and the Kosovo Government, together adoption share plan for Kosovo, 
implementation of the Plan for Partnerships with Europe. This was about as a direct 
connection between the EU and Kosovo; where as the single point was the issue of 
the future status process accuses and cooperation with the EU. In the case of Kosovo, 
European Partnership also dealt eight Standards for Kosovo.19 In response to the 
                                                 
16 Look at: EU Spilt could u undermine Kosovo. In –International Herald Tribune-20 February 
2008 
17Kosovo became part of this area in 2002, as a user of the euro currency using today's 15 
member countries, representing 2 / 3 of the population of the EU. 
18 This kind of mechanism to allow Kosovo to decide Relations of the EU structures, as well as a 
close collaboration with the legislation in the field of convenience standards of the EU, to see: 
Blerim Reka /ArtaIbrahimi: "European Studies" Tetovo 2004, pp. 270th  
19 These standards were: functioning democratic institutions; rule of law; the free movement 
of people; superglue and the return of minority interim; economy; property rights; dialogue 
with Belgrade and the KPC. See in: Michael Raith: "Project Stability in Time of Crisis-The 
European Union's Responsibility towards the Western Balkans", SÜDOSTEUROPA, 
Mitteilungen, 2008, pp. 32. 
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identification of priorities, national authorities require you to draft the Action Plan of 
European Partnership, which includes actions that the authorities intended to take to 
achieve those priorities, and as such it offers an agenda with which to measure 
progress. Monitoring of the European Partnership provided through annual reports to 
the European Commission for SAP and the Stabilization and Association Tracking 
Mechanism. Lot of work that has been made in Kosovo's long road towards 
integration in the European Union is establishing the Tracking Mechanism of the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)20 as an office in Kosovo, which has the 
EU in Kosovo, this is determined a away relations with Kosovo, through this office 
(SAA-s) done in the field of legislation co Kosovo since the issuance of laws to comply 
with European laws that in future not to have any problem in this area, this is a 
walking time and money necessary special and priorities towards speeding up the 
positive processes in Kosovo compared to other neighboring countries, which are a 
step ahead in these processes. In the framework of this field are working in Kosovo, 
international expert in collaboration with local experts who have the fitness to do so 
as standardized with the EU. Also before this time in 2004 the office was established 
for European Integration, the importance of this office in Kosovo is that it is 
conducting several activities such as:  
• Formulation of proposals for advancing the activities of the Government 
with the aim of approximating the norms and standards with those of the EU;  
• Will oversee the development and implementation of the program of the 
government in general    approximation of the relevant standards of the EU;  
• I will submit recommendations within the plan of the Standards for Kosovo 
and the Stabilization and Association Tracking Mechanism for coordination 
between the ministries and authorities as necessary together with UNMIK;  
• To assist the process of implementing standards for Kosovo in order to 
achieve compliance with the standards and the necessity of the EU, that all of 
these peregrine more closely and participate in the signing of the accuse.  
 
The future of Kosovo has been linked to Europe without regard to the postponement 
of the status that you had made Kosovo status since before the people of Kosovo 
remain consonant with European society, this is consistent with the EU to start to 
                                                 
20 This Agreement was reserved for the five countries of Southeast Europe as Croatia, BIH, 
Macedonia, Serbia and Albania, to see: Vlatko Mileta "lecture of the European Union" 
Prishtina, 2006. pp. 203. 
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ensure that when the framework was issued constitutional,21 and whether Kosovo will 
not have such a compliance with the EU, this would cause division between Kosovo 
and the rest of the region and would have a negative debate further towards 
processes for Kosovo. We should be more dedicated to meeting these assistance that 
the EU has given Kosovo because these also depend on respect for the principles of 
SAP. When all of Europe is located here, while Kosovo is currently as surveyed directly 
with the EU institutions in the region through which to make institutions more 
attractive co-operation with the Kosovo institutions as the EU-s action:  
 
• European Commission Liaison Office;  
• Personal Representative of the Secretary-General;  
• High Representative;  
• The European Agency in the framework of UNMIK;  
• Representatives of the member states of the EU.  
 
That all these factors are a much needed impetus and reference, further advice, SAP 
Tracking Mechanism of the (STM), and the continued assistance of the PISG 
(Provisional Institutions of Self Government),22 were key elements to benefit from 
SAP-s support was an UNMIK and the PISG with expertise Commission and with 
political guidance for the approximation with the EU, contributed to institution 
building and administrative reforms, increasing understood the basic principles and 
goals of European policy, which STM holds regular meetings to assess progress 
political, economic, institutional reforms and compatibility with the conditionality of 
the SAP, who are experts of the European Commission to formulate recommendations 
for actions to future. How important step and is necessary for the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement that Kosovo still has none in agreement that this will be a time 
to meet the many preconditions of the conditions to the signing of this agreement 
which, as the agreement is the new generation of the EU, as a process which was 
inaugurated in May 1999, for Western Balkan countries in order to begin to adopt 
their legislation with the European Union and seeks to meet the criteria that the 
European Union. This agreement was devoted to these countries in order that they 
stability within their state in order that they be prepared to asocial the EU. Given that 
this agreement provided:  
                                                 
21 This Agreement was reserved for the five countries of Southeast Europe as Croatia, BIH, 
Macedonia, Serbia and Albania, to see: Vlatko Mileta "lecture of the European Union" 
Prishtina, 2006. pp. 203. 
22 See in: Rexhep Hoti: “Kosova përball vetvetes” Prishtinë, 2004, pp. 201-206. 
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•  Road to Europe, the Western Balkan countries;  
•  These agreements gone towards more direct official connection with the EU 
in;  
•  This Agreement includes economic aid, and financial cooperation with the 
EU in the Kosovo  involving;  
•  Includes Political dialogue and Trade;  
•  Put a free trade zone, which brings a direct connection with the economic;  
•  Set an average of legislation and practice of the EU, which is competitive 
with the country should harmonized this field;  
•  leading cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs.  
 
This agreement was devoted to each state individually it cope with the challenges of 
the future with a view to harmonizing the objectives of the same political and 
economic urges the European Union. It is very important to note that the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement, as says the chief of the International Civilian Office (ICO) 
in Kosovo Pitter Faith: "It is a relationship of deep contracture within the EU to deal 
with the mutual rights and obligations"23, is no guarantee that each state which 
connects this agreement, will necessarily become members of the EU, in particular, 
but this much depends on the political will and economic capabilities that should meet 
every candidate who connects this agreement is  understandable. Also it is not a 
promise for integration. It puts emphasis on the stabilization of the situation in the 
countries concerned, to reach further in establishing a special relationship with the 
European Union. However, in a manner similar to European agreements signed in the 
early years with 90 Eastern European24 states, which are far more members of the EU, 
it encourages embracing the core values of the European Union from the Western 
Balkan countries as: 
•  Democracy and rule of law;  
•  Protection of human rights;  
•  Respect for national minorities;25  
•  market economy and justice. 
                                                 
23See in: Infopress 3. 12. 2008, pp. 3. 
24 As such the candidate countries: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and Cyprus which these states were admitted in 2004 that block 
called as the Eastern enlargement. See in: Skender Berisha: "European economic integration" 
Prishtina, 2005, pp. 85th 
25 One of the controversial issues during the drafting of the Ahtisaari package were minorities 
and their role in Kosovo, so the best guarantees, and gives rights to honor the best potential in 
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Given that this agreement aims to promote economic development of the country, 
supported by parallel assistance programs designed to help these countries meet 
obligations of the agreement.26 Order allowing common access to both processes. This 
document defines all measures that the Kosovo institutions intend to take to achieve 
the priorities set by the European Partnership and to meet the Standards for Kosovo, 
so are many prerequisites and conditions to be hardship sacrifice, and may time. To 
ensure that Kosovo to participate fully in SAP and allow Serbia to walk its steps, has 
been established the Stabilization and Association Tracking Mechanism (SAP), as a 
special tool for Kosovo for not behind in the process. The European integration 
process for Kosovo aims to asocial more closely with the European Union with a view 
to possible membership. In this respect, Kosovo participates in the SAP, which is the 
policy framework of the EU Western Balkan states. SAP longtime represents a 
commitment of the EU in the region, as the political efforts and financial assistance. 
When SAP allows each country in question that his steps to move towards further 
integration in the EU. STM is a forum for dialogue between Kosovo and the European 
Union and has so far shown that it is a valuable tool to help the Kosovo authorities in 
guiding the reforms and asserted that Kosovo. Kosovo in order to fully benefit from 
the various instruments the SAP. Can say that these steps that Kosovo had to go 
manure has moved in the best possible given the limited area and who had supervised 
Kosovo as a state to build a crossroads orientates Stabilization and Association 
Agreement. Kosovo is currently in phase before writing Stabilization and Association 
Agreement, but none here as the flowerbed and ASE short time to final this process, 
to come to this moment, when previously Kosovo must make a application for 
membership of the EU Council, which request the latter would then be a decision 
after analyzing the progress made, through which authorizes the European 
Commission to bring an expert in cooperation with the Kosovo institutions to study 
the feasibility 27, and his realization that as a package observers will come to the 
conclusion Conclusions or  up in filling the full package. This study will take several 
months and after this signal gives the Council the Commission to begin negotiations 
                                                                                                                                  
Europe and this more good or not observed in neighboring countries, see in: Document of 
Ahtisaari's Package. May, 2007. 
26 Lisen Bashkurti: “Evropa, Ballkani dhe Sfida e Kosovës”, Tiranë, 2006 pp. 45. 
27 In the autumn of 2009, the Commission will present a feasibility study that will assess the 
ways for promotion of political development and socio-economic Kosovo, and to assess how 
Kosovo could best advance, as part of region towards greater integration within the region and 
the EU. Study Fusibility mean level of training and meeting all the conditions for opening 
negotiations on the SAA, see the: Paskal Milo: "The European Union, idea, Integration, Identity 
and Future" Tirana, 2002, pp. 279th 
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for a Stabilization and Association. After all this remain a street full of orders and cut 
cuisine that should move up as the European destination. It's another thing favorite 
way clear that this is the last complication and decision to enter the EU, seeing the 
region (Croatia)28, with longtime of this period  be understood clearly that such a thing 
as is not close to Kosovo. After all these jobs that the yen will not slim and light to 
these preconditions remained the terms mentioned. Kosovo must be a determination 
as to the most unique work that will be in the hands of her and you realize you watch 
in more detail and commitment towards common goals as the European family. These 
conditions are not so easy and desired, but are conditional can not that you overlook 
one another without finishing the like is that we are within the EU. 
 
3. EU Mission in Kosovo  
 
The European Union is the largest provider of humanitarian aid and development in 
the region. Missions have shown that its been able to prevent conflicts that bring a 
prosperity in the region. Missions of the EU are in the political and economic interests 
as a model of successful extender29, which is applying in Kosovo, now as long as 
Kosovo is going through these missions from the change, with more influence in the 
democratic world, these missions were, and continue be for the good of Kosovo. As a 
country with a large number of organizations were missioner as special the specific 
oftentimes Kosovo that the international community and Kosovo's European call as 
(sui generis), the missions are almost so. Since Kosovo is among the most late, which is 
turned out by the war, with consequences too great as the loss of people, 
deportation, destruction of housing infrastructure, politico-economic infrastructure, 
and legislative, these realities of Kosovo in a lined new reality starting commitments in 
all areas for the consolidation of Kosovo as a functional state, thereby protecting 
universal human freedoms, through the democracy that is continually building and 
concretize Kosovo. Therefore, the missions of this kind were necessary. With these 
missions, the EU in Kosovo had intended to complete the works within a period as 
short as they build democratization in terse Kosovo as long as it would be necessary to 
be present until the finalization of these issues. The EU mission was intended as the 
implementation of standards that were dedicated to Kosovo, the main purpose of 
these standards were finalizing Kosovo's status. Such were the interests of the Contact 
                                                 
28 Croatia submitted its application for EU membership on 23 February 2003 and since one 
expects its membership in the European family. 
29 The Commission has drawn up detailed conclusions on Kosovo in particular his statement on 
enlargement. See in: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007-2008. 2007 Progress 
Report on Kosovo under RKSOKB 1244, Brussels, 6.11.2007, pp. 4. 
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Group and EU has common positions on how to emerge from this situation (status 
quo).30 The EU mission was interested in socio-economic helped laughter where 
Kosovo will be walked as a selling within the region towards a modern state. Objective 
or objectives of the EU mission was to help Kosovo with the help of agencies that will 
do in the future to submit crappy-independence ethnic rights in Kosovo, the customs 
service, important goal was the preservation of order and law especially respect for 
communities, the fight against corruption, organized crime. With these missions, the 
EU had intended monitoring and assistance directly to the administrative aspects, 
politico-economic sphere in Kosovo, and standardization of these aspects with those 
of the EU.31 All EU presenting an interest on the creation of social and economic policy 
in Kosovo and regional perspective. Achievements should focus on presentations that 
have more realistic as the only truly real in order to open prospects in the future 
towards the EU.32 The EU has made and makes great contribution to Kosovo only 
recently been given (about 2 billion euros, yen will be available within the years 2007-
2010), which was dedicated to the Kosovo capital. The work of the EU in Kosovo was a 
swing among the largest that has ever taken as a mission EULEX, Kosovo during talks 
with the Government, however present an international presence of regular 
communication, cultural and regional.33 of 2007 was presented a plan of the European 
Commission, the expansion of the EU was based on the Ahtisaari plan as a final 
proposal for Kosovo, which plans above looking by the ICO34, these reports were in the 
liaison between the European and U.S.35 Another goal the EU mission, involving the 
justice sector, in combating organized crime, not the services rules controlling how 
efficient customs that all these areas together were the priority of the EU mission, 
who had in other places that had these problems after status many states, the EU 
agenda within the mission,36 where Kosovo will be assisted financially with large sums 
                                                 
30 Kosovo was in a state of almost net that after the introduction of UNMIK to implement the 
standards. See in: Michail Raith: "Project Stability in Time of Crisis-The European Union's 
Responsibility towards the Western Balkans", SÜDOSTEUROPA, Mitteilungen, 2008, pp. 28 
31 Documentation: European Council Documentation on Kosovo, 16 February 2008, pp. 91. 
32 Tomas Sezmler-Marie-Janine Calic-Tomak-Dusam Reljic-Peter Schmidt: ”SÜDOSTEUROPA, 
The UE Presenc in a Post-Status Kosovo”, 55. Jahargang, 2007. Oldenbourg, pp. 162. 
33 Dokumentation: Europian Cuncil Documentation on Kosovo, 16 February 2008, pp. 90. 
34 The ICO, as international civil presence will be guaranteed by the International Civilian 
Office, where early this agency will be a representative of the EU, he must bear responsibility 
as special representatives of the EU, as chief of this office is elected Piter Fejt Germany. 
35 Thomas-Marie-Sezmler Ioannina Calic-Tomak-Dusam Reljic-Peter Schmidt: "SÜDOSTEUROPA, 
The EU Presence in a Post-Status Kosovo," 55. Jahargang, 2007. Oldenbourg, pp. 155th 
36 UNMIK, UNMIK's Impact on the Kosovo Economy: Spending Effect 1999-2006 and potential 
effects on Downsizing, Prishtina, July 2006, pp. 74th 
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in the future. Likewise the EU has a kind of two-year plan that involved involvement, 
as greater security in Kosovo towards the EU, and other documents which had 
adopted this vision. In early 2007, the EU has set a mission for. 
  Kosovo aid named (IPA)37, designed to help the Western Balkan countries 
included in this plan Kosovo. EAR is also gradually help programs which participate in 
this plan and where you introduced the Kosovo side. The plan of this strategy was 
intended during 2008 to 2010, Kosovo will benefit from 261 million euros as the 
budget by agency prior to membership of the IPA-s. These funds are aimed at building 
technical services institutions and social ties. Given that in the past, the European 
Council in collaboration with IPA had helped countries Romania and Bulgaria before 
entering the EU agreed a lot about head resident for 23 euros, while for the people of 
Kosovo at this very early cut cure UNMIK38 , had arrived in Kosovo have stated this 
mission during the early stages of expansion of this mission. Now this standard is 
multiple and ever-increasing forgiven assistance and contribution of the EU. 
Development was also part of the work called as the fourth pillar (Fourth Pillar)39, the 
administration of UNMIK, which is conveyance, it day by day towards the EU.40 The 
mission of the European Union will be in Kosovo until Kosovo fully integrated in the 
European Union, says as the International Civilian Representative, Pieter Faith: "We 
had a close cooperation so far and am confident that this cooperation will continue in 
the future". The future of the EU mission in Kosovo is a political and legal guarantee, 
together with European states to sign a basic process for the future of the EU as a 
presence in Kosovo. It is known that from 3 April 2007, when Ahtisaari presents final 
plan for Kosovo in the Security Council, recommended in this document was Kosovo, 
which should be granted independence. Even Mr. Package Ahtisaari which also signed 
the EU states, which agreement emerged clearly the role of the European who will 
                                                 
37 IPA, as Instrument pre-accession transistor, is intended to assist Kosovo in overcoming 
challenges towards EU integration, and in implementing necessary reforms as (the 
strengthening of key institutions) towards the progress of SAP in laying the foundations criteria 
Copenhagen. See in: Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006, Official Journal 
L210, pp. 82. 
38This was very low in the extreme and 10 euros for head resident at the time of arrival that 
this mission, see in: UNMIK, UNMIK-s Impact on the Kosovo Economy: Spending Effect 1999-
2006 and potential effects on Downsizing, Prishtina , July 2006, pp. 75th   
39 These are: Pillar I, the police and justice, Pillar II Civil Administration under the direct control 
of the UN, and as a role above looked, U.S., and Pillar III is concerned with democracy and 
institution building, under the direction of the OSCE of. 
40 UNMIK, UNMIK-s Impact on the Kosovo Economy: Spending Effect  on 1999-2006 and 
potential Downsizing, Prishtina, July 2006, pp. 74th 
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play the main role in Kosovo after the Status of new was presented in this plan.41 This 
strategy of the EU mission eventually fixes the future of the EU in Kosovo. With this 
strategy the EU has entered into an era of democratic missionary, the mission for 
Kosovo that will be gold for way signals that this mission. The presence of this mission 
will bring the rhythms of regional states as competitive to the EU, this mission will be 
promontory main shuttles all the processes towards the European table. 
 
4. EULEX mission in Kosovo  
 
Efforts around establishing EULEX mission in Kosovo had that intensity from the first 
half of 2007, when he was presented a plan on starting a mission in Kosovo, the plan 
and initiate Javier Solana plan which supports the European Parliament in same time 
agreed with Solana's position42. In the fall 2007 international diplomats began talks 
held in Brussels, about finding alternative routes to Kosovo and independence more 
quickly to her. And that this was achieved with a common commitment. Immediately 
after the declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 in Kosovo, one of the main 
themes of the meeting was Questa expansion of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo, and 
about the mandate that will have this mission, that this goal will be (and 
strengthening the  rule of law in Kosovo),43 this mission should be an urgent necessity 
for the extension, its entire territory of Kosovo to help Kosovo security sector and the 
judiciary.44 That this was clarified, with the guarantee package that Ahtisaari mission 
will consist on two thousand police and international judges which is a very important 
moment for Kosovo. EULEX mission, had plans to clear the present as a certainty in 
the sector terse, as in the elimination of negative economic phenomena in Kosovo. By 
quart on a genuine support of the EU, this project was in accordance with the 
European Commission, where together they had plans to use an instrument to for all 
within the Western Balkans, where the order within Kosovo to include these 
countries45. Brussels was making a preparation that would give Kosovo in the future a 
wider irradiation. This was certainly a help and not apart from the Kosovo region, but 
also in terse. EULEX mission was to help Kosovo point objective the legitimacy of 
                                                 
41 Thomas-Marie-Sezmler Ioannina Calic-Tomak-Dusam Reljic-Peter Schmidt: "SÜDOSTEUROPA, 
The EU Presence in a Post-Status Kosovo," 55. Jahargang, 2007. Oldenbourg pp. 151. 
42 See in: Joost Lagendijk (Reporter), Report on the future of Kosovo end the Role of the EU, 
2006, 2267 (INI), 22 February 2007, pp. 7. 
43 EULEX mission is also Rezoluten1244 how to extend and intervenes in Kosovo. See in: 
Resolution 1244. 
44 See in: Document package Ahtisarit Marti.    
45 Here we are with neighboring countries. See in: Council of the European Union: Council 
conclusions on Kosovo, 18 February, p. 2008. 1. 
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presenting a potential donor, as the interest and benefit bring cognitive46, Kosovo and 
throughout the region. It should not be forgotten Assistant big UNMIK had made 
during his term, but these powers of UNMIK now be transferred to EULEX, after which 
the status of these dilemmas were uncertain how long this time before the 
deployment of EULEX it47 was theater that many debates about this issue after the 
status of these dilemmas were evidently almost terse about the role and weight that 
would have this mission. Further talks UNMIK were not so far in signing the EU-s 
EULEX which relied on this authority and the Government of Kosovo on Kosovo's 
future. It was a lack of EULEX who by Pristine was not very clear where this mission 
appear at a time that hard talks with Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs. About the 
introduction of a hegemony in northern Kosovo where Serbia was based on a parallel 
structure in Kosovo, a plan which was decided by Prime Minister Kostunica as a true 
plan for Kosovo.48 Top 16 Short 2008 the European Council held a meeting districts 
law that rules the European EULEX mission in Kosovo, the European Council meetings 
have compromises districts to discuss the future presence in Kosovo. One of the 
primary priorities of the EU was the future of Kosovo and Western Balkans towards a 
family stress perspective of EU and European integration in the region. Is a gap of 
fulfilling aspects democratic, multiethnic, and ranks in the fulfillment of law.  Where 
these contributions will be a fulfillment of social yen in the region terse. The basis of 
this agreement was the basis of fulfilling the EU presence in Kosovo.49 EU Mission to 
the rule of law in Kosovo (EULEX), is the largest civilian mission that was established 
under the Policy ever European Security and Defense. The main goal of this mission is 
to help the Kosovo authorities in the field of rule of law, particularly the police, 
judiciary and customs.50 EULEX is a technical mission which, will overseas, monitors 
and advises keeping certain areas of a small number of executive powers. This civilian 
                                                 
46 We, like Kosovo, we are ready to join and to start implementing the political process and the 
political status of President Ahtisaari for Kosovo's future. and the decision on recognition of 
Kosovo's independence as soon as possible is a necessary step not only by the leaders of the 
European Union but also by other world leaders. 
47 Tim Judah: Kosovo: Who is in Charge? In: Balkan Insight, 26 February 2008. 
48 The aim of the European Union was that the EULEX mission in Kosovo based on the entire 
territory of Kosovo, to see: Michail Raith: "Project Stability in Time of Crisis-The European 
Union's Responsibility towards the Western Balkans" SÜDOSTEUROPA, Mitteilungen , 2008, pp. 
13. 
49 Documentation: European Documentation Council on Kosovo, 16 February 2008, pp. 90th 
50All three of these areas and bring security guarantees Kosovo, which areas of EULEX soon will 
take control in the whole territory, see: Michail Raith: "Project Stability in Time of Crisis-The 
European Union's Responsibility towards the Western Balkans "SÜDOSTEUROPA, Mitteilungen, 
2008, pp. 12.   
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
16 
 
mission is as the most important of the EU, which shows commitment to Kosovo, 
which brings a positive perspective for all of Kosovo, and that put of EULEX in Kosovo, 
the EU is taking the leading region because Kosovo is in the Balkans and this must be 
within Europe as terse51. The EU had to submit a plan within the state of Kosovo that 
these gaps, EULEX will be meeting directly with Brussels in the monitoring of these 
problems. Concessions that were made by Ahtisari52 were plans in cooperation with 
Brussels were directly and coordination. By the EU, these concessions were numerous 
and subtle to the Kosovo issue53. Prishtina was also based on these statements to the 
implementation of the package Ahtisari where the future of Kosovo will be clear in 
meeting its obligations and respect for minorities. However, the EULEX mission, there 
were some limits set in the presentation of several processes related to certain 
procedures to be followed in maintaining law and order. EULEX mission would take 
decisions after the 120 day deadline as a transitional phase, the basis of UNMIK, to the 
completion of phase transition, where the EU would step in to help Kosovo 
institutions essentially had to do with how the system with regular state. Fulfilling this 
mission in 1900 brought on police officer by the EU court, prosecutors, customs 
official, and approximately about 1100 local staff who would be based in central 
Kosovo, this run features bring the crusher 300, within the limits where the purpose of 
these would be the preservation of state borders. EU in the future will present a 
political general in Kosovo headed by Commissioner Yves de Kermabon,54 which will 
be presenting as a representative of civil office in Brussels which will be reported on 
the situation in Kosovo. Community safety and the EU-s political will to exert under 
the responsibility of the EU Council, the political and strategic control of this mission. 
EULEX mandate is to preserve order and law and order, to achieve coverage within a 
period of 6 months which will be used on 205 million euros. Presentation of special 
representatives of the EU Pitter Fait appointees was special in that union a special 
appearance in Kosovo (EUSR) in Kosovo from 4 February 2008 that the mandate 
would last until 28 February 2009, which would present an offer which The EU will 
accept and will assist in the political process and its coordination with the EU. The 
office, which was more detailed monitoring purpose, districts main conclusions after 
status. When deployed in general and ICO EUSR in Kosovo will be some yen 75 
                                                 
51 Kosova Sot: Wednesday, December 17, 2008. 
52Ahtisari presented a plan for decentralization in acceptance of the Serb community and its 
ties with Belgrade. However, this was about a level of clean with the Prishtina authorities as 
scheduled.  
53 See in: "Born under a bad Sing", Financial Time-to-15 February 2008. 
54 Scope of the EU made a good choice of appointees P. German Faith that was special 
representative and Frenchman Yves de Kermabon, as a general and representative of EULX it. 
They both presented and had a key insight about the expansion of EULEX in Kosovo. 
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international offices, and 200 local staff based in Prishtina and a representative office 
in Mitrovica, which together will monitor the situation in Kosovo. EU plans its along 
helped with Solana at the EU to be more active with a coherent and successful in 
Kosovo. 55  
Mission of EULEX will functionalize in Kosovo and in the north in base peaceful 
dialogue and not violence on the basis of this is obvious since its establishment. The 
aim of the EU is to decide EULEX in 56the entire territory of Kosovo that would serve in 
terse people in further improving the processes based on the state of Kosovo          
               One of the challenges and work general in the future will remain the rule of 
law, police and customs in a way that all the yen even before the arrival of law, EULEX, 
clearly shows this together with Kosovo institutions to which areas would be common 
challenge. The role and legal basis of the main EULEX, will be monitoring and main 
supporters of the rule of law which would be a repair reporting directly to Brussels, 
which will be a way for European help for Kosovo. 
               Kosovo will benefit from the EULEX, given that first bring Kosovo closer to the 
EU;  secondly, the presence of EULEX in the north of Kosovo will enable the mission to 
monitor closely the behavior of Serbia and the who will address the problems to really 
bring the sides, these sides are positive that the state of Kosovo best faceted and scan 
in generality by the EU mission. Granted in the field of judge bring contribution the 
arrival of judge and procurer the EULEX to help build a judicial system by European 
standards of construction which has to face many challenges to ensure the trial 
procedures and the correct way towards the judges independent in respect full pale 
rights and protection of victims regardless of nationality that all equal before the law 
of the yen. Now finally after many attempts to discuss extension of this mission in 
northern Kosovo this mission refrained promises about the functioning and 
monitoring of this part of Kosovo, a political installer as pacific and correct to the 
parties, seem challenge bed manager from structures nationalist Serbian criminal for 
order to have as little bring incidence violent to focus on different opinion not the 
proper functioning of this mission, but one this now, it is clear that from the first 
moments of arrival The EULEX Kosovo things are walking in the direction of the overall 
peace and security. Future of EULEX, brought a non-desired news for crime, 
corruption, bad use public Funds and those who have abused the law in Kosovo, as 
this mission will make efforts to eliminate these phenomena eventually in cooperation 
with institutions of the Republic Kosovo, this cooperation will be a reinforcement of 
the guarantee and coordinated way in the European away. EULEX mission is plant 
                                                 
55 Documentation: European Documentation Council on Kosovo, 16. February 2008, pp. 91. 
56 Legal Basis of EULEX is Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of the Council dated 4th February. 2008. 
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European fare better, so that we as a nation we are dedicated to European get out 
efficiency how fast and long. One thing is now clear between processes of EULEX is to 
prepare the way Kosovo as the European table wants this mission open road even 
more quickly signing the SAA process, which in future will also be followed with the 
status candidate with the EU integration. The presence of this mission is the best 
prepares the people of Kosovo for maintaining proper equilibrist, is huge builds 
bridges across CINET will walk terse in Kosovo and the region to the EU, we can say 
that EULEX is gravities processes Kosovo right EU. 
 
5. European perspective of Kosovo  
 
The European Union is bring perspective long, but prosperities longtime regarding 
political developments in Kosovo and throughout the region, given that in the future 
as the reference point will be Brussels for Kosovo here clarified and strengthened 
even more this perspective building link bridges with the EU. Support from the EU, the 
financial issues was a clear reflection of the continuation and willingness to helping 
Kosovo in the future to more closely approaching the European table. The future of 
Kosovo in the EU also can be a model of how to achieve independence of a state as 
was the case with Kosovo.57 The EU had a clear expedite for international leaders, 
after the election of Kosovo's status, this was an important role regional organizations 
in Europe, in perspective and ensuring the unity of the state and processes in the 
implementation of European standards and participation in Kosovo. Since 2005, Kai 
Eeide,58 presented a report about the role and prospect of the EU in Kosovo in the 
future, and this need it’s add up representatives of the EU, which presented many 
arguments in the same time continue appearances European Community, in 
cooperation with the U.S. in Kosovo59. 
The role of the EU, presented willingness to above see role of Kosovo by the 
UNHCR in 1244, to be full involvement in the implementation of the future status. 
Presence high levels of the Council, CFSP (Secretary General, Secretary of the Council 
and European Commission), where they presented three reports on Kosovo: "The role 
of the future of the EU and its contribution in Kosovo." They first proposed that, "The 
future of the international presence, offices and international importance by the EU", 
                                                 
57 Michail Raith: "Project Stability in Time of Crisis-The European Union's Responsibility 
towards the Western Balkans" SÜDOSTEUROPA, Mitteilungen, 2008, pp. 18. 
58 Kai Eide, special envoy of UN in Kosovo, report submitted to the Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan said that the time has come for the opening of the Kosovo status process. Mr Eide's 
report, was based to Mr Annan suggested the Security Council to authorize negotiations on 
Kosovo's final status. See in: www.albasoul.com/vjeter/modules.php.20.10.2008. 
59 Eide: A Comprehensive Review of the situation in Kosovo, op. cit (above nr.44) pp. 16. 
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the arguments continued military presence, which was under the leadership of 
NATO's leadership within the ESDP (Protection Policy the European Security), and the 
task of the EU, the following will be the protection of minorities, law and order.60 In 
the second report, by Solana and Rehn, the EU after Kosovo Status as one of the most 
important issues was the idea preserving law and order, residual developments in the 
arena and instruments of ESDP.61 Point the third, presented "implementation of the 
status settlement, law and order and fiscal problems in the economy," the powers in 
the future international presence for Kosovo, with some intervention and cooperation 
with the state of Kosovo. This was a way of presenting international, bilateral 
cooperation, the special presence of the EU, would help the operator of the ESDP, in 
the protection of rules and order. Offices of the Commission in Kosovo to take 
proceedings by the European Commission in Kosovo. Aid organizations by the 
European Commission and World Bank, in choosing the status of Kosovo would 
represent a development in Europe. Changes to the foreign policy institutions of the 
EU, played a role in the process and the situation after the eventual status under the 
presence of the EU. The EU is bringing important role in stabilizing the region through 
political means and security (ESDP). So even sees Javier Solana: "The EU is considered 
as an obligation to provide the Western Balkan countries closer to the prospects for 
EU membership and in their"62 The future of Kosovo now shifts towards the EU of.   
Kosovo can say that separates the European  perspective of Western Balkan countries. 
Concentration ever growing presence of the EU is bringing infirmity Kosovo. Kosovo is 
in a good way towards European perspectives, who is making progress in transforming 
the reform initiatives, the European right. 
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European Integration and the United States: Shared Prosperity and Shared Crises 
 
The United States and Europe are inextricably tied together – and increasingly so. 
These ties are not only economic, but also profoundly cultural. The shared history of 
the United States and Europe has also made clear that not only is the prosperity of the 
two sides of the Atlantic mutually dependent, but so is their security.   American 
economic crises have almost always been linked to crises in Europe and, of course, 
European crises are usually inseparable from those in the U.S. These crises have not 
only been connected to the usual economic cycles and transformations, but also to 
security threats. The worst breakdowns in security, large-scale wars that have pulled 
in both sides of the Atlantic, have also provoked economic crises. Major wars are very 
costly, and the two world wars of the twentieth century instigated severe transatlantic 
economic challenges that could only be solved through American financial 
intervention with European coordination. The same could be said of the long Cold 
War. So, each new crisis has made it evident that solutions must be Euro-Atlantic, all 
the more so as the transatlantic economy has become increasingly interdependent 
and dense.  
 
Markets, Open Trade, and Economic Integration 
 
For the most part the solutions preferred by Americans have given prominence to 
market forces and open trade.  When it has been necessary for the state to step in, it 
is considered a temporary expedient until markets and trade are once again stabilized. 
After the return to the open market, vestiges of state intervention have nevertheless 
been maintained and institutionalized in an attempt to bring increased economic 
predictability and improved social justice. Even though there has been an increased 
formalization of transatlantic economic relations, Americans are still tempted to rely 
primarily on the private sector and civil society. For instance, in 1995 The Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue (TABD) was created as an informal process whereby European and 
American companies and business associations will develop joint EU-US trade policy 
recommendations, working together with the European Commission and US 
Administration. The TABD is a coalition of U.S. and European CEOs, largely from 
transnational corporations, whose goal is to boost transatlantic trade and investment 
through the removal of barriers caused by regulatory differences. It has become a 
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transatlantic business association which advises the newly created Transatlantic 
Economic Council (TEC).  
For the last six decades in particular, the keystone of the American approach to shared 
crises with Europe, which is the flip side of shared interests, has been the pursuit of 
European integration.  The United States has consistently supported European 
economic and political integration, even though Americans have at the same time 
held ambivalent attitudes towards the European Union. Americans have for all of their 
history, even in the colonial period and the early history of the republic, been closely 
connected to Europe. Americans have also tended to view European integration from 
the perspective of their own history of economic and political integration -- and 
therefore have basically viewed European integration favorably.   
In the early years following World War II Americans saw European integration 
not only in economic terms, but also as an historic effort to ensure peace, stability and 
democracy. Successive American administrations encouraged European economic 
integration through such policies as the Marshall Plan in order to help create the 
conditions for prosperity that would serve as a bulwark against communism. American 
business leaders also viewed the prospect of a large, open European market based on 
liberal economic principles as a promising and fruitful investment opportunity. 
American policymakers considered that the material well-being of the United States 
was deeply connected to the prosperity of Europe, just as the security of the United 
States was seen as intimately connected to European security. On the other hand, 
Washington has been concerned about the effects of European integration whenever 
it generates independent European policy initiatives that are not always in 
concordance with American views and interests, or when it threatens substantial US 
business projects and markets.  
Americans and Europeans have differed on the nature of the threats facing 
the transatlantic community as well as the means to address them, but the Euro-
Atlantic community has remained solid. So solid that their crises, and their solutions to 
them, cannot be disentangled.  For the most part, Americans have remained 
supportive of the widening and deepening of European integration, even though they 
have had differing relations with particular countries, for example the “special 
relationship” with Great Britain, their peculiar and turbulent history with Germany, 
and their contentious but usually amicable history with France. Despite tensions, the 
transatlantic link is still a strong and influential component of international affairs, 
reinforced by a myriad of institutions -- above all the EU and NATO.   
 
The Long History of the Euro-Atlantic Economy  
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The lessons drawn by Americans of their shared crises with Europe go deep into the 
past.  This is because America’s economic relations with Europe have a very long 
history, and a very close history.  In fact these relations are older than the United 
States as an independent nation.  In the 17th and 18th centuries the commercial and 
financial relations of the American British colonies were closer with European 
economic centers than was trade between the colonies themselves. Boston, 
Massachusetts was economically closer to London than it was to Charleston, South 
Carolina, for example – and very far from French New Orleans (Bruchey, 1965). 
Without the financial aid and loans provided by the French king, the Spanish 
government and loans from Dutch banks, it is not even likely that the United States 
would have achieved its independence at the end of the 18th century (Dull, 1985). The 
War of Independence itself was largely provoked by disputes over the regulation of 
trade with Europe. A very old lesson is that trade disputes and commercial conflict can 
evolve into deadly armed conflict. Of course armed conflict is not simply trade 
relations carried out by more violent means, but can become a deadly element in an 
unstable chemistry of other contentious issues. 
The US Constitution itself is an answer to this dangerous possibility.  Adopted 
in 1787, it created a stronger central federal government than had the previous 
Articles of Confederation. A stronger national government was necessary not only for 
the common defense, but for a stronger economy. In effect, in 1787 a unified common 
market was established, with no internal tariffs or taxes on interstate commerce, 
facilitating peaceful trade and mutual prosperity among formerly independent 
colonies.  As in the European Union today, the extent of federal power was much 
debated, with Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, taking a very 
broad view of central power. He succeeded in building a respected national credit 
based on a national debt held by the wealthy (and of course by many political 
leaders), who would then have an interest in supporting a healthy and powerful 
central government (Chernow 2004; Ellis, 2002). The national debt at the time, owed 
largely to Europeans, was funded by tariffs on imported goods. In fact, until the 
beginning of the 20th century government was mostly funded by income from tariffs 
on trade. Some of the most bitter political fights in the early history of the republic 
centered on the economic role of the federal government, especially regarding the 
desirability of a national central bank (North, 1961). These disputes were finally 
settled by the creation of central institutions. It should be recalled that the United 
States only gave itself a permanent central bank in 1913, the current Federal Reserve 
System, along with a national currency, Federal Reserve notes – the current American 
dollar.  The need to finance an increasingly important central federal government 
required the adoption of a national personal income tax in the same year.   
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Europe: The Mirror of America  
This brief overview is relevant to American views of European integration because 
American observers of Europe tend to view European attempts at integration as 
mirroring the American experience. Americans view the drawing together of Europe 
through the lens of their own experience, and therefore view an economically and 
politically integrated Europe favorably, because they view their own history of 
integration favorably. Americans looked fondly upon the first steps of the fledgling 
European Communities in the 1950s as opening the prospect for the creation of a 
“United States of Europe,” somewhat akin to the United States of America. Jean 
Monnet, the “Father of Europe,” was viewed very sympathetically, especially because 
“Mr. Europe” liked to speak of the establishment of a “sort of second America” and 
even named his action group for European integration the “Action Committee for the 
United States of Europe.” While many influential American policymakers did indeed 
envision transplanting the US federal system to Europe, Europeans remained 
skeptical, even though the vision was appealing (Winand, 1993). But this positive view 
of European integration is not only an idealistic projection onto Europe of the 
American experience; it is also fundamentally connected to American interests, in 
particular economic and business interests. A lesson could be drawn from the present 
crisis. A more integrated Europe, even a federal Europe, would be able to react in a 
more timely fashion. Bank bail-outs require a swift political response. It may also be 
easier for a single head of state to instill confidence than a myriad of diverse and even 
antagonistic political leaders. In reference to the euro zone it is not clear at all where 
this response might come from. By the time European ministers have traveled for a 
meeting in Brussels, let alone reached or implemented a decision, the financial 
markets would have long drastically melted. On the other hand, a larger unified 
market means that banks become bigger and bigger, even too big to let fail -- but so 
big they are difficult if not impossible to save when they are in trouble.  
Transatlantic Integration: The Central Lesson 
The American economy has always been integrated with the European economy.  
American prosperity has always been intimately connected to European prosperity – 
and increasingly so as transatlantic relations become denser and denser with 
globalization. The evolution of American policy toward Europe has been a steady 
formalization and institutionalization of the relationship, with the goal of making it 
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increasingly open, but nevertheless regulated.  This has not prevented competition of 
American business enterprises with European companies – far from it.  But the 
competition has been contained by an increasingly complex regulatory system.  It also 
does not mean that governments have abstained from trying to give their companies 
advantages. They certainly have. But here also the overall trend has been one of 
establishing rules to mediate and control the interventions of states in an increasingly 
interdependent world. With the decline of tariffs, capital controls and transport costs, 
interaction between the US and European economies has intensified through means 
of free trade and open markets.  
The growth of cross-border banking, securities trading and other kinds of 
capital flows has made financial markets on both sides increasingly indistinguishable. 
Policies on one side of the Atlantic have growing repercussions on the other – be 
these central bank decisions over interest rates, legislative decisions about budgets, or 
government regulatory policies. This has brought Euro-Atlantic economies together, 
but has also multiplied competition and conflict. As Barry Eichengreen (1996) puts it, 
US producers and policymakers have complained about EU farm subsidies and food 
product standards (such has hormone treated meat), while Europeans object to US 
restrictions on trade and investment in the financial, telecommunications and 
transport sectors.  When US anti-trust authorities decide whether or not to let Boeing 
and McDonell-Douglas merge, they are little concerned about the impact on Airbus 
Industrie. When the member states of the European Union decide to form a monetary 
union, they do so with little regard for the reserve currency status and exchange rate 
of the dollar. And despite this, Eichengreen remarks, the policy makers on the two 
sides of the Atlantic continue to work toward common goals.  Even while pursuing 
regional initiatives like the enlargement and deepening of the European Union, 
ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement, US and European 
governments have continued to press for the expansion and liberalization of the 
multilateral trading system. He points out that it was US and European support that 
ultimately pushed the Uruguay Round to its successful conclusion. And US and 
European governments supported one another’s efforts to secure improved market 
access in Japan and other developing countries. Europeans and Americans   
collaborate in the G7, the G8, the G-20, the Bank for International Settlements, the 
World Bank and the IMF (to name just a few multilateral organizations) to support 
stabilization and liberalization.   
A revealing way of demonstrating the long history of de facto as well as 
institutionalized transatlantic integration is to notice how crises in the American 
economy have almost always had a European connection (Kindleberger, 1978). The 
United States as an independent nation suffered its first recession in the years 
between 1797 and 1800, and it is interesting to note that it was caused primarily by 
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the deflationary policy of the Bank of England. As the American national market grew, 
it remained closely tied to European markets. By the second half of the nineteenth 
century as America industrialized, its prosperity increasingly depended on its 
commercial and financial ties with Europe. It was largely British capital, for example, 
that financed railroad building in the United States. But this required that the federal 
government provide free land and other assistance to the railroad companies. This is 
only one example in the long history of mutual support and dependence of the 
American government and American and European business enterprises. For example, 
the 1870s recession, known as the Panic of 1873, was caused primarily by economic 
problems in Europe. This trouble brought about the failure of the American bank Jay 
Cooke & Company, which at that time was the largest in the United States. The next 
crisis, the panic of 1893 was brought about by the failure of the United States Reading 
Railroad. The failure prompted European investors to withdraw their investments, and 
left the US financial system in tatters. As just one more example among many that 
could be cited, the recession of 1926, which lasted 13 months, was precipitated by a 
British coal miners’ strike that turned into a general strike that weakened the British 
economy and impacted on the American economy. Of course, the Great Depression 
was world-wide in scope and dramatically demonstrated the interdependence of all 
economies, and not just the transatlantic economy.  
These are a few examples of the intertwining of European and American 
economic crises. What generations of American economic policymakers came to learn 
from these incidents was that all forms of protectionism (whether they are tariffs, 
quotas, currency controls, or other non-tariff barriers) were all prejudicial to American 
prosperity. Furthermore, as the post-World War I Dawes and Young Plans showed, 
and the post-World War II Marshall Plan demonstrated, Americans were prepared to 
move capital in large doses to fragile post-war European economies in order to restart 
shared transatlantic prosperity.  But along with their capital, Americans also exported 
to Europe their regulatory institutions and their approaches to economic recovery 
(Hogan, 1986). American solutions were adopted by Europeans because both sides of 
the Atlantic had in reality become a vast single economy – which helps to explain why 
American foreign policy has always fundamentally supported European integration, 
even though there have always also been commercial disputes and business 
antagonism.  
 
Transatlantic Financial Flows 
 
Although France, Germany and the United States had become capital exporters by the 
end of the 19th century, the foremost supplier of capital was Great Britain. The City of 
London increased it foreign holdings more than five times between 1870 and 1914. By 
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1914, over one quarter of British wealth was invested in foreign government securities 
and foreign railroads. As with Canada and Australia, the economic impacts on the 
United States were far-reaching and profound. The capital imports financed an 
infrastructure of urban centers, port facilities and transportation networks that laid 
the basis for American economic development. As railroads were constructed, the 
interior of the American continent was opened and linked to world commerce, mostly 
European. The First World War brought to a close this era of international finance. The 
intensity and duration of the war obliged the major European belligerents to reduce 
and even liquidate their overseas investments in order to pay for the efforts of their 
armies (Gilpin, 1987). Even though after the Great War the United States did withdraw 
into political isolation with the rejection by the Senate of the League of Nations, 
American economic involvement with the rest of the world, in particular Europe 
continued to expand (Williams, 1954).   
The American financial community began to recognize the increased 
importance of the United States to the European and world economies. As a result of 
this new distribution of power, American financiers took on a major role in funding of 
German reparations payments to France and other countries.  This was the goal of the 
Dawes and Young Plans. The liquidity made available was a crucial factor in the 
stimulation of European economic activity in the 1920s. Priming the German economy 
so that it could produce the wealth necessary to paying reparations to the victors 
provided the allied powers the means to reimburse the heavy loans they had taken 
from American banks to underwrite their war efforts. A significant part of German 
diplomatic efforts in this period was devoted to reducing and rescheduling reparations 
payments (Jacobson, 1972).  This recycling of dollars was beneficial to the American 
banks in particular, but also to the transatlantic economy as a whole. But the Dawes 
Plan also made the German economy dependent on foreign markets and other 
economies, and therefore vulnerable to economic dysfunctions in the U.S.   This 
system collapsed with the onset of the Great Depression. One enduring consequence 
of the Young Plan was the provision for creating the current Bank for International 
Settlements. The BIS is another example of keeping an institution in place after it has 
served an immediate need in a preceding crisis.  
The next era of international finance was introduced at the end of World War 
II, and here the transatlantic relationship was further integrated and strengthened.  
But whereas capital flows had previously consisted almost entirely of private funds, 
after the Second World War official foreign aid, grants, also became a central element 
of financial flows to Europe. Of course private capital still played a significant role. The 
multinational corporation was regarded not only as an instrument of global economic 
development, but also as a mechanism to spread the institutions and ideology of the 
American free enterprise system. Beginning with the Marshall Plan, many saw the 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
28 
 
multinational corporation as a way to strengthen foreign economies and thereby 
contain communism by demonstrating the superiority of American technology, 
capital, and managerial know-how.  The aim was to outperform and therefore 
delegitimize central planning and state ownership. But despite the preference given to 
private enterprise, American government aid grew in importance. The United States’ 
aid sent to Western Europe through the Marshall Plan is estimated to have amounted 
to 4.5 percent of American GDP between 1949 and 1952 (Gilpin, 1987, p. 311). It 
should also not be forgotten that the first mission of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, was the economic reinvigoration 
of Europe.  
 
The Marshall Plan 
 
 The Marshall Plan is viewed at the most successful episode in the history of the Cold 
War containment of the Soviet Union and communism in Europe. The aid to Europe 
used the economic and financial strength of the United States to turn back an 
ideological and political threat, so it was meant as more than an effort to support the 
economic reconstruction of Europe. Today the Marshall plan would be characterized 
as a shining example of the potency of soft power. American officials hoped to 
refashion Western Europe into another version of the integrated single-market and 
mixed capitalist economy that already existed in the United States. So, the Marshall 
Plan was an extension of American domestic attributes and foreign-policy goals 
stretching back into American history. In the immediate memory of the plan’s policy 
makers were the institutions of the New Deal and the policies of the period between 
the two world wars. As Michael J. Hogan (1987) shows, the object was to make 
Western Europe into the sort of liberal economy that had taken shape in the United 
States. In addition to making trade multilateral, making currencies convertible, and 
allowing free-market forces to integrate economies, American policymakers urged 
their transatlantic counterparts to organize European trade commissions, monetary 
boards, and other instruments of capitalist economic planning and regulation that 
were familiar to them in the United States.  American aid was used to introduce 
European leaders to Keynesian strategies of fiscal and monetary management. It also 
aimed to Americanize European production, marketing and engineering methods. It 
was hoped that such mechanisms and networks would make it possible for Europeans 
to sustain their recovery and lead to high living standards. It was believed that a large, 
internal market, similar to the one that existed in the United States, would generate 
economies of scale and higher rates of productivity, merging into an open multilateral 
system that would also be beneficial to American business.  Hogan (1987) argues that 
through these and related initiatives, American leaders tried to forge a Western 
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European community in which political considerations would give way to technocratic 
solutions, downplaying redistributive political struggles in favor of a quest for shared 
abundance – all with an emphasis on public-private power sharing.  
However, Americans were never able to impose their preferred approach. 
Collaboration between policymakers in Washington and the European capitals 
required compromises on all sides. In particular, the British tried to build a North 
Atlantic, rather than a European, economic and security system. This threw the 
burden of European integration onto the French, who could be rather contentious 
allies of the Americans. Even so, there was a shared goal of building a liberal system 
large enough and coherent enough to include Germany.  This would make it possible 
to reconcile German economic recovery and future power with France’s security. So, 
the Marshall Plan established the basis for the kind of community that would serve as 
a rampart against Soviets, while at the same time setting up the conditions for 
economic growth and social peace in Western Europe that would undermine their 
communist parties. In short, the post-World War II approach was to project American 
institutions and its grand bargain between capital, labor and the state onto Europe.  
As the historian of US national security policy John Lewis Gaddis (1987; 2005) shows, 
the American strategists wanted by these means to rebuild European political self-
confidence as a shield against communist expansion. 
  
Special Relationships  
 
Americans learned that pursuing and supporting European integration could not be 
done by neglecting special bi-lateral relations that had been developed over centuries. 
This is particularly the case with America’s unique relations with the British -- what is 
frequently labeled the “special relationship.”  The Anglo-American relation is largely 
based on a long shared history and a cultural connection grounded in culture, 
sentiments and language, even though the Americans in their early history struggled 
politically and even military against the British Empire – and remained suspicious and 
resentful of their British cousins into the twentieth century.  Actually, the concept of 
“special relationship” is rather recent, growing out of the period of collaboration 
between the British and Americans during the Second World War.  During the Cold 
War the special relationship grew to such an extent that it “seemed almost a fact of 
nature” (Dumbrell, 2006).   
From the point of view of the British, the US-UK relationship has been seen as 
one of “three circles of influence” for Britain – the other two being the relationship 
with the Commonwealth and with Europe. Naturally, the concept of circles of 
influence comes from the thinking of policy elites. The elites on the American side of 
the Atlantic have cherished, at least until recently, a self-consciously “Anglo” 
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orientation. Indeed, up to the late twentieth century the US foreign policy 
establishment came mostly from sectors of the country with a deep British cultural 
influence. In the middle of the century less than half the US population was of British 
stock. By the year 2000, only about one in ten of the population claimed any British 
ancestry. Nevertheless, polls show that Americans and British, regardless of origin, 
have very favorable opinions of each other (Dumbrell, 2006, p. 27).  However, for 
many Americans today, “Englishness” has tended to evoke images of a kind of 
haughtiness in rags – a refusal to admit that the days of British imperial power are 
over. So today it is closer to the truth to say the idea of a special relationship is 
probably considered more import to the British than to the Yankees. 
Of course the relations Americans have had with other European nations have 
also been unique in their own ways, but never to the point of considering the 
relationship as “special.” For example, Germans and their culture have played an 
important role in America since its earliest beginnings (Ekovich 1992; 2001). Germans 
are not strangers to Americans, but have lived beside them, mixed with them and 
have nourished American culture in many ways.  Much of American trade in the 
nineteenth century, especially in cereals, was with the regions of the European 
continent that would become Germany. In the United States, Germany has not evoked 
the same sentiments of insecurity that it has for European nations.  And even though 
Germany has been perceived as a big, powerful nation, Americans have been able to 
reassure themselves that the United States is even bigger and more powerful.  These 
underlying sentiments, situated deeply in the American psyche, have made it very 
easy for Americans, whether the general population, intellectuals or policy-makers, to 
accept without inordinate anxiety, and even a good measure of joy, a strong, 
prosperous and unified Germany -- particularly a Germany transformed by an open-
market economy and democratic political institutions.  This goes a long way toward 
explaining why Americans of all types received the news of the fall of the Berlin Wall 
with warm feelings of good will for Germans.  In fact, Americans may have felt more at 
ease and joyful with the crumbling of the wall than the Germans themselves.   Since 
the end of World War II, American policy consistently advocated German unity and 
the integration into Europe of a prosperous and powerful united Germany – but of 
course on the condition that it also be capitalist and democratic. 
 
Transatlantic Security and Military Integration  
 
It should not be overlooked that Europe was integrated militarily as well as 
economically. After two world wars drew the United States into the defense of liberal 
democracy in Europe, American leaders were more convinced than ever that the 
security of Europe was intimately connected to their own security and well-being. This 
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was a lesson learned after a lot of bloodshed. The foundation of shared military 
security was built with the transatlantic alliance, NATO. American leaders saw 
European economic and defense integration as part of a larger dense web of 
transatlantic institutions remaking post-World War II Europe. After the failure of the 
European Defense Community (EDC) in the 1950s, Americans decided to shoulder 
most of the burden of defense themselves, while encouraging economic integration 
and its consequent prosperity as an alternate route to security. Stanley Sloan has 
noted the enduring nature of the fundamental transatlantic arrangement:  the United 
States guaranteeing continued involvement in European security in return for a 
European commitment to integrate itself for both external defense and internal 
stability. So, advancing and deepening the two-centuries-old economic relationship 
would bolster security also by leading to thickened political and social links rendering 
war between Germany and its neighbors unthinkable once and for all.    
Americans supported European integration because US officials believed that 
this process would bind together former enemies and prevent another European “civil 
war.” Of course there are those who see the American attitude towards Europe in the 
post-World War II period as a combination of both benevolence and hegemony 
(Brimmer, 2007). However, regardless of attempts at political domination the United 
States today frequently calls upon its European allies to share, in differing degrees 
according to capabilities, its interests in international affairs. But this has not always 
been successful. For example, the deepest and sharpest difference with American 
policy was the intervention in Iraq in 2003. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 
remark about “old Europe” and “new Europe” brought to light a schism in the 
sensitivities of European nations. Rumsfeld gave voice to an assumption that the 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe would be more likely to support US policy 
because the Americans had been strong defenders, stronger than some parts of “old” 
Western Europe, of their right to be free of Soviet dominance during the Cold War. 
However, the overall relationship to all of Europe has proven deeper than this 
temporary division and has evolved from one of “primacy” in the immediate post-
World War II period to one of  “partnership” more recently – of course with the 
American partner remaining the most powerful (Toje, 2008).    
Americans have a tendency to measure their European allies by their ability to 
join the United States in its actions on the global stage. This sometimes leads to 
skepticism about Europeans’ ability to cooperate, and has also lead to occasional fears 
that Europe is trying to go its on way and exclude the United States.  This was certainly 
the case with the recent debate regarding the European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). There was a worry that 
Europeans were “re-nationalizing” their security, a historic nightmare.  Americans 
wondered why the EU could not deal with security issues in conjunction with NATO 
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without creating a competing European security apparatus.  This concern has pretty 
much been dissipated, but there is still a recognition that NATO and the EU need to 
develop closer and better relations. Despite efforts by many in NATO and the EU, the 
relationship between the two institutions requires improvement. As NATO Secretary 
General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer believes (2007), the two most important Euro-Atlantic 
institutions could do a better job of working together. He said in January 2007 that 
“…when one looks at how diverse and complex the challenges to our security have 
become today, it is astounding how narrow the bandwidth of cooperation between 
NATO and the Union has remained. Despite many attempts to bring the two 
institutions closer together, there is still a remarkable distance between them.”  This is 
all the more important in the eyes of the general as today’s threats make it clear that 
the military and non-military dimensions of security must go hand in hand. Of course, 
improving EU-NATO cooperation reinforces the EU in American eyes, especially to the 
extent that it does not disconnect Europe from the United States.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The deep and historically long relations of the United States with Europe have become 
increasingly dense and institutionalized over the past 250 years. It would not be an 
outrageous exaggeration to claim that the United States is fundamentally a European 
country, a very powerful European country, the inheritor of European values and 
shared interests, even though fewer and fewer Americans have distant cousins on the 
other side of the Atlantic.  This long shared history goes a long way to helping to 
understand the support Americans have given to European integration as the central 
solution to a long history of shared crises.  They have frequently viewed their own 
history in the light of European history, and have viewed European efforts at 
integration from the perspective of their own economic and political integration. 
American policymakers, especially since the end of World War II, have considered 
European integration as beneficial to Europe and have encouraged it as long as it is 
tied to the American liberal economy. American prosperity has been built along with 
European prosperity, just as American security has been linked to European security. 
This is not to say that the Americans and the Europeans are always in accord, but 
policy differences, even passionate and heated differences have not undermined the 
solidarity of the Euro-Atlantic democratic world. In general, European economic and 
political integration has been good for the United States, as it has also been good for 
Europe. This is the fundamental lesson.  
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        The Enlargement Policy of EU and Relations with Turkey 
 
Introduction: 
The Asia, Middle East and the West have all played unique role in shaping the 
direction of Turkey`s foreign policy.  The Asianness bears the characteristics of 
feudalism and nobadic life style and this influences many aspects of life ranging from 
culinary culture, uncomprosing and hostile attitutes of people towards each other.  
The Middle Eastern aspect is dominated mainly by Islamic elements.  Efforts to put 
pressures on Muslims living in other parts of the world cause reactions among the 
Turkish puplic opinion.  The Western influence has the most decisive influence in 
Turkey. Turkey is the only Muslim state in the world implementing a policy of 
secularization. The Turkish elites started the Westernization process nearly 100 years 
earlier (1839) than the elites of the colonized countries. There are differences 
between the elites and the people in this regard.  The foreign policy is shaped by 
Westernized elites. Turkish Republic was established following the disintegration of 
the Ottoman Empire and many characteristics of the Republic was inherited from the 
Empire. In a similar fashion to the Ottoman Empire which was able to utilize the 
Balance of Powers  to its benefit, Turkey was able to benefit from status quo oriented 
and a balanced foreign policy approach1.   
The Republic of Turkey founded after the WWI accepted the Western model 
for secularization . This status quo oriented approach of Turkey rejecting irredentist 
policiees can be summarized by the words of Ataturk `peace at home,  peace in the 
world` While Turkey pursued a pro-Western policy it strived towards a balance 
between West and its opponents 2. 
 
I- Turkey- EU Relations In  Cold War Era   
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War (the WWII), Europeans focused on 
establishing mechanisms for cooperation in an attempt to prevent  the devastating 
                                                 
1 For the characteristics and principles of the Turkish foreign policy see: Baskın Oran (ed), 
(2006), Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1: 
1919-1980, İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2006. 
2 Mehmet Günlübol-Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, (Mart 1985), “Atatürk Dönemi Türk Dış Politikasına 
Genel Bir Bakış”, AAMD, I(2 ), 462. 
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consequences of another war.  Less than ten years after the WWII, the Coal and Steel 
Community brought together six countries: Germany,  France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Belgium,  and Luxemburg  established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
by signing the Paris Agreement in 19513. In 1957, the same countries signed the Rome 
Treaty which established the European Economic Community and Eureopan Atomic 
Agency. 
The ecomic integration has become an important component of EU integration 
process. Turkey  whose efforts at modernization was modelled on the West  opted to 
become member of Westen organisations during the Republican era.  Turkey 
maintained its policy of Westernisation after the WWII. Subsequently, during the Cold 
war period Turkey established a close alliance with the West and became founding 
member of the UN, member of NATO, Council of Europe, OECD and WEU. The main 
elements of Turkey`s foreign policy in terms of freedom, democracy and human rights 
overlaps with that of its European partners4.  
Achievement of economic development was an important reason behind Turkish 
modernization movement. Moreover Turkey saw establishing economic relations with 
Turkey as a natural extension of its political relations with the Western Europe.  In 
addition to expectations based on the belief that EEC membership would boost 
economic development process another main reason why Turkey applied for associate 
membership on 31 July 1959 was due to its desire not to be left behind Greek After 
consultations with Turkey, Ankara Association Agreement was signed between Turkey 
and the member states on 12  September 19635. 
Ankara Agreement was aimed at narrowing the gap between between the 
economy of Turkey and that of EEC member states in an attempt to prepare Turkey 
was eventual membership.  The Article 28 of the agreement stipulated that in case 
Turkey fulfilled all the conditions the issue of membership would be reviewed by the 
                                                 
3Lejeune, Ine and W. Van Denberghe C. Canedy (2004), "The Enlargement of the European 
Union: A Guide For The Entrepreneur" John Wiley & Sons Ltd., England, 1. 
4Ömer Kürkçüoğlu,(1978), “ Türk Demokrasisinin Kuruluş ve İşleyişinde Dış Etkenler (1946’dan 
bu yana)” A.Ü.S.B.F. Dergisi, 33(1-4), 213-247; Enver Bozkurt, M. Ozcan ve A. Köktaş, (2004), 
Avrupa Birliği Hukuku, Asil Yay. Ankara, 344 .   
5 Rıdvan Karluk (1996), Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye, İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsası, İstanbul, 
392; Enver Bozkurt, M. Ozcan ve A. Köktaş, 2004: 344; Ceren Uysal, 2001: 140-153. 
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member states6. Ankara Agreement envisaged three phases for Turkey-EEC 
Association7: 
1) Preperatory Period: During this period the Community fulfilled its unilateral 
responsibilities towards Turkey and tried to prepare Turkey for Customs Union 
lasted  until 1972.  Easing of the import conditions from Turkey on certain 
agricultural products and the first Protocol led to an incease in share of Turkey`s 
trade with the Community during 1964-1972.  
2) Transition Period: This period which started in 1973 aimed at establishing a 
Customs Union for industrial products.  Apart from some exceptions, the EU 
banned all customs taxes and restrictions on Turkish industrial products and it 
was envisaged that Turkey would gradually lift customs duties on Community 
origninating industrial products within a period of 12 years. This period was set 
to be 22 for sensitive products that were subject to protection. 
3) Final Period: This period was defined by Article 5 of the Agreement as  the period of  
customs union between Turkey and the Community and envisaged coordination 
of economic policies between the parties.  
  The power to manage the partnership regime was given to the Association 
Council by the Ankara Agreement.   
II. EU Enlargement In Post Cold War Era and Relations With Turkey 
Enlargement is one of the EU’s most important tools due to the EU’s strategic 
interests in stability, security, and conflict prevention. It is also very essential for 
improving links with vital transport and energy routes and increasing the EU’s weigght 
in the World8. The applications of Central and Eastern European states for 
membership following their transition to market economy in early 1990s  led to 
debates regarding widening and deeping of the EU. During this period several 
decisions were taken at EU Summits with regard to Turkey.   
                                                 
6 Tuğrul, Arat,(1995), “Avrupa Birliği İle Türkiye Arasındaki İlişkiler ve Gümrük Birliğinin Yeri”, 
Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, XLIV,( 1-4), 589  , 
http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/38/298/2742.pdf.  
7 Enver Bozkurt, M. Ozcan ve A. Köktaş, (2004), Avrupa Birliği Hukuku, Asil Yay. Ankara, 348-
351; Ceren Uysal, 2001: 140-153. 
8 “Communication From The Commission To The Council And The European Parlıament, 
Enlargement Strategy And Main Challenges 2008-2009”, 
Http://Ec.Europa.Eu/Enlargement/Pdf/Press_Corner/Key 
Documents/Reports_Nov_2008/Strategy_Paper_İncl_Country_Conclu_En.Pdf.   
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-Maastricht Summit(9-10 Decemebr 1991): Three preconditions were 
emphasized for membership: applicant country must be European, have a democratic 
regime and respect human rights. 
-Lisbon summit(25-27 June 1992): The applications of Cyprus, Malta and 
Turkey were assesed and Turkey’s right for full memership based on Ankara Agrement 
was emphasized.  
-Copenhagen Summit (21-22 June 1993):  This Summit mentioned that 
central and eastern European states could become members as soon as they 
complete the political and economic requirements. The Copenhagen criteria was 
announces and a decision was taken that cooperation with Turkey would be based on 
Customs Union.  
-Cannes Summit(26-27 June 1995):For the first time non EU states were 
invited. With regard to Turkey only the issue of the completion of Customs Union was 
mentioned.   
- Dublin Summit(13-14 December 1996): Central and Eastern European 
states, Cyprus and Malta were invited to this meeting. The Aegian question was 
mentioned for the first time. The Summit also pointed out for the need to improve 
human rights standards.  
-Luxemburg Summit(12-13 December 1997): Three main issues were taken by 
the Summit were : EU’s policies in the new century and the reforms that should be 
undertaken by the EU, enlargement and the financial framework to be used for 2000-
2006 period. Compliance with Copenhagen Criteria became a basic condition of EU 
membership in the forthcoming period. 
A decision was taken during the Summit to launch membership negotiatons with 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland. Slovenia and Greek Cypriot Administration on April 
1998. It was also decided to establish closer relations with the second group of states 
Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia within the association agreements.  
Paragraph 31-36 of the Summit declaration covered Turkey. The Summit has 
significance for Turkey-EU relations as it refers to  Article 28 of Ankara Agreement.  For the 
first time a Summit had declared that Turkey’s membership application would be reviewed 
following the fulfıllment of its obligations under Ankara Agerement. Turkey was also invited 
to the European Council meeting. Together with other applicants.  It was seen that Turkey-
EU relations would proceed on the basis of Ankara Agreement rather than on the 
basis of Turkey’s application in 1987. However Turkey interpreted this as 
discrimination and refused to attend the European conferances. The EU had asked for 
improvement of human rights situation, respect for minorities, settlement of disputes 
with Greece through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the settlement of 
Cyprus issue on the basis of UN decisions.  
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At the Summit, negotiation timetable of all applicant countries was announced except 
that of Turkey.  Central and Eastern European states together with Cyprus and Malta 
was envisaged to be full members. It is not difficult to discern that only Turkey’s 
application was made subject to Copenhagen criteria.  
 In the aftermath of the December 1997 Council Summit decisions, Commisson started 
to submit reports to the Council and the Parliament on a regular basis. The reports on 
Turkey are mostly follow up reports based on previous reports on Turkey.  In its 
report, Commission 
-Briefly explain the relations between the EU and Turkey.  
- Analyses Turkey’s position in terms of political criteria for memebrship. 
-Analyses Turkey’s position in terms of economic criteria for memebrship. 
- Reviews Turkey’s ability to undertake its obligations for membership9. 
At the Cardiff Summit held on 15-16 June 1998 pararaph 68 of the Presidency’s 
declaration covers Turkey. It calls for a European strategy for Turkey and calls upon 
Turkey to continue with the approximation of its laws with the EU acquis10.  
Turkey submitted a document entitled “  Strategy for the Development of 
Relations between Turkey and the EU”  to the Commission on 22 July 1998.  
Commison included Turkey in its  first regular report  prepared for the 12 canditate 
states( 4 November 1998) . The second regular report announced on October 1999 
assesed the latest develeopments in Turkey in terms of Copenhagen criteria.  The 
report mentioned  deficiencies in the field of human rights and the protection of 
minorities, the continuing practice of torture, repression of right of expression. While 
the report mentioned that Turkey was in a more favourable position in economic 
terms, it pointed out that with the condition that once Turkey acquires all elements  
of a market economy, provided macroeconomic stability and implements a legal and 
structural reforms, it will be able to cope with competitive pressures and market forces 
within the EU.  
At the European Council's Helsinki meeting (10-11 December 1999), Turkey was 
accepted as a candidate for EU membership11. Turkey was accepted as a candidate in 
After the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey realized important political reforms in the 
field of human rights and fundamental freedoms and also made legal and 
                                                 
9http://projeler.meb.gov.tr/pkm1/dokumanlar/duzenli_ilerleme_raporlari/2007ilerlemeraporu
_tr_.pdf.  
10 Enver Bozkurt, M. Ozcan ve A. Köktaş, 2004: 371.  
11http://www.belgenet.com/arsiv/ab/helsinki_sonuc.html.  
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administrative reforms. Particularly the Turkish Penal Code close to EU standards with 
all relevant changes in legislation limits freedom of thought and expression12. 
 
III. Develeopments In The Aftermath Of The Copenhagen Summi t(Dec 2002)  
In Copenhagen Summit(December 2002), is decided to start accession negotiations 
without delay if Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen criteria. Also it was indicated that 
current participation strategy that related to supporting Turkey on the path to EU 
membership. The commission were invited to intencify the process of review of 
legislations. And also declared that the EU- Turkey Customs Union will be extend and 
deep. Financial aid to Turkey will significantly be increased in the pre accesion process. 
In December 2002, in accordance with the results of Copenhagen Summit, EU 
Commission prepared the report and recommendation and released “Effect 
Assesment Study” that includes possible effects of Turkey’s EU membership  in the 
future.  
Comission’s report, Turkey’s adaptation process for EU was considered 
compherensively and it was recommended that starting the negotiations with Turkey 
by pointing out the criterias have been adequately performed. In addition to this, the 
Commisson can submit to suspend the negotiations in case of permanently and 
seriously violation of democracy, human rights, respect of fundemental rights and 
freedom. Otherwise  in duration of negotiation, The Council will oversee whether  the 
conformity and implamentation of the statute will be pleasurable and will identify the 
criterias concerning temporarily closing and in case of necessity opening of the each 
debated tittle. The Negotiation is an uncertain process and it is impossible that 
estimating the result previously. 
In the Effect Assesment Study, it is expressed that the  EU  membership of 
Turkey will contribute to issues as law, internal affairs, economy, budget, internal 
market, agriculture and fishing industry on the whole the Union. Consequently,at  
December 17th 2004 Brussels  Summit of the EU Presidents and Prime Ministers 
which has importance on the relationship Turkey and EU, it is determined that the 
membership negotiations with Turkey will be started on October 13rd 2005. After the 
summit, EU Comission is employed to prepare two main document named  
“Framework of the Negotiations Document” and  “Declaration on Political and 
Cultural Dialogue ( Civil Society Dialogue)”. 
                                                 
12Avrupa Birliği Uyum Yasa Paketleri, T.C: Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği, Ankara 2007; 
Türkiye’de Siyasi ReformUyum Paketleri ve Güncel Gelişmeler, T.C: Avrupa Birliği Genel 
Sekreterliği, Ankara 2007. 
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On  June 29th 2005 the Commission published  the declaration “Civil Society Dialogue 
Between Applicant Countries and EU” to remove mutual preconceived opinion and 
the lack of information between Turkey and EU Countries. The aims of the Civil society 
dialogue are developing of collboration opportunities   in Turkey and in EU Countries 
by means of further nongovermental organisations, universities and mass media 
institutions and bringing Turkey about benefitting from the union’s programmes 
incrementally. 
It is decided to starting of the accession negotiations with Turkey being 
approved  the Framework of the Negotiations Document by the EU Foreing Ministers 
on  3 October  2006. In the Intergovermental Conference dated  12 June 2006, de 
facto negotiations was started and finished titled “Science and Research” which is the 
first negotiation session. 
In the decision dated 29 November 2006 EU Commission recommended that not to 
open the negotiations to Intergovermental Conference on the articles including policy 
issue related to restrictions of Turkey devoted to Cyprus Republic ( 8 issues; “Free 
Movement of Goods”, “Business establishment Right and Employment Offer liberty”, 
“Financial Duties”, “Agriculture and Rural Country Development”, “Fishing Industry”, 
“Transmission Policy”, “Customs Union” and “External Relations”) and not to close any 
session temporarily till verification of Commission that Turkey completed the 
obligations, expressing that Turkey not to put into practice the Additional Protocol to 
Ankara Treaty. The suggestion of Commission is approved at Summit of the EU 
Presidents and Prime Ministers dated 14-15 December 2006. At the same time, with  
assumption presidency of Germany,  after January 2007 accession negotiations 
accelerated again and negotiations opened on the issue “Industrial and Enterprise 
Policy” at the Intergovermental Conference dated 29 March 2007. Also in the 
presidency  term of Portugal , negotiations was started on the subjects Trans-Europe 
Networks and Conservation of the Consumer and Welfare in the Intergovermental 
Conference which was organized on December 19th 2007. In decisions which is taken 
by Foreign Ministers of EU Countries and is approved by Presidents and Prime 
Ministers on December 10th during negotiations, it is emphasized that loyalty of EU to 
expansion process which include also Turkey by means of cast back to 2006 and 2007 
Expansion Strategy Documents. In 2008 Progress Report it is stated that Turkey 
performed the negotiations on 8 issues. Taxation issue was opened to negotiate at the 
intergovermental conference  in Brussels  on June 30th 2009. Consequently, in 
negotiation process which continued beginning from October 2005, 11 tittles of 35 
was opened to negotiate. The negotiations on Science and Research issues was closed 
temporarily during the sessions on Enterprise and Industry Policy, Statistic, Financial 
Control, Trans-Europe Networks, Conservation of the Consumer and Welfare, 
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Intellectual ownership Law, Enterprise Law, Knowledge society and Mass Media,Free 
Movement of Monetary Fund and Taxation.  
IV. Turkey’s New Foreign Policy and Its EU Dimension 
Turkey has a very strategic importance to the EU in the areas of energy security, 
conflict prevention and regional security in the Sothern Caucasus and the Middle East. 
The Country’s engagement with the EU and the pace of accession negotiations, makes 
Turkeya stronger force for the stability in the region13.   
The Justice and Development (JD) Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi ) which 
gained the respect of its neighbours due to the launch of accession negotions with the 
Eu has built up upon the regional policy inherited from the past and considered this 
policy among one of the most important successes of the government. 
   The policy of having no or zero  problems with the neighbours pursued by the 
President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan is associated with the Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davudoglu and aims to reverse the former policy thinking of finding scapegoat 
for internal problems through maximim cooperation.   In addition to mediating 
between Syria and Israel Turkey made important contribution to regional peace by  
supporting a trilteral process with Pakistan and Afghanistan, helped to resolve the 
Presidential election crisis of lebanon in 2008, promoting  the Caucauses Stability and 
Cooperation Platform and contributing to EU mission in Balkans and NATO`s mission 
in Afganistan at the military and command level,  Turkey has also become an observer 
in Gulf Cooperation Council and African Union and became the President of 57- 
member  OIC  in its first democratic elections. Turkeys goal oriented efforts reached 
its peak when 151 countries voted for Turkeys election as the permanent member of 
the UN Security Council for 2009-201014. 
                                                 
13 Communication From The Commission To The Council And The European Parlıament, 
Enlargement Strategy And Main Challenges 2008-2009”, 
Http://Ec.Europa.Eu/Enlargement/Pdf/Press_Corner/Key 
Documents/Reports_Nov_2008/Strategy_Paper_İncl_Country_Conclu_En.Pdf.; Müftüler-Baç, 
Meltem (2006) Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği ilişkilerine güvenlik boyutundan bir bakış. Monograph. 
TESEV Yayınları, İstanbul. 
14 “Turkey in Europe: Breaking The Vicious Circle, Second report of the Independent 
Commission on Turkey”, September 2009, The second Report of Independent Commission on 
Turkey,  http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/2009_english.pdf. (The 
Independent Commission on Turkey formed by important experts such as; Martti Ahtisaari 
(Former President of Finland, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2008), KurtBiedenkopf, Emma 
Bonino,Hans van den Broek, Bronisław Geremek, Anthony Giddens, Marcelino Oreja  Aguirre, 
Michel Rocard, Albert Rohan (Rapporteur).  
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Once Turkey speeded up its efforts to comply with Copenhagen criteria since 2002. 
Turkey-EU relations which experienced fluctuations for many years  moved to a more 
solid ground with the introduction of time-table for negotiotions. 
Turkey’s relations with EU was effected negatively after  2004. One of this 
reason is that the Greek Cypriot Authority was accepted for EU membership as the 
“legal representative” of the whole island in 2004. The Union requested from Turkey  
to comply with the previous legal documents regarding the Customs Union, namely 
the Additional Protocol, and to open its ports to the 10 new EU member countries 
including the Greek side of the island. Eventually in 2006, the EU decided to block 
eight negotiating areas from further discussion and Turkey-EU relations entered a 
“vicious circle”15. The other factor which is effective in Turkey-EU relations is European 
public opinion. So, in December 2004 the European Council declared that Turkey 
should be treated to the same as any other candidate countries, but Germany’s 
Merkel  in Germany  and Sarkozy in France insisted on a “privileged partnership” for 
Turkey during the election campaigns16. 
Since 1 July 2009 Sweden assumed the rotating Presidency of the EU. It is a 
well known fact theat Sweden as a leading member of the pro-Enlargement camp has 
been lending open support to Turkey17. Turkey has opened 11 chapters out of 35 
policy areas after four years of accession talks. But the process of opening and 
provisionally closing its negotiating chapters has been halted because of Cyprus 
question.  
Conclusion 
Significant changes  took place in the world  political and economic conjucture  since 
1963, the date of signing of the  Ankara Agreement  which constitued the main 
reference point in Turkey-EU relations.  Changes such as the membership of 10 
Central and Eastern Euroepan states following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
the transition of the former Eastern block countries to market economy has had a 
profound impact on Turkey-EU relations. And in May 2009, The EU marked the fifth 
anniversary of the 2004 enlargement. 
Turkey has marked a sad more than a half century from the first official 
announcement of its application to join the EU, which was then called the European 
Economic Community.  Although the agreement which mentioned  the membership 
                                                 
15 http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/2009_english.pdf.  
16Mustafa Kutlay, “The Cyprus Question and the Future of Turkey-EU Relations”, 
http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3187/the-cyprus-question-and-the-future-of-turkey-
eu-relations.html.  
17Star, 4 September 2009; Mustafa Kutlay,(30 Haziran 2009),  “İsveç’in AB Dönem Başkanlığı ve 
Türkiye İçin Önemi”, http://www.usakgundem.com. 
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prospects for Turkey,  it took almost 40 years for Turkey to acquire a formal candidate 
status. The EU recognized Turkey formally as a candidate at the 1999 Helsinki Council 
summit but six more years to inaugurate the actual talks on the conditions to join the 
EU in 200518. 
Notwithstanding this, the real decisive factor in Turkey-EU relations is 
whether Turkey will undertake concrete steps  as a sign of its commitment to the Eu 
process and the EU will be able to proceed on the principle of pacta sunt servanta and 
work on a fair and objective basis. And the upcoming Presidency of Spain in January 
2010  and its positive atitude vis a vis Turkey, the forthcoming era points out to a 
period characterised by mutual gains. 
 
                                                 
18Lucıa Kubosova, “Turkey Marks 50 Years As Eu Suitor”, Http://Euobserver.Com/15/28515.  
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Abstract 
 
The paper analyses the EU policy on migration management and its impact for 
countries of origin of migrants, with a specific focus to the case of Albania. It examines 
the efforts of Albania to align its migration policies and legislation with the obligations 
stemming from the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) and the European 
Partnership document for Albania.  In particular, the paper analyses the Readmission 
Agreement EC-Albania, as an instrument concluded pursuant to the SAA 
requirements, its impact for Albania and its level of implementation 3 years after 
entry into force for readmission of own nationals and one year after entry into force 
of the third country nationals clause.  
 
Keywords: Migration management, illegal migration, readmission agreement.  
 
Introduction 
 
Migration management has been one of the main objectives of the EU policies since 
the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere European Council. While initially the central 
concern was the fight against illegal immigration through strengthening of the 
external borders and a harmonized visa policy, EU gradually embarked on an overall 
immigration policy which combined previous acts with measures for tackling the root 
causes of migration. This approach was endorsed by the European Council in the 
Seville meeting when it affirmed that “an integrated, comprehensive and balanced 
approach to tackle the root causes of illegal immigration must remain the EU constant 
long term objective’.1 It further emphasized that “any future cooperation, association 
or equivalent agreement that EU or the EC concludes with any country should include 
a clause on joint management of migration flows and on a compulsory readmission in 
the event of illegal immigration’.2 Cooperation with the third countries becomes a 
                                                 
1 See Conclusions of the European Council, Seville, 21 and 22 June 2002. See also 
Communication from the Commission integrating migration issues in the European Union’s 
relations with third countries COM (2002) 703, final.  
2 Ibid. 
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condition sine qua non for the success these objectives. Thus, in its Communication to 
Council and European Parliament in 2002, the Commission highlighted the importance 
for integrating migration issues in the external policy of the Community in order to 
foster its objectives for addressing root causes of migration and conclusion of 
readmission agreements.  
The above approach was followed during the negotiations for the Stabilization 
and Association Agreements with Western Balkans, and in particular with Albania. As 
the top country in Europe for the migration rate, with up to 27.5% or 860.485 
emigrants abroad3, Albania has been targeted by EC as a priority country to fight 
illegal migration and address root causes of migration through a holistic intervention. 
Within this framework, Albania became the first country in WB which drafted a 
Strategy on Migration that provides a clear link between emigration and 
development. The elaboration of this strategy ‘required’ by EC was supported 
financially under the EC CARDS Programme. It follows the EU policies on migration 
management and provides measures that range from fight against illegal migration to 
enhancing legal channels of emigration, diaspora and development, brain gain and 
business promotion. While the Strategy aimed at addressing root causes of migration, 
thus to keep potential migrants home, EC conditioned SAA with the conclusion of 
another instrument- the multilateral Readmission Agreement. Albania became also 
the first country in Europe to sign a RA with EC.   
             The objective of the proposed paper is to analyze the actual impact of the EU 
migration policies for the countries of origin, focusing on the ‘case of Albania”. The 
paper will pay specific attention to Albania, as the first country in the region targeted 
by EC for conclusion of a RA. It will analyze the impact of the RA regarding changes of 
the national legislative framework, the modalities and the number of returned 
migrants. The article will examine RA given the fact that its conclusion started as a 
clear obligation under SAP for Albania, as opposed to the general reaction of the 
Albanian public who was against it. For easy reference, the paper has been divided 
into two main sections: in the first section it states briefly the European policy in 
immigration and its impact for Albania; while the second section examines the RA, 
both from the perspective of EU and Albania. The analysis concludes with 
recommendations for future action both by EC and Albania, which can be taken in 
consideration (if and where relevant) also by other WB. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 See IOM (2008), Migration in Albania, A Country Profile, p.15. 
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2. European policy on immigration and its impact on Albania 
 
2.1 Developments within EU migration policies 
 
Development of a common policy on migration management has been considered as 
indispensable in the EU level4, given the fact that all Member States (MS) have been 
significantly affected by international migration. Economic and demographic features 
of the latter are determinant factors in drafting of such policy, due to the reported 
need for labor force/migrants in Europe which can go up to 56 millions until the year 
2050.5     
            The demand for labor force by MS has been associated with uncontrolled 
increase of the number of immigrants in EU, which, quite often goes beyond the labor 
market needs. Poverty and high unemployment rates in the countries of origin are 
among reasons that oblige migrants to pay large amounts of money to organized 
criminal networks to cross the borders illegally. Smuggling of irregular migrants has 
since many years turned into a very lucrative and well organized criminal business, 
which is in the same time very difficult to be tackled by MS individually. Thus, 
necessarily EU policies have been addressing both dimensions: management of 
migration flows/legal migration to meet the needs for labor force on one side and 
fight against irregular migration on the other. The policies and actions against illegal 
migration initially have been mainly repressive, aiming at strengthening border 
control, establishment of a harmonized visa policy and strengthening of the penalties 
against smugglers, which have been followed by a gradual consolidation of a common 
return policy. In 2002, EC adopted the Green Paper on a Community Return Policy on 
Illegal Residence which states that “a sustainable and common return policy of the 
Community is indispensable for a successful management of migration flows (being 
legal or illegal) and asylum”.6This document was followed by the Return Action Plan 
(November 2002) and the Communication from the Commission on ‘Policy priorities in 
the fight against illegal immigration of third-country nationals’(2006) 
(COM/2006/0402 final). The latter emphasizes inter alia the need for strengthening 
the cooperation with third countries and conclusion of readmission agreements in 
                                                 
4 Reiterated in the Presidency Conclusions on the Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 
2009, European Council Meeting in Laekean (2001), Seville European Council (2002), 
Thessaloniki European Council(2003), and the Brussels European Council (2004) followed by 
the Hague Programme.  
5 Website of European Parliament citing the study (2007) on "Europe's Demographic Future” at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IMPRESS&reference=20
080107STO17493.  
6 Shih “Green Paper on a Community Return Policy on illegal residents COM (2002) 175, final.   
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particular with WB. In line with these political objectives, the Directive “On common 
standards and procedures in MS for returning illegally staying third-country nationals 
(2008/115/EC)”7 was adopted in 2008 after several years of discussions. 
             In addition to the repressive actions, EU gradually embarked into a preventive 
approach, which focuses at fighting root causes of illegal immigration through 
establishing a real partnership with countries of origin. It can be traced back at the 
Tampere European Council and in Seville Conclusions8 followed by the Commission’s 
Communication “Integrating migration issues in the EU external relations with third 
countries” (COM/2002/0703 final) which constituted the first attempt at clarifying the 
link between migration and development. The latter served as the basis for the 
Commission’s Communication ‘ Migration and development: some concrete 
orientations” (COM (2005) 390) which points out concrete orientations on fostering 
the development of the countries of origin through increasing remittances flows, 
facilitating the involvement of Diaspora in the development of countries of origin; 
facilitating brain circulation and limiting brain drain. These political objectives were 
reinforced by the Hague Programe and its implementing Action Plan, which inter alia 
require strengthening of the borders, fight against illegal migration, conclusion of RA 
with countries of origin on one side, and strengthening of partnership and provision of 
technical and financial assistance to enhance their capacities for migration 
management on the other.  
 
2.2 EU migration policies and Albania 
  
In line with its overall political developments on immigration issues, EU framed its 
relations with Western Balkans, which share one common feature: EU perspective. 
The main tool to draw the region closer to such a perspective was the Stabilisation 
and Association Process (SAP), which was launched as a regional approach in May 
1999. The negotiations for the Albanian SAA started in 2003. The draft-SAA (as of 2003 
version) included the obligation for management of migration, border control and 
obligation for conclusion of a Readmission Agreement (art.80 of the draft.SAA).  
However, being the top country in Europe for migration rate and considered a tranzit 
route for illegal migration, Albania has been targeted by EU as a priority country to 
fight irregular migration prior to the launch of SAP. The Action Plan for Albania (1999), 
envisaged inter alia that EU should: finance initiatives for prevention of immigration 
                                                 
7 This directive is an amended version of the 2005 Proposal for a Return Directive.   
8 See Conclusions of the European Council, Seville, 21 and 22 June 2002 which reiterate that  
“an integrated, comprehensive and balanced approach to tackle the root causes of illegal 
immigration must remain the EU constant long term objective”. 
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flows (from Albania), pressure Albania to combat illegal trafficking of migrants, force 
readmission agreements in the context of SAA.  Albania was targeted for the second 
time within a list of 9 countries of priority such as China, Russia, Turkey, Libya, 
Morocco, Tunisia for intensifying the dialogue and cooperation for joint migration 
management.9  
Within the framework of the European Partnership approach for WB, EU 
adopoted the first Partnership with Albania in 2004. The document, inter alia requires 
Albania to manage migration flows, strengthen border control, conclude RA with EC10. 
The revised partnership document of 2008 highlights, inter alia, the obligation for 
implementation of the EC-Albania Readmission Agreement and of the National 
Strategy on Migration.11  
Aiming the EU perspective, Albania has committed itself in complying with the 
above obligations, while EC has provided financial and technical support.12 Thus, 
Albania approved the National Strategy on Migration (2004) and its Action Plan (2005) 
which were made possible only through the financial support of EC under the CARDS 
programe. The strategy has been conceived as a holistic document in addressing all 
migration dimensions. Its consists of 3 main pillars: fight against illegal migration, 
linking emigration of Albanians with the development of Albania and elaboration of an 
approapriate legal and institutional framework. However, as per the 2008 EC Progress 
Report the implementation of the Strategy has been slow.13 
EC apprached Albania for negotiating the Readmission Agreement in 2003, 
after obtaining its mandate in November 2002. The negotiations started immediately 
in May 2003 and concluded with the signature of the RA in April 2005. While SAA was 
signed one year later in 2006 and entered into force in January 2009.  
The progress made by Albania is monitored by EC on yearly basis; the success 
or failure has a direct impact on the liberalization of the visa regime and the 
                                                 
9 See Albanian National Strategy on Migration (2005), pg. 17.  
10 The 2004 Document has been revised in 2006 and 2008 in accordance with progress made. 
See European Partnership Document, 
http://www.mie.gov.al/?fq=brenda&d=3&gj=gj1&kid=111. 
11 See respectively pg.17 and 25 of the 2008 Partnership Document, ibid.  
12 Through its financial assistance programme- Phare, Cards, AENEAS, EC has provided during 
1991-2007, 1.3 billion euros for Albania. While for the 2008-2010 there has been foreseen 245 
million euro.  
13 See 2008 EC Progress Report for Albania. See also Report on the implementation of National 
Strategy on Migration, 2007 elaborated from European Institute of Tirana which provides that 
out of 63 measures for implementation within 2006, only 27% were implemented or started 
the implementation process. See pg.19 of the document at 
www.soros.al/nosa/en/migration_strategy.pdf 
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application for EU membership. The last EC Progress Report of 2008 points out on the 
visa, migration and border control that: Albania overall continues to partially meet the 
obligations on border control, some progress has been made on migration 
management, implementation of the national strategy is ongoing, albeit slowly. 
Border and migration staff cuts could limit Albanian’s capacity to meet its obligation 
under Readmission Agreement. Overall illegal migration remains a significant problem, 
especially at Albania-Greek border. Albania continues to partially meet its targets on 
migration.  
 
 
3. Analyses of EC-Albania Readmission Agreement 
 
3.1 Background   
 
Entry into force of the RA EC- Albania in May 2006 was considered a historical step, 
not only in the formulation of an EC common policy on readmission, but also in the 
development of a new cooperation of the EC with the Western Balkans.14 Albania was 
the first European country that concluded such an agreement with EC, paving the way 
to other agreements with the rest of WB countries.  
The RA EC- Albania is considered a new instrument in the fight against illegal 
migration, because of its two specific features: multilateral character and inclusion of 
the third country nationals’ (TCN) clause. Prior to it, Albania had concluded RA with 
individual MS15, however, the EC-Albania RA provided unified return/readmission 
procedures in the EU level and contained the third country nationals’ clause, which 
was the most problematic point (Achilles’ hill) during the negotiations. 
  Contrary to what was expected, the entry into force of the RA was not 
followed by any substantial change in the numbers and return procedures. The 
highest number of returnees continues to be that of Albanians expelled from Greece; 
however, their return/readmission is not in line with the procedures foreseen in the 
agreement, despite the fact that Greece is one of the MS for which the agreement is 
binding. Similarly, the return of TCN has not been affected by the entry into force of 
the TCN’s clause in May 2008. This should not be taken as an indication that the 
                                                 
14 Statement of the European Commission, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security, 
published at the IOM Publication ‘Return and Readmission- Experience of selected EU member 
states”, 2006. 
15 Prior to the RA with EC, Albania had concluded  11 bilateral RAs, some of them with the 
traditional and new MS , such as with Italy of 1997, Belgium (2001), Hungary (2001), Bulgaria 
(2002), Germany (2002), Romania (2002) or with other European countries such as Switzerland 
(2000), Croatia(2003).   
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situation will continue to be the same in the future. Prior to analyzing the reasons for 
the lack of implementation, it is worth to mention the rationale for concluding such an 
agreement both on EU and Albanian perspective.  
 
 
3.2. The role of RA on the perspective of EU 
 
Readmission is the last component of the consolidated repressive set of measures 
used by EU to fight illegal migration. Other traditional components envisaged by EU 
Acquis are strengthening the border control, a harmonized visa policy, strengthening 
of the criminal penalties against illegal residence/employment, trafficking and 
smuggling of migrants. However, these measures would be without effect in practice, 
if not followed with the return of irregular migrants. An important development 
within EU on this issue is the approval of the Directive on ‘Common standards and 
procedures of the MS for return of irregular third country nationals” (2008/115/EC) 
which unified the return procedures by MS, through envisaging common standards 
and procedures. It should be highlighted that the Directive’s standards are considered 
minimalist, thus, MS should minimally respect those standards, while ensuring higher 
ones, if relevant. In this framework, Albania, in its efforts to approximate with EU 
legislation, should duly take in consideration the provisions of the Directive.The 
Directive stipulates that a TCN shall be removed pursuant to a removal order issued 
after individual examination of the case, with due consideration of the best interest of 
the child, family life, health conditions or any other special need of irregular migrant, 
in full compliance with human rights law.16It provides for voluntary return as preferred 
option.17 In case the immigrant does not leave voluntary within the specified period or 
for interests of national security or public policies, he/she is returned immediately in 
the country of origin.18  
           Despite this framework, MS often face difficulties in carrying out removal, 
mainly due to the lack of documentation of the irregular migrant. In such situations, 
MS are in front of two alternatives: 1) to detain the irregular migrant in a closed 
reception center, until the conditions for return are fulfilled; or, 2) to allow him/her to 
move freely in the territory, regardless of irregular status. The latter is problematic, as 
first of all, there is the risk of absconding, in case the authorities manage to obtain the 
relevant documentation. Secondly, there is the risk of creating the perception that 
                                                 
16 See arts.3, 5, 7, 10 and 12 of the Return Directive.   
17 Art. 7, Ibid.   
18 Art.7,8,  Ibid. The removal order is followed by the ‘entry ban’ which forbids the migrant to 
enter any MS within a period (in principle) of 5 years. 18  
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illegal residence is not problematic in EU, which, in turn, becomes a ‘pull factor’ for 
further irregular migrants’ flows. In this situation, MS have mainly followed the first 
alternative, detention of the migrant in a closed Reception Center. Detention is very 
expensive for the MS, thus, it should be considered only as the least worst available 
option.19  
Detention is prevention of liberty, as such is can be only allowed under the 
conditions and pursuant to the procedures envisaged by law.20 The Return Directive 
envisages that: unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be applied 
effectively in a specific case, MS may only keep in detention a third country national 
(TCN) who is subject of return decision to prepare the return and/or carry out removal 
in particular when there is the risk of absconding or the TCN hampers the preparation 
of the removal process.21 The detention shall be carried out pursuant to an official 
administrative or judicial written order and the right to appeal against the order shall 
be provided.22 One of the most debatable issues addressed by the Directive- length of 
detention- has been envisaged for 6 months, with possibility of extension with further 
12 months.23Given the fact that detention is not considered as a criminal sentence, 
but rather as a measure to facilitate the return of migrant, the Directive provides that 
as a rule, it shall take place in special centers established for this 
purpose.24Establishment of such centers, creation of adequate accommodation, 
running and daily maintenance is a huge financial burden for the MS. Thus, irregular 
migration is associated with high costs, both for the individual and the state. 
Expensive for the individual as illegal border crossing or illegal stay is generally 
facilitated by smugglers, who in return require high fees from immigrants. It is 
                                                 
19 In many cases, the MS offer amnesty for irregular migrants, but only when there is need for 
labor force. 
20 See art. Art. 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. European 
Convention on Human Rights envisages that ‘No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the 
following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law… (f) the lawful arrest or 
detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a 
person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition (art.5) 
21 Art. 15 of the Return Directive.   
22 Ibid.   
23Only if and when the TCN does not cooperate for obtaining the necessary documents. Ibid.  
24 Art. 16 of the Return Directive. In case MS can not afford such centers, irregular migrants can 
be detained in prisons, the TCN in detention shall be separated by ordinary prisoners. Minors 
shall be detained only as a last resort for the shortest appropriate period of time (art.17 of the 
Return Directive). During detention, irregular migrants shall have the right to meet their legal 
representatives or family members; as well as to be informed in a language that she/he 
understands on the rights and obligations.  
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expensive for MS as the measures for the return of illegal migrant are all financial and 
human resources consuming; all the procedures, starting from the bureaucratic 
elements of individual examination of the case, removal order, actual removal, which 
mainly takes place through special charters, and in particular detention in specific 
centers for migrants, is more and more becoming a huge public burden for the MS. In 
this way, it is in the interest of the MS to return irregular migrants as soon as possible 
to eliminate the costs. Here comes to play the Readmission Agreement, whose very 
essence is to facilitate the return process.   
RA is important for an effective return of irregular migrants, given the fact 
that the right of a state to return illegal migrants in their country of origin and transit 
is without any practical relevance if there is not a corresponding obligation of the 
country of origin or transit to accept own citizens or TCN who have used the said 
country as a transit for EU MS. But, is it legal for a state to refuse entry into the 
territory of his citizens if it has not concluded any RA with returning country? Can a 
state actually refuse entry to own citizens? 
International law, in particular international human rights law envisages that 
states can not refuse entry in the territory to their citizens. Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), ICCPR, ECHR state that: “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
the right to enter the territory of the state of which country he is a national’.25 It is 
believed that the obligation to readmit own citizens has obtained the status of 
international custom and prevails to all other obligations that states have towards 
each other.26  
             However, in practice the return of irregular migrants is associated with many 
difficulties. Countries of origin not necessarily accept returnees due to lack of relevant 
documentation that can prove the citizenship of the migrant. In such cases, the 
authorities of the MS are obliged to cooperate with the diplomatic/consular 
representatives of the country of origin to enable the identification of the person. Due 
to the long bureaucratic procedures (while the immigrant is held in the detention 
centers) or in other limited cases, due to lack of cooperation by the countries of origin, 
MS try to avoid these barriers through negotiating RAs, which envisage obligations, 
cooperation modalities and return procedures for both the parties in the agreement. 
Thus, in essence, the RA ‘was born’ by the lack of spontaneous reaction of the 
countries of origin towards the requests for identification of irregular migrant, and 
subsequently, refusal to readmit own citizens. In this context, it can be said that 
Readmission has become an issue closely linked with the level of cooperation among 
the countries. It is meant to facilitate the communication between MS (sending 
                                                 
25 See art. 3,Prot.4 of ECHR. See also art. 13 of UDHR, Art.12  of ICCPR. 
26 IOM, Essentials on Migration Management, IOM, 2004, p. 35.  
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countries) and countries of origin for an effective implementation of removal, which in 
turn, reduces costs of illegal migration for countries of destination. 
           As such, EU has treated conclusion of the Readmission Agreement as one of the 
priorities of its foreign policy. One important development in this area is the 
movement from bilateral agreement in multilateral agreements concluded by the 
European Commission. In so far, EC has concluded multilateral readmission 
agreements with several countries of origin such as Hong Kong (2001), Sri Lanka 
(2002), Macao (2003) Albania(2005), Russia (2006), Ukraine (2006), Moldova (2007) 
Ukraine(2007) Macedonia (2007), Montenegro(2007), Serbia (2007) B&H (2007) and is 
under negotiations with Algeria, China, Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey.   
 
3.3 Readmission Agreement from the perspective of Albania  
 
While it is clear why the returning countries, in particular EU MS are interested for 
conclusion of RA, it can not be said the same for the countries of origin. In many cases, 
countries of origin are reluctant to conclude such agreements, claiming that it is not in 
the interest of their citizens. However, the more migration is becoming an 
international phenomena, the more it is becoming difficult to find countries that are 
only of origin or only of destination; the same country can be both returning and 
readmitting irregular migrants, as such, it is interested to facilitate the return process 
in a reciprocal way. In the case of WB, there is one more specific factor: WB aspire the 
European perspective, which is conditional inter alia with the migration management 
and conclusion of RA as an integral part of the EU external policy.  
In the case of Albania, the conclusion of the RA was stipulated in the article 80 
of draft- SAA: The parties agree for conclusion of an agreement… that stipulates 
concrete obligations... for readmission, including readmission of third country 
nationals and stateless persons.27  
  In the final version of SAA, the Readmission is foreseen in article 81, which 
actually sanctions the article 2 and 5 of the RA.28    
  The negotiations for the RA were carried out in parallel with those for SAA. 
Despite the objective of the Albanian team to finalize the two agreements in the 
                                                 
27 Draft –SAA, prior to final version.   
28 Art.81 of the SAA reiterates the very essence of the EC-Albania RA. See for a full text of the 
SAA at : ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/albania/st08164.06_en.pdf  It envisages that: Parties 
agree that, upon request and without further formalities, Albania and the Member States: shall 
readmit any of their nationals illegally present on their territories; shall readmit nationals of 
third countries and stateless persons illegally present on their territories and having entered 
the territory of Albania via or from a Member State, or having entered the territory of a 
Member State via or from Albania. 
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same time, it became obvious that it was impossible due to the complexity of the 
SAA. In the end, the RA was concluded one year earlier then the SAA.   
  Ratification of RA was fiercely opposed by the public opinion.29 The written 
media highlighted the massive potential return of Albanian emigrants from EU MS, 
given the fact that many of them were with irregular status. However, the 
governmental representatives in most of the cases pointed out that conclusion of 
the RA was an obligation of the SAA, non reversible and non-negotiable. It was 
further reiterated that the conclusion of RA would subsequently lead to visa 
facilitation and liberalization.30 However, regardless of the interest and the requests 
of the Albanian part for negotiating in parallel a Visa Facilitation Agreement (VFA), 
the EC team made it clear that they did not have the authority to negotiate visa 
facilitation or liberalization. Their mandate could only allow the Commission to 
conclude RA.31 It is worth to mention here that during a certain phase of the 
negotiations of SAA, the Albanian authorities started to articulate a ‘visa 
liberalization agreement’, instead of visa facilitation agreement. Even though, as of 
2008, visa liberalization is the main objective of the GOA, clearly this was not the 
situation of the 2006. However this is an indication that there was confusion as to 
the distinction of the two instruments.32 The VFA, by its name, aims at facilitating 
the procedures for some categories of citizens, depending on the success of 
negotiations by the interested parties, in some cases it includes a clause for 
speeding up the process of issuing the visas or facilitates the process for issuing 
multi-entry or long term visas. This was actually what happened with the EC-Albania 
VFA. Even though an analysis of the implementation of this agreement is not 
objective of this article, it is important to mention that regardless of the objective, in 
practice the VFA is not fully functioning.33 The procedures and difficulties for 
obtaining visas remain almost the same, with Albania being the top country for visa 
refusal in the WB.34  
 
Several scholars have identified that the link between the process of visa facilitation 
regime and conclusion of the RA is articulated in some strategic documents such as 
the Hague Programme (2004) which ‘invites the Council and the Commission to 
                                                 
29 IOM, Return and Readmission- The case of Albania, 2006, p.25 
30 Ibid, p.23. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Declaration of former Minister of European Integration, Ms. Trashani in 2006 for requesting 
visa liberalization regime during the 10th round of SAA negotiations.  
33 See Albanian European Movement Study  http://www.em 
al.org/?fq=brenda&m=shfaqart&aid=95 
34 Ibid.  
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examine, with a view to developing a common approach, whether in the context of the 
EC readmission policy it would be opportune to facilitate, on a case by case basis, the 
issuance of short-stay visas to third-country nationals, where possible and on a basis of 
reciprocity, as part of a real partnership in external relations, including migration-
related issues”35; or in the action plan implementing Hague Programme ( 2005) where 
the Commission recommends that ‘Specific recommendations for negotiating 
directives on visa facilitation on a case by case basis with third countries in the context 
of the EC readmission policy, where possible and on the basis of reciprocity, with a 
view to developing a real partnership on migration management issues (2005-
2009)”.36  
             In fact, most of the countries, such as Macao, Hong Kong that negotiated RA 
before Albania had been exempted from visa requirements, while Russia considered it 
as a prerequisite for continuing negotiations on RA, while Albania was an exceptional 
case.  Philippe DeBruycker mentions that even if Albanian team insisted further, it is 
more likely that the Commission would not have accepted such approach, because by 
that time, the political and technical structures of the Commission where discussing 
on changing the perception on the conditional relation between RA and VFA.37 
However, the hesitation of the Commission for negotiation of the VFA in parallel with 
RA in the case of Albania was an exception. The VFA concluded two years after the EC-
Albania RA was not only for Albania, as the first WB state that ratified RA, but was part 
of a regional approach, which included all the WB countries. The Commission 
negotiated in parallel two agreements-RA and VFA- for other WB such as Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia. The result of the Commission’s 
negotiations finalized in September 18, 2007 was the conclusion of nine agreements, 
five VFA and only four RA. This is due to the fact that the RA with Albania was signed 
since two years. The situation was similar with Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, which, 
following Russia’s example conditioned the EC with conclusion of the two agreements 
in the same time- RA and VFA38.Thus, regardless of the (temporary) arguments of the 
Commission that RA is not a condition for the facilitation of the visa regime, the 
practice, before and after ‘the case of Albania’, clearly indicates that RA are followed 
with VFA.  
 
                                                 
35 Hague Programme, p. 18. See also  Debruycker, Philipe:  Obtaining Visa Facilitation for the 
EU: the Case of Albania,  Workshop on National Strategy on Migration, 2005 and Trauner and 
Kruse, EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements, 2008.  
36Action plan implementing Hague Programme, p.11. .  
37 Ibid. 
38 Trauner and Kruse, EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements, 2008 
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3.4. Analyses of EC- Albania Readmission Agreement 
 
The RA stipulates the obligation of the parties to readmit own citizens and TCN in 
some specific conditions. The agreement, as a framework instrument provides also 
the mechanisms and procedures for the readmission of the above categories. For 
purposes of this article, the obligations of Albania for readmission of nationals and 
TCN will be analyzed as the ones of MS are identical/ reciprocal. 
 
Readmission of nationals 
 
The key provision of RA is its article 2- Readmission of nationals which stipulates:  
‘Albania shall readmit, upon application by a MS and without further formalities other 
than those provided for in this Agreement, all persons who do not, or who no longer, 
fulfill the conditions in force for entry into, presence in, or residence on, the territory of 
the requesting Member State provided that it is proved, or may be validly assumed on 
the basis of prima facie evidence furnished, that they are nationals of Albania’. This 
paragraph has three main elements which must be analyzed: subjects, proofs and 
application by the MS.  
 
Subjects: 
 
Article 2 of the RA stipulates the obligation to readmit, through RA procedures only 
irregular migrants stopped into the territory and not those in the borders. At least, 
this is the interpretation provided by both parties of the agreement.39 The rationale 
for this, is that, irregular migrants caught in the external borders can be immediately 
sent back, once entry is refused, thus, it is not necessary to follow long buraucratic 
procedures which can go up to a minimum of 14 days as per RA. This is one of the 
arguments used by Greece, which points out that returnees are stopped at the 
borders and not in the territory, thus, no need for prior application, in accordance 
with the RA.40 Article 2 further stipulates that for the purpose of the agreement, 
subject of readmission are also those persons who have been deprived of citizenship 
                                                 
39 See Arn “Manual for application on Readmisison Agreement between the EC and RoA’, 
published by IOM, 2006, p.15. This is the interpretation used by Albanian and Greek authorities 
during the meetings of the Committee on Readmission, established under the IOM 
implemented project AENEAS Project “Implementing Readmission Agreement EC-Albania” 
(2006-2008). See Conclusions of the Albanian Readmission Committee, published by IOM 2008.  
40 Information received by the Director of Immigration Sector, MoI, Albania, during the 
workshop “Observance of Human rights of returning emigrants’ 11.06.2009, Tirana 
International Hotel.  
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or have renounced Albanian citizenship, unless, they have been promised citizenship 
by the MS.41It has been discussed whether the Albanian nationals that have been 
residing in the MS for more than one year are subject of RA procedures, pursuant to 
article 10 of the RA.42 One interpretation is that Art.10 which stipulates the time limits 
for application of return and readmission procedures excludes those who have been 
residing for more than one year.43However, it is not clear whether this interpretation 
has been accepted by the MS44. Art.10 exempts from RA procedures ‘third country 
nationals or stateless persons that have been residing for more than one year in the 
MS”.45 It is true that within EU migration terminology Albanians are ‘third country 
nationals’, however, for the purposes of the RA between EC and Albania, TCN are only 
persons who are neither Albanian nationals nor of any EU member state. As such, for 
purpose of this agreement, the time limit of one year can not be argued for own 
nationals. However, it is yet to be expected how this will be implemented in practice.   
 
Proofs: 
 
RA considers as proofs for citizenship not only the original documents such as 
passports, seaman documents, ID cards, citizenship certificates or any other official 
document that mentions the citizenship of the person (the so called, undisputed 
documents as indicators of the ID of a persons), but also ‘prima facie’ evidence. Such 
documents are photocopies of any of the original document mentioned above, driving 
license or its photocopies, birth certificate or its photocopy, company identity cards or 
its photocopy, statements by witnesses or the concerned person and his/her 
language, any other document which can help in concluding on his/her identity. The 
language, considered as a prima facie proof is quite problematic in practice, given the 
fact that a good part of the irregular migrants from Kosovo, Macedonia who may be 
Albanian speaker can be returned in Albania on the basis of such proof.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 Article 2.1 of the RA.  
42 Art.10 of RA.  
43 From the declaration of N.Ndoci in the Workshop “Observance of the human rights of 
returning emigrants”, 11.6.2009, Tirana International Hotel.   
44 This issue has not also been addressed by the Commentary-Training Manual on EC-Albania 
RA prepared by Fernand Arn, 2006. 
45 Art.10 of RA.  
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Application for Readmission:  
 
RA stipulates that “Albania shall readmit, upon application by a MS and without 
further formalities other than those provided for in this Agreement… (art.2). Thus, the 
procedural condition to be followed is the application from the MS. Since the entry 
into force of the RA, the number of applications following RA have been 0.01% 
according to the Department of Border and Migration, in the Albanian Interior 
Ministry.46While the number of returned Albanian migrants for the year 2008 is 
approximately 66109 persons or 173 Albanian migrants per day.47 The highest number 
of returnees is from border crossing points with Greece, in particular Kapshtica and 
Kakavija.   
 
What impact has in practice the prior application for readmission by MS? 
 
Enables Albanian authorities to take adequate measures for readmission process   
 
The high number of returnees has created frequently problems for Albanian border 
police in charge of readmission. The returned emigrants, in particular from Greece 
have been subject of long and tiring procedures which go up to 7 days, and once in the 
borders, have to wait sometimes for more then 10 hours until the finalization of the 
readmission procedures from Albanian border police. As per Albanian legislation, 
returned migrants can not be stopped for more than 10 hours by the police, but, in 
cases of large number of returnees (up to 170 persons) and an interviewing process of 
a minimum of 10 minutes for a person, the waiting period can go far beyond the 
allowed time limits. If Albanian police is notified duly in advance through application 
as stipulated by the agreement, it could take measures by reallocating extra staff, so 
as proceed quickly. This is not possible, when the MS just ‘leaves the returnees in the 
borders, with an accompanying list” without prior notification/application.  
 
Enables Albanian authorities to take special measures for the minors 
 
A considerable number of returnees are unaccompanied minors48, which, according to 
the Albanian legislation are subject to special protection. Thus, they can not be 
                                                 
46 According to the declaration of the Border and Migration Department in the Joint 
Readmission Committee, December 2008.  
47 Statistics obtained at the BM department, 2008.  
48 Fatmir Memaj, Study on the  Profile of Returning Migrants, 2008 reports a daily average 
number of 34 returned minors.  
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interviewed without the presence of their family members of legal custodian. 
However, in practice, the presence of the family member or the legal custodian is not 
possible due to two main reasons: a) given the fact that the return of the minor is not 
carried out following an application by the MS, Albanian border police is not aware of 
the presence of minors, and thus, can not inform in advance the parents to be present 
during the interviewing process; b) if the border police officer, during the interview 
notices that the returnee is minor and obtains information on how to contact his/her 
parents, in most of the cases, the parents or legal custodian can not come 
immediately due to the long distance. The police officers may suspend the interview 
until the arrival of the parents, but this could go for more then the allowed timeframe 
of 10 hours. This creates further problems with the accommodation of the minor, as 
there is not a special room/accommodation facility for minors in the border crossing 
points. Prior application by MS would have a significant impact on this situation, as 
border police would have adequate time to inform the family members on the 
returnee.  
 
Eliminates the cases of return in error 
 
Quite often, due to the lack of documentation, the language is the only ‘prima facie’ 
proof of the citizenship of a person. As such, there have been cases of citizens of 
Kosovo, Macedonia or any other country in the region who have been returned in 
Albania instead of their country of origin, due to the Albanian language. Prior 
application, as stipulated by the RA, enables elimination of such mistakes, which 
create extra costs for both the returning and readmitting country.  
 
Eliminates the cases of abuse with the identity of the citizens   
 
One of the problems that accompanies the phenomena of irregular migration is 
misuse/ abuse with the identity of another person. Irregular migrants, who most of 
the time lack identity documents, when stopped by police often provide another 
identity, in several cases the identity of a real person. Pursuant to the EU acquis, 
irregular migrants that are returned by MS are subject to an entry ban which is up to 5 
years. This means that if the returnee applies for a visa in one of the Schengen 
countries, the visa is refused in any of the MS. However, in practice, many Albanian 
citizens who have never been in any EU MS have suffered from this penalty, when 
have applied for a visa, due to misuse of their identity. If the return of irregular 
migrants is carried out with prior application for return, Albanian authorities, 
responsible for verifying the identity of the returnee can trace whether it is a case of a 
misuse of the identity of the person. If that is the case, the MS is informed to double 
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check the identity of the imigrant and suspend the ban under the false identity, as it 
would unjustly deprive another citizen from the right to move freely.  
 
Why EU MS do not comply with the obligations of the RA while returning Albanian 
citizens?  
 
According to RA, the application for readmission can be in two ways: firstly, in the 
form of a request/application submitted to the Albanian authorities, who are obliged 
to respond within 14 days from the application. In case they do not respond within the 
said timeframes, they are bound to readmit the returnee once he/she is at the 
borders. 49  
Secondly, it is in the form of a written communication, whereby the sending 
authorities only inform their Albanian counterparts on the returning process, without 
need for approval, in the cases when the returnee has a passport or a valid travel 
document. It goes without saying that when the returnee has valid travel 
documentation, there is no need for further formalities.50This procedure is faster and 
very convenient for the sending country.   
The request for readmission should indicate the generalities of the migrant, 
the proof of nationality, and if relevant, whether the person needs special care, i.e. in 
case of a minor. Such information facilitates the readmission process for Albanian 
police as they are able to take all the necessary measures in advance. However, it 
seems that for the MS the obligations and procedures envisaged by RA are not 
convenient, despite the fact that MS were actually fostering conclusion of such 
agreement. One of the argument brought forward by the MS is the lack of 
implementing protocols, pursuant to article 19 (1) of RA which stipulates that: Albania 
and a Member State may draw up implementing Protocols which shall cover rules on 
(a) designation of the competent authorities, border crossing points and exchange of 
contact points; (b) conditions for escorted returns, including the transit of third-country 
nationals and stateless persons under escort; (c) means and documents additional to 
those listed in the Annexes 1 to 4 to this Agreement.. 
This article uses the term “may” draw up implementing protocols, thus, if the 
parties consider it as necessary to conclude, however, lack of implementing protocol 
does not render the RA inapplicable. RA is a self executing document, as it stipulates 
clearly the modalities and procedures of return and readmission. The rationale behind 
article 19 was to provide the parties with further tools to facilitate the process 
through detailing the procedures in accordance with their specific needs for a 
                                                 
49 Art.2 of RA. 
50 Art. 14 of RA.  
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successful cooperation; i.e. while Albania and Germany can not use return by land, the 
implementing protocol can further specify different conditions for escorting of 
returnees as compared with Greece, where the preferred return mode would be via 
land. The parties could also design specific hours or specific border crossing points for 
return, relevant to their needs or appoint specific contact points. However, the lack of 
the implementing protocol does not impair the implementation of the RA, as the RA 
itself does not envisage the protocol as a conditio sine qua non for its implementation.  
Another argument articulated lately is that full compliance with the 
obligations of RA  does not facilitate but slows down the return process, which in turn, 
penalizes the Albanian irregular migrants whose period of detention would be 
extended.51 It is true that if we refer to the number of the returnees, i.e. from Greece, 
the main returning MS, with a daily average of 160 irregular migrants for the year 
2008, the application for readmission would create difficulties for sending authorities. 
However, it can be argued that if the Greek authorities were to comply with the 
provisions of RA, it is quite likely that the daily average would be far less for several 
reasons:  
1. Irregular migrants stopped at the borders do not fall under the RA, as 
opposed to those stopped in the territory. Thus, the former would be immediately 
returned in the border, without any prior application. In this way, the fluxes of 
migrants stopped at the borders and those in the territory, which are subject to RA 
would be clearly divided. In so far, Greek authorities do not make any differentiation 
as to the return procedures or treatment.  
2. The subject of readmission would enjoy the guarantees envisaged by the EU 
return Directive, which inter alia provides the issuance of the removal order, 
information of the returnee on the reasons for removal, appeal possibilities etc. In 
practice, the majority of returnees from Greece do not enjoy the minimal guarantees 
envisaged by the Directive, as immediately after the prima facie proof- mainly 
Albanian language, when the migrant does not have any documentation, he/she is 
immediately send in the police commissariat and removed from the territory without 
any possibility for appeal or legal assistance52. Thus, any Albanian irregular migrant, 
regardless of his/her residence is treated as ‘stopped at the borders’ by the Greek 
authorities. Speculations have also been on the nature of the ‘sweeping operations’53 
for the Albanian irregular migrants, which could be argued as ‘collective expulsion’ 
given the fact that in those operations the irregular migrants are stopped at the spot- 
                                                 
51 As per the IOM’s representative comment in the workshop on “Observance of human rights 
of returned migrants” organized in 11 June 2009, Tirana, Albania.    
52 As per the interviews conducted by F.Memaj “Profile of returned migrants”, 2008.  
53 Ibid.  
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in the street, work or any public place frequented by irregular migrants, and are 
immediately sent with buses in the borders, without following the procedures 
specified by the return Directive, in particular the obligation for an individual 
examination of the case for each returnee.   
3. Even if the number of the irregular migrant’s subject of readmission would 
still be very high, Greek authorities could at least follow the written communication as 
a procedure, and not the prior application, so as to avoid delays and buraucracy. This 
option would be beneficial for both parties, given the fact as neighboring countries 
sharing land borders, the travel document is not necessary for the return, as it is the 
case for return from many EU MS due to transiting in different airports. An advanced 
notification could only provide the generalities of the returnees, specific needs, if 
relevant, the border crossing point and the time of return (without having to wait 14 
days envisaged in RA). 
It can be argued that EU MS do not comply with RA due to a continued 
commodity provided by the Albanian readmission authorities. Albania has never 
refused readmission of own citizens even without prior notification or application; in 
several cases it has readmitted TCN with the argument of the returning party that the 
migrant is Albanian, regardless of inadequate proofs. Hence, it can be further argued 
that the reason why Albania was the first European country targeted by EU for 
conclusion of a RA, was not to facilitate the return of nationals but rather the 
facilitation of the return of TCN.  
 
Can Albania refuse readmission of citizens if the MS do not follow the procedures 
stipulated by RA?  
 
Albanian legislation does not include a provision similar to the one found in article 3 
Protocol 4 of the ECHR regarding the ‘arbitrary deprival of entry of nationals in the 
country”. Article 38 of the Constitution envisages only right of free movement within 
the territory and the right to go abroad. However, as Albania has ratified the ECHR, it 
is bound by its provisions. Thus, Albania can not refuse the entry of Albanian citizens 
in the territory. However, possession of a document indicating the citizenship is a 
necessity, as the ECHR refers specifically to the ‘nationals’. Thus, the application from 
MS providing adequate proof of the citizenship of returnees is crucial. Furthermore, 
RA is a legal document, a ‘solemn commitment’ by the parties for complying with its 
obligations, as such, there is not any reason to refrain from complying with it, given 
that EU itself required and conditioned conclusion of such agreement within SAP. 
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Readmission of third country nationals 
 
The most debatable point of the RA was the ‘third country nationals’ clause”. As 
mentioned in the previous section of this article, this is one of the new features of this 
agreement as compared to previous bilateral ones that Albania had concluded with 
Member States. As it stands currently, RA envisages that: Albania shall readmit, upon 
application by a Member State and without further formalities other than those 
provided for in this Agreement, all third-country nationals or stateless persons who do 
not, or who no longer, fulfill the conditions in force for entry into, presence in, or 
residence on, the territory of the requesting Member State provided that it is proved, 
or may be validly assumed on the basis of prima facie evidence furnished, that such 
persons (a) hold or at the time of entry held a valid visa or residence authorization 
issued by Albania; or (b) entered the territory of the Member States after having 
stayed on, or transited through, the territory of Albania. 
Subject of this clause are the TCN that have transited through Albania for EU 
MS. However, the clause does not cover the TCN who, prior to or after entering EU 
MS, have been issued a residence permit or visa to the said MS54. Also, pursuant to 
article 10 of the RA, MS can not return in Albania any TCN one year after they have 
gained knowledge that a third-country national or a stateless person does not, or does 
no longer fulfill the conditions in force for entry, presence or residence. (art.10) 
Application by MS is a condition sine qua non readmission of TCN, which 
means that Albania can not readmit any TCN without prior application. While Albania 
readmits Albanian nationals contrary to procedures foreseen by the RA, this can not 
be the case for TCN. The (ECHR) obligation to allow entry to its territory to the citizens 
is an obligation towards the citizens and not towards the sending county. As such, it 
can not be extended to the TCN. Albania should not readmit any TCN, without prior 
application by MS, in accordance with the RA provisions, regardless of the lack of 
implementing protocol.  
The TCN readmitted who do not have legal /valid documentation are detained 
pursuant to the Albanian Law on Foreigners (LoF)55 in the closed reception center, 
until the finalization of preparations for removing them back in the country of origin 
or any country that is ready to accept them. While the minors, pursuant to said law, 
can be stopped only in the social centers established for this purpose. The maximum 
length of detention stipulated by the LoF is 6 months.  
It should be highlighted that the new LoF was approved after several years of 
discussion and work by the relevant structures. Adoption of such law was raised as 
                                                 
54 See Article 3.2 of RA. 
55 LoF approved in July 2008, entered into force in December 2008. 
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obligation in most of the EC progress reports for Albania and was part of the SAA. Its 
drafting process followed the developments in this area on the EU acquis. In this 
perspective, the initial period of detention of 6 months is pursuant to the Proposal for 
the Return Directive (by the time the law was being drafted the Directive was not 
approved yet). However, given the practical difficulties in returning irregular migrants, 
and in particular the experience of MS which quite often are obliged to extend the 
detention period LoF envisages the possibility of extending the detention period up to 
12 months.  However the wording of the law is not clear whether the period of 
extension is 12 months, which means in total the detention can go up to 18 months 
or, the whole detention period can go up to 12 months, 6 of them initial period of 
detention and other 6 months extension. If we take in consideration the EU Return 
Directive, MS can extend the detention period for further 12 months. Whatever was 
the objective of the legislator, it needs to be genuinely interpreted or clearly specified 
in the respective bylaws, so as to avoid discrepancy and subjective 
interpretation/implementation by detention authorities of this delicate legal 
provision.  
LoF stipulates that the detained migrants have the right of humane and 
dignified treatment, health care, legal assistance, and translator, the right to appeal 
the order of detention or on the conditions of detention. However, the actual 
conditions of detained migrants are quite different from legal provisions.  Irregular 
migrants are detained in a separate building of the Center for Victims of Trafficking in 
Albania (Linza), given the fact that the building envisaged for this purpose is not 
finalized, even though it was expected to be functional in 2008.56 The construction of 
the center is financed by the EC, within its holistic approach for financially supporting 
countries of origin to meet standards on migration management. A serious problem 
remains also the accommodation of the unaccompanied minors, who pursuant to LoF 
should be kept in social centers, but as of September 2009, there is not any such 
center.   
Detention of migrants in the building within the Center for Victims of 
Trafficking is problematic due to its confidentiality nature. Irregular migrants can not 
have visits by friends, family members of legal advisor. Another concern is the lack of 
translators. Most of irregular migrants in Albania are citizens of countries such as 
Afghanistan, Nepal, India, which are considered to have a rare language for Albania 
and it is quite impossible to find a translator for those languages. Lack of means of 
communication definitely impairs the proper enjoyment of rights of immigrant. 
                                                 
56 Construction of the closed reception center was financed by EU in order to assist Albania 
with adequate infrastructure for implementing the TCN clause, after its entry into force in may 
2008.   
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Actually, if the immigrant is not informed on his/ her rights and duties, their exictence 
is mainly virtual rather than concrete.  
             The legal framework does not clarify what happens with the TCN with the 
expiration of the allowed detention timeframe. Due to the difficulties for return in 
their country of origin, it is the risk that Albania falls in the so called ‘readmisison 
trap’, in particular if the number of returnees will be increased. It should be pointed 
out that since the entry into force of the third country nationals clause, in May 2008, 
the number of returns from MS has not been increased significantly. However it is 
more likely that this number will be increased in the future, and the risk of the 
readmission trap will be present. In such conditions, Albania must start negotiations 
for concluding RA with countries of origin, however the chances are failure limited. 
We say limited, as these are countries with whom, EC itself has in a way or another 
failed to conclude, regardless of its diplomatic leverage. That is the reason why 
member states will return TCN in Albania, the country of transit and not directly in the 
country of origin.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Readmission agreement is indeed a very important tool in the fight against irregular 
migration as it facilitates the cooperation between the returning country and that of  
origin or transit on one side and guarantees respect of human rights and a dignified 
treatment of irregular migrant during return process on the other. Through clear and 
transparent procedures, it enables the parties to organize and plan in advance the 
return/readmission process. However, the impact of the EC-Albania RA is not clear for 
the return of the own nationals. Three years after its entry into force, MS continue to 
return migrants using the same modus operandi as before conclusion of such 
agreement.  
Contrary to the initial public opinion in Albania, observance of RA provisions 
from MS would facilitate the work of Albanian authorities during the readmission 
process, which in turn would result in a better treatment of returnee, in particular in 
case of ‘massive’ returns from Greece which is the main returning country. Albania 
should increase the pressure in the Joint Readmission Committee established to 
monitor the implementation of the RA, with participation of Albania and MS, in 
particular given the fact that it was EU which conditioned the conclusion of this 
agreement.  
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Pacta sund servanda.  
 
It is recommended that Joint Readmisison Committee commissions a study on 
whether at the current stage, full compliance with RA is feasible for member states, 
and provide guidelines in case a more flexible approach would be needed. If that 
would be the case, Joint Committee should emphasise the obligation of the MSs for a 
prior notification on the generalities of the retunees, as a less formal obligation on 
their side. 
Regarding the readmission of TCN, currently there is not any increase in the 
number of returnees, which might be also due to the hesitation of MS to return in 
Albania as long as there is not an adequate reception facility. However, the 
readmission trap remains a serious concern as Albania lacks the diplomatic leverage to 
foster conclusion of RA with the countries with whom, EC has failed. We say this, as if 
EC would have concluded RA with third countries, it would not return their nationals 
in Albania, the country of transit, but in the country of origin. Thus, the challenge for 
Albania authorities is the conclusion of RA with countries of origin, in order to avoid 
the risk that Albania becomes the surrogate destination of the irregular migrants.  
The conditions of detention are not adequate and in compliance with the legal 
requirements, due to the lack of a specific closed reception centers. As such, 
immediate measures should be taken in order to start the functioning of the 
envisaged building for this purpose. In parallel, Albanian institutions should start the 
recruitment and training of the staff of the closed reception center and draft the 
framework regulation of center.  
Immediate measures should be taken for identification of the translators 
through a public call/advertisement, and if no one can be found in the country, 
support should be sought with international organizations or counterparts in EU to 
obtain written translation at least of the regulation of the center, rights and duties of 
the detainees. 
Albania should also allocate relevant budget for translation and medical 
services for detained migrants as well as for the running/daily maintenance of the 
center, once it is functional. In this framework, it should consider application for 
financial support from EU in the framework of EU Programms of Assistance for third 
countries so as to partially alleviate the financial burden from the (tight) state budget.   
 
________________________  
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Political Communication and Journalism in the Balkans  
 
About journalism in general 
 
The process of informing is becoming one of the fundamental social processes, and 
the true, fast, accurate and complete information is a foundation of the democratic 
society and the political participation The method of creating information has become 
a subject of the academic interest and social practice as individuals from various 
spheres, such as politics, business and culture are affected by it. Journalism in 
Macedonia can not be yet called an established profession. Namely, in Macedonia, as 
opposed to the U.S. for instance, anyone can be a journalist, regardless of his or her 
education. There are interdisciplinary studies in journalism at the Law Faculty in 
Skopje, which have been existing for the last 30 years, but for which there is relatively 
little interest. 
These trends have made important the professional training of journalists in 
order to be able to interpret social reality. Journalists have realized that it is essential 
to have a continuous journalist training through innovation of knowledge and a 
constructive practice in media. Journalism is less and less tied to talent and skill, and 
more to formal education. Many journalists do not have formal education. The 
journalist power and dignity of profession is directly correlated to the intensity of 
media’s influence in modern society as well as the possibility to manipulate public 
opinion - a possibility which is not vested in any other profession, not even in the 
government itself. Citizens nowadays (readers, viewers, listeners) are much more 
exposed to journalist interpretation of reality, than to factors that one-sidedly convey 
individual positions.   
           The shape of this profession is changing and with it is also changing the status 
and the evaluation of journalism in social frameworks. Journalists have become an 
influential, privileged and untouchable elite. There are various interpretations and 
theories that differ based on the idea of the role of journalism in society as well as on 
the quality and type of accountability that journalists have. Despite the fact that often 
journalism is accused of impairing the consensus which is necessary for the 
functioning of democracy, it still secures a forum for the different and opposing 
opinions. This is a result of the development and the use of new technologies in 
modern journalism (the intellectual level of the audience and the importance of media 
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in society). The theories that demystify the social role of journalism differ in two main 
aspects. According to one aspect journalism has a passive role (gatekeeping), while 
the advocates of the second aspect see journalism as an active factor and a 
spokesperson of the socially neglected groups – it investigates and reveals scandals 
and problems. It also sees journalism as a bridge between the socially neglected 
groups, as a pedagogue and a scout. 
Historically, journalism has had its own development path, a “ripening” of the 
profession, its establishment and the introduction of professional criteria. Certain 
criteria and standards of conduct are being introduced in journalism, even if it is not 
to the extent being done in other professions (doctors, architects, etc.) This impulse 
for progress comes from within the profession, from its ethical essence, from 
professional associations and from the relevant departments at universities. 
Most young people are attracted to take up journalism based on two fundamental 
values of journalism – freedom and the impulse for truth and objectivity. The ideal for 
truthfulness and objectivity has always been a complex concept. In the history of 
world journalism there are examples of many journalist sacrifices for accurate 
information and honesty in reporting. Often it is believed that the strive for the truth 
in reporting is a utopist attempt. Objectivity in journalism is not an individual concept, 
but a category tied to many related concepts: empirics, experiment, methodology, 
perception, positivism, and subjectivity. Such an explanation of objectivity actualizes 
the problem of journalist methodology and research. This is mainly related to the 
research work of the journalist whose aim is to detect the cause-consequence 
relations in social events. 
           With the development of media two types of journalism can be identified: 
reporting and interpretative. Today we can mostly speak about interpretative 
journalism. The reporting journalism presents events, answering to the questions:  
who, what, where, when and how, whereas interpretative journalist places events 
within the coordinates for the causal-consequential importance, i.e. it offers answers 
to the questions why and what next. The journalist is a professional who describes and 
analyses events (occurrences, individuals) as a result of gathering of all available facts 
in an effort to allow the audience to better interpret them. The interpretative method 
of elaboration of the subject is in correlation with the contemporary need the 
information to have depth and to be complete. A prerequisite for such information is 
to find the hidden facts through journalistic research. Such journalism is a barrier 
against manipulation. The need for research in journalism is a result of the need for 
interpretation of events, which in turn is a result of the increasingly large presence of 
media in society and in the crisis situations (wars, economic crises, social 
restructuring, etc.) Today the event is not only observed as an isolated, individual 
case, but as a link in a chain that connects the causes and consequences. 
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Interpretative journalism is “reporting by the use of facts, which without a comment 
sheds light and explains the event” (Ellmore R. T.,1992). 
            The journalist is required to have a high level of intellectualism, wide general 
education and specialist knowledge in certain areas (sports, culture, politics, ecology, 
medicine, etc.). 
 Taking into consideration the history and communication factors of interpretative 
reporting, it can be clearly seen how modern information is becoming more in-depth, 
fuller and ideologically neutral as well as its genesis. Uneducated journalist cannot be 
competent enough for the area for which they have been assigned in the editorial and 
are unable to use the methodology of journalist research. In order for the journalists 
to use journalist methodology it is essential that they know at least the fundaments of 
theory and the most and often used research techniques and procedures, which are 
best elaborated in the methodology of social sciences, particularly in the methodology 
of social research. The studying of these methods must be incorporated into the 
process of journalist education. This will contribute to the acquiring of intellectual 
criteria and analytical skills. Especially important is the studying of the techniques for 
gathering information. The strategy for gathering information is “a product of the 
same spirit which connects methods of research in history, the method of work of 
intelligence agencies and the scientific method. The journalist research method - the 
search for facts related to current events that can be verified, is expressed through 
having initiative, observation and in-depth research – digging”.2  
           The public today is all the time more educated and it imposes the need of 
impartial and highly educated journalist. The high intellectual level of the audience, 
the educated and active journalists and the development of public journalism2 put 
pressure on the false and partial reporting and are the main factors that condition the 
need for quality and interpretative information based on facts and argumentation. 
Such quality of information can only be a result of a new type of journalism that has 
appeared at the end of the 20th century, and in which base is the educated and 
research oriented journalist-specialist, who apart from the timely, full, and accurate 
information can also offer an explanation, i.e. an in-depth analysis, which in turn is a 
prerequisite for a straightforward and accurate conclusion. 
 
2. Political communication and media – Information trends in te Balkans 
 
At present, the criteria for the democratic equality is untouched and clean zone for 
communication between those who ruled and the ones who are ruled. In the hands of 
the ruled ones the only shield and corrector to the authority remains the public 
opinion. Political communications are mainly institutionalized through media. 
Analogically, in the political analytics debates regarding the misuse of the political 
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communications are directed in two ways: firstly the structuring of media systems, 
and secondly, the misuse communications through ways and technique with which 
public opinion and understanding of the citizens are formed and creating with the 
aimed of taking over and main the authority. 
              In the first case there are two media systems: American and European ones. 
In the American model, the co called  corporate oligopolism, there is no presence of 
state media. The public debate is a market merchandize which interesting enough for 
someone to buy it. I 
In the European model of the media organization the degree of control depends on 
the type of political system. In practice, the state media are mainly on the hands those 
who ruled the state. The Republic of Macedonia belongs to these model where the 
political public traditionally is no treated as a market. Here, the political socialization 
in which, at present the media are key factor, is different.  
             In the second half of the 80s and in the 90s, the Balkan states were faced 
with serious economic and political challenges whose impact altered the logic of social 
living. These changes were simultaneous with some other crucial changes taking place 
at the world level. While the so-called Eastern Block was faced with radical social 
changes, the global changes that the world faced were, above all, of a technical and 
technological nature, the repercussions of which had their great impact in the area of 
communications. The development of remarkably fast communication systems in the 
1990s introduced a different quality of information and of mutual understanding, in 
addition to a greater world- wide interdependence which in turn led to a swift 
globalization (economic, political and cultural).  
              After World War II, the Balkan countries, with the exception of Greece, lived 
in what was commonly known as the communist block. During this period the majority 
of the Balkan countries underwent a process of fast emancipation that increased the 
literacy rates of the population to a significant level compared to the European 
average. Hence the Balkan countries had a very specific historic experience that 
differed from the experience of the other European countries. The Cold War division 
of the world into two blocks continued until the end of the 1980’s. This fact traced the 
path of development and of specific perception of the rest of the world. The historical 
experience of the Balkan states, the collective memory and life under the specific 
political system (that produced extensive closure) resulted in formation of stereotypes 
and prejudices in  the perception and understanding of the world. The mobility of 
people was very low, and in some countries it was almost impossible. People received 
information about the latest world developments through the media owned by the 
state. In other words, the state had a complete monopoly over the diffused 
information. The media were often viewed as a means for disseminating socialist 
culture and values.  
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This already established perception of the world, as well as the dominant social 
psychology in the Balkans, began to change as a result of the changes in the socio- 
political systems, but also under the influence of the new means of information which 
was made possible by the new media: the satellite and cable TV, the Internet, the 
video and videotext as well as the computerization. 
These technical and technological changes have contributed to new types of  
communication flows, bringing about changes in the social relations. The theory (it is 
also partially confirmed by research), points out the social power of media as well as 
the significant role played by the media in the distribution of information, the creation 
of public opinion and the global power of suggestion. The sociologists refer to the 
contemporary society as information society in which the information and its diffusion 
have a central meaning. The term information society associates mostly with the new 
media (product of the technological revolution) and the new means of transmission. 
When we talk about information societies we think of the societies in the developed 
countries where the computer and telecommunication technologies are widely 
accessible, a great number of people are employed in the information sector, the 
average spending on information products is remarkably high and the number of 
analysts of the information tendencies is growing. How many of the Balkan states 
participate in these tendencies?  
             The events that happened in the Balkans at the end of the 1980’s and the 
beginning of the 1990’s give us a rare opportunity to observe the role of media in the 
contemporary socio-political developments. The media were the key promoters of 
national identity, national consciousness and cultural identity. The political changes 
that happened in the media sector were expected to provide freedom of information 
and competition by means of pluralism. One of the first tasks was to transform the 
centralized media and their monopoly role. In the Balkan countries and most of 
Eastern Europe the state- owned media took over the role of national media. That was 
the case with the Republic of Macedonia as well.  
            The analysts of the media sector in the Balkans noticed two parallel processes: 
first, the creation of national media and second, the transnationalisation, due to the 
simultaneous presence of the processes of technological change and convergence. 
One of the common characteristics of the Balkan countries and Eastern Europe 
appears to be the lack of legal regulation in the media sector. The new media share 
some new characteristics that facilitate the development of a new way of 
communication deprived of the old features such as unilaterality, simultaneous 
distribution to the mass audience and the absence of interactivity.    
             In this respect, most of the communist Balkan countries, including Macedonia, 
are still challenged by the construction of a new media system, both in terms of 
technical modernization and in terms of legal definition of its media system. Hence, 
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here arise the problems of media monopolization, cultural protection, human 
resources, etc. The legal regulation of media represents a problem at global level as 
well. The legal regulation is hindered by certain economic factors and the fast 
technological innovations. One of the major problems regarding the media regulation 
is the monopolization of media. It worries the theoreticians of democracy because it 
threatens the competition and the quality of political communication. These are the 
two main guarantees of a democratic system. Some of the possible solutions to the 
problem of monopolization suggest recognizing the domination of only few media 
corporations and preventing the creation of new monopolies as well as establishing a 
stable and attractive public sector which would be the key factor in preventing the 
creation of new media corporations.  
The media manipulation and its emancipatory role are the two main factors 
that impose the need of establishing a high quality legal framework in the media 
sector. Manipulation is an extremely harmful tool because it distorts reality by 
omitting the relevant facts that are necessary for having a complete understanding of 
the issue or by misinterpreting the present facts. The objective is to mislead the 
audience in order to achieve certain political or economic goals. According to Rainer 
Geissler there are two types of manipulation: in the first case certain élites or a class 
of people occupy the mass media, in the second case a mass political culture is being 
produced by means of the market- economic mechanisms (maximizing the recipients).  
           The emancipatory role of media is crucial for the contemporary world. In the 
contemporary societies the number of young people who expand their knowledge via 
Internet is constantly growing. Books begin to loose their popularity. In the future the 
media will continue to have the most important role in education. “With its 
ideologically death subjects as well as difficult and boring courses schools can not 
compete with the mass culture and its shining idols. But when they understand that 
and they try to imitate the mass culture and its way of presentation the schools only 
trivialize their subjects without making it less boring” (Mils, 1951). Yet, many 
sociologists warn that mass media direct their attention towards attractive and 
interesting issues from our lives neglecting those that are less attractive but 
nevertheless very important.  
            The developed European countries have already taken into consideration the 
great influence of media while preparing their teaching programs. They include 
subjects whose main objective is to develop the student’s capacity and responsibility 
for critical understanding of the messages delivered by the media. Unlike the 
developed European countries where there is a long tradition in scientific and 
academic following of up to date media and information trends, it should be 
highlighted that the first departments in Macedonia were opened after the year 2000, 
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mainly at newly established private universities. Thus there is a great need in 
literature, staff as well as in research projects, exchange of students, etc.  
             A good media system and a thoroughly organized media policy is crucial for 
the integration processes in the Balkan societies. The introduction of cable and 
satellite TV imposed the issue of the diasporic or transnational audiences within the 
sector of the international public opinion. The diasporic audiences are composed of 
members of national minorities or communities that live in one country (ex: the Indian 
community in Great Britain, the Turkish community in Germany, the Moroccan 
community in Spain, the Albanian community in Italy, the Hungarian minority in 
Romania, the Macedonian minority in Greece and Bulgaria, etc…) Researches 
conducted in the Republic of Macedonia (Panova. 2000, 52-53) demonstrate that 
ethnic communities in Macedonia primarily follow satellite programs of their kin 
countries, followed by their interest in privately owned TV stations on ethnic grounds. 
The third in popularity are the commercial Macedonian TV stations, and the last is the 
Macedonian National Television. When it comes to diasporic audiences the same occurs 
in the countries of Western Europe, an example of which is the Turkish community in 
Germany. Such technological revolutions (satellite TV) in the area of communications 
(the possibility of diasporic communities to follow programs of their country of origin) 
seriously influences their attitudes as a political subject and a participant in the 
current politics of the country in which they live. In the Balkan region, where the use 
of cable and satellite TV is widely spread, the video and audiocassettes are not as 
important as in Iran, where vast part of the population lives in media isolation.  
             When we talk about new media the latest novelty is the multimediality. 
Multimediality represents an intersection of computers, telecommunications and 
media. “Four technological trends have contributed to these developments: first, the 
constant improvement in the capabilities of computers, together with declining costs; 
second, digitization of data, making possible the integration of computer and 
telecommunications technologies; third, satellite communications development; and 
fourth, fibre optics, which allow many different messages to travel down a single small 
cable. The dramatic communications explosion of recent years shows no signs of 
slowing down” (Giddens 2006, 594).  
           In this domain, the digitalization (the transfer of electronic signals by 
transforming them into binary signals) is one of the greatest technological 
achievements after the discovery of cable and satellite TV. The main characteristics of 
multimediality are: interactive use, integration of different types of media and digital 
technology. According to the way the personal computer is being used the 
multimediality can be classified into two forms: open and closed. When the user is 
connected to a telecommunications network through infrastructural network we have 
open multimediality, referred to as Internet.  
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“The Internet originated during the Cold War period that preceded 1989. The “Net” 
developed out of a system used in the Pentagon, the headquarters of the American 
military, from 1969.This system was firstly named the ARPA net, after the Pentagon’s 
Advanced Research Projects Agency. The aim was limited. The ARPA sought to allow 
scientists working on military contracts in different parts of America to pool their 
resources and to share the expensive equipment they were using” (Giddens 2006, 
594).  
            The web was discovered in 1990 by a software engineer who worked at a 
Swiss physics lab and it was popularized by an undergraduate student at the 
University of Illinois.   
The discovery of Internet was a real boom in the information sector and it led to great 
social transformations. This sophisticated communication network is owned by 
nobody and it is available to everyone. The greatest advantage of Internet is its 
capacity to develop a dynamic interactive communication. People from different parts 
of the world communicate with each other via this network57. This communication 
develops in accordance with the personal needs, interests and affinity. The 
possibilities offered by this revolutionary discovery are various: information diffusion, 
education, self- promotion and shopping. In addition the Internet absorbs the 
conventional forms of communication such as: conferences, congresses, round tables 
and other types of debates. It is feared that the Internet could wipe out the other 
media in their original form. However, it is still difficult to predict what the impact of 
Internet would be. For example, the discovery of radio and TV, which was considered 
a great advancement compared to the press, did not cause the disappearance of the 
last.   
             The theoreticians consider the Internet the basis of the new global order that 
appeared during the last years of the 20th century. The Internet is spread rapidly and 
spontaneously. The diffusion and use of Internet depends on money. Therefore, 
according to available data, the Internet is still, more or less, a privilege of the 
developed countries. One of the main conditions for the expansion of the Internet is 
the number of personal computers in use. Whether a family will own a computer and 
an Internet connection depends on its financial status. This correlation between the 
standard of living and the quality of information reveals that Macedonia, Albania and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina are among the countries in Europe with the least use of the 
Internet. In most of the Balkan countries the old media (such as newspapers, radio 
and TV) are still holding a dominant position in the information process. The change of 
                                                 
57 According to some researches the number of Internet users is approximately 35 million 
people. It is estimated that the annual Internet traffic growth rates in the period 1985- 1998 
were close to 200%.  
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the socio- political system led to a free information flow and media pluralism, though 
with a disputable quality.  
In this context the Balkan people know very little about the socioeconomic 
and political circumstances in their neighboring countries which has negative 
implications on the economic cooperation. The lack of information and true 
understanding of the other leads to the creation of stereotypes and prejudices which 
affects negatively the cultural cooperation not only in the Balkans but in the entire 
world as well. To a great extent it is the result of the development of the so called 
agency journalism (journalism that depends on news agencies). Very few of the Balkan 
media have a developed correspondent network; therefore most of them depend on 
the news distributed by the large global news agencies. These gigantic transnational 
corporations dictate the quantity and quality of information as well as the structure of 
the news system in the world. “The big four western news agencies, Associated Press 
(AP), United Press International (UPI), Reuters and Agence France- Press (AFP) are the 
heart of the world’s news systems, pumping basic information from their 
headquarters to newsrooms throughout the world, whether English speaking or not” 
(Herbert 2000, 13).  
             It is estimated that internationally there are approximately 200 top journalists 
who enjoy the confidence of the establishment. They hold the monopoly over the 
information regarding the international diplomatic relations and they regularly attend 
all international events as reporters. As a result of their professionalism these 
journalists very often are given the role of advisors.  
Due to the high costs, it is financially impossible for one media (radio, TV or 
newspaper) to have its own correspondent network that will cover the whole 
international arena.  
             The national agencies perform the key role in the distribution of news in each 
country and they are followed by the four transnational agencies. The national 
agencies serve as a filter which prevents the information aggression imposed by these 
gigantic world agencies.  
            When it comes to media and the dominant social opinions the issue of media 
and cultural imperialism or globalization can not be omitted. A global media order has 
already been established. If we scan the real situation we will notice a network of 
corporations in which the different media aspects (press, film, TV, publishing activity, 
music) are combined in order to form global communication corporations that possess 
the greatest part of the global flow of images and information. Some of the 
theoreticians criticize the current situation and talk about cultural imperialism. This 
refers above all to the invasion of Western culture, meaning the American cultural 
domination.  
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
78 
 
             Regarding media and entertainment, the social psychologists talk about the 
narcotizing disfunction of media. This refers to the loss of critical consciousness as 
well as the decrease in productive social engagement of people under the influence of 
media. This is achieved by giving too much space and time to cheap entertainment. 
Via the process of commercialization, media become a means for moving people away 
from the real life problems such as: economy, politics, social responsibility, etc…  
             The globalization of youth culture happens at very fast speed. The key role in 
this process is performed by the TV station MTV which is specialized in music 
television. This TV station appeared in 1981 in the US and it begun working in Europe 
in 1987.  
In 1980’s the European countries begun implementing quota (for non-
European media contents) in order to protect themselves from the American 
influence. The sociologist McQuail (McQuail 1994) believes that there should not be 
any concern regarding the influence of the transnational media, especially in the case 
of Europe, because the cultural influence comes from a culture which is historically 
fond of Europe. In the Balkans this type of protection is still not debated in debates 
and it is completely absent in the audiovisual politics. 
 
____________________  
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Abstract 
 
The goal of this paper is to give a complete overview of the global financial crisis 
consequences in the Albanian economy. It is a fact that the world crisis has affected 
our economy by trembling the factors and equilibriums that have supported economic 
growth. These factors have been reflected in the reduction of the level of 
consumption, of exports and investments, bringing to a deceleration of the economic 
activity and a greater pressure over fiscal indices, such as budgetary incomes and 
budget deficit. 
The decline in the inflow of foreign currency funds has also been associated to 
the worsening of the balance of payments indices and to the augmentation of 
depreciative pressures over the foreign exchange rate.   
 
 Key Words: global crisis, economic growth, trade deficit, exchange rate.  
 
What is a financial crisis 
 
The term financial crisis can be used to describe a “series of situations in which some 
institutions or financial assets lose immediately a large part of their value”1. Many 
economists have been offering their theories on how a crisis starts and develops, what 
are its causes and effects and how can it be prevented.  But, unfortunately they have 
not yet come to a consensus as far as these issues are concerned and as a 
consequence the measures to prevent such situations are still lacking nowadays.  
 
 
                                                 
1 A.Boriçi, Diploma Thesis”  The global financial crisis and its effects in the world and  the 
Albanian economy”  (September, 2009), pp 6 
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A historical overview 
 
The American crisis, the crisis of the most powerful nation of the world, has been 
recently placed in the first pages of the pan world media, being considered the issue 
of the day not only by the US, but by the world as a whole. The belief that the 
American economy, as a consolidated and solid economy, could not face such a critical 
situation was trembled. The crisis of the year 1929, the so called “Great Depression”, 
was almost forgotten until the US faced recession again in the year 2008. In that 
period the value of the stocks in the NYSE fell from 80 to 50 billion US dollars within 
certain hours. In the year 1933, when the crisis was about to end, the Dow Jones index 
was at the same value as that of the year 1900. On the 29th of October 1929 the NYSE 
faced what was called the “The black Tuesday”, which signed the beginning of an 
unseen crisis in the New World. The drastic decline in the prices of stocks in NYSE 
lasted almost a month, but only after certain years NYSE was able to reach the prior to 
crisis levels. 
 It is imperative for the American society and the world economy as a whole 
that specialized and long analyses be conducted in order to explain in details the 
actual global crisis. The causes of it must be well known, because this is the only way 
to prevent other economic disasters in the future.  
 However, the crisis that first showed in the real estate sector (construction, 
buying and selling of real estate) originates in the American financial system, as well 
as in the way the American economy is financed2. According to some authors, the 
stock exchange is the one of the main financing resources for the American economy, 
taking into account too the drawbacks of this financing. On the other hand, from a 
general overview of the actual world recession, tendencies to limit the trade economy 
and the free enterprise can be distinguished, which bring to the question if a higher 
intervention of the government in the economy is necessary.  
 The free market is being considered the main responsible for the actual crisis, 
while the real cause of it has in fact been the intervention of the US government. The 
involvement of the later took two forms3: 
 The first one was through the use of the Federal Reserve, which decreased the 
rate of interest from 6.5% to 1% in the January of 2001 and hold that level 
until the June of 2003, stimulating a massive wave of lending.  
 The second form has been the use of two companies sponsored by the 
government, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to offer assurance for house loans.  
 
                                                 
2Nuro A., http://tsh.albemigrant.com/?c=120&a=1562 
3Nurellari A., http://arkivi.peshkupauje.com/kriza-ekonomike-dhe-rruga-e-trete/2008/10/21/ 
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How did the financial crisis “tsunami” expand? 
 
In June of 2004 the Federal Reserve decided to restrain monetary policy by increasing 
interest rates by 1% to reach the level of 5.25%. This increase continued until the 
August of 2007. The drop of the houses’ prices put into difficulties many banks which 
have offered loans or loan guarantees to buy houses the market value of which was 
now lower than the value of the credit used to finance them. Events took the 
following path: 
 On the 6th of June 2007 the first victim in the American real estate market, the 
well-known American Foundation Home Mortgage failed. 
 On the 9th of June 2007, BNP Paris stopped its three investing funds, of a value 
of 2 billion euros, because their market “disappeared”4. 
 In March of 2008 J.P. Morgan Chase, one of the strongest American banking 
and commercial institutions, bought the shares of another company, one of 
the most aggressive Wall Street institutions, Bears  Stearns, which was also 
risking failure. Each share cost 10 dollars. Transaction financing was possible 
because the American government had offered the guarantee for a 30 billion 
US dollars credit acquired b J.P Chase Morgan.  
 In September of the same year American government bought the two 
mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac which otherwise would 
have lost until 5000 billion dollars. A part from these events the crisis progress 
could not be stopped5. 
The Treasury Department and the FED refused to continue the intervention 
with the excuse that this would cost billions of dollars to the American taxpayers. 
Immediately after this statement the investing bank Lehman Brothers declared its 
failure based on the Code 11 of the Failure Law. Its debt to the American creditors 
amounted to a value of about 610 billion dollars. Other banks chose other ways. 
Merryl Lynch for example saved the failure by being sold to the Bank of America at the 
amount of 50 billion dollars. To save the insurance company AIG the Treasury 
Department offered to it a loan of around 85 billion dollars. If this loan is not paid on 
time the government has the right to sell the company assets through an auction6.  
However the biggest intervention of the government took place during the 
last week of September 2008, when the administration of the ex-president George W. 
Bush gave an absolute authority to the Treasury Department to buy all the assets and 
                                                 
4 Selmani B., http://myweb.tiscali.co.uk/kosovo/kriza_financiare_2008.html 
5 U.Lushi, http://qafirarnaut.wordpress.com/2008/10/01/cfare-po-ndodhe-ne-tregjet-
financiare-boterore/ 
6 Ivi.  
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mortgages owned by banks which altogether would amount to the value of 700 billion 
dollars. This guarantee provided by the American government would then increase 
the level of the US national debt to the value of 11.3 trillion dollars, making it difficult 
for this government macroeconomic maneuvering. The deficit of the American 
government for this year was projected to reach the value of 500 billion dollars, but 
undertaking this project increased this figure to the level of 700 billion dollars. In 
simpler terms this expense for the American government is about the same as the 
cost of Iraq occupation and will cost around 2000 dollars to each American citizen7.  
The expansion of the crisis and its consequences in other countries 
 Because of very high indices of the American economy and of the high degree of the 
integration between international financial systems in the world, financial crisis 
expanded very quickly in other countries as well. The fast evolution of the crisis and 
the lack of trust on the international markets resulted in the decrease of liquidity and 
the increase of interest rates in these markets, where for example, LIBOR and 
EURIBOR experienced continuous growth. As a consequence a considerable number of 
banks faced big financial difficulties which itself influenced negatively in the level of 
trust in the markets. Within a very short time problems in the financial sector did 
reflect in the real economy sector. The economic deceleration in the US was 
associated with the decline in the level of this country’s exports and imports, which 
than affected directly the economies of certain other countries. The increase in the 
level of unemployment and the decrease of the purchasing power were consequences 
of the recession that expanded over the world. After the US these indices experienced 
drastic decline in other developed countries too.  
The economic recession in the developed world caused a decrease in the 
industrial production of about 12%, directly influencing the unemployment degree 
enhancement. 5.1 million job places were lost in the US, mainly in the services sector, 
in the processing and in the construction industry. In the EU countries too 
unemployment rate increased, reaching the level of 8% by the end of 2008, compared 
to a 6.8% rate in the previous year. According to some forecasts by the end of 2010 
the unemployment rate in the US and in the EU will be respectively 9.5% and 10.2%8.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Ivi.  
8 Annual Report of Kosovo Central Bank , 
http://www.bqkkos.org/Publications/BQK%20Raporti%20Vjetor%202008.pdf 
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Figure 1. 
                   
                      
 
Resource:BoA (2008) 
IMF forecast 
International Monetary Fund, in its document of “World Economic Forecast, Crisis and 
Revitalization” of April 2009, emphasizes that world economic growth for the year 
2009 is expected to be 1.3 % negative. The growth rate in the economies of the 
developed countries will be limited to around 3.8% (for the first time from the Second 
World War), while developing economies will grow by only 1.6%. Besides this situation 
not very positive a regeneration of the world economy is expected by the year 2010, 
when economies are expected to grow in average by 2%. On the other hand, in the 
Euro zone the growth is expected to be 0.4% during 2010, while our economy is 
expected to grow by 0.7%. 
Recession will influence public finance as well. The primary deficit is expected 
to increase from 2% of GDP in 2008 to the level of 4.5% during 20109. 
Following, using a table and a chart, will be presented the evolution of the GDP level 
and inflation level during the years 2007-2008 and the forecast for the years 2009-
2010 
 
                                                 
9 Report of the Financial Stability, Bank of Albania, 
http://www.bankofalbania.org/web/Raporti_i_Stabilitetit_Financiar_2008_5462_1.php 
  GDP Growth  Forecast     Annual average Inflation Forecast 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 5.2 3.2 -1.3 1.9 3.9 5.9 2.5 2.4 
Developed 
Countries 2.7 0.9 -3.8 0 2.2 3.4 -0.2 0.3 
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Table 1. Resource: BoA, 2009 
 
 
Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resource:BoA (2008) 
 
Effects of the crisis in the Albanian economy 
 
The year 2008 was positive for the economic growth of Albania, which was estimated 
to have surpassed the yearly level of 6%. Economic growth was supported by 
considerable fiscal and monetary stimulus, in the context of the budgetary expenses 
and financial sector credit support. However, the effects of the international financial 
crisis started to be felt in Albania to by the last quarter of 2008. They were reflected in 
USA 2 1.1 -2.8 0 2.9 3.8 -0.9 -0.1 
Japon 2.4 -0.6 -6.2 0.5 0 1.4 -1 -0.6 
Eurozone 2.7 0.9 -4.2 -0.4 2.1 3.3 0.4 0.6 
Great Bretagne 3 0.7 -4.1 -0.4 2.3 3.6 1.5 0.8 
Developing 
Countries 8.3 6.1 1.6 4 6.4 9.3 5.7 4.7 
Central Est 
Europe 5.4 2.9 -3.7 0.8 6.1 8 4.6 4.2 
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India 9.3 7.3 4.5 5.6 6.4 8.3 6.3 4 
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Meksiko 3.3 1.3 -3.7 1 4 5.1 4.8 3.4 
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the developments of the balance of payments, in the deceleration of the credit 
growth and in the reduction of optimism through businesses and individuals for the 
economic developments in the near future10. 
 The negative effects reflected in the Albanian economy by the end of 2008 
enlarged during the year 2009. The impact of the world crisis was felt mainly in the 
strong deceleration of the economic growth as well as in the decline of the incomes. 
At these conditions it is necessary to review the level of public expenses in 
order to adjust them to the income generation. These way better conditions would be 
created to preserve budget deficit at the expected level of 4.2% of GDP. 
During the year 2009 exports have experienced a higher decrease as 
compared to imports. A significant decrease was also registered in the level of 
remittances. As a result of the higher degree of unemployment in the countries were 
they live and work, Albanian emigrants are continuously sending less foreign currency 
to their home country.  
The value of the ALL (Albanian LEK) and the level of prices in the Albanian 
market have also been affected by the world recession. “The Supervision Council of 
the Bank of Albania in its meeting of July 29th, 2009, after getting informed about the 
later economic and financial developments within and outside the country and after 
the careful analysis of the trust indices, expectations of the banking system and the 
specialists forecasts about inflationist developments in the future 8 quarters, decided 
to keep unchanged the basic interest rate”11. 
Following will be provided three charts showing the evolution through the 
years of three main Albanian macroeconomic indicators, GDP, foreign exhchange rate 
and inflation rate. It is difficult to forecast the economic growth of Albania during 
2009, according to the IMF this growth is expected to be somewhere around 0.4%, 
while according to the Ministry of Finances it might reach the 4.8% level12. 
                             Figure 3 
Resource:Bank of Albania (2008) 
                                                 
10 Bank of Albania, Annual Report 2008. 
11 Bank of Albania, 2009. 
12 http://www.top-channel.tv/artikull.php?id=159930 
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Figure 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resource:Bank of Albania (2008) 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resource:Bank of Albania (2008) 
Foreign trade 
 
By the end of 2008, the deficit in the current account reached the level of 14.9% of the 
GDP, from the 10.4% at the end of 2007 which is equal to a 55% increase. The value of 
this deficit has been deepening during the fourth quarter of the year, because of the 
decrease in the level of exports and emigrants’ remittances. The decrease in the net 
current transfers has been estimated to be around 213 million Euros. The difference 
between imports and exports, in other words the trade deficit, was calculated to be 
27.9% of GDP in 2008, compared to 26.6% in 2007. The main factor for the worsening 
of this index has been the increase in the level of goods trade deficit by 301 million 
Euros13. 
                                                 
13 http://www.bankofalbania.org/web/Annual Raport _new_2611_1.php 
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This tendency is continuing this year too. The value of exports for the first two months 
of the year was 14 billion and 151 million ALLs or about 2.2 billion ALLs lower than 
that of the first two months of 2008. Imports have been decreasing too from a 64 
billion ALLs for the first two months of 2008 to 61 billion ALLs for the first two months 
of 200914. 
The General Directory of Customs has reported that during the first two 
months of 2009 the amount of the realized incomes was 1.8 billion LEKs lower than 
the amount planned for this period15. Official data reveal that from 16 billion and 267 
million ALLs planned to be collected during this period (in the form of customs duties, 
VAT and other taxes) only 14 billion and 422 million ALLs were actually collected. This 
means that only 89% of the planned got realized16.  
 
The Albanian financial market   
 
The banks and the Albanian financial system witnessed that they were not directly 
related to the foreign financial markets. Lack of liquidity was not noticed at the 
beginning. Also, during the past year the lending process did not decelerate. The Bank 
of Albania asked to second level banks to keep high the level of credit to the Albanian 
economy.  
 Treasury Bills interest rates continued to grow even during 2009. In January of 
this year the one year Treasury Bills interest rate reached the level 8.86%. However, 
the proclaimed amount in the auction was not achieved. The same thing happened 
with the 6 months Treasury Bills, whose interest rate reached the level 7.46%. 
Compared to November 2008, the one year Treasury Bills interest rate increased by 1 
%.  
Figure 6                                                                                          Data Resource:BoA (2008) 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Uruçi E. & Begani A., The impact of the actual global crisis in the Albanian economy and business, 
International Scientific Conference, 25th -27th September 2009, Belgrade, Serbia 
15 Ivi.  
16 Ivi. 
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This continuous increase in the interest rate of the Treasury Bills witnesses that banks 
continue to have liquidity difficulties and the demand of the government for money 
has not yet been accomplished17.  
 
The foreign exchange market  
 
In general, during the year 2008, the progress in the value of the ALL has been 
reflecting the stability of the country’s macroeconomic indicators, the positive 
difference of interest rates in various foreign currencies, the developments in the 
international currency exchange market and the temporary movements in the 
demand and the supply for foreign currency in the internal market. Following is 
presented a chart showing change in the value of the ALL vs. the USD and the Euro 
during the year 2008, followed by another chart showing interest rates for deposits in 
ALLs and in Euros. 
 
Figure 7. EX rate fluctuations (2008)                                 Figure 8. Deposit interest rates  
                                (ALL vs. Euro) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resource:BoA (2008) 
 
                                                 
17 E.Uruçi & A.Begani, The impact of the actual global crisis in the Albanian economy and 
business, International Scientific Conference, 25th -27th September 2009, Belgrade, Serbia 
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The Euro dilemmas  
 
The analysis of the foreign exchange rate during the summer’s season of the last 5 
years has usually evidenced the depreciation of the Euro vs. our currency. This has 
been explained with the inflow of foreign currencies in Albania through emigrants’ 
remittances and the increase in the number of tourists during this period. In the new 
situation created by the world recession, by the end of 2008 and during 2009, was 
noticed a stability of the European currency vs. the ALL. This is related to the decrease 
in the level of foreign trade of Albania and to the return of emigrants from the 
countries where they previously worked. Another factor that caused this situation was 
also the decline in the number of foreign tourists in Albania.  
The current deficit, about 15%, represents itself another red light that can 
influence negatively to the value of the ALL, together with the increase in the interest 
rates and difficulties in attracting investments18. 
  
The banking system, deposits and loans  
 
The year 2008 signed an increase in the banking system activity, which is evidenced in 
the total level of assets in the system reaching the value of 843.1 billion ALLs or 12.4% 
higher than that of the previous year. 
Figure 9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Resource:BoA, 2008 
 
                                                 
18 Sh.Cani, Qeveria, indiference vrastare ndaj krizes,  Shqip Newspaper, The Economy Session, 
may 20 2009,  pp 6 
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Besides the many problems faced by the economy of our country, the year 2008 has 
also been characterized by a 36% increase in the sector as compared to 2007. Clients 
deposits as well increased by 2.4% in comparison to the year 2007. 
 
Figure  10.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Resource:BoA, 2008 
 
It must be emphasized that by the end of 2008, the weight of public deposits 
versus the total fell for the first time after some years, as a result of deposits 
withdrawals. It is estimated that during this period 49.1 billion ALLs were withdrawn 
or about 7% of the value of deposits in the third quarter. 
 
 
Figure 11.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Resource:BoA, 2008 
By the end of 2008, the major part of the assets in the banking sector 
consisted of the credit portfolio, which accounted for 47.6 % of the total or 3.5 
percentage points higher than the level of this indicator by the end of the third 
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quarter. The weight of the credit portfolio within the total assets of the banking sector 
has been continuously increasing since the end of the year.   
 But the reduction in the fund resources of the banks and the increase in the 
level of insecurity caused a deceleration in the credit growth rates. However, during 
the first months of 2009 the credit to our economy has been increasing again. Also the 
banking system has signaled that the credit conditions will not be restrained more 
during the last two quarters of 2009. The demand of the private sector for credit in 
ALLs has been faced with a continuous willingness by the banks to satisfy it, as result 
of the liquidity situation stabilization and of the release of the monetary conditions at 
the beginning of 200919. 
The credit portfolio reached the value of 396.8 billion ALLs, which is equal to 37% of 
GDP. Compared to the same period of the previous year this balance evidence a 36% 
increase equal to a value of 104.3 billion ALLs.   
According to the Bank of Albania survey: “Banks are expecting an increase in 
the interest rates for foreign currency loans, which will be agreed in the third quarter 
of 2009.  The net percentage of the banks that share this expectation is 12.3%, 
compared to the percentage of banks expecting increase in interest rates for credit in 
ALLs, which is only 4.7%”20. 
 
Figure 12.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Resource:BoA, 2008 
 
 According to the EBRD, Albania may be faced with the second wave of the 
crisis as result of the increase in the bad debt and of businesses financial difficulties. 
According to its experts all countries that were characterized by high economic growth 
rates are now facing demand and foreign direct investments decline. This situation 
                                                 
19 Bank of Albania, 2009. 
20 “Panorama” Newspaper ,  August, 2nd 2009, pp. 6 
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needs an immediate intervention of the government and the major measures 
suggested include21: 
− Reconstruction of the private debt, 
− Reduction of the risk from the foreign exchange, and 
− Improvement of banks balances through their capitalization.  
The Bank of Albania itself has declared that the volume of problematic loans 
as increased, meaning that the quality of the credit portfolio has diminished. The 
trade sector is considered to be the most problematic as far as credit repayment is 
concerned.  
 In the fourth quarter of 2008, the sectors which account for the biggest part 
of the problematic credit include22: 
− The trade sector, which accounts for about 32% of the total problematic credit 
(was 9.7 %),  
− The construction sector, with 16.4% of the total (was 7.6 %). 
        The industry sector, with around 11% (was 6.7 %)   
                 Figure 13.  
                 
 
Data Resource: BoA, 2009. 
 
The ratio of the problematic credit versus the total, on a gross basis, has been 
changed as follows through the fourth quarter of 2007 and the third and fourth 
quarter of 2008  23. 
                                                 
21 “Panorama” Newspaper, July 28th,  2009, pp 6 
22 “Panorama” Newspaper, July 29th,  2009, pp 17 
23 “Panorama”, Newspaper, July 29th,  2009, pp 17 
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Figure 14.  
Data Resource: BoA, 2009. 
 
By the end of 2008, 78.3% of the credit portfolio was considered “standard”, 
i.e that can b repaid regularly, and only 1.3% of it was considered “lost credit”, for 
which banks has started procedures of recovering through the execution of the 
collateral.24 
 
Construction sector  
 
During 2007 and 2008 the number of constructions and sales in the construction 
sector has been decelerating. Many companies report to have difficulties in collecting 
their funds. Actually, construction business in Albania will work and invest much less 
than before because there is lack of liquidity and the total activity is expected to fall to 
the 60% of their capacities. The major reasons for this situation are: 
− The reduction in the level of credit offered by the banks 
− The deceleration of the economic growth and reduction of remittances25. 
The future does not seem optimistic too, specifically for the housing market. Less 
credit offered by the banks will be followed by a lower demand for houses purchases, 
because around 80% of these transactions are financed by mortgage loans. This sector 
accounts for 13% of the GDP, taking an important place in our economy26. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 The world recession has affected Albanian economy by trembling the factors and 
equilibriums that have supported its economic growth.  
                                                 
24 Same as above  
25 E.Uruçi & A.Begani, The of the actual global crisis in the Albanian economy and business, 
International Scientific Conference, 25th -27th September 2009, Belgrade, Serbia 
26 Same  as above. 
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 These effects have been reflected in the decline of consumption, exports and 
investments, resulting in the deceleration of the economic activity and pressuring 
over the fiscal indicators, such as the budgetary incomes and budget deficit.  
 The decrease of the foreign currency inflows has been associated with the 
worsening of the balance of payments indices and the depreciation of the ALL 
versus the most important currencies.  
 Also the slow increase of the credit and of the monetary supply as well as the slow 
progress in the budgetary incomes is a sign that the rhythm of economic growth in 
Albanian has been falling.  
 In these conditions it is necessary for the government to intervene in order to 
alleviate the negative effects of the crisis. It is important for the economic activity 
to be revived and in this context the government should play its role 
 Stimulating export activities would be a good start. Providing legal, financial and 
promotional support to businesses working in this sector would help enhance the 
inflow of Made in Albania products in the foreign markets and face more 
successfully international competition. 
 Also the creation of a favorable political and legal environment would help attract 
more foreign direct investments, which in turn would bring foreign currency to 
Albania and therefore would help reduce the balance of payments deficit and the 
risk of ALL depreciation. 
 On the other hand, businesses themselves should be more careful in planning and 
managing their activities, by emphasizing more on long-term instead of short-
term profits.  
____________________________  
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Jeta HANI and Kadishe LIMANI 
 
Does Macedonia Have to Abandon Its Fixed Exchange Rate of the Denar or 
Devaluate It? 
                                            
 
Introduction 
 
We are in the world economic crisis’ swirl and the economies in transition are 
intervening in order to protect their currencies from devaluation, concretely 
Macedonia. Our research treats the issue if, in the actual crisis conditions, Macedonia 
has to keep its fixed exchange rate of denar or to pass into another exchange rate 
regime. The research also treats the alternative if Macedonia has to do an eventual 
devaluation of denar, in order to protect its economy from the actual world crisis.  
Because of its fixed exchange rate regime of denar, it is recommended a 
restrictive monetary policy in order to be ignored the possible risk of loaning as a 
result of giving loans without cover up from the banks of the second level.  This can 
cause serious damages in the banking system of Macedonia. A restrictive monetary 
policy also means an increase of interest rates in short terms which will have effects in 
decreasing the credits. This policy, in one hand, will affect negatively the components 
of Aggregate Demand (decreasing them), but will generate positive effects in keeping 
safe the banking system of Macdonia from any influence of the crisis, in the other 
hand. Macedonia, through a fixed exchange rate of denar, will eliminate the possible 
importation of inflation from other countries. One of the elements that influences in 
the current account is the possibility of speculation as a result of possible fluctuations 
of inflation and interest rates. Based on the Balance of Payments and the effects of 
global financial crisis on the most important macroeconomic indicators we conclude 
that Macedonia needs to continue keeping its currency exchange rate fixed. 
An eventual devaluation of denar can cause deterioration of the denars’ 
fluctuation and worsening the situation of the commercial banks. In a case of 
increasing the need for denar for daily purposes, the public and enterprises will 
replace their deposits in foreign currencies for denars with a high exchange rate. 
Obviously, this affects negatively the banks’ liquidity of denar. The only positive effect 
of the eventual devaluation can be the fact that Macedonia will have cheaper exports. 
But keeping in mind the fact that the world financial crises has attacked also the most 
important importers of Macedonia, EU countries ( up to 50% of foreign trade 
Macedonia realizes with these countries), this cheapening of the Macedonian exports 
will not have a significant effect in the current account. 
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The exchange rate policy in The Republic of Macedonia and other economies in 
transition 
 
Since the beginning of the years 1970 with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, 
the determination of the process of the exchange rate for the countries in 
development has been substantially different than the industrial countries. The 
majority of the industrial countries have followed a policy of variation management, in 
which the trade forces determine the exchange rate, even though with a frequent 
intervention of The Central Bank. As contrast, the majority of the countries in 
development didn’t relinquish the policy of determination of the exchange rate of 
their currency. So, for the countries in development the exchange rate has remained a 
political instrument.  
 The regimen of the fixed exchange rate is a kind of system, where the 
government or the monetary observer authority holds the convertibility of their coin 
in a fixed exchange rate. A coin is convertible if the Central Bank will buy or sell that 
amount of coins that the citizens want to exchange in a fixed exchange rate.  
 
In the system of a fixed exchange rate, the monetary authority interferes to 
maintain unchanged the exchange rate. If the cost of the coin increases, the 
monetary authority can sell native currency or decrease the interest rates. 
             
The fixed exchange rate has its advantages and disadvantages. Firstly, one of the 
advantages of this exchange rate stands in the way that it creates stability for the 
enterprises and families because it encourages investments and trade. Throughout 
these fixed rates, the varieties of the currency rate are eliminated and as a result it 
also eliminates competitive ability of the native enterprises. The enterprises are safer 
with their capital investments as a result of the stability of the interest rates.  
           Secondly, the fixed exchange rates can act as limiters of the native inflation. This 
happens because they eliminate the possibility for an inflation to be imported from 
other countries. Finally, the fixed exchange rates prevent speculations, because there 
is no need since the system is fixed. One of the elements that influence the Current 
accounting is the possibility of speculations as a result of the possibilities for variation 
of the inflation and interest rates.  
However the fixed exchange rates have their disadvantages. The main critic is 
that the government should have sufficient stocks to maintain the fixed price of their 
coin. At the same time, the enterprises of a country can be noncompetitive if the 
exchange rate is fixed too high. An exchange rate above the world level would 
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decrease the competitive ability of native enterprises and as a result the decrease of 
exports and increase of imports, causing a chain reaction. On the other behalf, the 
monetary authority should interfere in exchange rate, where it could happen that it 
could undertake policies that damage the native economy. For example, to maintain a 
fixed rate, the government can increase the interest rates and as a result can decrease 
the demand in the country. 
The volume of imports increases when native currency is valued. This makes 
foreign goods cheaper in compartment to those native. That’s why the offer of native 
currency connects in a positive way with the exchange rate when it is measured with 
the first method and the opposite for the second method.  
 
Is Macedonia immune from the crisis? 
  
Considering that Europe has officially entered recession, which means increase of 
unemployment and the creation of many problems for our country (problems that will 
be pointed out later during the structural analysis of the balance sheet of payments of 
RM): 
 Firstly, the demand for Macedonian exports will decrease as a result of the 
general demand decrease; 
 Secondly, foreign investments will be restrained, and the interest for 
privatization by European investors will decrease; 
 Thirdly, will the increase of unemployment, the income of emigrants will be 
afflicted negatively reducing their entrances in the country; 
 Fourthly, the predicted EU funds for the non-member countries (like our 
country) will decrease in the projects for aid, infrastructure, public services 
etc.  
 Fifthly, there will be implications in the variation of all basic macroeconomic 
indicators such as economic increase, exchange rate, monetary offer, 
inflation, interest rate, unemployment, the deficit of the KORRENT and 
budgetary accounting, profit of the enterprises, etc.  
 Sixthly, it will influence the increase of financial cost of the debt, if the 
Government will enter the market for long-term funding in currency; 
 Seventhly, there is risk of imported inflation in a second phase. 
  
The country should observe the possibility to increase currency stocks for an 
unexpected stroke of the coin by the devaluation to limit the damages in the economy. 
The calls for investments encouraged in the most inappropriate conjuncture should 
not be allowed, because it will end with unserious investors, in sale of the national 
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values with low prices etc. Experience tells us that if the interfere and feedback by the 
authorities is late, the cost that the country will confront will be higher.  
II.How does the monetary policy influences the Macedonian economy ? 
 
IS-LM Model 
 
In this model, ,,IS,,  shows the different combinations of incomes and interest rates 
where the market of goods is in equilibrium; ,,LM,, shows the combinations of interest 
rates and incomes where the market of money is in equilibrium.1 Since in economy 
every study begins with assumptions, we cannot depart from this fact also in our 
analysis of the “IS-LM” model, as a key element to receive a desired answer (How 
does the monetary and fiscal policy influence the economy of RM?). 
We suppose that the government has specified as objectif to stabilize the 
revenues in the point Y* and this could be achieved with expansive fiscal policy and 
restrictive monetary policy. The equilibrium in point E1 where LM 1 and IS 1 intersect, 
implies high interest rates and low level of investments and consumption of the 
private sector in PBB where that kind of policy is followed.   
Seeing on behalv of the other side, with a expansive monetary policy and 
restrictive fiscal policy, the equilibrium in point E2 which implies an intersect of LMo 
and ISo is still accomplishing the targeted revenue (Y*) but with lower rates of interest 
r0. the participation of investments and consumption in the private sector of PBB will 
be higher than in point E1. If the government chooses restrictive monetary policy and 
restrictive fiscal policy it will result with a restrictive policy exertion which in the 
graphic is the point E3 
 If the government chooses expansive monetary policy and expansive fiscal 
policy it will result with a expansive policy exertion wich in the graphic is the point E4, 
and  
The possible alternatives (points E1, E2, E3 and E4) in the graphic suggest that 
it ideal to follow a restrictive fiscal policy and a expansive monetary policy point (E2), 
but momentarily by the economists it is applied and recommended point E1 to 
confront the crisis that is argumented and analysed in the last session of the Central 
Bank. 
 
                                                 
1 “Economics for Managers”, Paul Farnham, pg.303-333;  “The Economy Today”, Bradley 
Schiller, pg.80-100; “The return of depression economics and the crisis 2008”, Paul Krugman, 
pg. 47-52. 
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Comment:   
 
On behalv of the economists it is recommended a restrictive monetary policy and 
expansive fiscal policy to confront the crisis. We talk about point E1 in the above 
graphic. Momentarily the country is in deflation, where even the deflation itselfs 
imposes costs in economy (lack of liquidity in market). In the situation where there is 
general decrease of the level of prices there can be a decrease of profits of businesses, 
decrease of earnings, and also increase of unemployment. In this case the borrowers 
loose and lenders gain.2  
According to economists, even though deflation is more suitable for the 
clients rather than inflation, since for the same amount of money they can buy more 
goods, for the producers it can be devastating because it decreases their revenues. 
The longer and frequent presence of deflation can have negative effects for the whole 
economy and in these frames even for its consumers.3  
To confront the crisis the government took several measures that were 
announced on 22 April 2009, and that: restriction of hiring in public administration, a 
delay in increase of earnings of 10%, a decrease in public expenses in some sectors, 
and a strict controle of the managers compensations in public enterprises.4 But in the 
other side the government is taking stimulating measures for the development of the 
industrial branches in the country. The minister of economy Fatmir Besimi said that 
the Government with 90.000 Euro has subsidied the food industry, the wood industry, 
                                                 
2 “Economics for Managers”, Paul G. Farnham,Georgia State University, Upper Saddle\River, 
New Jersey 07458, pg.303-333. 
3 http://alsat-m.tv/ekonomi/index.9.html 
4 http://alsat-m.tv/ekonomi/15661.html 
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textile and wine.5 According to the EU representative Andrea Forti, the key to 
development of the industry in Macedonia is the promotion of entrepreneurship.6  
Actually CBRM is following a restrictive monetary policy, where today this is 
also considered as reasonable on behalv of the economic experts even though in the 
beginning of November the Parlamentary Comission requested point E4 to be 
followed (expansive monetary and fiscal policy). This kind of request in reality present 
a paradox because it confronts the objective of the Government (maintaining the 
earings in a stabile level Y*). The Government cannot ask CBRM to follow an expansive 
monetary policy when the world is facing an financial-economical crisis, where an 
increase in the monetary offer will cause the decrease of the interest rates which will 
cause the increase of credit-lending while having no cover backup. In this moment it 
seems that in the times of global economical crisis, the devaluation of denar (caused 
by the increase in monetary offer) will be antiproductive with negativity rather than 
positive results.  A positive effects by this devaluation would be the expensive imports 
and cheaper exports (increase of competitivness). However in todays 
entrepreneurship conditions and surrounded by a huge number of controversies and 
the worlds economic crisis, there aren’t many possibilities that these positive changes 
will last for a longer period and for them to have a meaningful effect for the Current 
Accounting of the country.  
On the other side, threats by the negative effects of the devaluation in today’s 
conditions can be proven and identified easily. So, during a devaluation of the denar, 
the buying force of denar tools which the citizens and the enterprises own will 
decrease the percentage of the devaluation, when they will want to buy goods whose 
price is specified with a foreign currency clausol (for example apartments, cars, etc). 
This means that their demand will countinue to decrease, with which will appear 
negative phenomenons  in the real sector (decrease of production, increase of 
unemployed, and vigorous trends of deflation, and with this recession of the 
economy).  
The eventual devaluation will cause a big problem for the families and for the 
enterprises that are obliged with credit in banks based on the agreement that 
contains clausol of foreign currency. In this case, everyone that should secure more 
denaric tools to pay back their credits, which will influence even more negatively in 
the demand, and with this even in the economic increase. An additional problem for 
the enterprises will be how to secure denaric tools to purchase foreighn currencies 
with which they have to pay financial credits and goods that they have taken outside 
                                                 
5 http://alsat-m.tv/ekonomi/15661.html 
6 http://alsat-m.tv/ekonomi/15661.html 
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the country in the previous period, and which have to be paid in this year or the next, 
years that are considered years stoke by the global economic crisis. 7 
The devaluation will even risk the realization the budget of Republic of 
Macedonia. For the return withoyt payment of the credits taken previously outside 
the country and for the payment of annuities euro and obligations which expire in this 
year or the next, in the budget there should be separated denaric tools for the 
purchase of the needed foreign currencies with which would make the payment of the 
credits. This will put in risk the realization of this years activities planed by the 
Government of Macedonia, especially the realization of the activities by the capital 
investors.  
The devaluation can cause a wosening in the liquidity of the denar and of the 
commercial banks. In case of increase of the need for denare for everyday needs, the 
citizens and enterprises will replace the deposits of foreign currencies for denars with 
a higher exchange rate. This normaly has a negative effect in the liquidity of the denar 
in the banks, and with this even in the union of credits for the economical sector.8 The 
banks that in the previous period have created debts towards the foreigners will have 
to divide a higher amount of denars to purchase foreign currencies for the payment of 
credits, which will worsen their denaric liquidity. Meanwhile, for the percentage of the 
eventual devaluation of the denar, the founders of a part of the banks have to secure 
additional financial means, denars, to secure the socalled adequate capital of their 
banks. This, off course, will decrease the liquidity of the founders and will make the 
banks capital more expensive. All this will cause increase the interest fee of the banks, 
will decrease the support of the developmental activities of the enterprises and lower 
consumption of the citizens.  
According to this the eventual devaluation today, is obvious that will be 
something painfull. Thas why, the answer to the question whether the denar should 
devaluate in the existing economic conditions of the country, is NO. The regime of the 
fixed exchange rate can remain as it is for a predicted future, especially since the flow 
of international capital is limited. 
 
The last session of the Counsil of the Central Bank  
 
In the last session, The Counsil of Central Bank of RM debated the reports of the four 
trimesters of 2008. The report determined that the last trimester of 2008 is the one 
where the economy of Macedonia started to feel the consequences of the global 
                                                 
7 Tome Nenovski, professor, author of the article, “Devaluation yes or no”?, pg.1, 2 
8 Petar Goshev (Governator of Central Bank of Macedonia), http://alsat-
m.tv/ekonomi/15709.html 
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economic crisis, and that in the foreign market and investments. The same trend has 
continued even in the first trimester of the 2009, giving a small decrease in the 
exports opposite the imports of the goods. 
The market deficit continues to keep high levels, which in the conditions of a 
high insecurity as consequences of the world crisis in the economy of the country and 
the decrease of the internal flow of the capital from abroad and the increase of the 
demand for foreign assets.  These kinds of transactions increase the offer of the native 
currency which creates pressure for the devaluation of the native currency. This kind 
of pressure was overcome by the Central Bank of RM except for the interference in 
the currency trade, reacted even with the increase of the main rates of interest from 
7% to 9% in the end of March 2009. So the economic growth for 2009, for which the 
last projections were from 3% to 4,4% was reviewed by FMN to be -0.4%, with a 
significant decrease of the expected internal demand in the second trimester of the 
same year. The expected inflation rate for 2009 is 0.6%, which is a lower level from 
the one projected previously. 9 
 
Comment:  
 
Through an example and a hyphothezed graphic we will argument how BPRM 
intereres in the currency market to maintain stabile the exchange rate while taking 
into consideration the pressure that is usually upon the native currency: 
              We suppose that BPRM wants to maintain the exchange rate in 1 den=0.01626 
euro (expressed with the direct method) or 1euro=61.5 denar (indirect method). We 
have to mention that the demand for native currency (De) is connected negatively 
with the exchange rate when it is measured with the direct method but the offer for 
native currency (Se) is connected positively with the exchange rate. In this example we 
will manipulate with the exchange rate measured with the first method (direct).  
 
                                 R=€/de           D1                         S            
                                                          D                                             S1 
        
  1den=0.0162 
 
                                                                            
                                                      100            150              Qde 
 
                                                 
9 http://www.nbrm.gov.mk/default-en.asp?ItemID=D8A490DBD776A24AA976262C2D2D2966 
A B 
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The displacement of So in S1 is a result of the increase of the offer of the native 
currency and the displacement of Do in D1 is a result of the selling of the currency 
stocks (realized by BPRM to maintain fixed the exchange rate). The equilibrium of the 
balance sheet of payments is remade by this political action: 
                                     BP = ( X – M ) + K + RA = ( 100 – 150 ) + 0 + 50 = 0 
 
Short term analysis of exchanging rate 
 
As far as in the long term period is the export-import of goods and services the one 
that assigns the exchange rates, in the short term period are the incomes on the 
investments (norms of interests) that represent the assignment factor of the 
exchanging rate.10 
According to the modern theory of market assets, the exchanging rate 
expresses the prize of deposits in local currency in terms of bank’s deposits in foreign 
currency.    The most important factor that affects the demand for deposits in denar 
and deposits in Euro is the expected return in these deposits (actives) compare to 
each other.  When this return is higher for deposits in denar then for these deposits it 
will increase, whilst for deposits in dollars will decrease.   So, if supposing that the 
deposit in Euro has an interest of 1.5% it is expected that Euro will be assessed 0.13%, 
than the expected return of deposits in Euro ( euro
eIRR  ) will be 1.63%. 
The condition of parity of the interest’s norm, which confirms that the internal 
norm of interest is equal with foreign norm of interest minus the expected assessment 
of local currency.  This condition can be expressed in another way: the internal norm 
of interest is equal with the foreign norm of interest plus the expected assessment of 
the foreign currency.  
             
 
euro
e
den
e
ttteuroden
IRRIRR
EEEII

  /1  , this condition supports the fact that deposits 
are in complete substitution with each other and  also represents the condition of 
market currency balance.  
We start the analysis with how the expected returns for deposits in Denar and 
Euro change with changing of the exchanging rate. 
 
1. Expected returns for the deposits in denars ( den
eIRR )- always are equal to the 
interest rate of these deposits dispite of the exchange rate.  Thus, the curve of 
                                                 
10 “Currency market and international institutions", lecture of Prof. Dr. Sulo Haderi at 
postgraduate programm (finances) at SEE University, Tetove, September 2008. 
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expected returns for the deposits in denars, which we denote as ,den
eIRR will be 
vertical. 
2. Expected returns for the deposits in dollars-   ttteeuroeuroe EEEiIRR /1   . 11 
In 2007 the interest rate of the deposits in euroa is 1.2% and the expected 
exchange rate for 2008 is deneuroE t
e /0163224267.01  , (we suppose that in 
this exchange rate the currency market is in equilibrium). Whereas the current 
exchange rate (2007) is 0163441957.0tE , as result, the expected devaluation 
of the denar will be: 
  %1332.0100*001332.00163441957.0/0163441957.00163224267.0   
1. In this way, the expected return for the deposits in euro expressed in denars will 
be %3332.1%1332.0%2.1  . Since it is expectated a devaluation of the 
domestic currency , the demand for the deposits in euro will increase, where: 
denar
ee
euro IRRIRR  , (1.3%>1.2%). The following graph presents the curve of 
expected returns in euro, which we denote as euro
eIRR . It's slope is positive,which 
shows that with the expected devaluation of the denar /euro, the expected 
returns of the deposits in euro will decrease in order to fulfill the condition of the 
interest rate parity (Point A). 
2. Keeping in mind the effects of global-financial crisis in the end of  2008- 
continuation of  2009 the monetar authority doesn't allow a further devaluation 
of the denar. 
3. Assume the pressure that the denar had and still has for a further devaluation is  
0163031871.0tE dhe deneuroE t
e /0163224267.01  . 
 
Balance in the market currency. – the meeting point of the two above curves 
shows the point of balance where the expected returns for the two kinds of deposits 
are equal, so the condition of parity norm of interest is fulfilled and we also have the 
balance of currency market.  
 
                                                 
11 These rates are calculated as average of all interest rates for deposits in euro ( for the 12 
months of the year 2007  and  2008) ;  
http://www.nbrm.gov.mk/defaulten.asp?ItemID=5E3B5CA79135FE49B0E5121BBAA68CC9; 
National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia 
Statistics Department 
Monetary Statistics Division 
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                           Et                          IRRde                       IRReuro 
              0.016344195 
                    
             0.016322426 
         
               0.0163031871                                            
 
                                                                                                 
                                                                                              Expected returns in denars 
                                                        1.08         1.2           1.3                                
 
Comment:  To analyze the mechanism of suitability towards balance, we took the year 
of 2007, ,/0163441957.0 denareuroEt   over the one of balance. As it can be 
seen on figure, the expected retunes for deposits in Euro (point A) are mere than the 
deposits in denars (point B).  As long as the two kinds of deposits are both preferable 
people would like to sell the deposits in denars in order to by deposits in Euro offering 
denars in changing with Euros (offering deposits in denars changing with deposits in 
Euro). So, exactly this happened in 2008 in RM, where the surplus of offers of deposits 
of denars made the exchanging rate of denar with Euro to go down until the balance 
of expected returns of the two deposits (parity conditions of norms of interest).   
For such kind of devaluation the CBRM sold local currency in exchange for 
Euro. The last quarter of the 2008 and the other coming quarters of the 2009 are 
characterized by keeping the exchanging rate within the assigned borders. So, to avoid 
further devaluation of the denar CBRM intervenes in the currency market by selling 
Euro in exchange for denars until the balance of expected returns for the two deposits 
is reached.    In less developed countries, like our country the dominating factor for 
the daily changings of the exchanging rates is the change in expected exchanging rates 
for the future period ( 1t
eE ). The expected fall of the exchanging rate drives to 
devaluation of local currency (denar) the curve of expected returns for deposits in 
Euro will be removed to the right.  
 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
C 
A 
B 
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          IRR den                               IRR euro 1 
                                                                                                           IRR euro 2 
  
                                       E1 
                                       E2 
                                                       
                                                                                               
                                                             i den 
 
 
  
 
V. Overview of the balance sheet of payments of RM 
  
V.1. What does the balance sheet of payments present? 
 
 
              The balance sheet of payment is a system of accounts that serves for the 
registration of all transactions that are based in the movement of goods or funds 
between countries with the other part of the world. So, BoP presents economical and 
financial actions of a country with the rest of the world: 
 His trade in goods, services, 
 Puchase and selling of financial fortunes,  
 Other important transactions, as foreign aids, payment for damages etc. 
  
Transactions that are registered in BoP, based on their economic nature are 
classified in three groups: 
 The first Group involves transactions that have as object goods, services and 
revenues between residents and nonresidents. 
 The second Group, financial transactions that are rights/obligations of 
residents and nonresidents. 
 The third Group is refered to the balance elements that maintain equilibrity in 
both sides of the balance sheet of payments. 
The first and the third group of trasactions combine in a socalled Current 
account, and the second group appears in the capital and financial account. 
The main principle for the recoring of transactions in the balance sheet of 
payments is the one of the double system registration. all the payments of 
nonresidents ar called entrances or registrations in credit and are market with the sign 
E2 
E1 
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(+), meanwhile payments from residents are called exits or registrations in debit and 
are marked with the sign (-). 
 
V.2. Structural analysis of the Balance of Payments in Macedonia (in millions of 
euro) 12 
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 v.2006 2007 2008 2006    
% 
2007    
% 
2008       % 
GDP 5.082 5.782 6.507 100 100 100 
I. Current Account -44,92 -414,83 -851,16 -0.88 -7,17 -13,08 
1.Goods, neto -1.020,43 -1.174,82 -1.736,67 -20.08 -20,32 -26,69 
a) Exports 1.902,65 2.441,45 2.684,20 37.44 42,23 41,25 
b) Imports -2.923,08 -3.616,27 -4.420.87 -57.52 -62,54 -67,94 
2. Services, neto 22,15 25,54 -0.04 0.44 0,44 0,000614 
3. Incomes, neto -28,44 -277,67 -93,39 -0.56 -4,80 -1,44 
4. Current Transferts, 
neto 
981,80 1.012,11 978,94 19.32 17,50 15,04 
a) Official 58,73 23,94 47,92 1.16 0,41 0,74 
b) Private 923,07 988,17 931,02 18.16 17,09 14,30 
II. Capital and financial 
Accounting 
37,97 447,64 852,62 0.74 7,74 13,10 
Capital Accounting -0,82 3,68 -12,84 -0.02 0,06 -0,20 
1. Capital transferts, 
neto 
-0,82 1,23 -1,64 -0.02 0,02 -0,03 
a) Official 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
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1 Source, the link:   
http://www.nbrm.gov.mk/default-en.asp?ItemID=16C5679A8986CE4391D1F76413410999- 
b) Private -0,82 1,23 -1,64 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 
2. Purchases, 
nonfinancial asets  
0,00 2,45 -11.20 0,00 0,04 -0.17 
Financial Asstes 38,79 443,96 865,46 0,76 7,68 13,30 
3. Direct investments 344,65 506,85 422,02 6,78 8,77 6,49 
4. Portofolio investments 73,13 114,39 -50,64 1,44 1,98 -0,78 
5. Other investments -81,39 -75,52 442,44 -1,60 -1.31 6,80 
a) Commercial 
loans 
2,92 -28,98 24,62 0,06 -0.50 0,38 
   b)Loans, neto -22,28 -128,70 172,44 -0,44 -2,23 2,65 
c) Currencies and 
deposits, neto 
-83,74 5,93 207,44 -1,65 0,10 3,19 
 Monetary 
authorities 
-5,74 -0,17 16,04 -0,11 -0,003 0,25 
 Comercial 
Banks 
-10,42 68,45 234,62 -0,21 1,18 3,61 
 Individuals, 
neto 
-67,59 -62,34 -43,21 -1,33 -1,08 -0,66 
d)  Others, neto 21,71 76,22 37,94 0,43 1.32 0,58 
6. Official reserves,   
    bruto 
   (- = increase) / 3 
-297,60 -101,76 51,64 -5,86 -1,76 0,79 
III. Errors and oblivion 6,94 -32,81 -1,47 0,13 -0,57 -0,02 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
111 
 
The Current account:  
         The negative state and the movements in the market balance sheet in our 
country have been the main reason for the growing deficit and of the Current account 
in the balance sheet of payments, which was 13.08% of GDP of Macedonia in 2008. In 
this result has influenced the decreasing trend of the private transfers – revenues 
from abroad, not from the goods sold abroad but from the nonresidents. In the 
conference for organized export by the American agency USAID, the experts and 
businessmen of the government requested suventions for the textile industry, 
agriculture with the purpose of growth of the export of the products in the foreign 
countries. According to the expert analysis if measures aren’t taken fast, the country 
will have to confront with high consequences in economy as a result of spending the 
foreign currencies stocks. “Since dhe export in 2009 has marked a decreas of 30%, this 
means that the foreign currencis stocks are melting to maintain an currency 
equilibrium, and if this trend continues in the future the situation may be extremily 
bad”, declared Irena Kikerkova, economic expert.  
The Minister of economy Fatmir Besimi said that the executive power is 
working in increasing the export of the native products in the foreign countries. “Since 
this period is nontipical because of the economic crisis, one of the biggest markets of 
Macedonia is the EU market and from there we have implications in the volume of our 
export”, declared Fatmir Besimi, Minister of Economy.13 
 
Capital and financial account:  
 
         The inappropriate movements of the Current balance sheet haven’t been 
followed with meaningful movements in the capital-financial balance sheet of the 
country. The revenues of the foreign currencies on an abroad basis, direct foreign 
investments, selling of the countries fortune to foreign investors and the like, have a 
meaningful importance after the deficit of the Current account in the balance sheet of 
payments of the country.14 In these kinds of conditions, for the first time after a long 
time, in Macedonia there is that kind of a situation where the offer has a big 
importance staning behind the demand of the foreign currencies. The Central Bank of 
Macedonia, while securing the fixed exchange rate of the denar, in year 2008 
according to the data in the balance sheet of payments intervened with 51.64 milion 
euro’s and in last trimester of 2008 intervened with 194.79 milion euro’s to maintain 
in equilibrium the currency market and in the first two months of 2009 has intervened 
permanently in the currency market making unusual expenses (in comparament with 
                                                 
13 http://alsat-m.tv/ekonomi/15459.html 
14 Tome Nenovski, professr, author of the article: “Devaluation yes or no?”, pg. 2; 
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the previous periods in many years) to tie the offer with the demand for currency and 
in this way to keep stabile the exchange rate of the denar. The expense of nearly 300 
milion euro’s from the foreign currencies stocks in the last five months for securing 
the fixed exchange rate of the denar is one of the victims. 
This question rises: How can the native authorities overcome the lack of 
foreign currencies stock to secure the fixed exchange rate of the denar (or to 
garantuee the stability of the denar)? 
According to the economic expert Abdylmenaf Bexheti, the government with 
or without its will it has to sign an arrangement with the International Monetary Fund. 
“If we cant secure additional means, the country lacks 500-600 milion euro’s, and if 
we don’t finf other resources with similar conditions as those of FMN and The World 
Bank, it is required that the government does that and I think it will do it. I wouldn’t 
say that until now it has tacticized, they thought that it wouldn’t be necessary because 
the arrangements with FMN also mean active supervision of the economic policy, and 
not only consumption of financial means”, highlighted Abdylmenaf Bexheti.15 
 
 The Ministry of Finance took in market papirs with value which would be sold 
with foreign currencies' clausole with which it plans to cash in 16 milion euros. This 
will mean that these papirs with value will be garantued with euro’s, a new 
instrument which it seems that the Ministry of Finance was obliged to implement, 
because of the speculations that the value of denar may decrease.16 
 Except budgetary bonos which are produced by the Ministry of Finance, in the 
financial market of Macedonia are present Bono’s of the Kitty which are produced by 
the Central Bank in Macedonia. The rase during the past months between these two 
institutions that who will sell more bono’s, influenced in the increase of the interest 
fee’s of the bonos in almost 9%, but the interest fees that these two institutions 
specify, influence directly in the forming of the interest fees of commercial banks. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Interview with the expert of economy in Macedonia, Abdylmenaf Bexheti 
16 “Lajm”,  daily newspaper, Macedonia, 13-14 June,  nr.1237;pg. 6 
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Conclusion 
 
According to our analysis of the Balance of Payments, we conclude that the 
present currency crisis is caused from the speculative attacs of the denar, compained 
with the emphasized deficit of the current accounting and other problems of the 
macroeconomic stability. 
The regime of the fixed exchange rate of Macedonia, for a predictable future, 
should stay as it is. The Central Bank of Macedonia should intervene in the currency 
market to support the denar even though it is necessary to use foreign reserves of 
exchange. A stable exchange rate ensures to Macedonia a low inflation and an 
economic growth. 
           NO – to the devaluation of the denar. An eventual devaluation can cause 
worsening of the liquidity of the denar of commecional banks. Thus, there will 
increase the need for denars, where the citizens and enterprices will replace the 
deposits in foreign currency for denars with a high exchange rate. This has negative 
impact in the denars' liquidity of the banks. A situation which at the actual conditions 
of the crisis Macedonia doesn't need at all. 
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The Role of Economic Freedoms on the Road to the EU: The Case of Balkan Countries 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Measurement of economic freedoms and cross-country comparisons based on 
economic freedom performance has become increasingly popular in recent years. 
There seems to be a strong positive correlation between economic freedom and the 
major welfare indicators. Many Balkan nations are either on the way to, or planning to 
join the EU in a foreseeable future. Economic freedom indices may play a crucial role 
in shaping the future plans of the Balkans in the context of preparation efforts. This 
paper looks briefly at the history of EU-Balkan relations and the performance of the 
Balkan countries in terms of economic freedoms. 
 
Key words: economic freedoms, index of economic freedom, Balkans. 
 
European Union and Balkans 
 
A Brief History of the Relations Between European Union and the Balkan Countries  
 
Although throughout the Cold War period, the Balkan region was an isolated 
peninsula, with the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and with the 
strong aim of enlargement of EU that followed the Maastricht Treaty, integration of 
the Balkans into the EU appeared as a necessity. Today The Balkan Region is an 
indispensable part of the European area.  
EU declared that “the future of the Balkans is strongly associated with the 
European Union”.  According to the Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans that 
was held in 19-20 June 2003, the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 
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confirmed the European perspective of the countries of the Western Balkans, as 
potential candidates, and underlined its determination to support their efforts to 
move closer to the European Union. The European Council in March 2003 reiterated 
that the future of the Western Balkans is within the European Union and pledged the 
Union`s full support to the endeavors of the countries of the region to consolidate 
democracy, stability and to promote economic development (EU Council, 2003).  
So far Macedonia and Croatia have become candidate countries (Croatia has 
already started negotiations); Albania and Montenegro have signed Stabilization and 
Association Agreements (SAAs), an important step in the accession process; and 
Serbia, along with Bosnia and Herzegovina, has initialed a draft SAA with the European 
Commission. 
However, its incorporation into the New European Architecture has proved 
particularly problematic with negative consequences for the whole of the European 
space and the evolution of European integration (Demetropoulou, 2002:87).  The 
EU would consider the Western Balkan states for membership, but it will be on 
condition that if they reached EU standards. The EU was motivated by the usual 
economic considerations connected to enlargement and also a desire to increase 
regional stability. In pursuit of those objectives the EU adopted a strategy based on 
conditionality, tailored country strategies and regional co-operation (Brown and 
Attenborough, 2007:7). Conditionality is the principle which makes accession 
dependent on meeting EU standards. This aims to protect the integrity of the internal 
market and promote reform in potential candidate countries.  
 
Main Conditions for the Balkan Countries on the Road to the EU  
 
The EU’s strategy for the Western Balkans contained a number of key elements which 
are to be fulfilled and dealt with by potential candidate countries. These 
responsibilities are specified by the Stabilization and Association Agreement which 
represents a far-reaching contractual relationship between the EU and each Western 
Balkan country, entailing mutual rights and obligations. Such an association has high 
political value. It is based on the gradual implementation of a free trade area and 
reforms designed to achieve the adoption of EU standards with the aim of moving 
closer to the EU.  
The Stabilization and Association Agreements are tools which provide, much 
as the Europe Agreements did for the candidate countries in Central Europe, the 
formal mechanisms and agreed benchmarks which allow the EU to work with each 
country to bring them closer to the standards which apply in the EU. 
The Stabilization and Association Agreements focus on respect for key 
democratic principles and the core elements at the heart of the EU single market. 
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Through a free trade area with the EU and the associated disciplines (competition and 
state aid rules, intellectual property etc) and benefits (e.g. rights of establishment), 
this process will allow the economies of the region to begin to integrate with that of 
the European Union. For those areas where the agreements do not impose specific 
obligations relating to the EU acquits, there are provisions for detailed co-operation 
and discussion with the EU which again have the purpose of helping each country 
move closer to EU standards.  
EU gives the economic conditions a big importance and treats economic 
prosperity as essential for long-term stability in the Balkan Region. Although some 
important progress has been made in all Western Balkan countries to obtain 
macroeconomic stabilization, implementing modern market economy have a slow 
process, requiring persistent efforts over a wide front of structural reforms. The 
transition to free functioning market economies from centrally planned needs further 
reform efforts in many areas of the economy, by taking into consideration sustainable 
development objectives. 
As it can be understood from the above explanations, Western Balkan 
Countries are considered in every aspect a complementary territory of the European 
Union and it is much likely to be integrated to EU in the near future.  In the light of The 
Stabilization and Association Agreements, Thessaloniki Agenda, and Western Balkan 
Integration and the EU report issued in 2008 by World Bank, some main economic 
shortcomings that the region countries have to overcome can be showed as in the 
below table:  
Table 1.1. Conditions to Be Fulfilled By the Balkan Countries 
 
 
Source: Western 
Balkan 
Economic  
Conditions 
 Macroeconomic Stability 
 Prudent Fiscal Policies 
 Stable Monetary Policies 
 Increasing Competitiveness 
 Reducing High Level of Unemployment 
 Implementing an Appropriate Tax Policy 
 Fostering Human Development and Labor Market 
Participation 
 Placing Transparency and Accountability in Public 
Sector 
 To Create a Good Business Environment 
 Simplifying the Bureaucratic Proceedings for FDI     
 Liberalizing Trade and Developing Free Trade with 
the Region     
  Anti Corruption Legislation 
 Reduce State Intervention in the Economy 
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Integration and the EU, World Bank (2008) and EU Conditionality in the Balkans 
(2002). 
 
The above counted items are the main challenges yet for the Balkan Countries that 
have to be struggled to reach the directives of the Stabilization and Association 
Treatment of the EU. With these economic conditions and targets for the Balkans, we 
may make an evaluation of their efforts on this troubled long journey that they have 
done so far. Due to the fact that their contents are quite similar, it would be fruitful to 
follow a recently released “The Index of Economic Freedom 2009” by the Heritage 
Foundation to make comparison between the conditions that have been put forward 
for the Balkan Countries to fulfill and the actual level they have reached today.1 
 
EU Conditionality and the Criteria of Economic Freedom 
What Does Economic Freedom Mean? 
 
There are various definitions of the economic freedom, but there is no single and 
unique definition yet as accepted universally. One major approach to economic 
freedom comes from the libertarian tradition which is a school of economics 
emphasizes the importance of markets and the limited role of governments or even 
abolition of the state. Today the term is most commonly associated with a classical 
liberal thought (or free market), and defined as the freedom to produce, trade and 
consume any goods and services acquired without the use of force, fraud or theft.  
According to Adam Smith, who is the founder of the Classical Economic 
Thought and so called “founding father of the modern economics,” competition leads 
to proper pricing in the economy and there is an “invisible hand” managing the 
market effectively. Hence he strongly opposed any government intervention into 
business affairs. Trade restrictions, minimum wage laws, and product regulation were 
all viewed as detrimental to a nation's economic health.  
According to the Heritage Foundation, that releases the “Index of Economic 
Freedom” on a yearly base, is the fundamental right of every human to control his or 
her own labor and property. In an economically free society, individuals are free to 
work, produce, consume, and invest in any way they please, with that freedom both 
protected by the state and unconstrained by the state. In economically free societies, 
                                                 
1 There is another index called “Economic Freedom of the World” prepared by the Fraser 
Institute. It uses a slightly different methodology and indicators to measure and compare the 
economic freedom performance of the countries. Interestingly enough, the two indices reach 
similar conclusions. For details about Economic Freedom of the World Index, see Gwartney 
et.al. (2008).  
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governments allow labor, capital and goods to move freely, and refrain from coercion 
or constraint of liberty beyond the extent necessary to protect and maintain liberty 
itself.  
 
The Index of Economic Freedom 
 
The annual report, published by the Heritage Foundation, analyzes and grades the 
performance of countries on the basis of the following key criteria: business, 
investment, trade, fiscal and monetary environment, as well as the size of the 
government, perceived corruption and respect of property and labor rights. In this 
sense, these criteria show resemblance to the points of EUs Stabilization and 
Association conditions. In this regard, one can argue that the economic freedom 
indicators can be taken as a “road map” for a successful preparation process for the 
Balkan nations. The higher the performance of a country the easier and smoother the 
adjustment process on the road to join the EU. 
The 2009 Index of Economic Freedom covers 183 countries and measures 10 
separate components of economic freedom. Each one of the 10 economic freedoms is 
graded using a scale from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the maximum freedom. A 
score of 100 signifies an economic environment or set of policies that is most 
conducive to economic freedom. For example in the case of a country with zero tariffs 
and zero non-tariff barriers will have a trade freedom score of 100. The data covers 
the second half of the 2007 through the first half of the 2008. Some component scores 
are not the exact data for its year and based on historical information. For example, 
the monetary freedom component is a three-year weighted average rate of inflation. 
 Consistently, if the overall score of a country is between 100 and 80 the 
country is considered to be free, countries with score 79.9-70 are defined mostly free, 
countries with score 69.9-60 moderately free, countries with score 59.9-50 mostly 
unfree and countries with score between 49.9-0 are described as Repressed.  
 
 
Economic Freedom Performance of the Balkan Countries 
 
Table 2 below summarizes the economic freedom performance of the nine 
Balkan nations: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. The ten areas in which degree of 
freedom is measured are as follows: business, trade, fiscal freedom, government size, 
monetary freedom, investment, financial freedom, property rights, freedom from 
corruption, and labor freedom. 
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The first column gives the overall rank of a given country in the world while 
the second column shows the regional rank. Bulgaria takes the top position with a 
rank of 56 out of 183 countries followed by Albania and Turkey with a rank of 62 and 
75, respectively. Macedonia, Greece and Montenegro share middle positions with an 
overall rank of 78, 81, and 94, respectively. The last three Balkan countries with the 
lowest economic freedom scores are Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Over a 0-100 scale, the performance of Balkan countries range between 64.6 
(Bulgaria) and 53.1 (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Based on the Index of Economic 
Freedom classification, top 5 Balkan countries fall into “moderately free” category: 
Bulgaria, Albania, Turkey, Macedonia, and Greece. The last four countries are 
categorized as “mostly unfree” category since their score range between 59.9-50. As a 
general observation, one can see from Table 2 that 6 out of 9 countries slightly 
improved their performance compared to 2008, Bosnia and Herzegovina being the 
only exception.2 
When looking at the details of the individual countries, Bulgaria seems to be 
most successful at fiscal and trade freedoms with a score of 86.2 and 85.8 
respectively. Business, labor and monetary freedom scores are quite good (over 70). 
Bulgaria’s least scores are associated with freedom from corruption (41) and property 
rights (30). 
Albania seems to be highly good at fiscal freedom with a score of around 93 
out of 100, followed by monetary freedom, trade freedom and government size with 
scores ranging in the upper 70’s. Similar to Bulgaria, Albania has the lowest 
performance in property rights and freedom from corruption. 
Turkey is most successful at trade freedom (86.6) and government size (83.4), 
followed by fiscal, monetary, and business freedom. The most problematic area for 
the case of Turkey seems to be freedom from corruption where Turkey has the same 
score with Bulgaria (41). 
Fiscal freedom and monetary freedom are the two areas where Macedonia 
has the highest performance with upper 80’s, followed by trade freedom. 
Macedonia’s lowest scores belong to property rights and corruption, where its scores 
are very close to Albania. 
Greece has only one area with a score above 80: trade freedom, followed by 
monetary freedom and business freedom with scores of upper 70’s. Interestingly, 
Greece has very close performance with regard to investment freedom, financial 
freedom, property rights,  government size, and freedom from corruption. 
                                                 
2 There are no data available for Montenegro and Serbia so that comparison is not possible. 
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Montenegro is most successful at fiscal freedom (89.1), least successful at 
freedom from corruption. Serbia follows the same path with similar scores in both 
areas. 
Croatia has the highest score at trade freedom (87.6), followed by monetary 
freedom (79) and fiscal freedom. The country has the lowest scores at government 
size and property rights (30). 
Lastly, Bosnia and Herzegovina has the highest performance at monetary 
freedom (79), followed by trade and fiscal freedom. Property rights seem to be 
extremely problematic in this country. 
Overall, trade freedom and fiscal freedom scores are generally high in all 
countries, where property rights and corruption are the most problematic areas. 
 
Table 2. Economic Freedom in the Balkans 
 
 
 
 
 
56     26 Bulgaria 64.6    0.9    73.5    85.8    86.2    58.7   72.8    60    60    30     
41     78.4 
62     27 Albania 63.7    1.3    67.0    75.8    92.8    75.6   79.6    70    70    30     
29     47.2 
 
75     31 Turkey 61.6     1.6    69.9   86.6    73.2    83.4   71.1    50     50    50    
41     40.3 
78     33 Macedonia 61.2     0.2    58.2   81.6    89.4    65.1    85.4   50     60    30    
33     59.8 
81     34 Greece 60.8     0.2    78.7   80.8    66.5    46.3   78.8    50     50    50    
46     61.2 
94     36 Montenegro 58.2     n/a    68.7   80.2    89.1    45.3   78.9    40     50    40    
33     57.2 
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109   
37 
Serbia 56.6     n/a    56.0   78       85.9    46.3   65.8    40     50    40    
34     70.0 
 
116   
38 
Croatia 55.1     1.0    59.9   87.6    68.7    31.7   79.0    50     60    30   
41      43.4 
134   
40 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
53.1   - 0.8   59.9   77.2    71.8    37.6   79.0    50     60    10   
33      52.1 
Source: Index of Economic Freedom 2009, Heritage Foundation 
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Balkan Multiculturism: Example to Itself & to the EU 
 
Track 
 
Balkan countries have the potential core for economic and political development: 
Living by cohabitation in peace with tolerance and mutual respect. If the Balkan 
people relearn to live together, they could catch the wind of achieving for political and 
economical escalation. And again if Balkan countries can achieve it, as they succeeded 
it in their own history, this Balkan multiculturism can be also a sample for the EU’s 
multicultural aim.   
 
Abstract 
 
Almost all countries in the Balkan area are the multicultural samples with their 
heterogenic mosaic. This heterogeneity has become the reason of social togetherness 
and economical development in its history. According to old-fashion scholars 
economic development is the reason of socio-cultural togetherness; but the fact is, 
socio-cultural and political integrity is the reason of economic development. Then the 
economic development with the socio-cultural integrity brings welfare and regional 
peace. If this hypothesis is right, Balkans has the core value for the economic 
development, welfare and social togetherness and also EU’s multicultural purpose. 
 
Key Words: Multiculturism, Balkan &EU, tolerance, cohabitation. 
  
Introduction 
 
Balkan multicultural mentality is one of the best samples for the world and also it 
could be a richness and positive contribution for the realization of the EU’s 
multiculturistic claims and being a global actor in the world arena. Almost all countries 
in the Balkan area are the multicultural examples with their heterogenic mosaic. This 
heterogeneity has become the reason of social togetherness and economical 
development when it was used on the right path in its history. According to old-
fashion scholars economic development is the reason of socio-cultural togetherness; 
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but the fact is, socio-cultural and political integrity is the reason of economic 
development. Then the economic development with the socio-cultural integrity brings 
welfare and regional peace. If this hypothesis is right, Balkans has the core value for 
the economic development, welfare and social togetherness. Balkan history has the 
full of this kind of experiences and special individuals such as Sokollu, the Prime 
Minister of Ottomans, built a lot of bridges, fountains and caravanserais in several 
Balkan countries. The architecture of a city or a region is the coat of richness, culture 
and mentality of that region. At a glance it is said that Balkan area had very rich 
tolerance, togetherness and economic development in its history.  
Today, although there are a lot of cities which were established according to 
the ethnic and religionic differences, there are tens of cities with the full of 
heterogeneity in the same time. It is the reality even today that Bosnians, 
Macedonians, Turks, Albanians, Roms, Catholics, Orthodoxies and Muslims live as 
neighbors in the same city, even in the same street in Skopje, Ohri, Varna, Burgas, 
Prizren and so on. In general, if this mentioned heterogeneity is used as yeast for a 
mutual understanding, respect and tolerance, it is going to be a positive economic, 
social and political accelerator. However if modern separatist ideologies, such as 
nationalism, micro-nationalism, tribalism and ethno-religionism enter to the region, 
suddenly the region transforms (and will be transformed) to the habitat of negative 
social escalations and conflicts. This reality has the same potential danger for the 
other regions of the EU and the world.  
Ethnic and religionic separatism had been pressed by rigid ideology of 
communism in region, like Enver Hoca and Tito did. But the pressure is an artificial 
path and the temporary solution for the limited time. Normal and long-lasting 
(permanent) steps of the multiculturism are establishing mutual recognizing, 
acceptance, respect and natural habitat and then building a consensus on the strong 
main basement among the people. Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria had not given 
even the right of religion, which is the need for the human being, to the people of the 
region in their recent communist histories. This rigidity of communism and 
nationalism and also intolerance brought the end of these regimes. Jivkov’s Bulgarian 
regime which had not given the right of being Muslim or Turk, collapsed down in 
1989. Again Milosevic’s speech which was full of ethno-religionic unilateralism in 
Kosovo Square in 1989 became the reason of dismantling of Yugoslavia into seven 
countries of today.   
This recent historical background and bad experiences should become a 
guider and a teaching course for the new governments and states in the region and 
also for the EU. Bulgaria has succeeded it and adopted its own heterogeneity within 
its own structure after 1991. Right and Freedom Movement was established as an 
ethnic party at the beginning, but today it has transformed to a national party by 
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taking 3% non-Turkish votes in the last general elections. Macedonia had ignored 
Albanian minority in 1991 Constitution and the country has transformed to the bloody 
ethnic region suddenly. After recognizing ethnic minorities representing in Ohrid 
Framework Agreement in 2001, tension could be gotten down by the mediation of the 
US, EU and secretly Turkey. Bosnia Herzegovina has still been going on the flue path 
because of shortness of Dayton Peace Agreement about establishing a normal state 
and ignoring Bosnians’ systemic rights within the new system.  
Balkan countries have the potential core for economic and political 
development: Living by cohabitation in peace with mutual tolerance and respect. If 
the Balkan people live together, they could catch the wind of achieving for political 
and economical escalation. If Balkan countries can achieve it again, as they succeeded 
it in their history1, Balkan multiculturism can be a sample for the EU’s multicultural 
aim.   
 
Balkan’s multiculturism, tolerance and cohabitation: history & today  
 
In the Balkans, different religions, sects, ethnicities and cultures lived together, not 
side by side but one inside the other and nested, for several centuries. These 
differences were seen as a richness and cultural mosaic for a long time during the 
Rome and Ottomans sovereignties. During the nationalism and declining times, the 
whole Balkan area drastically transformed to a bloody region. Even Tito had 
established autonomy in respect of ethnicities and then a stable political system could 
be ensured during the communism. During the Balkan history, Bogomolism and Islam 
became the core of cohabitation and tolerance; church, synagogue and mosque were 
built side by side and used the joint walls for 500 years.         
Ottoman Empire system enabled the regulations of various interethnic, 
religious, and linguistic issues, promoting the concept of interethnic tolerance and 
patience. Ottoman case is a kind of proto- multiculturism which bases cultural rights 
upon collectivity, a group, a community, rather than upon an individual as has been 
the case in the contemporary society and in the authentic concept of multiculturism.2 
Even today, in the modern Greek political system, the notion of “being Greek” springs 
forth as a true heir of the Ottoman “millet” system. The claim that the “millet” system 
is alive today in Greece should not be surprising because the millet system is a wider 
                                                 
1 Cüneyt Yenigün (2008), “Autochthon Turkish Existence in the Balkans”, First International 
Balkan Congress Proceedings, 24-25 April 2008, Tekirdağ, 517-518. 
 
2 Misho Doknanovich (2007), “The Origins of Multiculturism in Macedonia”, Hikmet, 9, June 
2007/1, 9-10. 
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concept with the evident of ideological and legal results in the manner in which 
immigrants or even Greek citizens are presently classified.3  
Balkan history presents a very important regional specific fact: If a power 
struggles to erase the “others”, it loses; if a power struggles to establish a greater 
ethnic state by ignoring the others it gets smaller. “Big Croatia” Greater Macedonia 
and Greater Serbia aims resulted in accordance with this fact. Assimilation or ethnic 
cleansing strivings make a “boomerang impact” in this heterogenic region. Integration, 
cohabitation and mutual respect strivings of the states awards the sovereign powers 
with the legitimacy.   
 
Assimilation struggle  getting smaller 
                                           Integration struggle     legitimacy 
 
Czech and Slovak people and states could separate easily, because there was 
no heterogeneity in the region; they were living in de facto divided regions. But almost 
all Balkan regions were and are exactly heterogenic and it is impossible to separate 
the cities and regions one by one. That’s way there is no way for division for the 
region, otherwise region transforms to city and tribal states; but unique way is 
multiculturism and tolerance like its history.   
  Even today Balkan peoples have the cores values of multiculturism and mutual 
respect. “If a person speaks one language he is a one person; if a person speaks two 
languages he is accounted as two persons” according to a Middle East culture. Balkan 
individuals generally speak three languages because of multiculturistic feature of the 
region. This is valuable richness for the Balkans. Again individual respect to the others 
still continues on the streets in heterogenic Balkans. According to a public survey, this 
was taken in Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo in 2005, 
“backbiting” is seen one of the four worst things among the Balkan Muslims. Again 
according to the conclusion of this survey, the most important thing is the freedom of 
religion (41 %) in the region. (Second important thing is the solving economical issues. 
[17,2 %]).4 
Today there is a kind of “Balkan culture and folklore”5 and especially “Balkan 
identity” which differs the region from the rest of Europe in the region. It is normal 
                                                 
3 Lambros Baltsiotis  (2007), “Minorities in Greece: State Policies and Administrative Practices”, 
Minority Issues in Balkans and the EU Conference Proceedings, May 16th 2007, Istanbul, 120-
121. 
4 Musa Musai (2005), “Balkan Müslümanlarında Din, Kimlik Bütünleşmesi” Hikmet (6), 2005/2, 
34, 44. 
5 Nikolai Vukov (2008), “Deciphering Shared Heritage”, First Balkan Congress Proceedings, 
Tekirdağ, 78. 
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and acceptable specific feature of the region in according to geopolitics. For example 
Sweden, Norway and Denmark claim today “they are not European but “Nordics” or 
“Nordic European”. In the region for example, “Bosnian” terminology was not 
recognized officially until 19936 (during the war), because Bosnians and especially 
Aliya Izzetbegovic has struggled to establish a kind of upper-identity in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to solve the ethnic issue. This was very perfect formulation for whole 
Balkan region too. Upper identity: Balkan culture, “Balkanic”. Lower identity: ethnic or 
religionic differences.    
 
Eu’s Dilemma on Multiculturism & Multi-Religionism 
 
EU presents “hope of the peace” to the region, but this hope is already existed in 
Balkan’s own history. In addition to EU’s assistance, Balkan states and peoples 
especially should turn back their own spirit of civilization of multiculturism. Because as 
Fukuyama claims, democracy could be consolidated ideologically, institutionally and at 
the level of civil society, but the culture of a country can be the most resistant factor 
for democratic consolidation.7 People should find their own richness and develop their 
own democracy, in addition to EU’s help to the region.  
EU has been striving to become global/universal actor in the last two decades. 
To do this purpose, it is struggling to increase power by all means and to establish a 
permanent consensus among the people of its members. Sovereignty has two 
components: Rude power and legitimacy. Legitimacy is the most important factor for 
the EU’s incredibility nowadays. EU has to show more effort to increase respect and 
tolerance to the other cultures and religions, to ensure the credibility and trust in the 
EU-27 area and also in the Balkans. Micro-nationalism and anti-Islamism has been 
increasing especially in the eastern members of the EU. This is the one of the most 
important handicaps of being a global actor of the EU. Ethnic or ethno-religionic 
issues, such as Bask and Catalan issues in Spain, Northern Ireland issue in the United 
Kingdom, Sicily issue in Italy, Corsica issue in France, are on the way of the resolving by 
the assistance of the EU’s supranationalism within the EU-27 area, but it cannot be 
said that the EU is ready for the multi-religionic tolerance for the outsiders. The 
problem of accession of the countries of Muslim population majority is the flue point 
for the EU. On the process of enlargement, EU has long lasting pains to open its 
                                                 
6 Aydın Babuna, (2008), “Boşnaklar ve Kimlikler. Değişiklik ve Süreklilik”, First International 
Balkan Congress Proceedings, 24-25 April 2008, Tekirdağ, 44. 
7 Şaban Tanıyıcı (2008), “EU’s Copenhagen Political Criteria and Political Culture of tyhe 
Western Balkan Countries: Are They Compatibale?” International Conference on Balkan 
Studies Proceedings, Tiran, 89.  
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borders to the Muslim countries. This indecisiveness yield some allegations of “12 
stars of the EU represent the Jesus’ apostles”; or “EU is a kind of religionic union”. 
Today around 12-16 million muslim live in EU-27 area. But still according to 
some European scholars “differences and plurality, especially of a religious kind, have 
historically been more destructive than constructive. Differences have to find a place 
within an overall political, social and legal consensus.”8 Again for the plural 
constructive contribution for Europe, experts wish to point to Ottoman Empire and 
Islamic Spain at certain periods.9 Although United Kingdom and Austria have accepted 
Islam as official religion, EU is very reluctant (or EU moves very slowly) to accept 
muslim populated countries such as Turkey, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Albania to the 
union. Europe has just started to get acquainted with tolerance multiculturism and 
multi-religionism terms in the last 20 years, because history of Europe is full of nation-
state and religionic wars. “National identity”, “national interest” and “nation-state” 
terms were born in Europe. Today’s Belgium is on the way of Valon and Flamenc 
separatism and the EU has been struggling to find a unifying point for supranationalist 
phase, like Ottomans and Habsburgs. If the EU wants to be a global and powerful 
actor in the world arena, it has to produce effective projects against xenophobia, anti-
islamism and tribalism issues and has to solve them by tolerance, mutual respect, and 
multi-religionic approaches.     
In addition to EU’s flounders to solve its internal issues, it has been assisting the 
Balkan area’s consolidation of democracy, minority and human rights and 
development of multiculturism. For this purpose, EU Commission insists on EU 
candidate countries in the region to establish and develop: 
 Human and minority rights, 
 Stabilized democratic institutions, 
 Political movement standards and 
 Independent media10  
  
These are the some liabilities for the candidate countries to consolidate the 
democracy in accordance with Stability and Association Agreements (SAA)11. On the 
one hand the SAA give a carrot of membership in the future to the candidates; on the 
                                                 
8 Jorgen Nielsen (2001) Muslims in Western Europe, 2nd edition, Edinburg, Edinburg University 
Press, 169.  
9 Jorgen, ibid, 168.  
10 EU Commission (2007), “The Stabilization and Association Process and CARDS Assistance” 
2000-2006, 3.    
11 Cüneyt Yenigün, (2008), “EU’s Role on the Western Balkan Democratization”, International 
Conference on the Balkan Studies Proceedings, 7-8 November 2008, Tiran, 106.    
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other hand establish a kind of hierarchical relations12 between the candidates and the 
EU. This should be perceived by the candidates, not a negative pressure, but a positive 
guiding. 
Actually Balkan people perceive that the EU’s guider and the membership of 
the EU is positive development. According to Gallup Balkan Monitor survey in 2008, 
Balkan people were asked whether membership of the EU would be a good or a bad 
thing, nine out of 10 respondents from Kosovo answered positively (89 %).  In Albania, 
more than eight in 10 respondents were upbeat about their country’s membership of 
the EU (83%), and less than one in 10 interviewees gave a neutral response. 66% of 
Macedonians, 58 % of Serbians, 57 of Montenegrins, 48 % of Bosnians highly support 
the EU membership.13   
 
Conclusion and key elements: mutual respect and trust 
 
Emerging multiculturism must give deep attention also phenomenon of communities’ 
loyalty to the state, the respect of the laws and duties that the state imposes generally 
for all citizens, regardless of their religious, political or ethnic affiliations. The Balkan 
model must clearly define the elements for linking the minority groups with the 
Balkan societies which undoubtedly, should originate from the history of cohabitation, 
common traditions, common citizenship and finally common future.14  
 
Turks and Balkan peoples have learned multiculturism together in their history. During 
the 14 - 18. centuries while Europe was shaking with the religionic and ethnic wars, 
Balkans was living in multicultural and multi-religionic peace. It could be explicitly said 
that Balkans was the origin and the center of multiculturism and tolerance in Europe. 
Again it became a sample of cohabitation to the East and the West. This culture 
overshadowed in the Balkans during the 1990’s nationalistic winds, and now the 
region is looking for a permanent peace among its nations again. It is pay-back time of 
Turkey and the EU to assist Balkans’ regaining of multiculturistic spirit.  
EU struggles to be a multicultural and multi-religionic union by pursuing and 
updating Ottoman’s multicultural administration. Balkan countries had come and lived 
together under the Ottoman’s supranational administration in history and today they 
are struggling to come together under the EU’s administration on the way of 
                                                 
12 David Chandlar, (2008), “EU State Building: Securing the Liberal Peace Through EU 
Enlargement”,  Stratejik Öngörü (12), 10-11.  
13 Gallup Balkan Monitor (2008), Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans, 2008 
Summary of Findings, 14-15.    
14 Doknanovich, ibid, 16-17. 
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supranationalism. EU should assist Balkans, but it is not enough for the region. Balkans 
should strive to establish democracy in accordance with its multi-culture and historical 
background; because democracy cannot be exported, but can consolidate by the 
effort of own people. Balkans have a lot of bridges which connect and tie two cultures, 
religions and languages like Drina Bridge in Visegrad, Mostar Bridge in Mostar, 
Stonebridge in Skopje. Like these bridges, Balkans again has to struggle to establish 
bridges between the different cultures. Balkans has necessary components, richness 
and historical background to do it. Formulation is: 
 
Tolerance  Common Trust / Moral  Socio-Political Peace  Economic 
development & EU membership 
 
Regional governments and people are responsible actors to achieve the 
democratization. Governments should desire it and put into force some courageous 
steps on bureaucratic and institutional developments. Ohrid Framework Agreement in 
Macedonia, Bulgaria and Rights and Freedom Movement are good samples of 
cohabitation and peace. For the minority issues, kin-states should also suggest 
minorities to integrate their host states in the region. In the same time governments 
should work on decentralization steps which are the most important component of a 
democracy.    
Governmental and non-governmental organizations should be increased and 
they should be active. Today’s the biggest and the most active governmental society 
group is TİKA in the region. It is orchestrating tens of projects today, from the 
historical constructions to music festivals, from surveys to social initiatives, to develop 
common culture and good relations between minorities and the Balkan states.  
The number of civil society groups (CSGs) should be increased, developed and 
activated. Today the CSGs are counted as a new power or component of a democracy. 
There was no CSGs in communist era in the region, that’s why the old generation is 
very cold to them; but new generation has started to establish this kind of foundations 
as a good sign. For example in Turkey there are more than 300 foundations and 
associations only related with the Balkans.15  
Think-tanks should be increased and they should work and study on erasing 
xenophobia, tribalism and separatist nationalism and misinformation about the 
“others”. Still in some countries there is misinformation in primary school books and 
history books about the history and the “others” identification.  
 
                                                 
15 Özcan Pehlivanoğlu, (2008) “Rumeli, Balkan ve Trakya Sivil Toplum Örgütleri”, First 
International Balkan Congress Proceedings, Tekirdağ, 404.  
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Media is the fifth power in democracies right now. Media should play positive 
and constructive role for the multiculturism in the region.  
Political parties and pressure groups are also responsible for construct of 
friendship with the “others” among the people. It should not be forgotten that rigid 
nationalist and hegemonic approaches and entities have lost every time in this region. 
But peaceful policies both become the reason of the getting power of that party, and 
also establish socio-politic and economic development.  
EU project has started after millions of people killing in World War II. Balkans 
has also live very bad and sinful wars in the recent history, but in compare with the 
World Wars these are seen as regional wars. Balkan states and peoples should not 
grudge against each other. They have to enter EU’s peaceful umbrella, but before 
that, they have to solve antagonistic issues psychologically. When Balkans and Turkey 
becomes the member of the EU, this will enrich also EU in terms of multiculturism and 
multi-religionism.  
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The Prolonged Transition – an Obstacle for Macedonia’s Integration in Euro-Atlantic 
Structures 
 
Introduction 
  
This paper deals with different aspects of transition and the ways to overcome it. 
Different challenges countries in transition face take place in this respect, particularly 
in the Republic of Macedonia. Theoretical approaches and practical aspects of the 
impact and consequences of the prolonged transition are given in this paper, as well 
as the possibilities of escaping from this situation caused by the process of transition.  
            Transition, as a process of radical changes in social structures, by changing 
the economic structure of the society, for a short time changes the material position 
and the social status of people. It is already known that the transition period is 
manifested with the overall transformation of people’s social lives and their living 
circumstances. As a multidisciplinary phenomenon, the transition in society has 
always been presented as a focus of great importance by scientific workers. Lots of 
scientists and scholars such as J.K. Galbraith, Karl Paper, Alvin Toffler, F. Fukuyama, A. 
Heywood, David Easton, etc., have considered transition as a social change from the 
industrial to the information-postindustrial level.  
           In this respect, A. Toffler, analyzing all social changes which were influenced 
by the industrial revolution in the second half of the 17th century, has created a brand 
new reality and a new analytical method about the world, as well as the human 
attitude towards nature.1 
           According to A. Touraine, human society, besides its reproduction abilities 
and those for adapting to changes, possesses abilities by which it can changes 
directions and define new goals and rules. He notes that society as a system 
recognizes changes and balances, assuming that the society’s work and deeds against 
                                                 
1 A.Tofler 1983 ”Treci Talas”, Beograd, str, 124 
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itself occurs within special economic and cultural circumstances, i.e. the society does 
not create its own identity in an inter-subjective way, but through self-reflective 
interaction with the environment. 2 
           The human represents nature but he represents himself as well as a creature. 
According to K. Marks, the human being as a natural creature has partially natural and 
vital strength which exist in the form of lusts. These natural characteristics which are 
possessed by people and their behavior against nature are reasons enough to explain 
the changes in the society.  
           Problems that are related to human behavior against nature are global in their 
nature since the scientific technologic revolution and the economic development in 
contemporary societies directed the world to an extreme level of dependency.  
          Social innovations have always been an object of interest to a large number of 
theorists before and after the old philosophic thought, but this interest increased in 
intensity in the modern society.  
           Different theories deal with social changes as phenomena which appear at 
certain times having a certain form and shape.  
The evolution theory, according to Talkot Parson, reviews social evolution as a 
continuation of the biological evolution, emphasizing that mechanisms and 
development factors are the ones that change.  
            Other ideologists, so called evolutionists, defend the idea according to which 
the environment influences the development of social changes.  
The great Arab thinker, Ibn Haldun in his work “Prolegimena” explains the history of 
Arab nation and its neighbors, emphasizing that every country and nation develops, 
changes and eventually disappears.3 According to him, the social life represents a 
natural invention of a historic process. Also, the author speaks about the social 
dimension of tradition which has the form of hierarchy of functions which joins people 
together as if they were a living organism. He is one of the so called geographic 
materialists, according to whom social life is a natural show in certain geographic and 
climatic circumstances. Ibn Haldun’s conception about social changes rests upon 
sociologic analyses where one can see the relation between social phenomena. The 
interpretation of social changes should begin with objective and material factors.  
We can conclude that Ibn Haldun analyzes the evolution laws and biological contexts 
of people’s and societies.  
                                                 
2 A. Touraine “Sociologija drustvenih pokreta”,Beograd, Radnicka Stampa,1983 str.110 
3 Ali Dida “Filet e sociologjisë”,Tetove 1997, f.79  
    Neshet Toku, “Sociologjia e Ibën Haldunit”,Shkup 2006,Logos-a, f-24. 
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           According to Ali Dida, Ibn Haldun’s avangarda ideas about the society require 
special analyses and attention, since he is considered the predecessor of the 
sociological thought.  
It is evident that social changes depend on many factors, one of the most important of 
which is the demographic factor.4 
           The impact of demographic factor upon social changes can be found in many 
antique authors and modern ones, under the conception of “demographic explosion”.  
The first more serious attempts for a general analysis of the population growth as a 
social occurrence were made by the well known English theorist Thomas Malthus in 
his work “An essay on the principle of population” in 1789.  
           The Malthus’s theory on social changes was highly criticized by a large number 
of theorists such as David Ricardo, J.M. Keynes, K. Marks, etc.5 Today, this theory is 
again taking a deserved place within scientific debates and is constantly actualized as 
a result of the enormous population growth, especially in third world countries. In 
these regions there is a lack of food, the poverty is high, one fourth of world 
population shares the fate of the poor and hungry. According to Anthony Giddens, the 
population growth in the third millennium is again requiring the Malthusian approach, 
even though the number of those who subdue to the original idea is very small.  
A.Giddens thinks that the explosion in third world countries surpasses the production 
abilities of these countries.6 This social appearance is upsetting for a fourth of the 
world population. Scientific circumstances all over the world upon this problem pose 
great importance on it, since this situation does not exclude Europe too.  
            The poverty in EU countries not only is worrying, but alarming in some places. 
About 60 million people or 18% of the population live on the verge of poverty and this 
shows that this social occurrence is present in all parts of modern society.7 If we add 
to these data the vision of contemporary radical phenomena which were happening in 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia by the end of the 20th 
century, we will have a clear view of events and problems that covered world 
population. This can be best illustrated if we consider present times where there are 
extremely difficult circumstances due to the global financial crisis. The fight with the 
crisis has become quite challenging for Europe, whereas the transition countries are 
the most struck by it.  
             The situation in these countries is not only a product of economic factors but 
of social changes that happened as a result of different political processes.  
                                                 
4 Ali Dida “Fillet e sociologjisë”, Tetovë 1997, f.80 
5 Vlado Dimoski – Ideje, Beograd nr.4-5, 1998 fq.109 
6 A.Giddens “Socilogjia”, Tiranë 2002 f.560 
7 Hemerijk Anton “Models”, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.186 
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To date scientific analyses show that the fall of totalitarian regimes and the rise of 
political pluralism have had the greatest impact on social changes in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The countries in this region were facing enormous political-social and 
economic problems, including poverty and undisguised unemployment.  
 
Social changes in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
The second half of the 20th century is manifested through an open discontent 
articulated in the form of revolutionary changes, in almost all spheres of life.  
The culmination of these social problems in Central and Eastern European countries 
was the fall of Berlin Wall, in 1989, as well as the start of development of democratic 
societies with lots of changes and casualties.  
            The last years of the 20th century in Central and Eastern Europe, according to 
Etem Aziri, were revolutionary years, the end of the Cold War, the withdrawal of the 
Iron Curtain and the beginning of democratic processes in order to build the civil 
society.  
Not only analysts but centers of power in western countries are expressing 
their interest in social changes, offering material and staff support with the aim of 
overcoming the difficulties countries in transition are facing with.8 There are 
differences among scientists as well about the way of building sustainable 
democracies.  
           On the other hand, we can say that there is an agreement as regards the 
Rikard Lang’s opinion, according to whom it is impossible to make a miracle and 
establish a state with the rule of law and good market economy out of a country in 
transition.9  
           The process of transition is long, with lots of surprises and with already 
determined deformations and social issues such as unemployment, industrial 
production minimization, triple inflation and a lot of other changes which remind us of 
the Great Depression in the 1930s. The transition process in ex-communist countries 
has been manifested through enormous difficulties, more than in the period of the 
transformation of the society in post-totalitarian regimes in Spain and Portugal. 
Besides the similarities among these groupings, there also many differences, starting 
with differences in time and space (territory). Anyway, one of the most important 
changes is the support by European Union countries, without the help of which the 
overcoming of these problems would have been impossible in countries in transition. 
The transformation and development of democratic society would be an illusion 
                                                 
8 Etem Aziri “Organizimi politik i Shqiptarëve në Maqedoni”, Shkup, 2004 f.11 
9 Rikard Lang, “Kencepcija i strategija Razvoja” Zagreb 1989, str.33 
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during the 1970s for the populations in Greece, Portugal and Spain. We should 
particularly mention the material and moral support that was offered to them by EU 
countries for their accession into the Euro-Atlantic structures and institutions.  
           The role of the USA after WWII together with Western European countries, 
expressed through the Marshall Plan, according to Werner Weidenfeld, should be 
taken by developed countries of Western Europe and help the countries in transition 
in Eastern Europe10, especially those of Western Balkans.11 
            Social changes in Central and Eastern European countries, especially in the 
Balkans, are in step with other changes which are a sub-product of time and place 
where those transition and transformation processes are taking place. How serious 
and sustainable the offered model is, can be illustrated through the case of Republic 
of Macedonia during its transition period. The model of neighborhood help and 
support can be applied in Macedonia, since a country of only two million inhabitants 
has all the qualities to be analyzed, beginning with the social re-stratification to the 
development and perspectives that are provided by the process of democratization.  
 
The process of transition in Macedonia 
 
The process of transition in Macedonia can closely be related to the model of the 
German sociologist, Ralf Dahrendorf, according to whom the transformation from a 
planned-centralized economy to a free market economy assumes the change of 
political institutions within six months, the change of economic relationships within six 
years, the transformation of human behavior, attitudes and values within 60 years.12 
             This model would be applied in Macedonia, contributing towards the 
prolonged transition time but on condition of not wasting time in unnecessary re-
compositions of the state administration.  
The local analysts as well as international ones warned about a permanent 
crisis or a conflicting situation in Macedonia, beginning with its independence on 8 
September 1991. But, Macedonia managed to gain its independence peacefully 
without nay bloodshed, which was not the case with other parts of former Yugoslavia. 
The policy of two-facedness during the government of the former president Kiro 
Gligorov and his scion Branko Crvenkovski, two politicians closely connected to 
                                                 
10 Verner, Vajdenfld (ED) Demokracia dhe ekonomia e tregut në Europën Lindore, Strategji për 
Europën, Argeta-LMG, Tiranë, 1999, f.49 
11 Verner, Vajdenfld (ED) Demokracia dhe ekonomia e tregut në Europën Lindore, Strategji për 
Europën, Argeta-LMG, Tiranë, 1999, f.49 
12 NISPA cee-Instituti Otvoreno opstestvo Makedonija, Skopje, 2005, fq. 7. 
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Serbian decision making centers, would produce consequences in the Albanian – 
Macedonian relationships.  
Kiro Gligorov, Stojan Andov, Vasil Tupurkovski, academician Vllado Kambovski, 
holders of high positions in the structures of federal state until the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, replaced their residences but not their activities. Kiro Gligorov was the first 
president of the newly formed state; Stojan Andov was the first president of the multi-
party assembly in Macedonia.  One can see that there are no Albanians in any of the 
above-mentioned positions – they were always considered as second-hand people – 
their positions could no go above vice-presidents (let’s mention the vice-president of 
the first Parliament during 1990-1994, Xheladin Murati, who was accompanied by two 
other Macedonian co-vice-presidents; 1992-1994, vice-prime minister Beqir Zhuta, 
again accompanied by two other Macedonian co-vice-prime ministers, and without 
any Albanian counselors in the presidential cabinet).  
           Macedonia continued to be a stretched arm of Serbia, serving as an 
alternative way for export of goods from Serbia and contributing to the mitigation of 
consequences and the effects of the international embargo. This caused Macedonia to 
remain dependent on Serbia, a fact that would follow this country up to date. Many 
Albanian, Macedonian and international analysts note that Macedonia is still led by 
the Serbian politics. If we refer to Macedonian analytical resources, we will see that 
the latest approach during the compilation of the so called “Macedonian 
Encyclopedia” was made in accordance with Serbian projections. Furthermore, 
Macedonian analysts themselves             (such as the former Prime Minister Ljubco 
Georgievski and the former Foreign Affairs minister, Prof. Dr. Ljubomir Frckovski) do 
not hesitate to call this kind of encyclopedia – a product of perverted opinions from 
the SASA13 (read: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts). But, it is worth mentioning 
that since the beginning of the creation of this republic, many things went wrong. In 
this context, the initiative of building new state institutions continued with the same 
politics, by different means and under different circumstances. State institutions 
presented a continuation of the monist system of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia.  
 
Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic Integration 
 
In modern societies, political-judicial changes and economic-social ones are followed 
by a Euro-Atlantic process as e recipe that has decisive impact on democracy and 
world peace. The third millennium began with the so called “third wave in 
democracy”. In particular, this democratic spirit covered Eastern Europe, a very tense 
region and isolated from modern trends.  
                                                 
13 Televizioni Alsat M, Emisioni “Rruga drejt”, Shkup, 1 tetor 2009 
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          “The democratic transition can be considered a completed process when there is 
good synchronization with democratic procedures in which state powers are 
determined, when the government takes power through free elections and when the 
executive, legislative and judicial powers generated by the new democracy de jure 
does not share the power with other bodies”. 14 
- The harmonization of laws in Macedonia with the European Union Law is one 
of the fundamental preconditions for full EU membership; 
- The fulfillment of political criteria is a requirement for Macedonia’s 
integration into NATO and the EU; 
- The bases of political criteria. 
 
         What in fact do these political criteria consist of? 
The answer can be found by having a glance at fundamental documents of the 
EU and NATO, from the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 to the Declaration of Alliance on 
Security in the Bucharest summit in 2008.15 
Those political criteria could be included into these sections: 
1) Democracy 
2) The Principle of Rights 
3) Human rights 
 
            The regional cooperation of Macedonia in the war against corruption is a part 
of standards for accession into the EU and NATO.  
           After the fall of the Berlin Wall, democracy in Western Balkans and Central – 
Eastern Europe has often been experienced as a great uneasiness.  
           We should point out that Macedonia was the first country in Western Balkans 
that signed the       Association-Stabilization Agreement with the EU, on April 9th 2001 
which fully came into force three years later, but still did not manage to proceed in 
that way. Even though Macedonia applied in 2004 for accessing the EU, it has not 
received a starting date for negotiations.                 Macedonia has already handed in 
the questionnaire, but the waiting anxiety is still going on. All these problems are 
conditioned by two issues: the name contest with Greece and the internal 
circumstances in terms of the non-implementation of the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement.  
                                                 
14 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stephan, “Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation-
Southern Europe, South America and Post Communist Europe”, the Johns Hopkins University 
press, 1996. pp.3. 
15 Shih më gjërësisht Vlatko Mileta, Lidija Sehuliq “Victory”, Prishtinë 2006-f 184 dhe e 
përditshmja Koha. 04.04.2009 fq11 
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           Macedonia is one of the rare countries in transition, where the segment of the 
state departization as a condition for democracy and civic pluralism has turned into 
strong-partisan stronghold. The partisan state from the former mono-party system 
has merely turned into a pluro-partisan state, depending on which party or coalition is 
governing the country, since they are going to switch places after a while, depending 
on election results – put it simple, the state gains new owners of it.16 
          The society with partisan domination is hidden in the civil society. According 
to experts, after each parliamentary election there are partisan changes in about 10 
thousand public changes, in all sectors in the administration.  
           In countries such as the USA or Germany, after presidential or parliamentary 
elections, there are about 400 – 4,000 political or public functions that are replaced. 
Furthermore, some of the officials are not given the sack; they are just moved to some 
other positions, e.g. business, universities, science, culture, diplomacy, etc.17 
 
Inequality and the so called “Oasis of Peace” 
 
The Macedonian Constitution of 1991 determined the Macedonian population as 
dominant in its preamble, i.e. it defined the state as unitary. The Macedonian 
language and its Cyrillic alphabet are declared as official; the Macedonian Orthodox 
Church was also separated from other religious institutions in Macedonia. According 
to Robert Hayden from the University of Michigan, this phenomenon is known as 
“constitutional nationalism”.  
During the 1991-2000, the Macedonian state was hybrid, something between 
a national state (based on the form and the aspect of public administration and usage 
of languages) and civic state being governed by mixed national structures. But, the 
representation Albanians has always been peripheral without any important role in 
decision and policy making.  
           “The inequality at a national, confessional, and cultural level presented a 
danger for the development and perspectives of these societies. In fact, the lack of a 
just and principal approach against the national, confessional and cultural 
composition, especially in the two biggest socialist states, the former USSR and Tito’s 
Yugoslavia, reflected its destructive effects not only in these two countries but on 
socialism as a process”.18 
                                                 
16 Dimitar Mirçev “ Shteti i së Drejtës dhe Reformat në AP, rasti Maqedoni” UEJL-Tetovë 2008-
fq 119 
17 Mirçev “ Shteti Juridik” UEJL-Tetovë 2008-fq 123 
18 Etem Aziri “Ndarja e pushtetit dhe zbatimi i marrëveshjes kornizë të Ohrit” Fridrich Ebert 
Stiftung, Shkup 2008 fq 51-52. 
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            Therefore, Macedonia too, which gained its independence without war and 
conflicts, did show readiness and sincerity for establishing a civic state which would 
reflect the multinational, multireligious and multicultural character of the state. 
Albanian political parties made it clear a long time ago that they would not allow for 
Albanians to remain “renters at their own homes”.  
            But, unfortunately, regardless of all efforts, “the first decade of the pluralistic 
life in Macedonia is qualified by the tendency of domination and positioning”.19 After 
all, the images of disregard which was growing over these tendencies would become 
quite evident. “Unfortunately, soon after the first pluralistic elections, there were 
some dysfunctional relations that were created at a political level which implied the 
institutional and non-institutional tendency of domination by the Macedonian side as 
well as the tendency of partisan (not national) positioning of Albanians…”.20 
It is worth mentioning that the Macedonian Constitution of 1991 which was 
establishing the new state was not voted by the Albanian MPs because of the lack of 
its real offer. Exactly this constitution would become a crisis generator in the 
relationships between Macedonians and Albanians in the so called “Oasis of Peace” (a 
notion that was unjustly advertised by the former president Gligorov), because of the 
unjust treatment of Albanians, leaving them as a national minority.  
Recently, the struggle with the non-accomplishment of duties that come out 
from the Ohrid Framework Agreement is a clear indicator about the obstacles for 
integrative aspirations of Macedonia. “If the Ohrid Framework Agreement is 
considered as a document of democratic consensus between the two biggest 
ethnicities, then the lack of sustainable analyses about the conflict of 2001 would 
mean further hostage of Albanian – Macedonian relationships, and this means that it 
will negatively affect the democratic development and the integration of Macedonia 
in Euro-Atlantic structures”.21 
 
Consensual democracy 
 
 The American political scientist with a Dutch origin, Lijphart, in his famous work 
“Democracy in pluralist societies” warned about the disadvantages of majority 
democracies in multi-ethnic states about 20 years before the bloody ethnic conflicts in 
                                                 
19 Etem Aziri “Ndarja e pushtetit dhe zbatimi i marrëveshjes kornizë të Ohrit” Fridrich Ebert 
Stiftung, Shkup 2008 fq 56 
20 Etem Aziri “Ndarja e pushtetit dhe zbatimi i marrëveshjes kornizë të Ohrit” Fridrich Ebert 
Stiftung, Shkup 2008 fq 56 
21 Etem Aziri “Ndarja e pushtetit dhe zbatimi i marrëveshjes kornizë të Ohrit” Fridrich Ebert 
Stiftung, Shkup 2008 fq 60 
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Balkans. Not only is this kind of democracy unjust but it is also dangerous, since 
smaller ethnic groups are denied in terms of government participation. Lijphart’s 
theory of consensual democracy is based upon the history of war and peace in 
Belgium and Switzerland as well as conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in the 
Netherlands. Lijphart studied the political systems of these countries emphasizing the 
ways of dealing with religious conflicts and establishing the consensual model of 
power exchange known as Agreed Democracy. This theory is based on the limitation 
of the majority prevalence in multiethnic societies and differs from liberal democracy 
and the democracy of majority in these elements: 
1) A government which is based upon a broad coalition of parties – the most 
important elements of a pluralist society 
2) Reciprocal rights for veto and protection of vital minority interests 
3) Proportionality as a basic measure for determining the political 
representation and distribution of means 
4) High level of autonomy for segments in resolving internal issues 
(decentralization, which should not be understood only as an “ethnic” 
decentralization).22 
After the signing of the Ohrid Agreement, Macedonia, according to Florian Bieber 
from the University of Kent, has become a consensual minimalist system since it does 
not fulfill all aspects of consensualism. 
“The biggest step that Macedonia should undertake is the achievement of 
consensus”, the Euro-ambassador Ervan Fuere would say.23  
“The Ohrid Agreement according to analysts and scholars is treated and 
understood as a unique model for establishing a political consensus, a full agreement 
within the society with regard to the consensual and unitary order of the state”.24 
During the first decade since its independence (1991-2001), Macedonia 
became an area of social-political changes with a/an (uncontrolled) dose of partial 
inter-ethnic conflicts.  
The political pluralism before the conflict of 2001 was characterized by the political 
struggle between the “small majority” and the “big minority”. 
Here are some data about the 2002 census in Macedonia: 
 
1.297.981 - Macedonians     64% 
509.083 - Albanians               25.2% 
                                                 
22 Arend Liphard “Demokracia në shoqëritë pluraliste”, Shkup, 1994, fq. 59-101 
23 “Zaman”, mars 2009, Shkup, fq. 26 
24 Farimah Daftary “Conflict Resolution in FYR Macedonia: Power sharing or the ‘civic 
approach’,” Helsinki Monitor, Vol.12,12,No.4 (2001) fq. 291-312 
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77.959 - Turks                           3.9% 
53.879 - Roma                     2.6% 
35.939 - Serbs                     1.8% 
17.018 – Bosnians              0.8% 
Other                        1%.25 
 
The Macedonian Constitution from 1991 was the major cause of the armed 
conflict and it was modified in 2001 by signing the Ohrid Framework Agreement which 
ended the armed inter-ethnic conflict and established peace.  
Even after the conflict Macedonia continued to struggle with problems, having 
gone through a very long period of transition which caused radical changes in the 
society. These changes are evident in every sphere of life but they have negatively 
affected the lives of people according to data taken from different public surveys and 
questionnaires. According to an analysis performed in March 2009 by the South East 
European University – Tetovo (Macedonia) and UNDP – Skopje (Macedonia), it has 
been concluded that even the high social stratum in Macedonia is not contended with 
the current situation and is not optimistic about the future.26 
          The state is struggling with different problems that have arisen due to the 
extremely long transition period with lots of structural strikes which have given way to 
desperation generated by the negative international political environment, including 
the delays in the resolution of the name dispute with Greece as well as the slow 
advancement towards the accession to NATO and the EU. At the same time we should 
mention the inter-ethnic and security issues the resolution of which represents one of 
the main factors for creating a positive climate in terms of Macedonia’s integration in 
Euro-Atlantic processes.  
           According to research data from the Center for Ethnical and Security Issues at 
the St. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje during the 2004-2006 period, we can 
conclude that the Macedonian society is ethnically separated.27 
There are lots of arguments about ethnical divisions in Macedonia, and we are going 
to mention some of the achieved results by the above-mentioned research where the 
author offers evidence in favor of the drawn conclusion. The two biggest communities 
in Macedonia have opposing approaches in relation to the Ohrid Framework 
                                                 
25 www.stat.gov.mk 
26 Analyses based on citizens’ opinions (regional Development, local government and quality of 
life in FYROM, March 2009 Tetovo, p.29 – 38. 
27 Petar Atanasov, Партнери во Мир и превенција Pегионална стабилност преку човекова 
безбедност, одбрани текстови од Конференција за Превенција и човекова безбедност 
2005-2007,стр 87, Скопје 2008. 
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Agreement. Macedonians see it from a very negative viewpoint whereas Albanians are 
in favor of that agreement since it is a solid foundation for the promotion of their 
rights and status.   
           When talking about the relationship between the two biggest communities in 
Macedonia, we should point out that there also some vital issues for which both sides 
agree. One of them is the issue of security and stability in this country. The agreement 
can be best seen in people’s reaction to the question about the issue upon which 
Macedonia’s stability relies.28 Even though there are slight differences in terms of the 
impact of the living standards and the accession to the EU, they are still the most 
important things in Macedonia’s reality.  
          There have been many analyses carried out which illustrate the citizens’ 
opinion about Macedonia’s accession in to the EU and NATO, and we can see that the 
percentage of those in favor of these integrative processes is quite high. In this 
respect we can mention the scientific research that is being realized by CRPA at SEEU 
in Tetovo.29  
 
The chances of Macedonia’s accession to the EU and NATO 
 
This issue has become e discussion topic for quite a long time now and there have 
been different optimistic and pessimistic viewpoints, depending on the authors and 
the circles where these issues are discussed. All the preparations for Macedonia’s 
integration into the EU and NATO have been made in a timely manner by the state 
representatives and this can be illustrated by the National Strategy.30 It is a very 
important and long-lasting strategy for Macedonia which includes the steps and 
measures that are to be undertaken by the state itself. It represents a final product of 
the engagement of different experts, including the symbolic participation of Albanian 
ones.  
                                                 
28 Petar Atanasov, Партнери во Мир и превенција Пегионална стабилност преку човекова 
безбедност, одбрани текстови од Конференција за Превенција и човекова безбедност 
2005-2007,стр 88, Скопје 2008.  From the overall number of the surveyed, 63% think that the 
stability in Macedonia depends on the greater living standards; 18% think that it depends on 
Macedonia’s integration into the EU. These figures among the Albanian population are 47% 
and 24% respectively.  
29 CRPA – SEEUTetovo 2008, Report – project “Euro-Atlantic Perspectives of Macedonia, 
problems, challenges and the new reality after the failure of the Bucharest Summit in 2008.  
30 www.sei.gov.mk , национална стратегија  за интеграција на Р.М во Европска Унија, 
септември 2004 Скопје. 
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           Even though there is consensus about the implementation of this national 
strategy, there are still differences in ways and approaches towards it depending on 
the government structures that are leading the country. It is normal to have different 
government compositions, but they should proceed with what has been done by the 
previous government and not start everything from the beginning or even move 
things backwards.  
           Unfortunately, regardless of the political wing that has come to power, 
Albanians have also been marginalized, being left therefore on the edge of euro-
integrative processes in Macedonia.  
In order to achieve better results for this country, the Government should: 
- determine a more active role of the Albanian factor in the overall integrative 
processes that Macedonia is going through; 
- continuance of the dialogue among important political subjects under the 
patronage of the President of the country; 
- conclusion of reforms in public administration and jurisdiction; 
- fight against corruption; 
- creation of a more favorable business environment; 
- extension of the democratization of the elective process (without violence 
and manipulations) 
- overall democratization of the society.  
          All of these contribute toward Macedonia’s aspirations to become a member of 
the great family of NATO and the EU. The first chance of entering NATO was missed, 
separating in this way from the Adriatic group of states to access NATO, due to a 
stubborn policy which leads towards isolationism. It is time to overcome the 
challenges by following the example of Croatia and Slovenia which managed to find a 
solution to a similar dispute through compromise, or the political consensus achieved 
among political parties in Albania at the time of its accession to NATO. From all what 
was said, we come to conclusion that the only prosperous way for Macedonia is its 
soonest accession to NATO and the EU, which, we should not forget, is conditioned by 
the fulfillment of certain requirements and standards. One of those was the decision 
made by the Macedonian Parliament about the adoption of the Law on Public 
Administration, which was the most important for the EU. But, even though there was 
an inter-party consensus between a part of the opposition and the parliamentary 
majority, there are still considerable differences to be overcome in terms of its 
implementation. This is mainly because of the extreme partization of the 
administration and the deceleration of public administration reforms.  
________________________________  
 
 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
145 
 
 
 
References: 
- A. Tofler 1983 ”Treci Talas”, Beograd  
- A. Touraine “Sociologija drustvenih pokreta” Beograd, Radnicka Stampa 1983 
- Ali Dida “Filet e sociologjisë” Tetove 1997 
- J.Abdullai “Ndryshimet sociale dhe tranzicioni”, Arbëria design, Tetovë, 2008 
- “Proceset e integrimit Euroatlantik dhe Republika e Maqedonisë”, UEJL- CRPA dhe 
Fridrich Ebert Stiftung, Tetovë, 2008  
- Neshet Toku “Sociologjia e Ibën Haldunit” Shkup 2006 Logos a  
- Ali Dida “Fillet e sociologjisë” Tetovë 1997 
- Vlado Dimoski – Ideje, Beograd nr.4-5, 1998 
- A.Giddens “Socilogjia” Tiranë 2002 
- Hemerijk Anton “Models” Oxford University Press, 2002 
- Etem Aziri “Organizimi politik I Shqiptarëve në Maqedoni” Shkup, 2004  
- Rikard Lang “Kencepcija I strategija Razvoja” Zagreb 1989  
- Verner, Vajdenfld (ED) Demokracia dhe ekonomia e tregut në Europën Lindore, 
Strategji për Europën, Argeta-LMG, Tiranë, 1999 
- Verner, Vajdenfld (ED) Demokracia dhe ekonomia e tregut në Europën Lindore, 
Strategji për Europën, Argeta-LMG, Tiranë, 1999 
 NISPA cee-Instituti Otvoreno opstestvo Makedonija, Skopje, 2005 
_ Televizioni Alsat M, Emisioni “Rruga drejt”, Shkup, 1 tetor 2009 
- Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stephan “Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation-- Southern Europe, South America and Post Communist Europe”, 
the Johns Hopkins University press, 1996. 
- Shif më gjërësisht Vlatko Mileta, Lidija Sehuliq “Victory”, Prishtinë 2006 dhe e 
përditshmja Koha 04.04.2009. 
- Dimitar Mirçev “ Shteti i së Drejtës dhe Reformat në AP, rasti Maqedoni”, UEJL-Tetovë 
2008 
- Mirçev “Shteti Juridik”, UEJL-Tetovë 2008 
- Etem Aziri “Ndarja e pushtetit dhe zbatimi i marrëveshjes kornizë të Ohrit” Fridrich 
Ebert Stiftung, Shkup 2008 
- Etem Aziri “Ndarja e pushtetit dhe zbatimi i marrëveshjes kornizë të Ohrit” Fridrich 
Ebert Stiftung, Shkup 2008 
- Etem Aziri “Ndarja e pushtetit dhe zbatimi i marrëveshjes kornizë të Ohrit” Fridrich 
Ebert Stiftung, Shkup 2008 
- Etem Aziri “Ndarja e pushtetit dhe zbatimi i marrëveshjes kornizë të Ohrit” Fridrich 
Ebert Stiftung, Shkup 2008 
- Arend Liphard “Demokracia në shoqëritë pluraliste”, Shkup, 1994, fq. 59-101 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
146 
 
- “Zaman”, mars 2009, Shkup 
- Farimah Daftary “Conflict Resolution in FYR Macedonia: Power sharing or the ‘civic 
approach’,” Helsinki Monitor, Vol.12,12,No.4 (2001) 
- www.stat.gov.mk 
- Analizat e përqendruara në mendimet e qytetarëve (Zhvillimi rajonal, qeverisja lokale 
dhe cilësia e jetesës në Ish-Republikën Jugosllave të Maqedonisë, mars 2009, 
Tetovë 
- Petar Atanasov, Партнери во Мир и превенција Pегионална стабилност преку 
човекова безбедност, одбрани текстови од Конференција за Превенција и 
човекова безбедност 2005-2007, Скопје 2008. 
-  CRPA – UEJL Tetove 2008, raport – projekti “Perspektivat Euro Atlantike të RM, 
Problemet, sfidat dhe realiteti politik pas dështimit të Samitit të Bukureshtit 
2008.  
- Tim Bajhelt  “Evropskata Unija po prosiruvanjeto kon istok”, BC Izdavac za socijalni 
nauki, Vizbaden, Fondacija Kanrad Adenauer, Sekretarijat za evropski prasanja, 
Skopje, 2005. 
- www.sei.gov.mk  
-http:/www.bbc.co.uk/albanian/news
 
 
 
 
 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
147 
 
 
Ali BERK, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs,  
Strategy Development Board,  
Ankara, Turkey. 
Diana SHEHU,  
Agricultural University of Tirana,  
Dept. of Economy and Agrarian Policy,  
Tirana, Albania. 
Tufan BAL , 
Suleyman Demirel University, Faculty of Agriculture,  
Dept. of Agricultural Economics,  
Isparta, Turkey 
 
Rural Development Policies in European Union Membership Process: 
Evaluation in case of Turkey and Albania 
 
Abstract 
                 
This study examines situation of Turkey and Albanian rural areas and problems areas 
in the context of EU integration. The new policy instruments and their using to adopt 
CAP reforms in these countries were discussed in the study. Furthermore, Instrument 
for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) funds was review for both countries. As a result 
these funds will be carried out just four sector, milk, meat, chicken, and fruit-
vegetable and aqua products for 2007-2013 period (290 million Euro) in Turkey. 
Albania look like as a potential member of EU, the limited efficiency of Albanian 
agriculture, the output and income generated from agriculture is low, as compared to 
EU standards. To promote EU standards, 1323 million Euro (the share of IPA is 4.6 % of 
total amount) will be used for 2008-2010 for integration to EU by Albania. 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
In generally, “Development” can be defined such as increasing of communities’ 
prosperity in each country. Also, the function of development in rural areas includes 
several kinds of services; it contains a process that have not only economical concept 
but also from education to health, infrastructure services, agricultural production, 
creating new additional income possibilities and to be organized.    
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In recent years, it is commonly seen regional disparities in every part of World, 
especially in developing countries and even different part of the same country, which 
some of them are Turkey and Albania. Especially, this situation based on agricultural 
sector’s value added to national economies and rural areas’ situation in these 
countries. In Turkey, the share of rural population in total population, which was 75% 
in 1927, fell 40.9% in 1990, 35% in 2000 and 24% in 2007. On the other hand the 
portion of agricultural sector in general employments is yet very high (26.4% in 2007). 
Agricultural sector has a unique importance because 67.5% of these people, live in 
rural areas, make agricultural activities. In Albania the share rural population in total 
population in 1990 was 65% and about 50% in 2009. After 1990, the social and 
economical liberalization in Albania is causing and will continue to cause the migration 
of the population. Thus these countries’ rural areas have serious problems such as 
loosing labor force, migration of young population from rural to urban, also 
decreasing of agricultural productivity.  
In Turkey, though the major portion of the population is engaged in 
agricultural activities, distribution of national income has been impaired unfavorably 
against rural sections due to their low lot in GDP. Since the continuation of divisions of 
agricultural territories via inheritance, the decrease in sizes of agricultural enterprises, 
and the occurrence of further problems in agricultural fields (infrastructure, 
education, health, organizational structure etc.), poverty has become a current issue 
in both countries. According to criteria of Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, in Turkey, 14.8 % of population living in rural section, and 14.2 % of 
households in rural section are below poverty limit. (Pamuk, 2002). In 2002, 36.6 % of 
population living rural areas are below poverty limit (TURKSTAT, 2002). Furthermore it 
seems the same situation and in Albania, people that live in rural areas are the below 
poverty limit, in rural areas (especially in mountain areas).  Different surveys indicate a 
large reduction in poverty in rural areas between 2005 and 2008. The rapid reduction 
in rural poverty means that poverty may no longer be essentially a rural problem. 
Broad areas of Albania continue to witness declining poverty rates. The Central areas 
have had the largest reduction in poverty rates since 2005. However, the data indicate 
a noticeable slowdown in the rate of poverty reduction in Mountain Areas, where the 
incidence continues to be the high 
In last years, Regional and Rural Development Projects have come on the 
scene as a new model in rural development studies for last 20-25 years. National and 
international organizations gave place in their development programs. The majority of 
these projects aimed to reduce regional disparities basically. However there are also 
projects funded by International Organizations such as the World Bank, FAO, UNICEF, 
IFAD and EU.  
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Moreover, the beginning of relations between the EU and Turkey dates back 
to 1950s. It is foreseen that rura1 areas in Europe and in Turkey will be radically 
changed during the next decades. With EU enlargement allied to the fundamental 
reform of the CAP (Lux., June 2003) and the further changes that will continue after a 
WTO agreement. It will be essential to have a proper balance between economic, 
social, environmental and sustainable development of rural areas in both Europe and 
Turkey which is the major challenge for the future (Allen and others, 2006). Especially, 
after 2000s there are new policy instruments have been carrying out in Turkey thanks 
to Turkey’s candidacy process to EU by policy makers. The main aim of these 
implementations is reorganization of Turkish agriculture, increasing of agriculture 
competitive and ensuring sustainable rural development in rural sections.  
On the other hand, Albania shares the same process on IPA – The Instrument 
for Pre-accession Assistance- like Turkey too. In the framework of regional and 
European integration, since 1990 many agreements have been signed by Albania with 
European Union. In 1999, Albania gets the trade regime of the autonomous measures 
with EU, while in September 2000, Albania becomes member of World Trade 
Organization (WTO). In 2001 Albania signed The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with all 
regional countries. In June 2006 the Stability and Association Agreement was signed 
with EU, which came into force on December 1st, 2006,  CEFTA , which came into 
force in May, 2007.  (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Energy, 1990-2007). 
The signing of stability and association agreement marks the beginning of a 
new phase of prospect in corporation with EU and certainly deepening the integration 
process of Albania. We believe the membership of Albania in WTO and FTA, signed 
with regional countries and EU is in general the most important challenges for 
Albanian economy and in particular for Albanian agricultural sector. Nowadays the 
trend of economy is to increase exports and to decrease imports. In the recent years 
some of imported agricultural products have been replaced with Albanian agricultural 
products, produced or processed in the country.  
Another objective is encouraging farmers to increase the investments in their own 
farms. 
               Taking part of Turkey and Albania as member in these international 
organizations: FAO; IFAD; CIHEAM; OIE; EPPO; ISTA; FEZ, IPGRI, OECD, is a good 
chance to profit from different projects that offer them. It makes easy these countries 
to integrate to European Community.  
These agreements and programs release new perspectives about rural 
development and emphasis on multifunctional of rural areas. Recently, as a potential 
candidate country, Albania receives assistance under components I and II. The Multi-
Annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) 2008-2010 for Albania under IPA 
allocates to Albania a total amount of EUR 245.1 million. Of this amount 88 % will be 
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directed to projects under IPA component I; the rest will fund Cross Border 
Cooperation projects.  
In both countries (Turkey and Albania), rural areas must face new challenges 
such as further reform of the CAP during the next years, further liberalization of world 
trade for agricultural products, demographic changes (migration, etc.), need for 
investment in knowledge and innovation, the continuous reduction in the number of 
full time farmers and in the numbers directly employed on farms.  
To integrate to EU, facing new challenges summarized above, some policy 
priorities should be shared by these countries; reduce rural unemployment , improve 
income situation, improve agriculture efficiency and competitiveness, promote rural 
tourism, improve rural infrastructure and services, devote greater resources to 
training and preparation for employment, encourage opportunities for young people 
to rejuvenate rural society, need to promote women' s role in rural society, adequate 
provision of healthcare and social security services.  
 
Rural areas and rural development policies in turkey and Albania 
 
General Overview of Agriculture Sector and Rural Areas 
 
In general, Turkey can demonstrate some distinctive features in its development: an 
overall growing economy with frequent periods of economic crisis; a growing 
population with great disparities of income and capabilities, especially between urban 
and rural areas and different sectors of the economy; a rich endowment of natural 
resources strained by over consumption and poor management and more so 
concentrated in the agricultural sector and rural areas. The recent trends of the 
overall economy and its overall structural features manifest themselves in strong, 
distinctive and polarized ways, influencing the structure and evolution of the current 
socio-economic context. These trends are important for rural development policies as 
they have a major impact on rural areas.  
 Development disparities between urban and rural areas still prevail as a result 
of modernization efforts, industrialization and socio-economic transformation in the 
social and economic development process of Turkey to date. In this process, rural 
areas failed to catch up with the rapid development of the urban areas. Two of the 
basic reasons are the structural transformation of Turkish economy in favor of 
industry and service sectors and the migration between regions and from the rural to 
urban areas (IPARD Program, 2007). 
The drivers of economic growth have been the manufacturing and service 
sector. Agriculture’s share of GDP has been declining in relative terms (- 60, 5% in the 
last 25 years) although it has actually grown in absolute values. In 2007, average 
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income per capita in Turkish economy is 9.333 $ and also 2.433 $ in agriculture sector 
(26.1 % of general level). The sector shares (%) of GDP for are shown in below. 
According to table, two sectors have played an important role in economic growth and 
are relevant for agricultural and rural development: the food industry and tourism.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1. The sector shares (%) of GDP for the period 1980-2006 
Sectors  1980 1990 2000 2004 2005 2006 
Agriculture 26,1 17,5 14,1 11,2 10,3 9,2 
Industry 19,3 25,5 23,3 24,9 25,4 25,6 
Services 54,6 57,0 62,6 63,9 64,4 65,2 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Source: TURKSTAT, various years 
 
Agriculture sector has still important share of GDP in Albania, in spite of 
declining its share latest years. Industry and services sectors has 81,1 % of GDP and it 
shows that the share of agriculture will be less than recent value in future years (Table 
2).  
 
Table 2. The sector shares (%) of GDP for the period 1980-2006 
Sectors  1996 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Agriculture 36.5 25.5 22.3 20.6 19,4 18,9 
Industry   15 16.0 23.9 24.4 25,4 23,9 
Services 48.5 58.5 53.8 55.0 55.2 57,2 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
 Source: ALBANIAN INSTAT, various years 
 
Population movement is one of the most important indicator in rural areas in 
each country. Furthermore, it is seen second element, a growing population and fast 
urbanization. The “village” population (people living in settlements below 2.000 
residents) has been considered historically as coinciding with rural population. In the 
long-term, two distinct phases may be observed in the rural-urban distribution (shown 
in table 3  below): the first from 1927 to 1950 in which Turkish society remains an 
agrarian one, with three quarters of the population living in rural areas and 
maintaining its share notwithstanding population growth, and a second phase, after 
the 1950’s, in which a process of significant urbanization takes place and shifts the 
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balance of the Turkish population, which now lives predominantly in cities of over 
2.000 (64,9%) inhabitants.  
In Albania, as we see in the table the share of rural population in total 
population, which was 79.5% in 1950, fell 63.9 % in 1990, 58.8 in 2000 and 51.3 in 
2008, explained with the emigration of population from rural areas to the cities (Table 
4). 
 
Table 3. Rural-urban distribution of the population 
 
Census 
Year 
Village 
Population 
(million) 
Share of 
Village 
Population (%) 
City 
Population 
(million) 
Share of City 
Population (%) 
Total 
(million) 
1927 10,3 75,8 3,3 24,2 13,6 
1950 15,7 75,0 5,2 25,0 20,9 
1960 18,9 68,1 8,9 31,9 27,8 
1970 21,9 61,6 13,7 38,4 35,6 
1980 25,1 56,1 19,6 43,9 44,7 
1990 23,2 41,0 33,3 59,0 56,5 
2000 23,8 35,1 44,0 64,9 67,8 
Source: TURKSTAT, 2000 General Population Census 
 
 
Table 4. Rural-urban distribution of the population 
Census 
Year 
Village 
Population 
(million) 
Share of 
Village 
Population 
(%) 
City 
Population 
(million) 
Share of City 
Population (%) 
Total 
(million) 
1950 966.2 79.5 249.0 20.5 1215.2 
1960 1133.0 70.5 474.3 29.5 1607.3 
1970 1455.9 68,2 479.7 31,8 2135,6 
1980 1773.2 66.4 897.3 33.6 2670.5 
1990 2079.9 63.9 1176.0 36.1 3255.9 
2000 1798.9 58.8 1259.6 41.2 3058.5 
2008 1629.0 51.3 1541.0 48.7 3170.0 
Source: ALBANIANSTAT, General Population Census 
In the framework of EU membership, it is seen main differences on agro data 
between EU and Turkey. This situation shows that Turkey has some difficulties on 
integration to CAP because of amount of agr. population, in spite of this rate is 5-7 % 
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in EU-25, the same figure is still very high (29.5 %) in Turkey. The same situation can 
be seen easily for agriculture enterprises, agr. employment too.    
 
Table 5. Some Basic Indicators in EU and Turkey 
Indicators Albania Turkey EU-15 EU-25 
Surface (million ha) 2,9 78 332 402 
Agriculture Land (million 
ha) 
1.1 39 134 169 
Num. of enterprise 
(million) 
- 2.4 7.4 13 
Population (million) 3,1 80 372 452 
Agr. Share in employment 
(%) 
58,5 26.4 5.0 6.0 
Agr. Share in GDP (%) 21* 7.7 1.9 1.8 
Agriculture Population (%)  - 29.5 3.0-4,0 5.0-7,0 
 
Source: TURKSTAT, Various Indicators, various years (2007), INSTAT, 2005 
  
Regional and Rural Development Policies in Turkey 
 
Turkey is one of countries that gave a special importance on issue early times, its 
studies go back 1930s. At the first, it was main purpose ensuring food security on this 
issue. Regarding of all these progress explained above, it has been given a particular 
significance to some extent since the initial years of planned development period to 
rural areas. Preceding the planned term, these studies were limited with coming into 
effect of Village Law, earliest economics congress, earliest village congress, abolition 
of tithe (Aşar tax), establishment of Village Institutes, getting titles to the lands; 
however, during the period of planned term, thanks to the model village approach, 
many-sided arrangements of rural sections, programs for society development, city-
village model, and the projects of regional and rural development these studies have 
evolved (Gülçubuk, 2008). A great many development projects supported by foreign 
financing system like IFAD and national government were carried out in Turkey to 
eliminate local differences between the prosperity levels, to improve the living 
conditions of rural people, to impede the migration, and to minimize the problems 
causing cultural discrepancies. Among them the South Eastern Anatolian Project (GAP) 
is the largest one, also Eastern Anatolian Project (DAP) and Eastern Black Sea 
Development Project (DOKAP) are the main implementing regional development 
projects.   
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The principal rural development projects, completed recently or still on the 
process; Rural Development Project in Çorum-Çankırı (1976-1984), Rural Development 
Project in Erzurum (1984-1989), Rural Development Project in Ordu-Giresun (1996-
2004), Rural Development Project in Bingöl-Muş (1990-1999), Rural Development 
Project in Sivas-Erzincan -Tunceli (1993-2006), Rural Development Project in Yozgat 
(1991-2001).  
 
Integration to Europe (Turkey’s and Albanian potential candidacy to eu) and rural 
development 
 
In EU countries, since its launch in 1991 the Leader Program has encouraged active 
involvement of local communities in Rural Development. Turkey started to adopt in 
rural development programs EU programs since mid 1990’s by LEADER programs. 
Furthermore, in the beginning of 2000s there were made some legislative 
arrangements.  in the EU membership process, there have been made new expansions 
against rural section in Turkey such as acceptance of EU regulation by Turkish 
Government (21 March 2001), against economic and social adaptation in EU, a 
national development plan, include 2004-2006 period, was accepted (22 December 
2003/61). On the other hand, administration system reform studies have been 
accepted (23.07.2004 /5216), and also NUTS regulation made (22 September 
2002/4720). According to this regulation, the regions were divided in three groups, in 
first group, there are 12, in second group, there are 26 and third group there are 81 
regions (provinces). Therefore, regional development programs prepared for 12 
regions, which are in second group, have been accepted by EU. Finally, regional 
development agencies, 26 numbers, have been established in Turkey 
(25.1.2006/5449) (Berk and Yasar, 2008).  
In order to form a basis for a Rural Development plan and to establish the 
strategy for the rural areas in Turkey, the national Rural Development strategy has 
been prepared and it was adopted by the Supreme Planning Council and published in 
the Official Gazette (04.02.2006). The national rural development strategy has been 
prepared in conformity with the national development plans and within the view of 
harmonization for the EU’s rural development policy. The strategy document 
constitutes a specialized guideline for rural development in which the quantified 
analysis of the rural situation, development opportunities, results of previous 
implementations, required strategies and priorities, have been identified (Allen and 
others 2006).  
Recently, in order to make use of the IPARD funds. Turkey prepared a Rural 
Development Plan (IPARD Plan) for the years from 2007 to 2013 which will form the 
basis for financing the rural development measures under the IPARD and establish an 
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implementing / paying agency (IPARD Agency). Total amount of this fund for Turkey is 
290,5 million € for 2007-2013 periods. This plan was accepted by EU (19 December 
2007) and includes just four sector, milk, meat, chicken, and fruit-vegetable and aqua 
products.  
Table 6. Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance Rural Development Fund of Turkey 
Years 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total (Million Euro) 
Payment 
Amount 
20,7 53,0 85,5 131,3 290,5 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (www.tarim.gov.tr), 2009  
 
It is still continuing establishing of IPARD Agency in Turkey. Because of 
administrative mistakes these funds couldn’t be used desired level until now. In this 
step it is applied for accreditation process to EU. It is planning to be used these founds 
in 2010 efficiently.    
 
Table 7. Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) of Albania 
EC Assistance to Albania (1991-2007) in million € 
IPA 61 
CARDS 330 
Phare 635 
Macro-financial assistance 150 
ECHO 142 
EIDHR  5 
Total 1323 
Source: Multi-annual indicative planning document for Albania 2008-2010 
   
        In the part of Albania, the strategic objective of pre-accession assistance IPA 
to Albania is to support the country in moving towards membership of the European 
Union. The objectives identified in the MIPD 2008-2010 respond to the European 
Partnership priorities, the 2007 Progress Report and the SAA/Interim Agreement 
requirements. Assistance will also support the implementation of Albania’s 2007 
National Strategy for Development and Integration, the 2007-2012 National Plan for 
the Approximation of the Legislation and the Stabilization and Association Agreement, 
as well as other relevant strategies in areas related to the EU integration process. 
In this framework, Turkey and Albania has similar kind of agricultural 
problems to integrate CAP such as scale problems in agriculture. In turkey, high 
dependency of rural employment and income sources on agricultural activities is seen 
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as a main problem area. Specifically, the problems can be seen such as small scale and 
fragmented agricultural holdings, Inadequacy of agricultural training and extension 
services, and cooperation, standards and quality problems of agro products, 
inefficiency of marketing activities, insufficiency of capital and financial resources, 
situation of forest villages, low education level and low schooling ratio of female 
students, inadequacy of data required analyzing economic and social structures of 
rural areas. On the other hand, in Albania, it is based mainly on small farms (less than 
1,2 hectares and divided into 3-4 plots in Albania). This division is a great obstacle for 
a sustainable development of Albanian and Turkish agriculture. Secondly, it is seen 
socio-economic difficulties on agricultural production, difficulties with regard to 
adapting the old mentality of farmers to the new circumstances of the market 
economy like production of traditional crops, not participating of agricultural 
education and extension programs desired level. Also, it is seen the difficulties in 
storage and distribution of agricultural products and low level of development of agro-
processing industry in the both country. Also, there are some poor infrastructure and 
road network problems too. All of these problems can be seen a problem areas for 
integration to CAP. To solve this integration problem, EU funds like IPA have been 
tried to be used efficiently recent years. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
The integration to CAP needs new challenges for both countries. In this process, it is 
seen new opportunities to solve rural areas’ problem to be facilitated of integration to 
EU. Turkey and Albania have basic advantages because of their position. These 
countries follow new policy instruments in rural areas thanks to EU funds such as IPA. 
Turkey has liberal market system since 1980s on the contrary of Albania. So Turkey 
has specific integration problems.  IPA plays important role to integrate Turkish 
agriculture to CAP and adopted new rural development concept in Turkish rural areas. 
This concept consist of development trends of non-agriculture sectors, increasing 
consumer consciousness and demand for healthy, quality and organic products, 
development of food industry on the basis of domestic and foreign demand, 
increasing of demand of rural tourism, EU membership process and harmonization, 
accessibility to international resources-funds, enhanced opportunities to access 
foreign markets, progress in production, communication and information 
technologies, development in urban economies, stronger functional relations between 
urban and rural areas, increasing concern for the empowerment of local governments 
and improvement of public administration (SPO,2006 ). 
Albania is still trying to adopt liberal market system in agriculture. So mainly it 
needs land reform including land distribution and registration. IPA and other EU funds 
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can be used to make strong   agro-land and registration system. Limited agro-
investment possibilities (2 % of budget), level of agricultural production, insufficient of 
using new technologies, application of quality management systems are other 
problem area for integration to CAP and EU standards. To facilitate integration, it 
should be increased fund for investment in agriculture by IPA. To increase agricultural 
production and farm incomes, farmers should co-operate with each other because of 
the surface of lands are too small and so they can’t implement new technologies 
efficiently. Also, they need improve and strengthen veterinary and fitosanitary 
services, to strengthen food control and food security rules. 
Necessary requirement for the integration of the Albanian society is the 
application of   standards for quality management. Many Albanian companies are on 
the way of certification ISO, HACCP, CE. In the same time, it needs that business 
should to improve the marketing of its products. 
Mainly, it is seen adaptation problem to liberalization in Albania. This situation 
forces the country critical making decisions on ownership of agricultural land, 
registration system, monitoring and evaluation of agro products from land to 
consumer, and also future challenges under new conditions of WTO and CAP reforms.  
On the other hand, in spite of liberal policies implemented latest years in Turkish 
agriculture, Turkey needs reorganization of rural areas and rural development concept 
with new instruments to increase productivity thanks to EU membership.    
 
References 
 
1. Allen, F, Özcan N, (2006), “Rural Development in EU – Turkey”,  21th meeting of the 
EU-Turkey Joint Consultative Committee, Kayseri, Turkey 
2. Berk, A.,Akdemir,Ş., (2006), “Impacts of Rural Development Projects on Rural Areas 
in Turkey: A Study on Yozgat Rural Development Project”, Journal of Applied 
Sciences 6 (9): 1892-1899, ISSN 1812-5654, Pakistan 
3. Berk,A, Yaşar,B., (2008), “Biodiesel Production Opportunities in Rural Areas in 
Turkey, Oeconomia (Ekonomia) 7 (4), page 17–25, Poland,  
4. Gülçubuk, B., (2008), Rural Development and Rural Situation in EU and Turkey, 
Faculty of Agriculture and Dept of Agr. Economics, University of Ankara, Ankara, 
Turkey. 
5. IPARD Program, (2007), Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA),  
6. INSTAT, 1989-2004, Albania. 
7. IPA, Multi-annual indicative planning document for Albania 2008-2010, p 2. 
8. Pamuk, M., (2002). The Poverty in the Rural Areas in Turkey, The Strategies of 
Combating Against Poverty,    Right-work confederation’ publishing, Ankara, 
Turkey.  
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
158 
 
9. SPO, 2006, National Rural Development Strategy, State Planning Organization, 
Ankara, Turkey. 
10. TURKSTAT, (2002). The Study of Poverty. The Bulletin of the of Turkey Statistic Institute, 
No: B.02.1.DİE.0.11.00.03.906/62, Ankara Turkey.  
11. http://www.undp.org.al , Albania 
12. http://sgb.tarim.gov.tr/duyurular/IPARD_Program/IPARD_Programme_ENG.doc, 
Ankara, Turkey 
13.(http://www.aqua.ar.wroc.pl/acta/pl/main.php?p=8&sub=0&act=10&s=14&no=20
6&lang=en) 
 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
159 
 
 
Volkova EKATERINA, Ural State University,  
Ekaterinburg, Russia.  
PhD in Political Studies,  
pro-dean of the International Relations Faculty. 
 
The European Union Strategy towards the South European states: the Case of 
Political Transformation in Serbia 
 
        Serbia, as a part of SFRY, at the end of 80th of the XX century was a leader of 
integration processes; but in a result of its collapse and civil wars, also out of the long-
lasting process of confrontation with the Milosevic’s regime, these advantages were 
lost and the process of        institutional reforms was retarded.  
             The failure of the EU peaceful initiatives during the Yugoslavian conflict 
settlement in 90th leaded to the development and implementation fundamentally new 
strategy of stabilization – SAP – economic and political stabilization of the whole 
region in time.  
            The democratic opposition in Serbia took the course on integration into the EU 
from the very beginning (2000) but during long time it wasn’t able to implement the 
radical reforms.  
             In such conditions the EU’ tactics of categorical demands to admit new status 
of Kosovo and cooperate with Hague in aggregate with economic and financial 
support of institutional reforms and speeding up the process of the SAP signing, 
afforded. Such cynical “stick and carrot policy” from the side of EU fortunately was 
crowned with success. 
 
Key Words: S erbia, European Union, political transformation, European integration 
  
The region of central and southern Europe has always played a special role in the 
course of global development. In many ways geopolitical problem of Serbia's position 
in European transformational processes has a long and extremely ambiguous history; 
just remember the word of St Sava's "The East thought that we were West, while the 
West considered us to be East". Serbia, always remaining a European state, both 
territorially and geographically, but has never actually been in Europe Union. 
               As in the past, today the issue of European integration is connected with the 
complexity and uncertainty of "Serbian question" which has a 200 year history: how to 
combine the process of modernization and unification of "Serbism". In 2008, after the 
self-declaration of independence of        Kosovo this dilemma transformed into the 
equally urgent problem - the problem of preservation of state integrity and national 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
160 
 
identity of the Serbs. A long period of crisis and dissolution of SFRY, complicated by a 
civil war, turned Serbia from a leader of European integration of the end of the 80s 
into an outsider. An extended period of time of democratic revolution to a larger 
extent retarded institutional reforms as well as the essential transformation of social 
structure and political system of the country. 
  
Transformation of internal politics in Serbia in 1990-2000. 
 
At the end of the 1980s under the conditions of acute political crisis in Yugoslavia, the 
process of establishing of multi-party system began: new parties were organized in 
Slovenia and then in the other republics. However only in Serbia, (as opposed to any 
other former Yugoslav republics and the majority of Eastern European countries), 
communists managed to preserve their exclusive domain in power in the multi party 
system for quite a long period of time - right until the beginning of the 21st century. 
This very specificity gives us an opportunity to regard the political processes in Serbia 
as phenomenon of extended in time known as the "velvet revolution". 
 For a decade from the introduction of multi party system and to the "small October 
revolution" there was Slobodan Milosevic's personal rule regime with elements of a 
parliamentary system. Whereas in the countries of central and Eastern Europe the 
democratic opposition managed to come to power using national doctrines, S. 
Milosevic in Serbia under the slogan of "anti-bureaucratic revolution" managed to do 
so that the "old regime" played a role of a new one and created a paradoxical 
situation from a political point of view: the party, ruling for 40 years, managed to 
become a power and an opposition at one time by means of new, as it was called 
"refined" leadership. New Serbian administration leadership deprived the opposition 
of its ideological identity by proclaiming the protection of "serbism" its first objective. 
The most important event in the political live of Serbia of that period was the 
formation of the united opposition party - Democratic Party in 1990. DP leaders 
represented various political trends: from convinced liberals and supporters of 
western model of modernization of Yugoslavia(D. Micunovic and Z. Djindjic) and 
democrats -traditionalists (V. Kostunica, K. Cavoski, N. Milosevic) to radical 
nationalists(V. Sesel). This very heterogeneity determined contradictions in 
administration and constant organizational changes. Centrist and ideologically 
heterogeneous DP turned to be subjected to rifts; problems of national policy and 
uniting into broader coalitions turned out to be the reason why both leftists and 
rightists separated from it. As a result three trends were formed in the Serbian 
political arena: socialist (the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Yugoslav Left - IYUL (July)), 
liberal-democratic (the Democratic Party of Serbia, Serbian Renewal movement) and 
nationalistic (the Serbian Radical Party). 
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At the same time the conflict between two leading democratic parties DP and 
DPS was escalating: more and more they disagreed on the strategy of political 
transformation of the society and the national question. Not least important was the 
personal rivalry for leadership in a democratic camp between two leaders - 
V.Kostunica and Z. Djindjic. 
During the war all the parties except DP and DSP took up extremely 
nationalistic positions, blaming Milosevic for treason and insisting on "unification of all 
Serbian lands". However the same national and patriotic program was proposed by 
the leading SPS. In that way Serbian pluralism was a dilemma of communist and 
anticommunist nationalism. 
The 78-day war of NATO against Yugoslavia turned out to be the determinant 
- the turning point in confrontation of S. Milosevic's regime with democratic 
opposition. The attempt of the regime to represent itself as a "winner" in the war 
made it unpopular with all levels of Serbian society. At the same time the opposition 
forces united and a new coalition called "The Democratic opposition of Serbia" was 
created. The cause for consolidation of all oppositional forces and their unification 
with mass non-partisan protest was the preparation for 2000 elections. 
In reality Z. Djindjic was a creator and a manager of the election campaign DOS 
which resulted in S.Milosevic’s overthrow. The mass youth nongovernmental 
organization “Repulse” became an important ally of the coalition in the election 
campaign. Not less important reason of the triumph of opposition were blunders of 
the ruling regime. The Parliament of Yugoslavia made a number of amendments to 
the Constitution of the FR of Yugoslavia on the 6th July, 2000. Outwardly democratic 
changes, per se, purposed other objects. By means of these changes the Parliament 
actually cleared S. Milosevic the way to (absolute) power. 
It was Z. Djindjic who saw a chance for Serbian opposition in this decision made by 
his opponent. At the same time he managed to preserve the unity of opposition. It 
turned to be possible by Z. Djindjic’s tactical ploy. He understood that his own 
candidature was unacceptable and proposed an uncompromising figure of the DPS 
leader V.Kostunica as a candidate for the FR of Yugoslavia Presidency. All this 
predetermined the success of DOS in Presidential and Parliamentary elections of the 
24th September 2000 and gave an opportunity to head the mass protest movement on 
the 5th October, 2000, which, as a result of the so-called “October revolution”, led to 
the overthrow of S.Milosevic regime. However, becoming the leading coalition in the 
country, the Democratic opposition of Serbia was a priori doomed to the renewal of 
ideological and personal disagreements which characterized the inter-party relations 
in the late 1990’s. Moreover, they only intensified at the beginning of the 21st century, 
when integration into the global society became a necessity. 
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Political in-fighting in Serbia and its relationship with the EU in 2000- 2006 гг. 
 
Straight after V. Kostunica was pronounced the winner in presidential elections, the 
EU rescinded most of the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia and decided to extend the 
measures for liberalization of trade for Serbia. The EU also set a course for Serbia’s 
progressive integration into its organization. For the first time in the last 10 years 
representatives of Belgrade took part in a summit of the heads of state and 
government of the region held in October 2000, in Skopje (Macedonia) and this 
became a legitimization of new “democratic” Yugoslavia. During the conference the 
FR of Yugoslavia officially acceded to the Stability Pact for the countries of South 
Eastern Europe. 
Within the terms of regional cooperation between Serbia and Montenegro in 
April 2003, Serbia and Montenegro joined the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, in 
august – the international Danube Commission and the Regional Transportation and 
Energy System. Direct working contacts between the EU working bodies and the FR of 
Yugoslavia were made in June 2001. During the period between July 2002 and January 
2005 about 10 meetings between the representatives of the European Commission 
and the administration of the FR of Yugoslavia (from February 2003 – Serbia and 
Montenegro) were held, in the course of which the fields subjected to reformation 
were marked. 
              The Thessaloniki Summit was a powerful impetus to the development of the 
regional cooperation. Despite the acute situation in domestic policy in Serbia and 
contradictions between different groups of democrats, the course to euro integration 
became the long-term guiding line in the policy of Z. Zhivkovic’c transitional 
government (2003) as well as of V. Kostunica’s coalition government (2004-2007).   
               According to the decisions made at the Thessaloniki Summit, the government 
of the Republic of Serbia adopted a Plan of actions for bringing the national legal 
system in balance with the acts of the EU in July 2003. “The Office of the Government 
of Serbia for the joining the EU”, formed on the 8th March, 2004 became the main 
administrative body for coordination of work in the course of joining the EU. 
               The major achievement in the work of Serbian government and the 
parliament of Serbia for the joining was the development and adoption of the 
National strategy of Serbia for joining the EU by Serbia and Montenegro in May 2005. 
In spring 2005 the EU took a favorable view of institutional reforms in Serbia and 
Montenegro and was ready to start direct negotiations for signing the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement in autumn 2005. In the statement on the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement among other things it was marked that cooperation between 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
163 
 
Serbia and Montenegro and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia developed rapidly. 
However, already in spring 2006 the situation in the relationship between 
Serbia and the EU changed drastically: in the agenda not so much the problems of 
institutional transformation came to the fore as the most important issues concerning 
home political stability: the problem of cooperation with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the question of the status of the autonomous 
province of Kosovo and Metohija. It was in many respects connected with the 
situation in home policy of Serbia. 
              On the back of the fierce opposition of DP and DPS the active process of 
growth of the Serbian Radical Party took place. It can be explained by the fact that the 
Serbian Radical Party, gradually but quicker and smoother than the Socialist Party of 
Serbia, transformed from the extremist-radical party to the populist-conservative one 
and became the party of discontent and protest vote. To some extent the leaders of 
the Democratic Party are responsible for that as they thought there was an electoral 
community of the democratic bloc and the most important task is to redistribute 
these votes for its own benefit. As a result there was Kostunica’s weakening as well as 
the extension of influence of the radicals. 
                The results of the elections in Serbia in December 2003 and then the 
formation of Kostunica’s government in March 2004, supported by socialists, caused 
quite negative reaction of the West and laid foundation to the constant search for the 
variants of direct influence upon the political landscape in Serbia. From this moment 
on, V. Kostunica’s coalition governments (2004-May 2008) became opponents to 
Brussels and a factor which hindered the process of integration of Serbia.  
               Strengthening of interparty resistance in spring 2006 led to a stalemate: 
Kostunica’s Cabinet actually blocked the process of judicial reform and reform of force 
structures. In response DP leaders paralyzed the work of Parliament. It instigated the 
outside forces to take decisive actions: leaders of the EU placed their stake on the 
open pressure on Serbia. The Solicitor General of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia K.Del Ponte instigated an accusation of Serbia of the 
rejection to cooperate with ICTY in General Radko Mladic’s search and extradition. At 
the beginning of May 2006 it caused the formal interruption in negotiations for signing 
the Stabilization and Association Agreement. Announcement about the interruption in 
negotiations between the EU and Serbia on the 3rd May 2006 let M.Djukanovic (the 
president of Montenegro) get nominal majority in 0,3 % in favour of separation. 
Having finished the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia on its republican 
boarders, the EU made it clear that it will go any length to the partition of Serbia. 
Separation of Montenegro and formal extinction of the FR of Yugoslavia brought 
legitimacy of Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo into a question as the United Nations 
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Security Council Resolution 1244 provided that Kosovo was a sovereign part of a 
federal state. 
                It is obvious that one of the motives of the actions of the EU aimed at 
breakdown of talks with Serbia was striving for changing the home political landscape 
in the country. Brussels was persuaded to activate the pressure on the political elite of 
the country and to use the method of “carrot and sticks” for the reformation of the 
political arena of Serbia. It happened because of the single-line perception of political 
processes in Serbia by org-men of the EU and their confidence that center-right 
coalition headed by V. Kostunica turns the Euro integration process into the 
alternative of preserving the territorial integrity and national identity of the country 
by its policy.  
 
Means and methods of the EU influence on political landscape in Serbia in  
2006-2008. 
 
Breakdown of negotiations for the signing of the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement at the beginning of May 2006 and the transition of the western partners to 
forced politics about R. Karadijc’s extradition to the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia and about the status of Kosovo caused another political crisis in 
Serbia which lasted up to the spring of 2008. 
During the run in the office the cabinets of the DP (2001-2003) and then during the 
run of power of V. Kostunica’s coalition cabinet in 2004-beginning of 2006 the 
countries of the ES retarded the activity of the ICTY. They were afraid of 
destabilization of internal affairs in Serbia and the ultimate rupture of liberal-
conservative coalition, which, in their opinion, opened the way to power for V. 
Kostunica’s populist bloc and V. Sesel’s radical bloc. However in spring 2006 when the 
rupture of unsteady coalition of V. Kostunica and Tadic’s supporters turned out to be a 
reality and the process of reformation of judicial system and system of force 
structures stopped, the question of R. Mladic and R. Karadjic’s extradition became the 
most effective and sophisticated means of pressure on Belgrade. The radical turn to 
cooperation with the ICTY, especially R. Karadjic’s extradition to the Hague, happened 
only after the victory of democrats in the parliament elections and b. Tadic took 
control over the force structures and first of all over the key one – the Agency of 
Information and Security. 
              After the victory of “the october revolution” new democratic forces of 
Belgrade made every possible effort to implement the Kumanov Agreement and the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999 could improve the 
constructive dialog with the representatives of the international forces in Kosovo and 
the Contact group and to launch the complicated process of quest for a compromise 
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on the basis of the formula “at first-standards – then status”. By common effort they 
managed to localize the spread of the conflict in the southern parts of Serbia in March 
2001, which by the Kumanov Agreement were turned to so-called “buffer zone” of 
Preshev valley. 
However the deadlock in the process of Kosovo regulation contributed to the fact that 
by the end of 2002 Belgrade came to a conclusion that the battle for standards and 
creation of multiethnic Kosovo had failed and now it was essential to force onto the 
final defining of Kosovo’s status in a direct dialog with Washington, Moscow and 
Brussels on the basis of its partition. The document called “the Strategy for Kosovo 
and Metohija” adopted by Serbian government at the end of December, 2002 
presupposed constitutionalization of Serbian community in the administrative system 
of Kosovo and Metohija in the so-called “Dayton variant” by formula “more that 
autonomy, less than republic”. 
              New correlation of forces in Belgrade formed after Z. Djindjic’s assassination 
on the 12th of March 2003, immediately influenced the process of negotiations on the 
status of Kosovo. Internal fight for power in Serbia between the supporters of 
different Serbian parties in Serbian enclaves led to the full loss of initiative in the 
process of negotiations by Belgrade, which allowed the international community, first 
of all, the USA, the EU and the UN took the initiative in the final work on the status of 
Kosovo.Total failure of the policy “at first-standards – then status” afforded General 
Secretary of the UN  K. Annan ground to make a decision about the beginning of direct 
negotiations about the future status of Kosovo. The further course of negotiations 
about the status of Kosovo under the aegis of M. Ahtisaari, which began in February 
2006, became a preparation to the proclamation of independence of Kosovo, which 
was reflected in Ahtisaari plan, manifested in January 2007. Breakdown of 
negotiations about SPS, and the deadlock of negotiations about the status of Kosovo 
in autumn 2006 ignited another political crisis in Serbia.  
            Despite the fact that the new Constitution of Serbia was adopted in October 
2006 which proclaimed the province of Kosovo and Metohija a constituent part of 
Serbian territory, the strain in relationship of Tadic’s and Kostunica’s supporters was 
at its height. Special [parliamentary elections held on the 20th January 2007 could not 
help to overcome the crisis: the process of formation of the government lasted 4 
months and was finished on the 15th of May 2007 with formation of V.Kostunica’s 
coalition cabinet with the Democratic Party, conservative-traditionalist bloc of the         
Democratic Party of Serbia, V. Ilic’s «New serbia» and the party called «Group 17 
plus». 
             Though the principle of work of coalition government was based on five 
agreements established during the negotiations – retaining of Kosovo as a part of 
Serbia, Euro integration, fighting against corruption and organized crime, 
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intensification of social and economic policy and cooperation of Serbia with the ICTY – 
the crisis was not overcome: the final political landscape was formed as a result of the 
parliament elections in January- the beginning of February 2008 as well as the result 
of snap parliament elections of the 11th of May, 2008 which took place against the 
backdrop of acute political crisis, caused by ther declaration of Kosovo independence 
on the 17th February 2008. 
            In many respects the unexpected victory of the coalition “For European Serbia” 
in the parliament elections of the 11th May, 2008 and the following formation of 
coalition government of democrats with socialists and their electoral bloc partners 
was a result of principal changes of Serbian public sentiments towards the pro-
European vote and of the competent tactics used by the Democratic Party. B.Tadic 
managed not only to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU on 
the 28th April 2008, but also 2 days before the elections he managed to reach the 
approval of  the Oil and Gas Agreement with Russia, signed by the government on the 
25th January 2008. By doing this he managed to decrease the original clash of Serbian 
national consciousness – either with the West, or with Russia, by opposing this 
traditional choice to the formula – both with the West and with Russia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
167 
 
 
 
Orjeta JAUPAJ and Bashkim LUSHAJ 
 
An Evaluation of Chapter 14 of EU Acquis Communautaire Energy Acquis, Albanian 
Law Approximation and Challenges  
 
 
Abstract 
 
As it is known, the pre-accession period should be maximally used to provide concrete 
evidence of the country’s ability to respond to the EU membership requirements. 
The current paper aims at analyzing the approximation of Albanian Legislation 
with Energy acquis, which represents the body of all energy related EU law, 
regulations and policies and the challenge Albania faces to its implementation.         
We really hope to raise the awareness of governmental institutions and the 
public regarding the tendencies and trends of EU policies in the field of energy.  
 
Key words: Energy, biofuels, environment, Albania 
Introduction 
 Albania’s EU integration process represents perhaps one of the most debated matters 
in the national public and political discourse. On 18 February 2008, the Council 
adopted a new European partnership with Albania. The Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) was signed on 12 June 2006, which entered into force on 1 April 
2009. Eventually, Albania submitted its application for EU membership on 28 April 
2009. 
             Following the entry into force of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, 
Albania entered a new and more advanced stage in its EU integration process. The 
successful transition towards the attainment of the final goal requires therefore better 
capacities to respond to membership obligations and certainly a firmer commitment 
to consolidate the governance system, democratic institutions and economic 
performance. 
             As a matter of fact, sound administrative capacities to implement the EU 
legislation (Madrid criteria) constitute one of the core criteria that a country has to 
fulfill in order to join the European Union. In its “Guide to the Main Administrative 
Structures Required for Implementing the Acquis” (May 2005), the European 
Commission suggests that “a candidate country preparing for accession to the EU 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
168 
 
must bring its institutions, management capacity and administrative and judicial 
systems up to Union standards with a view to implementing the acquis effectively or, 
as the case may be, being able to implement it effectively in good time before 
accession”. 
Furthermore, Albania’s efforts to join the European Union (EU) are presently 
coordinated by the Ministry of European Integration (MEI), which was established in 
2004. Point 1 of the 2004 decision establishing the Ministry reads that “MEI’s mission 
involves technical management and coordination of Albania’s EU integration process 
through approximation of legislation, design of integration policies, coordination of 
financial assistance and informing the public about this process”. 
          Some of the core competencies and functions of the Ministry of Integration 
involve: 
 the coordination and monitoring of the Stabilization and Association Process 
(SAP); 
 coordination and monitoring of the process of addressing the SAP objectives 
and obligations;  
 coordination, monitoring and implementation of the process of 
approximation with EU acquis communautaire; 
In addition, the Albanian Government has also established specialized European 
Integration Units (EIU) in all line ministries to act as focal points for EU-related 
assistance, reporting and monitoring. The Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 179, 
dated 22/2/2006 outlines the responsibilities of these units, which inter alia involve: 
 internal coordination, ensuring direct links and cooperation with the MEI and 
other line ministries regarding the obligations the country has assumed with 
the SAP; 
 internal institutional coordination with the MEI and  other line ministries 
regarding the approximation of legislation and reporting on legal acts 
adopting the acquis communautaire under TAIEX; 
Despite the continuous improvements in the country, the Stabilization and Association 
progress reports still underline a number of shortcomings in specific areas related to 
legal gaps and/or blurred implementation performance (Vurmo, 2008). 
This study does not intend to fill all the gaps regarding the capacities to respond to 
membership obligations. It focuses mainly on some of the most essential components 
of the Energy Acquis as part of Chapter 15 of EU Acquis Communautaire. It also tends 
to provide an analytical examination of the afore-mentioned Chapter focusing on 
renewable energy and energy efficiency, Albanian Law approximation with the last EU 
Directives, which promotes such implementation, and Challenges in Albania’s EU 
integration process – experience and future prospects. Obviously, the current study 
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hopes to increase the sensitivity on the process and to generate continuous debate 
and far-reaching analysis on this topic. 
 
 
The climate change and EU policies toward clean energy  
 
Where does the environment leave off and society begin? That is the question that 
concerns the whole world for some decades now. In a world expanding production 
and consumption and driving greenhouse gas emissions, it is unclear where the 
climate ends and the economy begins. Climate change, brought about by increasing 
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping greenhouse 
gases, has been described by David King (2004), the UK’s Chief Scientist, as “the most 
severe problem that we are facing today - more serious even than the threat of 
terrorism”. The watershed event that brought the question of global warming, which 
began with the advent of the industrial revolution and fossil fuel consumption, to the 
forefront in the scientific community, was the publication of Revelle’s data in 1957, 
which quantified the geologically unprecedented build-up of atmospheric CO2. 
Revelle characterized the potential risk of global climate change this way: 
 
“Human beings are carrying out a large scale geophysical experiment of a kind 
that could not have happened in the past nor be produced in the future. 
Within a few centuries, we are returning to the atmosphere and the oceans 
the concentrated organic  carbon stored in sedimentary rocks over 
hundreds of millions of years.” 
 
Indeed, Revelle’s concise statement of the risks at play in global climate change 
remains the best framing of the issue available for policy makers today.  
Today the world is becoming more conscious of the risks of global climate change and 
the policies toward the clean energy are projected as the key to resolve it. Alternative, 
carbon neutral energy technologies and the so-called renewable energy technologies 
are considered as crucial towards the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. This 
includes wind, marine energy, small hydropower, solar energy, geothermal energy and 
energy from waste, and biomass energy (FREDS 2005a). The burning of fossil fuels 
(conventional source of energy) is thought to be the primary cause of increased 
carbon dioxide concentrations, thought to be responsible on a global scale for up to 
80% of annual emissions.  
              On the other hand, scarcity of traditional energy resources (fossil fuels) 
nowadays remains one of the main concerns of governments all over the world. It is 
estimated that coal resources, if utilized in accordance with current rates, would last 
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for 167 years, gas resources for 67 years and fossil oil resources for only 41 years 
(World Coal Institute 2007). In “World oil production and peaking outlook” Kopelaar 
(2005) asserts that “Oil production is expected to peak at some time in the near 
future, although there is considerable debate as to exactly when this will occur”. As 
such, the solution lies in utilizing renewable energy sources as well as increasing 
energy efficiency, which minimizes energy transmission losses and promotes energy 
efficient usage. 
    Over the last decades, there has been a worldwide unprecedented explosion 
of new concepts, theories, facts, and techniques that were followed by consequently 
Action Plans, Policies, and Legal Frameworks, to achieve the main objectives of the 
policymakers towards the security of supply and sustainability of energy and to tackle 
the global climate change, in order to promote the so-called renewable energy 
technologies and new approaches to promote the energy efficiency both considered 
as key solutions.  
                 On a European Scale, the Renewable Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion 
of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity 
market was the first initiative to put mandatory targets for the Member States in 
order to promote the renewable energy production, which set a target of 22.1% 
renewable electricity by 2010. This initiative was followed in 2003 by the Biofuel 
Directive 2003/30/EC where the EU set an indicative target of a 5.75% biofuel share of 
the transport fuel market by 2010 (EC 2003). 
                  The European Commission, on the other hand, has consequently 
communicated guides to help Member States implement such targets. It is worth 
mentioning here Biomass Action Plan launched in December 2005, followed by a EU 
Strategy for Biofuels in February 2006, Renewable Energy Road Map in January 2007 
and in November 2008, the Commission issued a major Green Paper "Towards a 
secure, sustainable and competitive European energy network" [COM(2008)782]. 
In December 2008, the European Parliament adopted the Climate Change Package 
with an aim to achieve:    
 a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions,  
 a 20% improvement in energy efficiency,  
 and a 20% share for renewables in the EU energy mix.  
  
         Finally on 23 April 2009 the European Parliament and the Council adopted the 
Directive2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources. 
This new renewable energy Directive lays down mandatory national targets to be 
achieved by EU-27 through promoting the use of renewable energy in the electricity, 
heating and cooling, and transport sectors in order to ensure that renewable energy 
makes up at least 20% of the EU’s total energy consumption by 2020. The agreement 
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foresees also that renewable energy, such as biofuels, electricity and hydrogen 
produced from renewable sources, account for at least 10% of the EU's total fuel 
consumption in all forms of transport by 2020  
Albania’s position in this new era of changes 
a) Current energy situation in Albania  
Energy consumption in 2005, according to Energy Strategy 2006-2020, was estimated 
as follows: fossil fuels topped the list with 1269 ktoe, followed by electric energy with 
551.7 ktoe, with woody fuels at the bottom with 235 ktoe (AKBN, 2007). Figure 1 
indicates the distribution in percentages of energy supply in Albania as provided by 
above-mentioned data. In fact, Internal Energy Agency (2006) provides approximately 
the same results for Albania. Such statistics indicate that total energy consumption 
consist of 213 ktoe more and the consumption of fossil fuels appears to be with 263 
ktoe more. Tables 1 and 2 indicate the Enery Balance for Albania in thousand tonnes 
of oil equivalent (ktoe) on a net calorific value basis (IEA, 2006) 
  
Fig. 1: Distribution in percentages of energy supply sources in Albania 
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Production 22 500 0 14 0 430 2 230 0 0 119
8 
Imports 3 0 1014 0 0 0 0  53 0 107
0 
Exports 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Stock 
Changes 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 
supply 
25 500 1014 14 0 430 2 230 53 0 226
8 
Consumpti
on 
18 0 1437 0 0 0 0 227 236 1 191
9 
Tabela 1: 2006 Energy Balance for Albania in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe) 
on a net calorific value basis: energy supply (International Energy Agency, 2006) 
 
Tabela 2: 2006 Energy Balance for Albania in thousand tonnes of oil  equivalent (ktoe) 
on a net calorific value basis: energy consumption (International Energy Agency, 2006) 
 
CONSUMPTION Coal 
and 
Peat 
Crude 
Oil  
Petroleum 
Products 
Gas Nuclear Hydro Geothermal, 
Solar, etc. 
Combustible 
Renewables 
and Waste 
Electricity Heat Total 
TFC 18 0 1437 0 0 0 0 227 236 1 1919 
Industry sector 14 0 187 0 0 0 0 10 62 0 273 
Transport 
sector 
0 0 754 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 754 
Other sectors 4 0 337 0 0 0 0 217 174 1 733 
Non-Energy 
Use 
0 0 159 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 159 
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According to AKBN, 99% of energy production in our country is secured by large 
hydropower dams (AKBN, 2007). In fact, concentrated production of energy is 
regarded nowadays as a policy which does not abide by EU directives/acquis towards 
a sustainable development. Electric energy generation by means of HEC poses serious 
risks such as: 
Risk of ensuring continuous energy supply  
       Currently, the risk of energy supply cuts by means of such large providers has 
become even more evident. 
 Considerable loss while being transmitted 
Lack of diversified generating sources plays a considerable role in technical losses, 
while energy is being transmitted, amounting to a staggering 25.5%. Introduction of 
distribution sources does play a primary role in allocating active and reactive fluxes of 
energy. As such, such distribution sources lead to the reduction of energy loss as 
energy sources are placed close to consumers. (Boškov E, Gubina A. F. et al). 
Environmental impact 
        The environmental impact of large hydropower dams is well-known nowadays 
as the construction of dams and reservoirs implies hydrographic changes which, as a 
result, have a negative effect on biodiversity itself. 
To put it differently, electric energy production by means of a small number of large 
HEC in Albania has created a situation when the amount of energy that could be 
generated can’t possibly be anticipated and it eventually leads to heavy transmission 
losses. As a result, Albania remains an electric energy importer. Statistically speaking, 
22% of electric energy consumed in Albania is imported (IEA 2006).  
        Nevertheless, as previously stated, fossil fuels top the list of energy 
consumption in Albania. Rapid development of the transportation sector (which 
consumes 55% of fossil fuels) has led to considerable consumption of crude oil 
byproducts such as (diesel and gasoline). The annual average rate of oil byproducts 
consumption has been estimated 6.2% (AKBN, 2007). In fact, the data provided by IEA 
match the above-mentioned rate. It is also worth mentioning that the majority of 
fossil fuels consumed in Albania have been secured by imports (table1).  
        As such, it is evident that energy situation in Albania requires immediate and 
efficient actions by means of well-established and reliable policies based on EU 
experience and directives in order to realize the two main objectives of energy aquis, 
that is, security of supply and sustainability.  
b) Legal framework in Albania and its implementation. 
            Law No. 7072 dated 22.05.2003 “For electric energy sector”, article 38, 
provides for awarding the privileged electric energy production status on the part of 
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ERE (as the Albanian Regulatory Authority) to the producer who secures electric 
energy by means of renewable energy sources with an installed capacity of up to 25 
MW, and, in the case of energy hydroelectric sources, with a capacity of up to 10 MW. 
As for self producers, the above-mentioned law provides for its electric energy surplus 
as in cases when renewable energy sources and its installed capacity do not exceed 10 
MW. 
             The privileged producer shall enjoy, pursuant to this law, complimentary 
treatment by transmission system operator. Likewise, article 39 provides that, electric 
energy producers with a capacity exceeding 100 MW shall produce 2% of its general 
energy production by means of renewable energy for electro-energetic system or shall 
buy equal amounts from renewable certified sources.   
             However, the current law fails to set national targets with regard to energy 
production from renewable sources. In addition, there exist no mechanism, 
whatsoever, to promote the production of energy from renewable sources.  
It was only in February 2008 when the Albanian Assembly passed the law No.9876 
“For production, transmission, and trading of bio-fuels and other renewable fuels for 
transportation”. This law provides that Council of Ministers shall annually determine 
the minimal amount of renewable bio-fuels and other renewable fuels to be utilized in 
the successive year in the transport sector. Annual minimal amount to be launched as 
of 2010 shall not consist of less than 3%, whereeras as of 2015 onward; the same 
amount shall not consist of less than 10. As for bio-fuels, targets tend to be clear yet 
delayed.  
             So, how about the current situation of renewable energy production in Albania 
and existing mechanism and policies to overcome the current 0% rate of clean 
energy? (table 1). How about the administrative and legal actions to be taken by 
Albania in order to implement the targets assigned by EU to all member states,which 
has eventually become mandatory even for cnadidate countries?  
                 As argued earlier on, the mandatory targets laid down by the new renewable 
energy Directive 2009/28/EC to be met by EU-27 through promoting the use of 
renewable energy are really ambitious: at least 20% of the EU' s total energy 
consumption by 2020 and at least 10% of the EU's total fuel consumption in all forms 
of transport by 2020. 
               In respect with the total energy consumption, Albania consumes 11% 
renewable energy from woody fuel combustion so 10 % target for the renewable 
energy consumption (heat and electricity) seems reachable (figure 1). Nevertheless, 
utilization of timber remains beyond control and has led to a state of deforestation. A 
comprehensive study with regard to consumption of timber in Albania titled “Analysis 
of markets and Marketing of forest based products” (Development Researcher 
network, 2003) reveals that Albania annually utilizes 2.75million m3 whereas the 
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annual capability of forest based products according to national forestry 
census/inventory of 2004 was 1.15 million m3, which means that annual timber deficit 
consists of 1.6 million m3 or, in other words, 58% beyond the current capability. Such 
a result hints at the degradation of forest-based sources and contradicts with 
sustainable forest development. Timber surfaces in Albania and its climate-soil 
conditions shall normally cover the needs for timber. However, under current 
conditions, in order to meet the needs, interventions in the way of converting timber 
energy into heat are required. The conversion of biomass to heat in modern heat 
systems today is very efficient, with most of the energy being converted to heat 
compared with low efficiency current stoves utilized for heating. The combustion in 
modern pellet boilers can reach more than 90% of efficiency (AEBIOM 2008).  
        This means that directing public money to support a change of the actual 
heating system toward the modern pellet boilers would have positive impacts in 
several directions: 
o Energy efficiency 
o Improved security of supply. 
o Sustainable Forestry development (thus improving the implementation of 
environmental acquis) 
o Incentives for the regional economy including job creation. (by means of 
establishing factories specialized in the production of pellets utilized for 
heating in similar systems of pellet boilers). 
        What is more, Albania possesses large potentials even for the production of 
energy from other renewable sources such as solar and wind power and small HPPs. 
The development of well-studied policies would diversify the network in order to 
increase transmission efficiency generated in the system.   
        This study mainly focuses on the target of producing at least 10% total fuel 
consumption in all forms of transport by 2020 which remains the most serious current 
challenge towards the implementation of energy acquis as the EU objectives tend to 
be very ambitious at a time when the production of biofuels in Albania has not been 
set in motion yet. So the problems lying ahead involve:  
         Firstly, the target of 3% provided for by law No.9876, which enters into force 
in 2010, remains too low when compared with the target of 10% set by EU for 
Member States. It should also be taken into account that, on European level, an 
indicative target of a 5.75% biofuel share of the transport fuel market has been set 
since 2003. Thus, it is self-evident that Law No.9876 does not abide by the actual 
ambitious objectives of EU; at least as far as 2010-2015 period is concerned. Secondly, 
the way the above-mentioned targets will be implemented pose a serious concern as 
the law will enter into force in 2010.  The current law becomes even more important if 
it is taken into account that 70% of fossil fuels in Albania are imported (table 1). Such a 
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situation renders Albania prone to current oil crisis. In fact, this tendency puts at risk 
not only the security of supply but it also might bring about price fluctuation.   
            Thirdly, what is the environmental impact of the use of biofuels compared to 
conventional ones? Can Albania implement the environmental acquis as well as 
Energy acquis or would the situation get worse? Tirana is estimated to be one of the 
most polluted cities in the world, behind New Delhi and Beijing. In its website, the 
European Commission states that: “As Albania gears up to join the European Union, 
pollution troubles get in the way. Albania is facing a humanitarian catastrophe due to 
growing pollution, 10 times above the tolerance level set by the World Health      
Organizations (WHO)” (European Commission http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement).  
             In the issue of ill-informed policies in the environmental ambit of Albania, the 
question remains if the replacement of fossil fuels with bio-genereted ones would 
improve or worsen the actual situation. Therefore, the questions to be answered 
remain: what might be the immediate results of the implementation of the above 
mentioned directive? Does such a directive contribute to Albania’s adoption of the 
environmental acquis, and thus consequently to the success of the Stabilisation-
Association process or does it have an adverse effect?  
 
Biofuels compared with Conventional fuels, their environmental impacts 
 
The main purpose of the current study remains the revision of literature with 
information on life cycle air pollutant emissions as well as combustion emissions. 
Interpreting published data on emissions from transport fuels including biofuels is not 
without problem. Variability is often quite high and studies that present only average 
values often do not provide an indication of the significance of the results. An attempt 
has also been made in this review to present data which are likely to be relevant to 
Albania. 
 
Biodiesel 
 
1. Light Duty Vehicles 
Table 3 summarizes the results of some recent European studies on changes in 
biodiesel emissions for light duty vehicles relative to fossil diesel. Although there is 
much variability in the data, as demonstrated in Table 3, there seems to be a general 
trend in light duty vehicles towards slightly increased NOx emissions relative to fossil 
diesel, but decreased HC, PM and CO emissions (Scottish Executive Environment and 
Rural Affairs Department, 2006).  
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Table 3: Illustrative Changes in Biodiesel Exhaust Emissions from Light Duty Vehicles 
Relative to Mineral Diesel (Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs 
Department, 2006). 
2. Heavy Duty Vehicles  
A major review of the exhaust emissions of biodiesel from heavy duty vehicles was 
published in 2002 (EPA 2002), but many of the studies reviewed used soybean 
biodiesel. 
The generic results of the study, without taking into consideration engine standards, 
were as follows: 
[NOx] = [NOx]MO + 0.1[biodiesel]   i.e. for 20% biodiesel there is a 2%  
      increase in NOx 
[PM] = [PM]MO - 0.5[biodiesel],   i.e. for 20% biodiesel there is a 10%  
        decrease in PM 
[HC] = [HC]MO - 0.9[biodiesel],   i.e. for 20% biodiesel there is a 18%  
        decrease in HC 
[CO] = [CO]MO - 0.5[biodiesel],   i.e. for 20% biodiesel there is a 10%  
        decrease in CO 
Table 4 gives the % change in emissions reported by two European studies for heavy 
duty vehicles running on various biodiesel blends in relation to mineral diesel. These 
findings are broadly in line with the EPA study results, although it is clear that there is 
much variability in the data. 
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Table 4: Changes in Pollutant Emissions from Biodiesel Combustion in Relation to 
Mineral Diesel (Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department, 2006). 
 
Bioethanol 
 
Perhaps the most relevant data for bioethanol emissions are given from an AEA 
Technology study carried out in 2002. The main conclusions of this study, which 
compared emissions from an E10 splash blended ethanol/gasoline mixture with 
petrol, are shown in Table 5. It is evident from the table that, as with biodiesel 
emissions, there is much variability associated with emissions from bioethanol, 
although there does appear to be a consistent decrease in PM emissions and 
considerable increase in acetaldehyde emissions. 
 
 
Table 5: Illustrative Change in Emissions (%) of E10 Bioethanol Blend in Relation to 
Petrol.  
(Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department, 2006). 
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          Another review on bioethanol emissions was produced by TNO for the GAVE 
(Gaseous and Liquid Climate Neutral Energy Carriers) Programme. In general terms, 
these results are in agreement with those from the earlier AEA Technology report, 
even though no numerical values were provided in the report. 
         The conclusions of the GAVE review (Senter Novem 2005a), quoted verbatim 
below, can be seen as representing the best available knowledge regarding air 
pollutant emissions from bioethanol: 
The use of ethanol in both petrol and diesel engines reduces PM emissions. For the 
other regulated pollutants (CO, HC and NOX) less consistent results are reported. The 
effect of ethanol on these pollutants can be positive, negative or negligible.  
         A few studies have examined the potential of high ethanol blends to achieve 
future emissions standards with modified vehicles. These studies were generally 
successful, which suggests that attainment of future standards should be expected for 
high ethanol  blends, provided that engine modifications are being made. In this 
respect, a potentially significant advantage is noted in using ethanol in spark ignition 
direct injection (SIDI) engines because of a reduction in soot and PM formation. 
 
Albanian air quality data 
 
In a specific study on Tirana air quality made by Deliu A, Ndroqi M (2005) the following 
results has been drawn: 
        The particulate matter results to be the most prominent component many 
times above the tolerance level set by the World Health Organizations (WHO) (graphic 
1). Soot level also happens to be above the acceptable norms. In fact, soot generally 
comprises 25-40% of urban dust. Other indexes, on the other hand, tend to be below 
the acceptable norms as industrial gases such as SO2 have undergone reductions due 
to decrease of industrial activity in cities after 1990s. As for 2002-2004, the increase of 
NO2 and O3 seems evident as well as the rapid rise of Pb concentration. Nevertheless, 
they still fall under acceptable norms (Deliu A, Ndroqi M, 2005). 
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  Grafiku 1: Tirana air quality years 2000-2002  
  Source: Deliu A, Ndroqi M.(2005) 
 
  Grafiku 2: Tirana air quality years 2002-2004  
  Source: Deliu A, Ndroqi M.(2005) 
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Conclusions 
 
Thus, as previously stated, the Albanian Legislation in the field of energy ought to be 
revised and involve economic mechanisms as well in order to implement and support 
the legislation.   
Firstly, it results that the Albanian legislation has not set targets for the total 
of renewable energy related to the total energy consumption in the country. 
Nevertheless, the 10% target of total renewable energy is currently being met in 
Albania. This energy is a conversion of wood energy into heat but such a conversion 
fails to convert efficiently, so there is much of lost energy. Meanwhile, the forests are 
in a degrading state. Therefore, it is crucial to put into motion mechanisms aiming at 
increasing the efficiency of biomass energy conversion to heat in order to decrease 
the amount of fire woods utilized for heating as well as promoting other renewable 
forms in Albania such as solar power and wind power, which offer large potentialities.  
Secondly a 3% target of the Albanian's total fuel consumption in all forms of 
transport by 2015 has been set too lately and remains too low as compared with the 
recent 10% target of EU for its Member States. On the other hand, Albania’s actual 
consumption of renewable sources in all forms of transport remains zero and there 
exist no incentives or mechanism to promote such sources and as a result launch 
alternative energy production. 
Thirdly, the comparison of above-mentioned results with regard to release of 
various air polluting components from the burning of biofuels both for bio-diesel and 
ethanol, as compared to fossil fuels, reveals very low levels of particulate matter (PM). 
Meanwhile, in Albania it is exactly the particulate matter PM which poses the main 
threat as it tops the world list. Even the levels of Nox and So2 released by biofuels in 
some studies seem to be higher; however the studies carried out by Deliu A. and 
Ndroqi M. (2005) reveal that such components in Albania tend to be below the 
standards set by WHO. Therefore, even if such values increased, it wouldn’t pose any 
risk for Albanian air quality.  
        As such, introduction of bio-generated fuels for transport sector is a must as it 
would bring about the following positive impacts: 
o Implementation of Energy acquis  
o Implementation of Environmental acquis  
o Improvement of Health quality  
o More security in transport fuels supply 
o Sustainable development  
        To reach such objectives, a well studied Action Plan promoting liquid biofuels 
production in Albania is required. Besides, apart from renewable energy targets, the 
government should introduce support mechanisms; integrate RES policies with the 
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other clean development mechanisms such as: energy and CO2 Taxes, tradable 
emissions permits, economic incentives, tradable green certificates and renewable 
energy or power auctions, and should well coordinate the regulation of such 
instruments. 
 
______________________  
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Abstract 
 
The amicable relations between Turkey and Albania were taken further after the Cold 
War, mostly in the context of Europeanization efforts. The aspiration to become part 
of the European structures drove Albania even closer to Turkey. Throughout the last 
two decades, Turkey offered its support to Albania in political, economic and military 
fields on the road to European integration, which in turn had a favorable impact on 
regional stability. The cooperative nature of relations is likely to continue to manifest 
itself in bilateral exchanges as far as efforts of integration are concerned.  
 
Key Words: Turkey, Albania, EU, Europeanization. 
 
“We embrace the Albanian nation, regard them as our brothers, and do not see them 
distant from us. We would definitely like it to become strong as a state and nation, to 
progress, and to assume a position in the Balkans which it deserves; particularly as a 
strong, sovereign and secure state.”  Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 1934.1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The longstanding relations between the peoples of Turkey and Albania date back to 
the Ottoman times, which continued to exist in the Republican era. Turkey had 
presence in Albania even under Communism although relations remained limited due 
to being on opposite camps. After the Cold War, the country that had the highest 
profile in Albania was Turkey.2  
 This paper argues that the most important characteristic of post-Cold War 
relations was that, despite the existing close ties, what drove Albania and Turkey even 
closer were Albania’s inclination to become part of the European structures and its 
relevant appeals to Turkey in the said process. Viewed through the larger lens, Turkish 
                                                 
1 For the original version of the citation, see Şimşir (2001: 14). 
2 Vickers and Pettifer (1997: 221). 
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– Albanian relations is a befitting case for seeing how European integration efforts not 
only stood as a final goal for both, but also functioned as a means to add onto regional 
stability subsequently.  
 As the empirical data display, a large part of post-Cold War relations took 
place in the context of either the EU or NATO bids of Albania. Turkey does not have 
any intention of acting as an accelerator or a facilitator of/in Albania’s EU process but 
of offering its experience on this challenging road. The conjuncture in the Balkans - 
including Albania - and the EU are still unfolding, which make it difficult to make long 
term estimates. Within this framework this paper will unfold in sections providing 
historical data on relations, theoretical approaches, Turkish and Albanian experiences 
regarding the EU, post-Cold War relations in political, economic and military fields, to 
conclude by confirming the “natural allies” nature of relations, strengthened by 
Europenization efforts. 
 
2. A Brief Historical Background of Turkish – Albanian Relations  
 
The relations between Turkey and Albania began in the 14th century, when the 
Ottoman domination of the Balkans began. As the Ottoman forces proceeded towards 
Albania, they would face resistance by strong feudal lords, the strongest of whom was 
Balša II. Only after the latter’s defeat were the feudal lords, who accepted obedience 
to the Ottoman rule, recognized as vassal administrators. Having fallen into a decline 
in authority following the Battle of Ankara (1402), the Ottomans would now see 
Venice seize control in the area. In 1404, Mehmet I restored authority within the 
Ottoman State, occupied Albania, put an end to vassal system and re-introduced 
Ottoman control in the area. One of the most successful opponents against the 
Ottomans was Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbeg between 1443 – 1468. The Ottoman 
campaigns were hindered by the forces of Skenderbeg, whose death in 1468 would 
gradually put an end to resistance movements. Subsequently, the Ottomans 
conquered Albania and made it a part of the Empire. The Albanian population began 
converting to Islam and assumed administrative, military and political positions in 
state service, including offices of grand viziers, viziers, and pashalıks. Nearly thirty 
grand viziers in the Ottoman court were of Albanian origin, which included the famous 
Köprülü family. During the Tanzimat era, there were uprisings among the Albanians 
against reforms.3 
After years of unrest and local uprisings in the Empire, amidst the Balkan War 
in 1912, the Albanian nationalists united under the leadership of İsmail Kemal and 
                                                 
3 Akman (2006: 153 – 156); Özgür (2007a: 314 – 335); Özgür (2007b: 337 – 347); and Atmaca 
(2007:350- 372). 
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declared independence on 28 November 1912 in Avlonia. The following day, the first 
Albanian government would be established. The independence of Albania was 
recognized at the London Conference of 1913. However, all this would not bring a 
quick peace as the country fell into domestic turmoil because of the refusal by the 
northern Albanians to recognize the government in Avlonia. During World War I, 
Albania witnessed occupation by the Serbs, Greeks, Italians and French. In the ensuing 
years, as both the Ottoman state and Albania found themselves in a situation whereby 
they had to ward off foreign occupation and domestic unrest, diplomatic relations 
between the two states could not be established. After the proclamation of the 
Republic in Turkey in 1923, former Prime Minister Ahmet Zogu sent a telegraph to 
Mustafa Kemal, which was followed by a Treaty of Friendship, and the Treaty of 
Residence and Citizenship between Turkey and Albania the same year. These treaties 
were followed by the opening of the Turkish Consulate in Avlonia in July 1925 and the 
Turkish Embassy in Tirana in 1926. Yet, the quick blow in relations came when Ahmet 
Zogu declared his kingdom in 1928 – a time when the leaders of the national 
liberation movement in Turkey were sensitive about the newly established Turkish 
Republic - which would be exacerbated by aggressive news reports portraying Zogu as 
a prospective example before Mustafa Kemal. While such reports might have been 
flattery for Albanians, they were absolutely not for Turks who saw the Republic as a 
delicate victory. Following this, the Turkish ambassador to Tirana Tahir Lütfi Bey was 
withdrawn, to leave his office vacant for six years. Similarly, Albania closed its 
embassy in Ankara - on grounds of budgetary matters. At the height of this hostility, 
Mustafa Kemal was able to reverse the tide in 1931 at the 2nd Balkan Conference in 
İstanbul by giving conciliatory messages to all Balkan states, including Albania. This 
friendly period did not last either. When Italy occupied Albania in 1939, Turkish 
embassy was closed - to remain closed for the following 20 years – although relations 
survived at the consulate level. By 1943, the Germans replaced the Italians in Albania. 
The Turkish Consulate continued to function even during the Nazi occupation. The 
leader of one of the resistance movements in Albania, Enver Hoxha, took over control 
of Tirana in November 1944 and closed the Turkish Consulate the following year, 
which was not closed even during the Nazi occupation.  
By mid-1950s, now as representatives of a Communist state, Albanian officials 
expressed their inclination to restore relations. With the opening of the Turkish 
embassy in 1958, relations resumed but were not taken further at least until 1965, 
due mainly to the fact that Turkey had to deal with the domestic reverberations of the 
1960 coup. The only concrete outcome of efforts of rapprochement during these 
years was the health agreement signed between the two states in 1964. By 1965, 
there were positive developments in bilateral relations for two reasons. As a country 
that had territory-related problems with Greece, Albania voted in favor of Turkey 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
187 
 
regarding the Cyprus issue at the United Nations (UN) this year, a move welcomed by 
Ankara. Moreover, since Albania had been isolated since 1961 due to cold relations 
with the Soviet Union and felt threatened by its immediate neighbors Greece and 
Yugoslavia, it looked to Turkey for support to which Turkey subsequently reciprocated 
with an official visit in Tirana in 1966. In general, relations after 1966 displayed a dim 
picture which was to be revived with the end of the communist regime in Albania.4  
On the eve of the fall of Communism, Albania’s relations with Turkey 
improved to the extent of causing one Albanian journalist to describe the state of 
affairs as “something of a renaissance”5, making reference to the agreement on air 
transport and others on cooperation and exchange, which were not welcome by 
Greece. By 1988, the official visit in Tirana by former Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz 
was regarded as a milestone in bilateral relations as being the first high level contact 
since the Communist era. It is also noteworthy that although Enver Hoxha was 
generally marked as the figure to have developed friendly relations with Turkey, it was 
Ramiz Alia who was given more credit for having given an impetus to bilateral ties. The 
unproblematic relations were confirmed during this visit.6 
 
3. Theoretical Framework: (Neo)Functionalism, Integration Theory, Federalism and 
Intergovernmentalism  
 
As two countries that had pre-cognizance of each other due to common history, 
Albania and Turkey entered a new period after 1992. Thinking hypothetically, 
although relations between the two states could still develop, they would not have 
assumed a natural allies relationship if it were not for the European integration efforts 
of Albania which drove it closer to Turkey. In this sense, the examination of European 
integration and its implications on our case study by briefly touching upon the 
relevant theoretical framework will be instrumental in our comprehension of the 
subject matter. By definition, “Europeanization” can be described, in its simplest form, 
as the process of becoming integrated into European structures, institutions, and 
systems. How this was (and is) brought to pass since the post-war era in the European 
Union (EU) poses itself as a question, the answer of which was offered in the streams 
of thought concerning global governance.  
 In this context, functionalism, as the most important approach to 
international institutions in the twentieth century since globalization issues are mostly 
based on functionalist ideas, is the first to mention.  “Functionalism looks to the 
                                                 
4 Şimşir (2001:14 – 50).  
5 Zanga (1984). 
6 Zanga (1988)  
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creation of a new world order in which sovereign state takes a back seat”7 and 
submits its powers to institutions which will carry out the necessary functions. 
Functionalism asserts that a peace system could be built from the bottom up through 
a kind of cooperation that reduces sovereignty capacities of states.8 As the powers of 
state are transferred to institutions, the state will exercise less functions and 
cooperation will be obtained with each organization carrying out its own function.  
 On the other hand, integration theory focuses on the creation of new states 
on the regional basis, which could lead to the establishment of a world state. In this 
sense, the most referred to regional political and economic entity comes to fore as the 
EU, which is thought to act as a possible prelude to a single world state.9 As the EU has 
gone through stages until it evolved to what it is today, integrationists conceive it to 
be a befitting test case for their arguments concerning a prospective evolution into a 
single world state. Furthermore, federalism views the EU as an evolving federation 
which already displays federal features. The end-result is intended to be a federal 
Europe. Federalist arguments regarding the EU cite the court, common market, 
common currency, common polices, etc.10 Apart from these approaches, 
intergovernmentalism takes the view that states in organizations are the main actors, 
that the integration process is driven by interstate relations and predicts the EU to 
evolve into an intergovernmentalist organization in the future.11 
 These theoretical reflections indeed came into the picture in Europe out of a 
common aspiration which was to build a federal Europe, with necessary institutions, 
one that would be free of wars. What we are currently witnessing today in the Balkans 
could be viewed as something similar, as an action replay of post-war times, to that 
aspiration in essence. Temporal and spatial conditions in the region have changed 
remarkably in the past two decades; yet the aspiration for seeking peace, stability and 
welfare in the larger European network remains. The regional states are inclined to 
see their future in the European institutions and the latter already named its price: 
conditionalities that have to be fulfilled for full membership. Although Turkey has 
been longer engaged in the EU bid than Albania, both countries are fully exposed to 
the challenges and positive prospects concerning membership. How this European 
zeal took to the stage in the relations between Turkey and Albania in the post-Cold 
War era follows after a brief chronicle of the relations of both countries with the EU.  
                                                 
7 Brown (1997: 133).  
8 For the argument which is summarized as “form follows function” and “peace in parts”, see 
Brown (1997: 130). 
9 Brown (1997: 133 – 134). 
10 Bogdani and Loughlin (2007: 15). 
11 Bogdani and Loughlin (2007: 16 – 17); and Brown (1997: 136). 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
189 
 
 
4. Turkey and Albania:  An Eu History 
 
The debut of Albania’s relations with the EU was the Agreement on Trade and 
Cooperation in 1992, signed with a view to fostering economy and democratization in 
Albania. This agreement and other trade-related ones signed after this agreement aim 
at helping Albania carve a space for its exports in the larger European market.12 By 
1995, Albania officially applied for the opening of negotiations for a possible full 
membership with the EU. The following year, although the Council of Ministers asked 
the Commission to prepare a proposal for further strengthening relations with 
Albania, this would be hindered by untoward political and economic crises in the 
ensuing years.13 The EU granted Albania certain preferential tariffs for promoting 
economic cooperation in 1998. The talks for accession had been initiated in 2003 and 
were finalized with the Stabilization and Association Act (SAA) in 2006. Apart from the 
agreements, the EU also extended assistance in form of aids and grants to Albania as a 
“Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Reconstruction of Their Economies” (PHARE) 
partner state since 1992. This program is directed at public administration and 
institutional reform, local community development, infrastructure development and 
agricultural development.14 As is the case with other countries, the road to a possible 
accession is an onerous process, from which Albania is also having its share since 
1992. 
 Turkey officially applied to the European Economic Community (EEC), which 
was the predecessor of the EU, in 1959 and relations began with the Association 
Agreement (Ankara Agreement) in 1963. The Ankara Agreement arranged Turkey’s 
relations with the EEC in three consecutive periods: preparatory (1964 – 1970), 
transition (1973 – 1995) and completion (1996 - ) phases. The first period ended in 
1970. The Additional Protocol setting forth the rules of transition period became 
effective in 1973 and highlighted the lifting of customs duties, financial liabilities and 
quotas as well as the related schedule and rules. The document envisaged Turkey to 
fulfill the requirements of the Customs Union in 22 years. By 1978, Turkey suspended 
its obligations in the framework of Article 60 of the Additional Protocol, to be followed 
by the complete freezing of relations when Greece was accepted as a full member in 
1981. The first official contact with the EEC took place in 1986. Turkey applied for full 
membership in 1987 and since then has taken many efforts for achieving this final 
goal. After the completion of the transition phase, the Customs Union Decision was 
                                                 
12 Abazi, (2008: 245). 
13 Bogdani and Loughlin (2007: 116). 
14 Abazi (2008: 245 – 247). 
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adopted during which Turkey eliminated customs duties for EU industrial goods and 
refined food products. Turkey was not mentioned at the 1997 Luxembourg Summit as 
one of the prospective candidates; however this was reversed at the 1999 Helsinki 
Summit which gave relations an impetus. The EU - Turkey Accession Partnership was 
adopted and Turkey’s National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis 
Communautaire was submitted to the EU Commission in 2001. In 2004, the European 
Council decided to open membership talks with Turkey, which materialized in 2005.15 
Turkey’s relationship with the EU is a complicated one with many headings and sub-
headings, which gets altered with the incoming and outgoing political figures on both 
sides, and changing conjunctures. Turkey’s Europeanization experience is the most 
peculiar one in terms of its duration and character. Temporally speaking, there is no 
other country that has waited for half a century for the completion of full membership 
procedures. As for the characteristics of this sui generis candidacy, there is no other 
state that has faced such a loaded package of requirements. Still, Ankara’s resolve for 
the realization of full membership is likely to continue. 
 
5. Turkey and Albania in The Post-Cold War Era 
 
5.1. Mutual Considerations 
 
There is no single accurate estimate or calculation as to the future form of EU. But it is 
no prophecy to argue that the EU will continue to evolve as it has done to date. It is 
not known whether it will end up as a federal, intergovernmental or single world state 
as relevant theories suggest, however its posture as the main means of 
Europeanization and as an aspired political body are seen in many ways, including its 
deepening effect on bilateral relations in the Balkans and our concern relates to how it 
was reflected on Turkish – Albanian relations in the post-Cold War era.  
 As the most isolated communist state of the 1970s, Albania found itself in an 
even weaker and more fragile environment in the aftermath of the Cold War. The 
pressing foreign policy issues for Albania were the Kosovo issue, the Albanian minority 
in Macedonia, the territorial problem with Greece related to Northern Epirus, and the 
issue of illegal Albanian minority in Greece. It also had to deal with serious economic 
problems. Given the hostile relations between Yugoslavia and Greece at the time and 
what former President Sali Berisha called “blood relations” referring to many Albanian 
migrants in Turkey, Turkey was a natural ally for Albania.16 On the other hand, by 
                                                 
15 Ülger (2003: 213 – 215); Canbolat (2004: 209); and Delegation of the European Commission 
to Turkey, http://www.avrupa.info.tr/AB_ve_Turkiye/Tarihcesi.html  
16 Uzgel (2001a: 54); and Xhudo (1996: 50). 
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chance or calculation, Turkey’s political and military cooperation with Albania 
followed a pattern similar to the one pursued by the U.S. in the same era and the fact 
that U.S. and Turkish strategic interests overlapped in Albania facilitated the 
improvement of bilateral relations.17  
 Nevertheless, it can be argued that bilateral relations were shaped to a great 
extent with Albania’s main foreign policy goal of Europeanization and Turkey’s due 
reciprocation. From the Albanian viewpoint, first and foremost, the reasons for 
appealing to Turkey on its road to the EU mainly rested on the shared history between 
the two states. The close relations also include what former President Sali Berisha 
described as “blood relations”18 referring to the Albanians who migrated to Turkey 
over the years. There is a strong Balkan émigré population in Turkey which includes 
the Albanians and is influential in Turkey’s policies towards the region. 
 Second, Turkey has more experience in the EU advent. As a country which has 
gained much experience in political, economic, military, technical, social, educational 
and other fields in integration process, Turkey has from the beginning offered its 
support to Albania. Turkey and Albania view EU membership as a common final goal 
and in this connection Turkey showed its willingness to proceed together to achieve 
this common objective. For instance, the Government Program (2001) explicitly stated 
the need to prioritize relations with the EU in relations with Albania, (and the U.S.) as 
a support for democracy in Albania.19 Furthermore, given its pre-cognizance of the 
region and its past with the regional states, Turkey can also be instrumental in offering 
the EU support in its policies towards the Balkans, including Albania.  
 Third, as a member of NATO, Turkey was an important actor in the Balkans 
and a valued natural ally for Albania. Membership in NATO is the second most 
important foreign policy goal for Albania. In fact, Albania was the first former Warsaw 
Pact member to apply for membership in NATO in 1992. Albania’s proximity to 
conflicts in the Balkans, exacerbated by its weak military posture, prompted it to look 
for protectors in its vicinity and “Turkey offered it the best chance to gain such 
protection given that Turkey is part of NATO and has one of the … modern militaries in 
the area.”20  
 Fourth, the unproblematic relations until then between the two states were 
another push for seeing Turkey as a partner in the efforts of integration. Although 
relations remained in certain margins due to ideological borders during the Cold War, 
                                                 
17 Uzgel (2001a: 55). 
18 Xhudo (1997: 50).  
19 Yılmaz (2001: 115). 
20 Xhudo (1997: 50). Albania was the first former Communist state to receive arms from the 
U.S. and granted the use of its harbors to the U.S. Navy; see Uzgel (2001a: 54). 
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the post-Cold War era proved a time for gearing up the traditional friendship, which 
was confirmed most recently at the official farewell of the outgoing Turkish 
ambassador to Tirana.21 
 Fifth, the recent memory of urgent economic aid had been a positive test case 
for both countries after the collapse of Communism in Albania, which was much 
appreciated by Albania. To give two examples, in 1990, Albania asked for electricity 
supply of 150 million kW from Türkiye Elektrik Kurumu (TEK - Turkish Electricity 
Institution) when President Turgut Özal and his counterpart Ramiz Alia had contacts in 
late September.22 Turkey also took efforts to support Albania in its transition from the 
outdated closed economy to liberal market economy. The humanitarian aid extended 
by Turkey to Albania in 1991 and 1992 amounted to $ 21,9 million which ranked 
second after Italian aid.23 
 In reciprocating Albania’s appeal, Turkey’s overall considerations were shaped 
mainly by historical ties and common heritage. In Balkans policy of Turkey, one of the 
anchorage groups in the region has come to be Albanians (along with the Bosnians) 
since the Ottoman times. Currently, Albania is still viewed as the barometer of 
Turkey’s Balkan policy – alongside with Bosnia which is viewed as the barometer of 
Turkey in the region. If Turkey fails to provide support to Albania for its stability and 
security in the Balkans, it cannot be as influential as it would aspire to be in the 
Balkans.24 
 Second, Turkey also takes into account that it is not just a Balkan country but 
belongs to the other immediate regions of the Middle East, Caucasus and the Eastern 
Mediterranean, which are in an interdependence relationship with each other. In 
order for Turkey to devise an influential policy towards the Balkans, it will need to 
observe global and regional balances. The most important aspect that differentiates 
Turkey from the rest of the regional countries is that it simultaneously belongs to 
these regions; no other Balkan state has a policy maneuver space as large. There is 
interdependence between these regions which, if explored efficiently, would be 
beneficial for Turkey.25 
 Third, Turkey is aware of the necessity of closely following the balances within 
the Balkans for conducting an active and effective diplomacy in the region, and that 
includes Albania. In this respect, Turkey’s priority in the Balkans should be to help 
                                                 
21 “Premier Berisha Receives H. E. Suphan Erkula, Outgoing Turkish Ambassador in Tirana”, 
Republika e Shqipërisë, Këshilli i Ministrave, Departementi i Enformacionit. 
22 25 September 1990, Milliyet; and 29 September 1990, Güneş. 
23 Xhudo (1997: 50). 
24 Davutoğlu (2008: 316 – 318). 
25 Davutoğlu (2008: 318). 
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Albania consolidate its security and to implement a comprehensive cooperation 
scheme. Although from the official viewpoint Greece is not seen as a rival of Turkey in 
the Balkans, the reverberations of the pyramid scheme crisis in 1997 said otherwise, 
which produced a maneuver space for Greece to move ahead as an influential actor. 
Likewise, Albanian officials looked to Greece for help in the initial days of the Kosovo 
crisis, which was self-explanatory in that sense.26 If Albania is going to continue to be 
viewed as the barometer for Turkey’s Balkan policy, Turkey should pursue policies 
which mind balances. 
 Fourth, Turkey attaches importance to devising comprehensive policies, and 
being part of these policies towards the region as a whole, aware of the contradictions 
and risks. In such a framework, Turkey is aware of the significance of undertaking 
active roles in regional platforms.27 Projects which could bolster relations with Albania 
in various fields can be proposed as part of future policies. 
 Fifth, being part of policies towards the region, Turkey acknowledges the 
important role of the strategic means that it has access to, i. e., NATO.28 NATO also 
regards the military cooperation between Turkey and Albania as a stabilizing factor in 
the volatile region of the Balkans.29 This was why, for instance, as early as 1990, the 
two states inked a military cooperation agreement and Turkey became the first 
country to send a full time military attaché to Tirana.30  
 These mutual concerns are by no means exhaustive or listed in order of 
importance. However, they can provide a background in seeing how they have found 
a space in bilateral relations embedded in Europeanization efforts of Albania. How 
they materialized in practice shall be seen in political/diplomatic, economic and 
military fields, respectively. 
 
5.2. Politics And Diplomacy 
 
The abovementioned appeal made by Albania in 1990 did not merely concern 
economic venue; it also extended to urgent diplomatic and humanitarian support in 
respect of which Turkey supported Albania’s bid for European organizations, extended 
diplomatic, military, police, and judicial assistance, and accepted Albanian students in 
Turkish universities.31 
                                                 
26 Davutoğlu (2008: 319 – 320). 
27 Davutoğlu (2008: 320). 
28 Davutoğlu (2008: 321 – 322). 
29 Uzgel (2001a: 55). 
30 Vickers and Pettifer (1997: 217). 
31 Kut (2002: 102). 
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 Turkey also played an important role in Albania’s entrance into the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC). As a secular country, Albania became a member of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1992 despite opposition from certain 
factions in the country.32 The OIC membership of Albania made the country the only 
other European country apart from Turkey. The opponents of this membership 
maintained that this membership would distance Albania from Europe. However, the 
Berisha government saw it as a positive development for Albania because it was a 
secular country like Turkey. It has been argued that among the reasons for joining the 
OIC was also seeing it as a source for economic support.33 
 Turkey and Albania signed the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation 
during Demirel’s visit in Albania in June 199234 and Turkey stated that it would extend 
a $ 50 million humanitarian and technical aid to Albania.35 The two states also signed 
the public safety cooperation protocol in early August 1992.36 Such an improvement in 
bilateral relations made former Greek Foreign Minister Andonis Samaras define 
Albania as part of the alleged “Muslim Axis” led by Turkey in the same year.37 It is well 
known that this active approach towards the region during Özal’s term of office 
caused Greece fear Turkey, thinking that it might want to play the “Muslim card” in 
the region. However, it was simply an indication of Turkey’s willingness for being part 
of the conjuncture it the region.  
 In 1992, Özal gave a speech at the Albanian parliament in which he gave 
recommendations. Özal advised the Albanian officials to draw up a 15-year plan, to 
focus on tourism and service sectors, and to improve relations with Macedonia.38 In 
the same year, Albanian officials stated that they would like to build a more 
systematized cooperation with Turkey and described the main shortcomings in the 
relations: inadequate levels of coordination concerning the issues envisaged in 
bilateral agreements; 1) lack of a sound coordination of the implementation of 
decisions jointly taken, 2) ignoring follow-up of the implementation of decisions taken, 
3) lack of tactical studies between the two countries.39 Despite such conditions, efforts 
continued to improve relations. In 1993, former Albanian Prime Minister Alexander 
Meksi paid an official visit to Turkey. The following year, Sali Berisha visited Turkey 
                                                 
32 Uzgel (2001b: 503). 
33 Xhudo (1997: 52). 
34 1 June 1992, Hürriyet; and 1 June 1992, Sabah. 
35 Demirtaş-Coşkun (2001: 87). 
36 7 August 1992, Cumhuriyet. 
37 Kut (2002: 102). 
38 20 February 1993, Hürriyet. 
39 Yılmaz (2001: 108). 
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and asked for support in the economic and security fields as well as support for 
Albania’s NATO bid and for peaceful solution of the problems in Kosovo.40  
 However, relations lost momentum by 1995 when Greece began translating 
its hostile approach into a friendly one in respect of regional states. Greece and 
Albania settled their bilateral disputes concerning the rights of the Greek minority in 
Albania and the situation of illegal Albanian workers in Greece. Greece lifted its veto 
concerning the EU aid to Albania and the beginning of mutual visits between the two 
states added on to the positive atmosphere. Moreover, Greece succeeded in pulling 
Albania to its side by extending economic aid in 1997.41 
In 1997, a financial crisis swayed the country into chaos and serious internal 
conflict. In face of thousands of demonstrators filling the streets and demanding the 
compensation of their money siphoned by the bankers, Albania asked for 
international support to quell the riots. The Berisha government faced the most 
difficult period of its six years in power by then as it had to deal with criticism from 
both the victims and the opposition.42  
 Although Turkey participated in the international force with 800 troops within 
the UN framework with Resolution 1101, it was seen that it ranked after Italy and 
France which contributed with 2,500 and 1,000 troops, respectively.43 The almost 
inherent discord in relations with Greece was observed once again when Greece 
objected to the location of deployment of Turkish troops in Albania. Greece did not 
want the Turkish troops to be deployed in the south of the country where Greek 
minority lived. Former Greek Defense Minister Chohalopoulos stated that they were 
not of the opinion that Turkey was directly affected by the developments in Albania 
and that the situation in Albania must not constitute a reason for Turkey’s hegemonic 
tendencies. The Greek Defense Minister did not refrain from saying that any change in 
the status quo in respect of Turkey’s relations with its neighbors would be an element 
of bargain in Turkey’s entrance in the EU.44 However, almost a year later, in February 
1998, during former President Recep Meydani’s visit in Ankara, it was stated that 
relations between Albania and Turkey were of an exemplary nature. President Demirel 
expressed his content to see Albania strengthen its democracy after the difficult 
experience in 1997.45 It was to be observed in the ensuing years that Albania was 
                                                 
40 Yılmaz (2001: 109). 
41 Yılmaz (2001: 112). 
42 “Başkan’ın Büyük Savaşı”, 3 February 1997, Milliyet. Albania’s faced a serious crisis due to 
what was called the pyramid schemes after the collapse of communism; see Elbirt (2006). 
43 “Arnavutluk’la İlgili Son Haberler (2)”, 27 May 1997, Türkiye. 
44 “Mehmetçik’e İtiraz” 7 April 1997, Milliyet. 
45 “Türkiye – Arnavutluk Sorunsuz İki Ülke” 13 February 1998, Siyah Beyaz; and “Balkanlardaki 
Örnek İşbirliği” 13 February 1998, Milliyet. 
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closer to Greece than to Turkey. However, the crisis to draw Albania closer to Turkey 
broke out in Kosovo in March 1998 when Milosevic’s latent Greater Serbia designs 
came to the surface once again, concerning which the two states acted on parallel 
policy lines. 
Post-Kosovo relations continued particularly with a view to ensuring economic 
and military cooperation. President Demirel paid an official visit to Albania and 
Macedonia in April 1999. Central to the agenda of this visit were the Kosovo problem, 
stability in Albania, and the situation of the refugees.46 In 2000, Turkish and Albanian 
presidents and prime ministers with those other regional states participated in the 
Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP) Heads of State and Government 
Summit. In early 2000, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit paid an official visit to Albania. 
Shortly afterwards, President Demirel went to Albania to discuss issues on Kosovo and 
other regional and international issues of mutual concern. The third high-level visit in 
the same year took place by Albanian Prime Minister Ilir Meta’s visit which was 
primarily on economic field.47  
In September 2005, Turkey and Albania signed an agreement on Turkish 
Armed Forces’ assistance to the Albanian Army concerning the allocation of military 
equipment of $ 2,5 million to contribute to the restructuring of the Albanian military 
and integration into NATO. Turkey also assists Albania in the field of logistics and 
police training.48  
The coalition government formed by Sali Berisha secured the highest number 
of votes in the July 2005 elections and received the vote of confidence in early 
September 2005. Both Turkey and Albania are cognizant of friendly bilateral relations. 
                                                 
46 Yılmaz (2001: 112). 
47 Yılmaz (2001: 112 – 114); at the turn of the century, Albania was among  the most important 
foreign policy titles in Ankara, seen clearly in the 2001 Government Program: 1) following a 
policy to support democracy and market economy in Albania; 2) solution and 
internationalization of the ‘Albanian issue’ on grounds of respect for commitment arising from 
international documents; 3) prioritizing relations with the U.S.A. and Western European states 
with respect to Albania; 4) following the process of integration in Europe as well as integrating 
into European political and economic organizations; 5) prioritizing relations with Germany and 
Italy; 6) making every effort to stop the policy of pressure and cruelty on the Albanian minority 
in former Yugoslavia to help them enjoy the right to legitimate political will; 7) recognizing 
Macedonia on the condition of respect for the rights and free movement of Albanians in 
Macedonia; and 8) making efforts to help Kosovo to be recognized and working for the 
peaceful solution of the problem.  
48 “Ankara Hosts Albanian Chief of Staff for Second Time in 2005”, 14 December 2005, Turkish 
Daily News. 
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Turkey is likely to increase its investments and continue to extend military assistance 
to Albania. 
 
5.3. Economy 
 
Turkey’s economic relations with Albania began with the Agreement on Trade and the 
Agreement on Economic, Commercial, Industrial and Technical Cooperation through 
the end of the Cold War, as late as 1988, since the country was isolated for a long time 
during the Cold War under Enver Hoxha’s regime. The legal framework of economic 
relations in the post-Cold War era was based on the Agreement on Mutual Promotion 
and Protection of Investments (1996) and the Agreement for the Prevention of Double 
Taxation (1998). The first round of talks concerning Free Trade Agreement was held in 
2003. Turkey’s exports to Albania were $ 160 million in 2004 while its imports were $ 
15,528 million. Main items in Turkish exports include iron – steel, aluminum, cereal, 
flour, electrical items, salt, sulfur, cement, rubber, cacao, and iron – steel products 
while its imports include the same items.49  
 In accordance with Law no. 7638 adopted in 1992, foreign companies in 
Albania were granted the rights given to Albanian companies, in the scope of which 
they could rent facilities and properties for 99 years. Among the investments of 
Turkish businessmen are shoe factory, shops, restaurants, and dental clinics. Kürüm 
Iron – Steel Joint Stock Company rented the iron and steel enterprises in Elbasan 
Valley for a 20-year period and started production. In the mining sector, Ber-Öner 
received the right to explore and operate mine reserves in copper-dense regions in 
Albania. Everest has made an investment of $ 2 million for polyethylene packing 
production. The companies operating in the construction sector are Tepe Construction 
Joint Stock Company, Be-Ha-Şe, Enka, Tümaş Joint Stock Company, GİNTAŞ, Mak-Yol, 
MNG, which have undertaken projects on highway construction, building restoration, 
military facility construction, and mass housing. As for banking, a Ziraat Bank branch 
was planned to open in Tirana with an investment of $ 3 million. However, the project 
had to be suspended due to the crisis in 1997 and the political instability that 
followed. Kentbank bought shares of the privatized Albanian National Commercial 
Bank in 2000. The Albanian Central Bank and Turkish Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BDDK) concluded Bilateral Cooperation Agreement with a view to 
reaching accurate information regarding the transaction of banks and finance 
institutions in their country, to build an institutional framework which would facilitate 
cooperation in cross-border supervision, and to share institutional experience and 
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technological training. Other possibilities of investment include telecommunication, 
medicine, energy, oil, natural gas, tobacco, tourism, mining, chemical industry, food 
processing, packaging, cement industry, insurance, and transportation.50   
By and large, economic relations with Albania displayed an improving trend 
until 1997. After 1997, Albania’s relations with Greece improved when the Socialist 
Party intensified relations with the country.51 Most recently, Albanian authorities 
decided to sell 76 % of Albanian state phone company Albtelecom Sh.A to the Turkish 
consortium made up of Türk Telekom and Çalık Enerji Telekomünikasyon A.Ş.52  
As is the case with other Balkan states, there are certain problems in bilateral 
economic relations with Albania. Letter of credit procedures are delayed due to lack of 
cash in local banks, problems in money transfer between cities, and complications in 
the state-owned bank procedures. Second, Turkish companies expect the existing 
customs legislation to be amended as soon as possible. Third, Turkish companies 
which export goods by land transportation reach Albania late and thus lose price 
advantages, due to lack of infrastructure in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania. Fourth, 
lack of electricity has negative impact upon foreign investors. Foreign companies are 
obliged to pay customs duties. This creates unjust competition and makes the 
marketing of Turkish products more difficult. Finally, the lack of any efforts to 
compensate for the loss of Turkish companies resulting from the domestic turmoil in 
1997 is yet another factor that hinders improvement in economic cooperation.53 
 
5.3. Military 
 
Bilateral military relations between Turkey and Albania began in early 1990s. Albania 
started defense cooperation almost simultaneously with Turkey and with the U.S.A. 
The first significant meeting at the ministerial level took place in Ankara in July 1992 
during which the parties signed a Defense Cooperation Pact. As Minister of Defense 
Nevzat Ayaz stated, the agreement focused on enhancing cooperation in military 
education and technology. During his visit to Turkey, Albanian Defense Minister Safet 
Zhulali was allowed to visit Turkish military facilities such as factories, command 
centers and bases, to which at the time only NATO members were allowed access. In 
turn, Turkish naval vessel Fevzi Çakmak visited the Albanian Port of Durres in August 
1992, the first such visit by a Turkish naval vessel to Albania since the days of the 
                                                 
50 “Türkiye – Arnavutluk Ticari ve Ekonomik İlişkileri”; and “Türkiye – Arnavutluk Ekonomik, 
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51 Ünal (1998). 
52 “Turkish Consortium Acquires Albanian Albtelecom”, 28 May 2005, Turkish Daily News. 
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Ottoman Empire.54 The two states concluded the Defense Technology and Military 
Training Cooperation55 and Albania also asked for arms aid October 1993.56  
 In July 1996, a Turkish contingent of 40 soldiers left for Albania to take part in 
the Peaceful Eagle 96 military exercise conducted under the auspices of NATO’s PfP 
program. Along with the Turkish contingent, headed by Lieutenant Colonel İhsan 
Balabanlı, troops from Albania, the U.S.A., Italy, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania 
took part in the military exercise. The use of light weapons, first aid training, mine 
sweeping, reconnaissance and security drills were practiced.57 A month later, a 
delegation of Albanian military offices headed by Major General Armando Vincani, the 
Deputy Chief of General Staff, came to Turkey for a meeting to exchange views on 
military issues,58 after which it was stated that Turkey and Albania would hold a joint 
military exercise in the Adriatic Sea off the coast of Albania in August. The Chief of 
General Staff stated that three Albanian warships, including a minesweeper and two 
torpedo ships and Turkish Turgut Reis, one of the best frigates in the Turkish Navy, 
were scheduled to participate in the exercise. The training included naval operations, 
on board fire fighting techniques and rescue operations, which were monitored by 
foreign attachés in Albania and officers from NATO.59 
 In early 1997, a crisis broke out in the country when a series of fraudulent 
investment schemes collapsed resulting in thousands of citizens’ loss of their savings. 
By April 1997, the parliament approved sending troops to Albania while Albanian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Rakipi was engaged in talks during his two-day visit in 
Ankara. During the unrest, militants armed with weapons looted military barracks, 
estimated at some 200,000 guns, seized control of much of southern Albania. Turkey 
feared that as the rebels refused to hand over the guns, the weaponry could be 
carried over to Macedonia and Bulgaria. Therefore, it followed the developments 
closely and conducted an intensive diplomacy in cooperation with Italy.60 After the 
Turkish troops’ duration of 3-month stay ended in late July, the Turkish soldiers 
returned to Turkey.61 
 During Albanian Defense Minister Luan Haydarağa’s visit to Ankara, the 
Haydarağa and his counterpart İsmet Sezgin signed an agreement for a $5 million 
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Turkish grant to Albania.62 For the second time, two weeks after the Albanian Defense 
Minister’s visit, Turkish parliament unanimously authorized the deployment of Turkish 
troops to Albania when the conflict in Kosovo escalated. It was left to the Cabinet to 
decide the needs, size, location, and time of the deployment. The move would also 
allow the deployment of soldiers for possible international peace-keeping missions in 
Albania. A small group of soldiers went to the southern Albanian town of Vlora to 
protect a Turkish technical team engaged in repairing a military shipyard, port, and 
army barracks. There were also voices in the parliament suggesting Turkey should also 
send Red Crescent aid for Kosovar Albanian refugees.63 
 By August 1998, an amphibious Turkish division was scheduled to set out for 
Albania to take part in a NATO exercise which would also be attended by the members 
of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The Chief of Staff related statement mentioned 
eleven NATO states; Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the U.S.A. and Britain and three PfP countries, Albania, 
Russia, Lithuania in the Cooperative Assembly 98 exercises. The maneuvers were 
carried out in Albanian and Macedonian territories and were based on a scenario to 
end regional conflicts peacefully. Land, air, and naval forces of the participating 
countries were involved in search-and-rescue (SAR) missions, medical evacuation 
(MEDEVAC), and airdrop operations. Apart from the amphibious division, Turkey sent 
four F-16s, a transport plane, a frigate, and logistic support.64 The following year, part 
of a 126-strong Turkish military unit left for Tirana, along with a number of vehicles 
and assorted equipment, in mid-May to join a special NATO force deployed in Albania 
to take part in the distribution of humanitarian aid to the Kosovar refugees who fled 
former Yugoslavia.65 
 In 2002, former National Defense Minister Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu met his 
Albanian counterpart Luan Rama in Tirana. Çakmakoğlu stated that Turkey would 
contribute to the modernization of Albania in the military field.66 The harvest of this 
visit was reaped during the visit of Chief of Staff General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu to Albania 
where he met several dignitaries and officials, both political and military. During the 
visit, Kıvrıkoğlu was received by Albanian president Recep Meydani who said relations 
between the two states fostered stability and peace in the region and drew attention 
to the restoration of Kucova airport. Kıvrıkoğlu signed a logistic application protocol 
with Rama. The protocol establishes the provision of $2,5 million assistance to help 
                                                 
62 “Albanian Defense Minister in Turkey”, 11 July 1998, Turkish Daily News. 
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the Albanian Army reach NATO standards. Kıvrıkoğlu also discussed with Albanian 
Chief of General Staff Pillumb Kazimi who Kazimi stated that Albania would send units 
to assist the Turkish Army’s mission in Afghanistan.67  
 Turkish Armed Forces offer Albanian military personnel education and training 
activities in military colleges, Gülhane Military Medical Academy, military academies, 
military high schools, branch schools, and language schools.68 Turkey also trained 
Albanian Special Forces Battalion. Turkish ammunition company Mechanical and 
Chemical Industry Corporation (Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu) bought out and 
modernized the biggest ammunition plant in Albania. Turkey also supplied radar 
systems for the surveillance of the Albanian air space and of telecommunication 
equipment.69  
 On 1 April 2009, Albania eventually achieved one of its most important foreign 
policy goals towards becoming integrated in Euro-Atlantic structures and became a 
member of NATO. The military cooperation recorded to this date between the two 
states would be unthinkable two decades ago. However, it can be argued that the 
reinforcement of relations owes much to military cooperation, due mostly to inspiring 
mutual confidence in a particularly conflict-ridden region as the Balkans. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Turkey and Albania have traditionally had friendly relations. These amicable relations 
were taken further after the Cold War; this time in the context of Europeanization 
efforts. The future characteristic to be assumed by the EU remains unknown for the 
time being; be that as it may, there is common belief that regional states see their 
future in the still evolving EU. Turkey has reiterated its support in many ways for 
Albania to this end. Albania became a member of the OIC backed by Turkey, received 
Turkish aid in cash and in kind, was given policy recommendations from Turkish 
officials in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, acted on parallel policy lines 
during the Kosovo crisis. With a view to helping Albania embark into liberal market 
economy, the basis of economic relations were established in early 1990s with legal 
arrangements which were taken further through investments in infrastructure 
construction, banking, finance, telecommunication, and other fields although relations 
in this venue still need further attention by both sides. The cooperative nature of 
military relations manifest itself in the frequent high-level visits, offering military 
education to Albanian military personnel, carrying out joint exercises, extending 
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military assistance to Albania at times of crises, modernization of Albanian army; all of 
which were directed at helping Albania become a member of NATO which eventually 
materialized this year.  
 The overall impact of these policies and practices was not only to reinforce 
individual ties but also to add onto regional stability in the larger network of the 
Balkans. As such, Europenization in the region has a dual effect, which turns out to be 
beneficial at both levels. The first tangible outcome in this sense was Albania’s 
membership of NATO last April. Turkey is likely to continue to lend support for Albania 
in its EU bid, also, if requested, to the EU in their enlargement process in the Balkans 
as an actor cognizant of the region. The directions the future relations are likely to 
take, provided that the regional states – including Albania – become full members of 
the EU before Turkey, is yet another question that deserves investigation in its own 
right. However, we can at least argue that it will depend on changing and 
interpedendent political and economic conjuctures in Turkey, the Balkans and the EU. 
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Abstract 
 
Nowadays, to search the accuracy of the information given in financial statements 
that are declared to public related to the operations and transactions companies 
perform and their conformity to legal regulations has become more and more 
important. To express in other words auditing has become an crucial task recently. 
 It is certain that Turkish Insurance sector, especially during the globalization 
period of Turkey has developped internationally and the sector is taking part in the 
fast changing and renovation process that is brought by the globalization. 
Accordingly, with the help of global standarts that are formed by International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) related to insurance sector public auditing; 
we aim to clarify the meaning of terms and conditions along with the institutions on 
public auditing, independent auditing and internal auditing in insurance sector both in 
European Union and in Turkey. 
The aim of our study is to examine and to discuss the professional standarts 
that an auditing company performing the independent audit of financial statements of 
insurance companies and their authorized auditors should have. In addition we will 
study general auditing and the development of auditing as a profession. In particular, 
we will disscuss the international accreditation of local auditors and the Turkish 
perception and understanding of European Union for this subject. 
 
Key Words: European Union, Insurance Sector, Auditing 
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1.Introduction 
 
Recently, especially increasing number of corruption cases and the development of 
economic life and its growing complexity has increased the need for reliable 
knowledge. In developed economies, the information that is declared to the public by 
corporations related to themselves is usually checked and verified by some 
independent auditors.   
The procedure of decision making about the accuracy and reliability of the 
information that is announced to the public and to the shareholders constitutes the 
subject of “auditing and independent external auditing”. During the process of 
auditing the independent expert and the so called auditor has a very important role. 
The auditor, is the one who carries out, directs and finalizes the process of auditing. 
The supporting of foreign capital in Turkey and by this means the increasing 
investment of multinational companies in Turkey, the development of international 
trade, increasing international financing opportunities, and increasing number of 
Turkish companies that are operationg abroad has created a suitable environment for 
the development of auditing profession in Turkey. When Turkish companies started to 
look for financial resources from international capital markets, they have been 
required to present verified and confirmed financial reports of the company; such 
type of requests obliged companies to have reliable auditing procedures. As a result of 
above mentioned developments, in Turkey, auditing process and auditing system, 
which were not legally established by legal authorities before, has started to arise in 
the country’s economic body by the push of economic conditions. 
It is obvious that, Turkish Insurance sector has developed internationally during the 
global integration process of Turkey and takes part certainly in the fast changing 
atmosphere brought by globalization.   
Accordingly, with the help of global standarts that are formed by International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) related to insurance sector public auditing; 
we aim to clarify the meaning of terms and conditions along with the institutions on 
public auditing, independent auditing and internal auditing in insurance sector both in 
European Union and in Turkey. 
As it is known, every country regulates its national standarts within the framework of 
its own rules. However, in certain sectors, standarts have to be adapted with those of 
other countries. Nowadays, in Turkey, which is in pre-accession period to the 
European Union, it is absolutely necessary that audit and the profession of auditing 
should be adapted to international standarts. 
In parallel to the the developments cited above, the auditing operations in Turkish 
Insurance sector, will be examined in this study both from internation perspective or 
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from a perspective of particular cases in th light of European Union standarts by 
considering national developments. We will also try to figure out the ways for 
increasing efficiency on related sector and profession.  
 
2. Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
 
Auditing standarts was first published in 1947 by American Institute of Chartered 
Public Accountant: AICPA as “Generally Accepted Auditing Standarts” and these 
standards were adopted by many countries. Auditing Standarts of Board revised cited 
standards and published them as “Statement on Auditing Standarts” after the year 
1972.1 That statement was a reinterpretation of the standarts published in 1947 and 
although there have been some amendments in the auditing application principles, 
those standards achieved to stay up-to-date until today. Generally accepted standards 
published by AICPA which is a good guide for auditors in analyzing financial 
statements  consists of three chapters: 1- General Standards, 2-Working Scope 
Standards, 3- Reporting Standards. 2 However, within the scope of study we will 
concentrate on “General Standards” due to recent important developments in 
independent acting standard and also we will deal with only “General Standards” 
cause in EU Directive No:8, merely general standards are cited. 
First section of Generally Accepted Auditing Standards was devoted to general 
standards. These standards draw a general framework for professional auditors about 
their characteristics, behaviours and professional education. For this reason “general 
standards” are often called personal standards. The standards covered in this section 
are education, professional proficiency, acting independently, professional self 
discipline and attention.3  
 
3. International Auditing Standards: 
 
The first international auditing standards were published by IAPC-International 
Auditing Practices Committee in 1991, which operates under the control of IFAC-
Internatioanal Federation of Accountants and which was renamed as “International 
                                                 
1 Carmichael, R. ve Willingham, J. Auditing Concepts and Methods, A guide to Current Auditing 
Theory and Practice, 5th Edition, Mc Graw-Hill,1989,p.15. 
2 Alvin A. Arens, James K. Loebbecke, Auditing an Integrated Approach, Prentice Hall, Eighth 
Edition, 2000, s.29. 
3 Şerafettin Sevim, Eskişehir Anatolian University Journal of F.A.S.S., “Muhasebe Raporlarının 
Yasal Denetimini Yürütmekten Sorumlu Kişilere Yetki Verilmesine Yönelik AT Sekizinci 
Yönergesinde Belirtilen Mesleki Standartlar ile 3568 Sayılı Yasa ve İlgili Mevzuattaki Mesleki 
Standartların Karşılaştırılması”,1990, V.VIII, S.1-2,p.198. 
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Auditing and Assurance Standards Board-IAASB in 2002”4. In 1994, all the standards 
were completed, brought together as a set and published together with their codes5. 
PIOB (Public Interest Oversight Board) which was established in 2005, within the 
reforming period of IFAC is responsible for auditing all the institutions operating under 
the body of IFAC and their standardization activities, in addition PIOB is responsible 
for providing them to make decisions for the benefit of public interest and for 
constructing their decision making processes6. There are certain instutions that are 
operating under IFAC body and which are being audited by PIOB and these institutions 
deal with standard determination. Those structures are listed below: 
-International Accounting Education Standards Board (IAESB): This 
committee which is operating under IFAC body has constructed international 
professional education standards which will constitute a benchmark in 
auditing and accounting profession. The purpose of the standards is to 
standardize every stage that starts with becoming a candidate accountant and 
lasts with completion of active workinglife as a professional.7 
-International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB): This 
committee focuses on financial reporting and auditing of national, regional 
and local public institutions, within this scope it  constitutes various standards 
for the purpose of ameliorating public financial reporting system, it organizes 
education and research programs8. 
-International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA): develops 
ethical standards and guidance for use by professional accountants. It 
encourages member bodies to adopt high standards of ethics for their 
members and promotes good ethical practices globally. The IESBA also fosters 
international debate on ethical issues faced by accountants.9 
-International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB): This 
Committee serves the public interest by: setting, independently and under its 
own authority, high quality standards dealing with auditing, review, other 
assurance, quality control and related services, and facilitating the 
convergence of national and international standards. This contributes to 
                                                 
4 www.icaew.co.uk/library/index.cfm 
5 Dönmez Adnan, P. Başak Berberoğlu, Ayten Ersoy, Mediterranean University, Journal of  
F.A.S.S., “ Comparison of Turkish Independent External Auditing Standads with US Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards and EU 8th Directive and also with International Auditing 
Standards” ,2005, V.9, p.59.    
6 For detailed; www.ifac.org 
7 www.ifac.org/Education  
8 www.ifac.org/PublicSector 
9 www.ifac.org/Ethics 
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enhanced quality and uniformity of practice in these areas throughout the 
world, and strengthened public confidence in financial reporting10. 
 
4. International Standards In Internal Auditing 
 
Although the history of internal auditing profession does not go back long, internal 
auditing has gained considerable importance since 1940’s11. After those years, various 
developments in business life caused an authority transfer towards professionals and 
internal auditing concept developed fast and at the beginning of 1941 Internal 
Auditing Institution gained a corporate identity. By the time, American Internal 
Auditing Institution accepted ethics rules, developed certain standards for 
professional internal auditing applications, constructed a programme for permanent 
education, established common information network and prepared a certificate and 
examination programme for people to be recognized as certified internal auditor12. 
The Instution for Internal Auditors, a quite important international 
professional association performing activities on the development of auditing 
profession published “Scope of Professional Applications” which is accepted as a 
global guide for the profession of internal auditing. The set of prerequested conditions 
for a complete activity of internal auditing consists of the following clauses13: 
- International Ethical Rules 
- Standards for Internal Auditing Professional Application Standards 
(Qualification Standards and Performance Standards14 
- Practice Suggestions 
- Development and Practice Aids  
-  
5. International Standards In The Field Of Public Auditing In Insurance Sector 
 
It is essential to audit instutions or companies in order to check their activities to see if 
they operate in accordance with legal regulations or in pursuance of public interest. 
Unfortunately there is not any global rules or regulation related to public auditing to 
be valid for all the countries. However, 1994  International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) was established for the purpose of developing global standards 
                                                 
10 www.ifac.org/IAASB 
11 Gürbüz, ibid,p.74. 
12 Taylor-Glezen.,ibid,p.1970. For a More Comprehensive, See:www.tide.org.tr ve 
www.theiia.org . 
13 www.theiia.org/?doc_id=1499  
14 For a More Comprehensive, See TİDE, International Internal Audit Standart Professional 
Framework, TİDE Publications No:3,İstanbul, p.3-4. 
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relating to public auditing and public auditors; setting regulations for public auditors in 
insurance sector; and of promoting co-operation among them. IAIS is setting 
international and globally accepted standards to guide actors in the sector.15     
 
6. Requested Standards For European Union  
 
Adaptation of the EU regulation in auditing sector has a considerable importance for 
domestic market in EU. For this reason, auditing subjects are executed by General 
Directorate of Internal Market under the heading of “Corporate Law”. Some studies 
are conducted in the Union in independent auditing sector under the body of 
European Federation of Accountants with the aim of adapting the global standards 
that are set by IAASB. In addition European Commission builds various regulations on 
the cited issue. No common author has been set forth for public auditing. On the 
other hand, internal auditing standards have not been adapted yet.16   
The instutions and foundations setting external and internal auditing standards in 
European Union are as follows:  
- The Internal Market and Services Directorate General (DG MARKT): is one of the 
Directorates General and specialised services which make up the European 
Commission. Its main role is to coordinate the Commission’s policy on the European 
Single Market and to seek the removal of unjustified obstacles to trade, in particular in 
the field of services and financial markets. It established Audit Regulatory Committee 
(AuRC) and European Group of Auditors' Oversight Bodies (EGAOB to have technical 
support while executing its operations. 
Due to the new Sarbanes-Oxley Law launched by the USA to regain the trust of 
investors that had been lost during the post-Enron period and due to recent financial 
reporting problems in Europe, as a part of European Commission’s initiatives related to 
enforce its corporate governance, it has become crucial to revise the priorities of legal 
auditing. For this reason European Commission presented to the Parliament The 
Commission's Communication of 21 May 2003 on “Modernising Company Law and 
Enhancing Corporate Governence in the European Union” modernizing the 8 th 
Company Law Directive.17 
                                                 
15 www.iaisweb.org 
16 Suna Oksay &Onur Acar, Audit in EU and Turkey Insurance Sectors, TSRŞB Publications No:9, 
İstanbul, p.103. 
17 Communication From The Commission To The Council and The Europan Parliament 
Reinforcing The Statuory Audit In The EU, Official Journal of the Europan Union, C 236, 
2.10.2003, p. 2, http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj-
/dat/2003/c_23620031002en0020013.pdf 
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-  Fedaration of European Accountants (FEE): The Federation operation in a wide 
range of sectors covering the interests of European accounting profession. Among 
these are auditing, banking, insurance and capital markets, ethical taxation, corporate 
law and environmental problems. Above mentioned activities of FEE are executed by 
work groups. 
It was cited in the report that was published by FEE in June 1998 that national 
auditing standards in the Union are very parallel to international auditing standards. In 
another report published in June 2000 it was indicated that the way of writing of audit 
reports differs among members within the Union. Another report of de federation 
published in May 2002, starting from 1st January 2005, it was recommended to follow 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in accounting field and International 
Standards of Auditing (ISA) in the field of auditing. In addition, it has become 
compulsory upon 1606/2002numbered bylaw and 2006/43/EC numbered directive for 
publicly open companies to prepare their consolidated financial statements in 
accordance with IFRS and to perform their auditing in accordance with ISA. 
FEE strongly believes that international standards have an important role in 
eliminating auditing process differences among EU member countries and other 
countries. In this respect, FEE supports, in its press release published in 2006 in 
Brussels, the 26th article of the directive 2006/43/EC which sets forth auditing of all 
companies in compliance with international standards and FEE desires to follow the 
auditing standards set by IAASB in allover Europe.   
The European Confederation of Institutes of Internal Auditing (ECIIA) is the 
professional representation of 32 national Institutes of Internal Audit in the wider 
European region. ECIIA's objective is to support the position of internal control 
professionals in the EU and ECIIA's member countries and to promote the application 
of the global Institute of Internal Auditing (IIA) Standards and Code of Ethics to all 
Internal Audit activity in the public and the private sector18. 
 
7. Overview Of European Union Regulations In Insurance Sector 
 
In European Union, The Internal Market and Services Directorate General (DG MARKT) 
is the responsible authority for preparing and supervising the directives regulating the 
insurance sector. 
Insurance unit, on the other hand is the responsible entity for legal regulations 
related to life insurance and other insurances. Among these regulations there is no 
unique framework layout for public auditing of insurance sector. However, in various 
directives citing life insurance and other insurance issues, there exists certain 
                                                 
18 http://www.eciia.org/eciia/overview/profile.html:10.08.2009 
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principles on auditing of insurance sector including the cooperations among national 
auditing authorities. These are: 
- 2002/83/EC Life Insurance Directive 
- 73/239/EEC, 88/357/EEC and 92749/EEC Directives for Other Insurances 
- 98/78/EC Additional Insurance Auditing Directive 
- 2000/64/EC Information Exchange Directive 
Inspite of the fact that International Financial Reporting Standards has started to be 
applied in accounting field in European Union, adaptation studies in independent 
auditing isssues still continue. European regulations relating to EU independent 
auditing legislation which is closely related to independent auditing of insurance 
sector and which is handled under the title of “corporate law” are as follows: 
- 78/660/EEC 4th Corporate Law Directive (Article 51) 
- 83/349/EEC 7th  Corporate Law Directive (Article 37) 
- 84/253/EEC 8th  Corporate Law Directive  (Mülga) 
- COM 1996/338 The Role, Position and Responsibility of legal auditor in EU 
(Green Book) 
- OJ-C 143 dated Quality Assurance for legal auditing: Minimum 
Requirements Declaration  
- 2002/590/EC  Recommendation Decision related to independence of legal 
auditors in EU  
- 2006/43/EC 4th and 7th Directive related to legal auditing of annual 
accounts and consolidated accounts, modifiying Corporate Law and 
removing 8th Corporate Law Directive  
In European Union in insurance sector there is no unique framework layout for public 
auditing of insurance sector. But ECIIA, is conducting studies to apply the internal 
auditing standards set by IIA in allover Europe. 
 
8. Legal Regulations Related To Auditing And The Profession Of Auditing In Turkey 
 
Latest developments in the world and especially company scandals experienced in 
USA and in Europe stimulated regulatory institutions in Turkey and they launced new 
regulation in the light of recent developments. 
Institutions guiding and supervising auditing and the profession of auditing in 
Turkey are as follows: 
- Ministry of Finance 
- Capital Markets Board (SPK) 
- Banking Regulation and Supervisory Board (BDDK) 
- Chamber of Accountants and Financial Consultants (TURMOB) 
- Accounting and Auditing Standards Board of Turkey (TMUDESK) 
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- Auditing Standards Board of Turkey (TÜDESK) 
- Accounting Standards Board of Turkey (TMSK) 
- Association of Independent Auditing  
- Undersecretariat of Treasury 
We will now summarize briefly the regulations made in Turkey within the operational 
scope of the authorities cited above. 
After the years 1970’s due to the reasons such as increasing level of 
international relations of Turkish companies, increasing investments of foreign 
enterprises, and increasing opportunities of Turkish firms for borrowing abroad, 
independent auditing has become a compulsory issue to focus on19. 
The first legal act on independent external auditing was enacted in 1987 
about auditing of banks. In parallel to this development, Central Bank of Turkey 
published in 24th December 1987, “Declaration on Independent Auditing” 
explaining the essential framework for bank audits executed by independent 
auditing institutions20.  
Following the auditing issues of the banks, compulsory auditing of 
affiliated joint venture companies under supervision of Capital Markets Board of 
Turkey (CMBT) pursued the process. CMBT, published “ Independent External 
Auditing Code in Capital Markets” for the purpose of regulating the auditing of 
joint venture companies under its supervision, on 13 th December 1987. 
Independent auditing institutions were established according to this code. CMBT, 
set forth general rules related to auditing and to the profession of auditing, 
auditing standards, general principles and rules of financial reporting in various 
declaration that it published afterwards. (Series: X, Declerations No:1-19). In 
parallel to Sarbanes-Oxley Law which had been published to prevent auditing 
scandals that arose in those days, CMBT published 02.11.2002 dated Decleration 
No: 19, Series:X “Decleration on assuring the independence of Auditors”. With this 
decleration, some of the articles of Decleration Series:X No: 16 was changed and 
some new articles were added. 
Turkey, has already started accession negotiations with European Union. In 
this direction, Turkey, promised in the Letter of Intent dated 30.07.2002 presented 
to IMF that CMBT will apply  International Financial Reporting Standards in 
Turkey.For the purpose of achieving this goal CBMT  published 15.11.2003 dated  
series:XI No: 25 “Decleration on Accounting Standards in Capital Markets and 
Series:XI No: 27 “Decleration on Modification of Accounting Standards in Capital 
                                                 
19 Y. Göksel, “The Difficulties in Finalcial Statement Analysis in Turkey”, Journal of Accounting, 
1992, V.31,p.13. 
20 B. Akgül, Turkish Audit Instutions, Türkmen Publishing, Ankara,  2000, p.5.  
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Markets”. These declerations provided conformity with international financial 
reporting standards and starting from 01.01.2005, it became cumpolsory to apply 
these declarations in Turkey for all the companies quoted in Istanbul Stock 
Exchange, all trust companies, all broker companies, portfolio management 
companies and their affiliated companies or their sharing companies  or their 
partner companies.21 
Although above mentioned standard is not directly related with independent 
external auditing, it is very important for independent auditing cause it will help to 
adapt to international financial reporting standards. Application of international 
financial reporting standards in allover the country will help to reduce the 
dicsrepencies in financial statements, will provide preparation of tables with more 
attention and gain a transparent structure. New applications will in addition simplify 
independent auditing and will help to conduct auditing in an easy and simple 
procedure. In addition, in terms of preparation of statements and financial table it will 
provide a common basis to make comparisons easily and this also will increase the 
credibility of the auditing done. Furthermore, it is obvious that from all the points 
cited above internationally accredited financial reports will facilitate global integration 
of Turkish financial system to the rest of the world. 
 
9. Independent Auditing In Turkey Within The Scope Of Turkish Law No: 3568 
 
One of the important developments in Turkey in the field of auditing is the law of  
“Accountants, Public Accountants and Certified Auditors” number 3568 published on 
13th June 1989, some other codes and declerations following mentioned law. 22 
According to this law in Turkey there exists three types of profession such as 
Accountants, Public Accountants and Auditing. Additionally in the law, different 
members of those professional fields who are executing accounting transactions and 
who are conducting the auditing of operational results are defined separately.  
 
10. Regulations On Auditing Standards In Turkey 
 
As implied before, legal status of auditing principles and rules in Turkey starts first 
with declerations   published in 1988 by Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMBT). 
Those regulations was accepted for the purpose of validating the auditing done by 
companies under Capital Markets Board’s supervision within the scope of capital 
                                                 
21 Dönmez et al, ibid, p.62. 
22 Akgül, ibid.p.5. 
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markets legistlation. Most of the principles and rules regarding independent auditing 
in capital markets appears in Decleration Number: 16 Series:X.23 
Some certain auditing standards are also mentioned inside the “Code on 
Working Procedure and Principles of Accountants, Public Accountants and Certified 
Auditors” which had been prepared according to the article number 50 of the law of 
“Accountants, Public Accountants and Certified Auditors” number 3568 accepted on 
1st June 1989. 
The duty of developing accounting and auditing standards was given to 
Accounting and Auditing Standards Board of Turkey (TMUDESK) by Chamber of 
Accountants, Public Accountants and Certified Auditors (TÜRMOB) on 9th February 
1994. The aim of TMUDESK is to define national accounting and auditing standards 
considering international standards and publish them.24 However, the duty of setting 
accounting standards of TMUDESK was transferred to Accounting Standards Board of 
Turkey which was recently founded by an amendment of Article 27 of the law dated 
15.12.1999 numbered 4487. At the moment, although mentioned board achieved to 
make a considerable progress on its studies for setting new standards in the field of 
accounting, it has not published any standard yet. 
One of the most important developments in auditing issues in Turkey is the 
establishment of “Auditing Standards Board of Turkey” (TÜDESK) on 22nd January 
2003. TÜDESK was established by TÜRMOB with an aim of determining and publishing 
international standards to provide that auditing processes are done properly and in a 
disciplined manner. 
The first activity of TÜDESK was to translate into Turkish International 
Auditing Standards which had been published by International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board functioning under the supervision of IFAC. The translation text of 
International Auditing Standards realized by TÜDESK was published by TÜRMOB.25 
- Professional Education and Proficiency Standard: These standards are explained in 
the 4th, 7th, 8th and 9th articles of “Declaration on Independent Auditing in Capital 
Markets” published by Capital Markets Board of Turkey.  
- Independent Acting Standard: The issue of independence has always been handled 
under a separate heading in both generally accepted auditing standards and 
professional ethic regulations. The issue is defined by Capital Markets Board of Turkey 
such as: “Having an understanding that will assure to conduct one’s professional 
activities in an unbiased and honest way.” (Series: X, No:16 Decleration: M.10. 
                                                 
23 C.,Küçüksözen, Z., Sayar, , “Independent Audit Report  Standards in Share Market”, Journal 
of Accounting and Audit Views, 2002, Y.l:2, V.6, p.51. 
24 www.turmob.org.tr/TMUDESK  
25 TÜRMOB News, 2004, p.1. 
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Besides, on the article number 11 of the “Decleration on Independent Auditing in 
Capital Markets”, circumstances causing elimination of independency is listed. On the 
article number 13 of the same decleration a list of jobs which is forbidded for 
Independent Auditing Firms was indicated. 
In parallel to regulations and precautions taken following the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Law, Capital Markets Board of Turkey published “Decleration on Assurance of Auditor 
Independence” Series: X, Number: 19. Three clauses were added to the first article of 
the decleration to this decleration and to the 11th article of the “Deleration on 
Independent Auditing (Series :X, Number: 16) of Capital Markets Board of Turkey 
containing the circumstances taking away auditor’s independence in conformity with 
the regulations in Sarbanes-Oxley Law. Within first clause the jobs which can not be 
performed by the auditors of independent institutions under paid or unpaid 
conditions was indicated clearly. In the second clause added to the 11th article, within 
the scope of the “Accountants, Public Accountants and Certified Auditors Law”, it is 
said that “the activities of controlling the suitability of financial statements and tax 
declerations, approving them, making written declerations and preparing reports on 
the issue are excluded from the activites prohibited in 1st article. As for the 3rd clause, 
it is indicated that a consulting firm which directly or indirectly hold by an 
independent auditing company can not give any consultancy service during the period 
in which auditing firm is conducting independent auditing. To this scope, consultancy 
services of independent auditing company’s real or corporate shareholders are 
included. The aim of this 3rd clause is to remove interest conflicts.26 
- Professional Attention and Care Standard: Issues handled as professional attention 
in generally accepted auditing standards, is handled under the scope of “professional 
attention and neutrality” in the regulations of Capital Markets Board of Turkey. 
Explanations regarding professional attention and neutrality is explained in the article 
number 12 of the “Decleration on Independent Auditing in Capital Markets.”27. 
Regarding professional attention and neutrality standard, in the 6th article of the 
regulatory statute cited above, it is said: “ Professional members of the field, stay 
away from conflicts of interest during execution of their studies and they show the 
most attention and neutrality while performing their duties” 
- Planning and Observation Standard: Planning is explained in the 25th article of the 
Decleration on the Independent Auditing in Capital Markets, while observation and 
coordination principles are explained on the 27th article of the same regulation. While 
it is clearly indicated in the 25th article that auditing activities should be planned 
efficiently, in the 27th article scope of the responsibilities of the chief auditor is drawn. 
                                                 
26 Dönmez et al, ibid. p.65. 
27 Dönmez et al, ibid. p.67. 
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There are also some brief explanations about planning and observation standards in 
the 53rd and 54th articles of the Code on Working Procedure and Principles of 
Accountants, Public Accountants and Certified Auditors. 
- Information Taking Standard about Internal Control System: Explanations about the 
inspection of internal control system takes place in the article 28 of the Decleration on 
Independent External Auditing in Capital Markets. In the mentioned article definition 
of the internal control system is stated. Within the same article it is said that, in order 
to determine the auditing technics that the auditor will use, the timing and scope of 
the auditing, the auditor has to evaluate and check whether the internal sytem works 
efficiently or not (Series: X, No: 16 Decleration : m.28). On the other hand there is no 
explanation on this standart in the law number 3568.  
- Evidence Gathering Standard:  The 29th, 30th, and 31st articles of the Decleration on 
Independent Auditing in Capital Markets are about evidende gathering standard. 29th 
article is about the proof gathering of auditor during auditing process; 30th article is 
about the purposes of proof gathering; 31st article is about the auditing techniques 
that will be helpful while proof gathering. Proof gathering is not mentioned separately 
in the Law Number 3568. 
- Conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles Standard: This standard 
requires explaining in the audit report whether the financial statements are in 
conformity with GAAP. Explanations on this standard take place in the Decleration on 
Independent Auditing in Capital Markets, in article 36/a. The standard states that if 
some deviations from GAAP are found, the effect of these deviations on financial 
statements should be calculated properly and should be written in the auditing report. 
- Permenance on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles Standard: Explanations 
on this standard take place in the Decleration on Independent Auditing in Capital 
Markets, in article 36/b. Within the scope of this article, it is indicated that the 
independent auditing report should state whether the accounting policy applications 
are coherent with the previous year. If there is any accounting policy change the 
report should explain it completely. Regarding this standard, in the 44th article of the 
Decleration on Principles and Rules about Financial Statements and Reports in Capital 
Markets it is said that “Appliying accounting policies consistently is 
compulsory.”(Series: XI, No:1 CMBT Decleration m.44)     
- Adequacy of Explanations in Financial Statements Standard: Explanations on this 
standard take place in the Decleration on Independent Auditing in Capital Markets, in 
article 36/c. In this article it is cited that “any financial statement which is not 
appropriate for the complete explanation concept of generally accepted accounting 
concepts should be indicated in the report including its reasons”. 
- Announcement of Opinion Standard: Article 34 of the Decleration on Independent 
Auditing in Capital Markets is about auditing reports and announcement of opinion. 
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Besides in the 39th article of the cited decleration various circumstances that may 
affect the auditor’s opinion are stated. On the other hand, within the 58th and 59th 
articles of the “Code on Working Procedure and Principles of Accountants, Public 
Accountants and Certified Auditors” under the Law Number 3568, there are some 
explanations about this standard. While article number 58 talks about the form of the 
audit report, article number 59 explains types of audit reports and opinion 
announcements.28 
 
Evaluation Of Turkish Regulations In Terms Of Insurance Sector  
 
Real financial position of Turkish insurance companies has to known for both correct 
insurance preferences of individuals, and for providing investors to invest on 
insurance companies and also for construting partnerships with foreign insurance 
companies.29 At this stage, accuracy of financial statements and the information on 
the financial statements of insurance companies comes into discussion. 30 Auditing of 
insurance sector and insurance companies, especially is done for the purpose of 
protecting the interest of insurees and for providing the positive contribution of 
insurance funds to the whole economy. With the aim of preventing weaking of 
financial power of insurance and reinsurance companies in order not to endanger 
insurees’ rights and benefits, some capital adequacy regulations are set in the sector. 
For this point of view, public auditing assures obedience of insurance companies to 
the regulations and penalizations of the ones who does not follow the regulations.  
Institutions conducting public auditing in Turkey are as follows31: 
-Undersecretariat of Tresasury (General Directorate of Insurance Sector, Directorate 
of Insurance Auditing Board). 
-Ministry of Finance Auditing Organs (Directorate of Financial Supervision Board, 
Directorate of Account Experts Board, Directorate of Income Management Board, 
Directorate of Income Inspectors Board, Directorate of Taxes) 
When we look at the regulations on the insurance sector in Turkey, we see that “guide 
tariff period” and “tariff auditing period” have already ended which was applied until 
the end of the 1980’s. Some certain standards were broght to the sector with 
regulations of uniform chart of account and one style financial statements and these 
regulations enabled more accurate comparison of the companies in the sector. 
                                                 
28 Dönmez et al., ibid, p.68. 
29 www.finanskulup.org.tr/html/makale/erdem_esenkaya.html 
30 Esenkaya,İ.E.,ibid.,p.134. 
31 Suna Oksay, Onur Acar, ibid, s.127. 
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Public auditing over insurance and reinsurance companies in Turkey is executed by 
permission system accompanied by physical inspection system. Routine audits done 
by Insurance Auditing Board over insurance companies are financial position auditing, 
guarantee auding, legistlation auditing, damage auditing, and auditing of 
mathematical provisions. 
When it comes to independent auditing in insurance sector, in addition to 
independent auditing authorities cited before, is performed according to legal 
regulations published by Undersecretariat of Treasury.  
As for setting the legistlation of internal auditing in insurance sector, there is 
not only one authority as it is the case for independent auditing as well. For this 
reason legistlation developed by General Directorate of Insurance Sector under 
Undersecretariat of Treasury, is used as a guide for internal auditing in insurance 
sector. However, benefiting from standards published by Turkish Institution of 
Internal Auditing will help to increase the quality level of internal auditing in insurance 
sector, althought cited standards has no legal sanction.32  
Some other studies in the sector on the discussed issue are as follows:33 
- Code on settlement of independent auditing in insurance and reinsurance 
companies (Official Newspaper of the Government dated 08.09.2003)  
- Code on the principles of independent insurance sector auditing (Official 
Newspaper of the Government dated 08.09.2003) 
- Code on the Accounting System of Insurance Companies (Official 
Newspaper of the Government dated 31.12.2004) 
- Circular on Internal Auditing Systems of Insurance and Reinsurance 
Companies (2004) 
- Circular on Data Processing Systems of Insurance and Reinsurance 
Companies 
- Insurance Auditing Board – Auditing Guide (2002) 
- Insurance Auditing Board - Electronical Pursuit of Damage Compensation 
Performance and Agency Systems of Insurance Companies (2004) 
- Insurance Auditing Board – Data Backup Systems of Insurance Companies 
and Disaster Management (2005) 
Although important studies were completed on auditing and supervision in the sector, 
there some other important tasks to be done. The most important part of these tasks 
                                                 
32 Özlem Aykaç, Internal Audit and Regulations in Insurance Sectors in During European Union 
Pre-Accession Period of Turkey, 1. National Insurance Symposium Proceedings, 24 May 2005, p. 
453. 
33 İbrahim Taşbaşı, Audit and Supervision in Insurance Sector, 1. National Insurance Symposium 
Proceedings, 24 May 2005, p. 407. 
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is to bring into force a new consistent and compatible legistlation which will have 
concrete legal sanctions as soon as possible. 
Despite of the fact that in EU, a specific directive was accepted regarding 
reinsurance sector in the year 2006, in Turkey no special act has been accepted for 
reinsurance transactions. 
In the routine report of European Commission, it was cited that the 
legistlative conformity of Turkish insurance sector is limited and that there is not any 
remarkable improvement for this issue. 
Certain subjects to develop and ctiques made on the subject listed in the 
report can be summarized as follows: 
- Lack of legistlative conformity in general 
- Restrictions on the presentation of service in insurance sector 
- Lack of complete independence of insurance auditing and supervision 
from political authorities. 
- Restrictions on foreign investment in the sector. 
- Reinsurance Monopoly in confliction with EU legistlation or protection 
previliged position of certain companies 
- Essentials of rate setting 
- Lack of law on insurance auditing which is in conformity with EU 
legislation 
-  
11. Conclusion 
 
When we examine insurance sector, problems faced and probable problems in the 
sector are mostly structural problems. In order to find a solution for structural 
problems modifiying legislation is compulsory but this is not sufficient enough. It is 
also essential to realize the necessary groundwork supporting legal changes. In 
addition following points need to be achieved urgently: 
- Providing economic stability and stable economic growth rate 
- A new legal system which will facilitate to solve conflicts in a short time 
- Starting to apply internationally accepted standards and adaptation of 
national standards to global standards. 
- Professional ethic, proficiency, continuous education and informing 
- Providing auditor independence 
- Assuring common trust by increasing transparency  
When we look at the EU, the regulations made and precautions taken in the 
Union are multinational whereas adaptations are national. From this point of view it 
can be said that Turkey is not on the losing part. 
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In Turkey, it can be claimed that preparation of standards about independent 
external auditing by separate laws instead of professional bodies as done in developed 
countries prevents the quick development of the profession. We believe that it is 
essential for Turkey to construct a unique professional body to prepare to start to 
apply nationally accepted auditing standards which is in conformity with EU standards 
and with international standards with the help of internationally accepted standards. 
Turkey, which is in preaccession period to the EU, should make necessary 
regulations to comply with EU Directives. Furhermore, international accreditation of 
Turkish auditing professionals is an important task during preaccession period. EU 
candidacy should be seen as a big opportunity for the recognition and validity of 
auditing profession in Turkey, as well. In today’s market structure in Turkey, biggest 
market share in auditing profession belongs to foreign companies. During EU 
negotiations, studies should focus on international accreditation. 
When we take into account the long negotiation process of Turkey, to talk 
about transition period is a very optimistic view. For this reason to realize adaptation 
step by step and completely without any missing point as soon as possible is very 
important. This activity is crucial because besides the new regulations to come up, 
adaptation of the market to these new regulations is another important point. 
In the globalization period, Turkish insurance sector should define the 
problems it faces, detect  reasons for the problems and find ways to solve these 
problems as soon as possible in order to achieve to survive in global competition 
environment. Necessary precautions should be taken for the aim of increasing Turkish 
Insurance Sector’s competition power during EU preaccession period and sector agent 
should fully support all the new regulations to be made.  
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Ict And Albanian Public Administation Reform 
 
 
Abstract 
 
European integration, along with rapid and sustainable growth, remains overarching 
goals for Albania. Public administration is a great asset of our country because it is the 
main pillar of the integration reforms. Therefore, further consolidation of public 
administration in Albania will be a priority of the government's performance during 
this governing term. The purpose of this paper is to study different stages of public 
administration reform in Albania and the use of ICTs during this process. Different 
international institutions and projects support GoA’ efforts to reduce corruption and 
improve performance in the key areas of public administration. This paper points out 
some of the problems that state administration struggles in all kind of democracies 
and several constraints that limit the use of ICT in public sector reforms in Albania. 
 
Key words: Public administration reform, ICT, e-service, European integration 
 
Concepts And Definitions 
1.1 What is “public administration”? 
 
Public administration refers to:  
1.   The aggregate machinery (policies, rules, procedures, systems, 
organizational structures, personnel, etc.) funded by the state budget and in charge 
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of the management and direction of the affairs of the executive government, and its 
interaction with other stakeholders in the state, society and external environment.  
2. The management and implementation of the whole set of government 
activities dealing with the implementation of laws, regulations and decisions of the 
government and the management related to the provision of public services. 
Public administration can be broadly described as the development, 
implementation and study of branches of government policy. The pursuit of the public 
good by enhancing civil society, ensuring a well-run, fair, and effective public service 
are some of the goals of the field. 
Public Administration is concerned with the management of public programs, 
which interact with the residents of the community or region. Those who work in it 
should share a commitment to offer public service. Negative reactions toward the 
system and its officials will often use the term "bureaucracy" (i.e. government by the 
desk holders), with connotations of an inflexible and unresponsive hierarchy that is 
unconcerned or ill-equipped in its fulfillment of public duties.  
Public administration is carried out by public servants who work in public 
departments and agencies, at all levels of government, and perform a wide range of 
tasks. Public administrators collect and analyze data (statistics), monitor budgets, 
draft legislation, develop policy, and execute legally mandated government activities. 
Public administrators serve in many roles: ranging from "front-line" positions serving 
the public (e.g., peace officers, parole officers, border guards); administrators (e.g., 
auditors); analysts (e.g., policy analysts); and managers and executives of government 
branches and agencies. 
Public administration is also an academic field. In comparison with related 
fields such as political science, public administration is relatively new, having emerged 
in the 19th century. Multidisciplinary in character, it draws on theories and concepts 
from political science, economics, sociology, administrative law, management, and a 
range of related fields. The goals of the field of public administration are related to the 
democratic values of improving equality, justice, security, efficiency, effectiveness of 
public services usually in a non-profit, non-taxable venue; business administration, on 
the other hand, is primarily concerned with taxable profit. For a field built on concepts 
(accountability, governance, decentralization, clientele), these concepts are often ill-
defined and typologies often ignore certain aspects of these concepts (Dubois & 
Fattore 2009).1  
 
                                                 
1 Dubois, Hans F. W.; Fattore, Giovanni (2009). International Journal of Public Administration. 
Volume 32, Issue 8 January 2009 , pages 704 - 727 
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1.1.  A historical review of  “public administration” concept 
 
Classic scholars including Plato, Aristotle, Vishnu Gupta (Kautilya) and Machiavelli are 
the basis of subsequent generations of public administration. Until the birth of a 
national state, the governors principally emphasized moral and political human 
nature, as well as the on the organization of the governing bodies.  
Lorenz von Stein, an 1855 German professor from Vienna, is considered the 
founder of the science of public administration in many parts of the world. In the time 
of Von Stein, public administration was considered a form of administrative law, but 
Von Stein believed this concept too restrictive. Von Stein taught: 
 Public administration relies on many pre-established disciplines such as 
sociology, political science, administrative law and public finance. Further, 
public administration is an integrating science. 
 Public administrators need be concerned with both theory and practice. 
Practical considerations are at the forefront of the field, but theory is the basis 
of best practices. 
 Public administration is a science because knowledge is generated and 
evaluated according to the scientific method. 
In the United States, Woodrow Wilson is considered the father of public 
administration. He first formally recognized public administration in an 1887 article 
entitled "The Study of Administration." The future president wrote that "it is the 
object of administrative study to discover, first, what government can properly and 
successfully do, and, secondly, how it can do these proper things with the utmost 
possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of money or of energy."2 
Wilson was more influential to the science of public administration than Von Stein, 
primarily due to the article he wrote in 1887 in which he advocated four concepts: 
 Separation of politics and administration 
 Comparative analysis of political and private organizations 
 Improving efficiency with business-like practices and attitudes toward daily 
operations 
 Improving the effectiveness of public service through management and by 
training civil servants, merit-based assessment 
The separation of politics and administration has been the subject of lasting debate. 
The separation of politics and administration advocated by Wilson continues to play a 
significant role in public administration today.  
                                                 
2 Wilson, Woodrow, "The Study of Administration," Political Science Quarterly 2 (June 1887) 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
228 
 
Several theorists bridged the gap between strictly private and public sector 
management. Luther Gulick negotiated a generic theory of organization. Max Weber 
exploring sociologist, explored the ideal bureaucracy in The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism (Denhardt 2000, 27). He claimed that bureaucracies are 
organizations that manage resources for citizens (Weber in Shafritz and Ott, 2001, 73). 
New public administration theories have emerged over the latter half of the 
twentieth century. New frameworks increasingly acknowledge that government is 
seen by citizens through administrators, front line, service deliverers. These are the 
employees that execute decisions by elected officials. What was called New Public 
Management was proposed by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler3 . The new model 
advocated the use of private sector innovation, resources, and organizational ideas to 
improve the public sector. During the Clinton Administration (1992-2000), Vice 
President Al Gore adopted and reformed federal agencies accordingly. New public 
management there by became prevalent throughout the US bureaucracy. 
There has been a rigorous critique and emphasis upon implicit problems with 
new public management. First, a reliance upon competition and market forces 
assumes that individual self interest will effectively bring about an equitable social and 
economic reality for citizens. Henry Mintzberg’s protests,“I am not a mere customer 
of my government, thank you.” (cited by Dendhardt 2001, 77). “I expect something 
more than arm’s length trading and something less than the encouragement to 
consume.” (Denhardt 152 citing Mintzberg 1992, 77). “Do we really want our 
governments…hawking products?” While greater government efficiency, an individual 
emphasis, and lower cost operations of new public management may be initially 
attractive, Mintzberg and Denhardt highlight many incompatibilities of such values 
with justice, equity, security, and other important government values. 
Further, encouraging an entrepreneurial spirit in administrators carries the 
benefits of innovation and productivity. These benefits are balanced by necessary 
costs. An entrepreneurial attitude tends to be accompanied by a willingness to bend 
the rules, reduced level of accountability, and a motivation to take risk with public 
resources are potentially costly (Denhardt 152-153). Despite what might appear to be 
a destructive criticism of a new model for public service delivery, Denhardt advocates 
new public service, one that carefully navigates the intricate differences between 
public and private organizations. 
Some critics argue that the New Public Management concept of Americans as 
"customers" rather than "citizens" is an unacceptable abuse. That is, customers are a 
means to an end, profit, rather than part of the policy making process. Citizens are in 
fact the proprietors of government (the owners), opposed to merely the customers of 
                                                 
3 Public Administration Review, Vol. 56, No. 3 (May – Jun., 1996), pp. 247–255 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
229 
 
a business (the patrons). In New Public Management, people are viewed as economic 
units not democratic participants. Nevertheless, the model is still widely accepted at 
all levels of government. 
In the late 1990s, Janet and Robert Denhardt proposed a new public service 
model4. This model's chief contribution is a focus on Americans as "citizens" rather 
than "customers". Accordingly, the citizen is expected to participate in government 
and take an active role throughout the policy process. No longer are the proprietors 
considered an end to a mean. While this remains feasible at the federal, state & local 
levels, where the concept of citizenship is commonly wedded, the emergence of 
'transnational administration' with the growing number of international organizations 
and 'transnational executive networks' complicates the prospects for citizen 
engagement.5  
The critics of NPM claim that a successor to NPM is digital era governance, 
focusing on themes of reintegrating government responsibilities, needs-based holism 
(executing duties in cursive ways), and digitalization (exploiting the transformational 
capabilities of modern IT and digital storage). 
 
1.2. Why is public administration reform – PAR so important? 
 
State administration in all kind of democracies struggles with the same kind of 
problems: how to ensure an efficient, effective, legitimate, responsible, accountable, 
professional and fair public service. From our state administration we normally aspect 
to be all of this or maybe even more, but at the same time we could be very unhappy 
if we have to admit trade off. The fact is that state administration constantly grows 
and needs more and higher means for its working. This is especially characteristic and 
problematic for the state administration in which the effectiveness 
of its working could not be directly measured in majority cases.  
Public Administration Reform (PAR) can be very comprehensive and include 
process changes in areas such as organizational structures, decentralization, personnel 
management, public finance, results-based management, regulatory reforms etc. It 
can also refer to targeted reforms such as the revision of the civil service statute. 
 
Increasing concern for PAR in developing countries derives from three main 
intellectual threads. 
                                                 
4 Denhardt , Robert B. and Janet Vinzant Denhardt (2000). "The New Public Service: Serving 
Rather than Steering." Public Administration Review 60(6) 
5 Diane Stone, (2008) 'Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy Communities and their 
Networks,' Journal of Policy Sciences. 
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A. New public management (NPM) - a number of Anglo-Saxon countries (the UK, New 
Zealand, Australia, the United States and Canada) starting in the early 1980s, 
began implementing wide ranging reform programs that provided both the model 
and the experience that could be applied in developing countries. NPM seeks to 
roll back the role of the state by applying private sector management principles to 
government organizations. The enthusiastic dissemination of this model to 
developing countries was seen by some as a new attempt to colonize 
development administration with a standardized, western approach to PAR. 
Nevertheless, the language of NPM, and the principles of client focus, 
decentralization, the separation of policy making from implementation, and the 
use of private partners for service delivery continues to inform current thinking 
about PAR.  
B. Structural adjustment reforms - in the mid 1980s, efforts at reforming the public 
administration in developing countries, supported by the IFIs, focused on reducing 
overall costs of the government, mainly through privatization of state owned 
enterprises and reduction of the wage bill to bring government spending down to 
sustainable levels and free resources for other uses more beneficial to the overall 
economy. However, most of the public sector reforms supported through the 
SAPs have met with considerable resistance (not least because in many countries 
the public sector is the principal source of formal employment), and their 
implementation has rarely been successful  
C. Transition from central planning to market economy, and from single party 
systems to multi-party democracies - The fall of the Soviet Union has persuaded 
governments of previously socialist countries to transform their economies to 
adhere more to market principles often linked to political reforms. In the 1990s, a 
large number of economies, especially in Central and Eastern Europe (but also in 
countries in South-East Asia) began this transition. This implied the reorientation 
of the system of public administration. This is also the case of Albania.  
 
1.3. Recent trends in Public Administration Reform  
 
 “A useful working definition of Administrative Reform is the induced, 
permanent improvement in administration”. (Wallis, 1993) 
 
Interdiciplinary Interface of Public Administration 
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 In spite of the influential neo-liberal arguments of the 1980s and 1990s which 
sought to roll back the state, recent surveys find that citizens want state institutions 
that are democratic, efficient in the use of public resources, effective in delivering 
public goods, but also strong and capable of standing up to powerful global forces. 
People want the state and its public administration to act as a social and economic 
promoter, capable of ensuring equitable distribution of opportunities, sustainable 
management of resources and equitable access to opportunities (political, economic, 
social and cultural). An established public administration has been, arguably, far more 
vital to economic development in historical fact than either free elections or 
parliaments. In the LDCs and post conflict countries in particular, underdeveloped 
private sectors require the public administration to play a major role in the delivery of 
services and the provision of much needed economic infrastructure. But, most 
important of all, an established non-partisan civil service is vital to democracy as it 
makes it possible to have a peaceful and orderly political succession, and thus genuine 
pluralism.  
 In recent years public sector management is increasingly seen as more than 
just modernizing state institutions and reducing civil service costs. It is also about 
fostering dynamic partnerships with the civil society and the private sector, to 
improve the quality of service delivery, enhance social responsibilities and ensure the 
broad participation of citizens in decision-making and feedback on public service 
performance.  
 
Public Administration in a Democracy 
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(Rosenbloom, Kravchuck, 2005) 
 
Above figure presents a conceptual framework that sees public administration 
taking the central role or stage in a broader political system (the conversion process in 
the systems model). 
- the model emphasizes the interrelated nature of the parts and how change in an 
external environment (cultural, economic, political, social) causes change in the 
structures and internal processes of public administration. 
- these changes, in turn, influence the outputs of the bureaucracy; that is, what 
goods, services, policy programs, rules, and regulations are implemented by 
bureaucracy. 
 
As in any system, a feedback loop develops in which the outputs affect the 
environment, which causes further change and often new demands from the 
environment to continue, increase or decrease, modify, or occasionally even cease a 
public policy or program. 
 
 
1. Use Of Ict In Public Administration 
 
2.1. e-Public Administration next big challenge of eEurope 
 
The European governments have embarked on important reforms for their public 
administrations. Public Administration Reforms (PAR) contributes to a sustainable 
development, with particular reference to countries in transition. Therefore, socio-
economic development, strategic planning, sound public finance and external 
assistance management, anti-corruption, powered by an increased use of Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT) for development, represent major national 
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priorities. ICT has shown a lot of promise in delivering many public administration 
reforms. Through its use, it changes the way Public Administrations performs its 
functions, helps reduce operational costs and at the same time increase efficiency in 
the delivery of government services. The primary driving force behind the creation 
and development of electronic public administration was to increase the efficiency of 
institutional operation first and consequently that of governance. In recent years, e-
administration, which mainly served the purpose of efficiency, became an economic 
and socio-political tool, which enabled the creation of the service provider state and, 
at the same time, outlined the system of requirements of the development of modern 
government operations for EU Member States. 
 
New applications for increasing the efficiency of the Public Administration are: 
 Development of Government-to-Government (G2G) applications 
 e-Government system across all governmental institutions 
 ICTs supporting public administration re-engineering 
 
 Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) provides increasingly 
powerful process tools that can be deployed to address traditional development 
problems in innovative ways. ICT does not consist solely of electronic- and micro-chip-
based e-governance solutions, but these predominate in most discussions of ICT in the 
context of PAR. Such information technologies as Wide Area Networks and the 
Internet, can transform government interactions with citizens, businesses, and other 
parts of government. However, the focus needs to be less on the technology per se 
and more on the transformation and reorganization of functions and interactions that 
it permits. By locating service centers closer to clients, customers and partners, e-
governance can facilitate better, user-friendly service delivery, improved and 
economical links with business, and more efficient and rigorous management of 
government business. Innovative examples, even in otherwise technologically under-
developed areas, have proven successful. In addition to enhancing relations with the 
public, e-government can also improve the internal working of an administration. 
Introducing Management Information Systems within government departments, for 
example, can result in improved personnel management, cost reductions and 
improvements in service delivery and government procurement, better management 
of technical assistance funds and projects, and increased revenue collection. However, 
e-government in so far as it is conceived of largely in terms of IT systems, tools and 
infrastructure does not automatically result in the streamlining and re-organization of 
government functions and transformation of roles and responsibilities which need to 
be part of a larger transformation process. 
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  The EU countries’ e-government work, which they have started in 2001, has 
made as height advancement as nearly half of all accentuated government services 
are fully online by today. Besides increasing digitalization, the current task for the 
coming years is to develop the skills of citizens and enterprises in applying e-
administration building on the available technological foundation, as well as to 
increase e-administration service efficiency and to establish pan-European operation. 
The success of online administration depends on the extent of that citizens are able 
and wish to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by electronic 
administration. Thus, it is especially important that a user-friendly service provision 
portfolio be created: one which takes client needs into account and goes beyond 
traditional administration. In order to integrate users, following unified strategic 
principles, as of 2007 Member States have set a higher online sophistication level of 
operation, which constitutes a fundamentally new approach to public administration 
operation with a view to the fact that, in accordance with this approach, services have 
to be provided to citizens in a pro-active fashion. The foundation and success 
measurement of the level of development of implementation are therefore familiarity 
with the citizen needs, and, from the point of view of the players of public 
administration, the application of a pro-active service provision approach based on ICT 
tools. Even though the application of technological developments and online services 
do significantly improve the quality of service provided to clients, they solely do not 
ensure client-oriented service and do not mean improvement in efficiency. In the case 
of client-oriented service, the realization of certain services often require the 
cooperation of several institutions. It is often the case in Albania - even in places 
where client relations are adequately digitalized - that behind the modern, digitalized 
front office systems there are outdated, institutional systems that do not cooperate 
with one another. A solution to such problems is to update service processes, to 
create the interoperability of back-office systems, and to standardize related data and 
technology. The system of shared, integrated services, situated above sectored 
subsystems, which covers the entire public administration domain and aims to 
increase efficiency on a national level. The unified infrastructure of customer services, 
human resource management, finances and electronic administration and document 
management, as well as the further development of e-administration services based 
on a unified framework, are not just crucial in terms of aspects of national efficiency, 
but are also basic requirements of the establishment of the pan-European level of 
service. 
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2.2 e-Public Administration Reform’ stages in Albania 
 
European and Euro-Atlantic integration, along with rapid and sustainable growth, 
remain overarching goals for Albania. That is why a main reason for the extra building 
and adjustment of the Albanian state administration arises from the need to join the 
European Union. If we want to be adopted into this community as a broad system, 
then it is absolutely clear that we have to understand and adjust our administration 
systems to the size that they would be able to be included into the broader 
administration integration’s. We do not have any other choices at this point while the 
inappropriate results and the under adaptability on this field mean also the 
incapability to join to this community. We should conclude that also Albania is forced 
to execute the modernization of its state administration with the opening into that 
world and with the inclusion to the west European integration, with the economic 
globalization and with the growth of the international competition and with the 
internal pressure elements as the demands for more qualitative services. Successful 
structural and functional restructuring of Albanian state administration would directly 
contribute to its greater effectiveness that is also the main fundamental goal of 
Albanian process of the modernization of the state administration.  
 Albania is trying on the IT infrastructure required to achieve this end. 
Information and communication technologies (ICT) are necessary, but not the only 
sufficient condition. ICT can play a key role in facilitating access to the public 
information and the delivery of public services. The potential of ICT is not only to 
improve the efficiency of public administrations’ internal operations but also to 
support the interaction between public administration, citizens and business sector. 
Electronic government will bring administration closer to citizens and businesses. 
Other important elements of e-government are electronic democracy, electronic 
accessibility of government information and improvement of informational 
management. 
 In April 2008, Albania was officially invited to join NATO and became a full-
fledged member in April 2009. The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), 
signed with the EU in June 2006, was ratified by all EU member states in January 2009 
and entered into force in April 2009. 
 ICTs for Government & e-government have a direct impact in the future of the 
country. They will help local and central governance, by bringing more transparency in 
governance, responsibility and effectiveness. Moreover, they will support the 
participation of citizens to increase their role in decision making processes. The 
increase of governance level and the improvement of governmental services will 
create a strong foundation for a good cooperation among governmental institutions 
and between governmental institutions and citizens. 
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 In September 2006, the Government of Albania entered into a two-year 
$13.85 million Partnership with the United States Millennium Challenge Corporation 
and USAID. Millennium Challenge Albania Threshold Agreement project, administered 
by USAID, aims to reduce corruption and improve performance in three key areas of 
public administration: 
 
1. Tax administration  
2. Public procurement 
3. Business registration.  
 The project addresses the lack of transparency and public scrutiny that have 
defined many economic activities in Albania in a two-pronged approach that involves 
process reform through legislative enhancements and IT solutions, as well as country-
wide public education campaign, and promotion of civil society watchdog activities. 
Progress in the following three components of the Millennium Challenge project will 
advance Albania in achieving the Millennium Development Goals and help the country 
to qualify for Millennium Challenge Corporation compact status.  
1. Tax Administration: Pilot reform efforts in the Tirana Tax Office and Large 
Taxpayers Office are aimed at upgrading tax collection and customer service, 
improving transparency and effectiveness, and better informing taxpayers of their 
rights and responsibilities.  
 The Millennium Challenge Albania project is working with GoA counterparts to 
enhance and reform the tax administration both in terms of its organizational 
structure and the way it operates. The cornerstone of this effort is the drafting of a 
new law on tax procedures. This draft law entails a substantial overhaul of the existing 
legislation to lead the way to a significant reorganization of the tax administration to 
promote efficiency, transparency and service to taxpayers, and fight corruption. The 
ultimate goal of the reform is to establish through rules and procedures the 
fundamental mission of the General Department of Taxation (GDT): to collect the 
appropriate amount of tax from all taxpayers.  
 On June 25, 2008 the tax procedure law, drafted with support from the 
Project, entered into force. It was approved by the Parliament on May 19, 2008. This 
process was preceded by an extensive precedent-setting public consultation period, 
which entailed four roundtables with more then 180 representatives of Albania’s 
taxpayers, lawyers and accountants, organized by the Ministry of Finance with support 
for the Millennium Challenge Albania project during September and October 2008. 
The law addresses several concerns raised during these extensive discussions with the 
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business community and interest groups, as well incorporates recommendations by 
the IMF and EU harmonization experts.  
Some of the major reform initiatives included in the tax procedure law include:  
1. A clear and precise functional structure for the General Department of Taxation to 
allow for robust work processes, evaluations and reviews. The reorganization 
steers away from the current tax police and investigative model toward one based 
on taxpayer service and self-assessment.  
2. A chapter on Taxpayer Rights, as part of a major emphasis on taxpayer services in 
guaranteeing procedural protections, tax publications, and tax education.  
3. The requirement for GDT to establish an integrated and interconnected tax 
database system that records liabilities, broken down by tax, interest and 
penalties, as well as by payments, on a taxpayer by taxpayer basis. The law 
stipulates that the individual taxpayer ledger data must be accessible to the 
taxpayer (in a manner similar to the way a person can access his own bank 
account), while at the same time it specifies safeguards for data accuracy, 
confidentiality, and database security.  
4. Provision of e-tax services, including e-filing and checking tax account statement 
online, for all taxpayers, as part of e-government practices that reduce taxpayer 
burden, minimize contact with tax officials and help combat corruption. 
5. Elimination of tax police and moving of many investigative activities to modern 
audit and collection practices, a fundamental shift in the current way of doing 
business, away from heavy reliance on tax police and investigative tactics, into a 
professional services administration.  
6. The use of risk assessment analysis for taxpayer auditing, which is the most 
generally accepted practice both in the European Union and internationally, a vast 
improvement over current legal practices whereby GDT audits 100% of returns, a 
method that is both inefficient and unlikely to prevent corruption. 
7. Introduction of modern collection procedures to deter tax avoidance and reduce 
the number of tax disputes. Under this law, the tax administration will have the 
ability to collect the necessary information required to determine whether taxes 
are owed, apply sophisticated computer programs to detect likely areas of non-
compliance, and employ new enforced collection techniques for those who avoid 
or evade their obligations 
8. A fundamental reform of the current appeal system to reduce the cost of 
resolving tax disputes and enhance taxpayer protections. As a result of these 
reforms, there will be only two levels of appeal on assessments: one at the 
administrative level, and the second at the judicial level. 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
238 
 
9. An overhaul of the penalty regime consolidating all penalties now found in various 
substantive laws (other than the customs law) and completely revising the existing 
penalty regime to bring Albania in line with best practices in the EU and OECD 
countries. 
The new system installed initially as a pilot in the Large Taxpayer Office and 
the Tirana Tax Office, provides: 
- Enhancements of the GDT web site offering services such as download of forms 
and instructions for taxpayer services; 
- e-Filing option for the Value Added Tax returns, the individual income tax, the 
estimated monthly profit tax and the annual returns, as well as social security and 
health contributions; 
- e-Payment of taxes; 
- A case tracking system to allow GDT action management e-tax serves and 
empowers taxpayers as it allows them to file and pay taxes online, avoiding on a 
large scale the direct contact with tax officials. The system provides taxpayers 
with new tools to find out their tax status, and what their rights are as regards 
taxes. The expected results include streamlined record-keeping and operations, as 
well as increased taxpayers' awareness and compliance.  
2. Public Procurement: Activities under this component strive to improve the 
capacity of the Public Procurement Agency to conduct transparent public 
procurements, promote active private sector engagement in the process, and 
increase awareness of the new public procurement legal framework.  
The regulatory reform in public procurement was initiated with the introduction 
of the new public procurement law no. 9643, dated 20.11.2006, which entered in 
effect in January 1, 2007, and of the new Public Procurements Rules approved by the 
Council of Minister's decision no.1, dated 10.01.2007. With the amendment of the law 
in December 2007, the Parliament approved the introduction of framework contracts, 
as an international best practice to be used for a more efficient purchase of electric 
power in Albania. With the support of the Millennium Challenge Albania project, PPA 
has developed the standard tender documents to be used by all contracting 
authorities. The project also has supported PPA in developing a set of regulations to 
enable the application of the e-procurement system for the first time in Albania, laid 
out in the Council of Ministers’ Decision no. 659, dated 3.10.2007, 
The e-procurement system, built by the Millennium Challenge Albania project, is 
modeled on EU guidelines, standards, and functional requirements, bringing Albania 
firmly in line with the goals of the EU 2010 e-Government action, and even placing it 
ahead of some EU member states in this important area.  
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- Public procurement through the use of information technology is easier, as 
procedures are sped up and optimized. 
- It is cheaper as it reduces costs by removing unnecessary paperwork on the part 
of both Contracting Authorities and Economic Operators, and encouraging 
competition. 
- It is more transparent as a result of increased information flow and less human 
intervention. 
- It is also more accountable given the tools to track activity and monitor 
compliance with procurement processes. 
- E-procurement, thus, results overall in a "more efficient and effective use of 
taxpayers’ money". 
The e-procurement system in Albania uses the web-based services approach by 
means of which all public procurement tender notices are uploaded into the e-
procurement website, and economic operators are able to download tender 
documents free of charge as soon as they are posted, as well as submit their bids 
online. As part of the e-government services put in place with the support of the 
Millennium Challenge Albania project, e-procurement is closely interconnected with 
the National Registration Center and the General Directorate of Taxation IT systems. 
3. Business Registration: The project is committed to assisting the Government of 
Albania to implement the new Law on the National Registration Center (NRC) and 
new business registration procedures which significantly reduce entrepreneurs' 
time and costs in registering a new business or requiring other business 
registration services, as well as provide public access to an Electronic Commercial 
Registry. 
One of the major regulatory reform initiatives undertaken by the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Energy (METE), with the support of the Millennium Challenge 
Albania project, is the reform of business registration procedures, which reduces to 
one day the time required to register new businesses, and combines all registration 
steps-including tax registration-in a single procedure, thus combating corruption and 
increasing efficiency. The new Law on business registration reform was approved by 
the Government on 14 March 2007, and was enacted by the Parliament on 3 May 
2007. In an effort to further facilitate access to business registration services for the 
business community, in January 2008, the Council of Ministers approved an 
amendment of the law to enable chambers of commerce to set up NRC service 
windows. The parliamentary vote on this amendment is expected soon. This business 
registration reform is a significant step in the overall Government program of 
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improving the business climate in Albania. It provides several important benefits for 
Albanian businesses as well as foreign investors:  
- Simpler, faster and less costly process of registering a new business 
- Simultaneous registration with tax authorities (national and municipal), social and 
     health insurance, as well as the labor inspectorate, using a single application 
and registration procedure.  
- Application windows located throughout Albania, making it possible for a business 
to do all registration procedures locally. 
- Free public access to Commercial Registry information via internet.  
 
The one-stop-shop process for business registration established by the Millennium 
Challenge Albania project through the opening of the National Registration Center 
(NRC) is based on IT solutions that ensure: 
- an electronic registration process,  
- public access to the Electronic Commercial Registry, as well as  
- interconnectivity with the e-tax system for tax registration, as well as the e-
procurement system to verify the registration status of economic operators. 
                            
E-registration - faster, easier and less costly business registration procedures in 
Albania 
 
 The e-register system offers all the necessary security safeguards and 
protection of information, including complete audit trails. It allows businesses to start 
the registration processes online, and provides the inquirer (who may be local 
businesses, foreign investors, government agencies and the general public) with the 
opportunity to search the Commercial Registry for all publicly-available information 
about any registered business 
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 The second stage of the MCC Albania Threshold Program is a two-year, $15.7 
million agreement between Albania and the United States, funded by the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC), and administered by USAID, which aims to strengthen 
the rule of law, reduce corruption and increase public oversight, thereby improving 
the business environment in Albania through IT solutions and technical assistance. The 
MCC Albania Threshold Program II builds upon the successes achieved during stage I 
of the MCC Albania Threshold Program, which included the establishment of the 
National Registration Center and the Procurement Advocate office, the enactment of 
the new tax procedure law, as well as the introduction of three major e-government 
services: e-registration,  e-procurement, and e-filing.  
The MCC Albania Threshold Program II supports reforms in the following main 
areas:  
1. Administrative Court System: The program works to increase judicial capacity, 
reduce opportunities for corruption, and build investor confidence by 
supporting the planned administrative court system. Key initiatives include 
providing technical assistance, training, IT systems, and equipment to establish 
a Tirana-based administrative court.  
2. Tax Administration Reform: The program continues work to modernize tax 
administration based on the 2008 tax procedures law. Key initiatives include 
expanding e-filing and taxpayer services, establishing a Criminal Investigative 
Unit, strengthening the tax audit function, and establishing the Taxpayers 
Consultative Council.  
3. Business Licensing Reform: Following the successful model of the National 
Registration Center, the program supported the establishment and helps the 
operation of a ‘one stop shop’ National Licensing Center that allows businesses 
to submit and track standardized business license applications electronically.  
4. Territorial Planning: Based on the new Law on Territorial Planning approved in 
April 2009, the program works to establish a National Planning Registry that 
will streamline the building planning process and reduce opportunities for 
corruption in building planning and permitting process.  
5. Private Sector and Civil Society Engagement: The program supports nonprofit 
and business associations to contribute in achieving MCCA2 goals by assisting 
with policy changes, monitoring program-supported reforms, and advocating 
for improved anti-corruption measures. Efforts continue to educate businesses 
and the public regarding opportunities and services developed with the 
program’s support.  
6. Anti-corruption Investigative Efforts:  The program helps establish Special 
Investigative Units in prosecutor’s offices in districts outside Tirana to 
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strengthen efforts to combat corruption-related and economic crimes. This 
program component is implemented with assistance by the U.S. Department of 
Justice.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Starting in 2002, UNDP Albania has offered a considerable assistance to the 
Government of Albania in implementing different ICT projects and preparing the 
necessary policy framework for supporting and sustaining the ICT projects. The 
Government constantly has expressed its commitment in partnering for these projects 
and there has been a constant communication and cooperation between the project 
and the government. Currently, the Government Electronic Network (GovNet) and E-
Services Projects have been completed. GovNet provided a high-speed infrastructure 
for exchange of information and data among the institutions of central government, 
whereas the e-services Project assisted the Government of Albania in surveying, 
designing and 
deploying a set of pilot ICT-driven information services and offered capacity building 
for IT staff of line-ministries. 
 On the other side, the network established and other services applied on top 
of it require from the Government of Albania a long-term strategy in order to sustain 
it. The Government should designate adequate financial and human resources in 
order to address the issues formulated in the National ICT Strategy and more 
specifically the ones related to network maintenance and operation. Ensuring funding 
and controlling disbursement of financial resources and ensuring a correct awareness 
of the costs associated to ICT services will be an immediate need the Government has 
to face. In addition, the Government has to appoint a special ICT structure that will 
direct, manage, coordinate and supervise all the ICT projects within the Government 
and at the same time will have a central role in designing and planning for the 
network. Specialized IT experts will have to be hired and motivated for working 
directly in maintaining and operating the network, the e-mail system and many other 
applications that are and will be implemented on top of the network. The IT staff that 
has been trained during the implementation of the project should remain at work and 
given more responsibilities in running the network. 
 Also, the Government needs to adapt and utilize a generally applicable and 
accepted standard for good IT security and control practices to support management's 
needs in determining and monitoring the appropriate level of IT security and control 
for their organizations, otherwise serious risks will soon appear from improper use of 
IT equipments and systems. These standards will ensure that users are making 
effective use of technology and are aware of the risks and responsibilities involved in 
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using the ICT tools. Government has to recognize that the issues exist and need to be 
addressed 
 There are several constraints that limit the use of ICT in public sector reforms 
in Albania: lack of political will to change, lack of financial resources, lack of 
government officials’ ICT skills, lack of buy-in from the general public, and lack of 
support from the private sector. To overcome these difficulties, it would be very 
important to learn from the experiences of other countries in the region.  
Albania, then, has much work to do to modernize its public administration. At 
the same time, there are unequivocal examples demonstrating that such a 
modernization is not just feasible, but can be carried out effectively where there is 
sufficient determination on the part of those involved immediately. 
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Power of the Commission and the Supranationalist Dimension of the Eu 
 
Abstract 
In this work, the power and independence of the Commission are investigated from 
three perspectives which are the reflection of the supranational dimension of the EU. 
The first is theoretical perspective that includes two main approaches. The second is 
the historical (and functional) perspective, and the impact of the member states on 
the Commission’s officials is the third perspective.  
By looking from the theoretical perspective, especially through 
intergovernmentalist approach, it can be seen that, the power of the European 
Commission has and must have an insignificant role. The member states know that, if 
they want to obtain integration of the European Union in all fields they will need a 
powerful, independent and supranational Commission. However, the historical and 
functional perspective demonstrates that, due to their national interests, the member 
states are not eager to strengthen the Commission. From the third perspective all the 
indications show that member states’ interests are more important than the European 
Union’s interests according to commissioners. 
Key words: European Commission, Supranationalism, EU, independent institution 
 
1. Introduction 
The structure of the European Union (EU) resembles a familiar national system having 
a council, a parliament and a court of justice, which are analogues to a national 
government’s executive, legislative and judiciary systems. On the other hand, the 
other institution of the EU is dissimilar to a national governmental system like the 
European Commission. The Commission epitomizes supranationalism that lies at the 
centre of the EU system which is synonymous with the EU itself.1 In this context, one 
of the most important debates in European Union is about the effectiveness of the 
European Commission. In addition, it is also related to the competition of main 
integration theories: intergovernmentalism and supranationalism (neofunctionalism).  
                                                 
1 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction To European Union, 2nd Ed., London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 205.  
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The idea whether the European Commission is powerful as an independent 
agent from the member states or not, can be examined from three different 
perspectives.  
The first is a theoretical perspective, which holds that perceptions of two 
theories differ from each other about the relative position of the Commission. One is 
Intergovernmentalists that perceive the Commission as relatively insignificant and the 
other that contradicts to the former one, is the supranationalists, which maintain that 
the Commission has an independent impact on policy outcomes.2 
The second perspective is the historical and functional perspective and 
according to this perspective, the European Commission is an interesting institution 
due to its exceptional features compared to the other international organisations. This 
exceptionality was obvious that the Treaty of European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) had mentioned the Commission (the High Authority) as an independent and 
supranational decision-making organ. However, the High Authority model has expired 
on account of both some problems which had been occurred in the beginning of the 
ECSC Treaty and the failure of the European Defence Corporation EDC in 1954. The 
High Authority, which had blatantly supranational elements found within it3, was 
excluded from the EEC (European Economic Community) and European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) Treaties. Its name and functions both were changed.  
Nevertheless, in the period of European integration, the Commission has led 
very important advances and in the last decade, member states have given more 
importance to the Commission. 
The impact of the member states on the Commission’s officials is the third 
perspective. In respect of the attitudes of the Commissioners, policy-making 
mechanism and the independent structure of the Commission can be affected by the 
member states. 
This work examines the influence of the relations between the member states 
and the Commission to the Commission’s position. From the aforementioned three 
perspectives, it is to be investigated whether the Commission is only as powerful as 
the member states allow it to be. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Morten Egeberg, “The European Commission” in European Union Politics, (Edited by Michele 
Cini), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 131-147. 
3 Michelle Cini, The European Commission: Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU 
Administration, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 36. 
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1. Theoretical Perspective 
Theoretical infrastructure of the European integration has two different approaches 
that the supranationalists want to achieve a completely integrated Europe in all fields 
such as a state (a new federal state), and on the other side, intergovernmentalists 
who are defending the national states’ interests and they believe that, national 
governments are the real driving forces in the European project.    
Diez and Wiener suggest that the development of integration theory can be 
divided into three phases.4 These three phases identified as explanatory, analytical 
and constructive, respectively, which are meant to identify the emergence, 
development and, from time to time, dominance of particular theoretical tendencies. 
By the first phase roughly lasting from the signing of the Treaty of Rome until 
the early 1980s, the European integration theory5 begins proper. In this period two 
theoretical approaches came to dominate the debate. Both contending theories based 
on rational actor assumptions, while locating the push and pull for the integration 
process on different levels. On one side, neofunctionalists6 with their broad definition 
of integration7, and on the opposite side intergovernmentalists who explained 
supranational institution-building as the result of rational decision-making within a 
historical context that was conductive to strong and clearly defined interests of the 
nation state governments involved.8 
                                                 
4 Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Ed.), ‘Introducing the Mosaic of Integration’, European 
Integration Theory, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 1-21.  
5 Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000. 
6 Neofunctionalists built on functionalism and kept part of its normative agenda, but they also 
introduced both a stronger emphasis on actors with an interest in, and therefore promoting 
further integration –primarily the Commission- and an explicit social scientific interest in 
creating a general theory of regional  integration that was applicable beyond the singular case 
of Europe. See Ernst B. Haas, “International Integration: The European and the Universal 
Process”, International Organization, 15(3), 1961, pp. 366-392; The Uniting of Europe: Political, 
Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967. 
7 “Neofunctionalists explained the move away from the anarchic state system and towards 
supranational institution-building by depicting particular societal and market patterns as 
pushing for elite behaviour towards common market building”. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez 
(Eds.), ‘Introducing the Mosaic of Integration’, European Integration Theory, p. 8. 
8  Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Eds.), ‘Introducing the Mosaic of Integration’, European 
Integration Theory, p. 8.  
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In the second phase, comparative and institutionalist approaches came to the 
foreground of integration theory, following questions of what kind of polity the EU 
really is and how it operates.9  
In the third phase the influence of the International Relations Theory has 
enlarged on the integration theory. International Relations Theory was characterised 
by the rise of a variety of critical and constructivist approaches. This phase focused on 
substantial questions about constructing and limiting European integration.10 
 
Phase When? Main Themes 
Explaining integration 1960s 
onwards 
How can integration outcomes be 
explained? 
Why does European integration take 
place? 
 
Analysing governance 
 
1980s 
onwards 
What kind of political system is the EU? 
How can the political processes within the 
EU be described? 
How does the EU’s regulatory policy 
work? 
 
Constructing the EU 
 
1990s 
onwards 
How and with which social and political 
consequences does integration develop? 
How are integration and governance 
conceptualized? How should they be? 
                                                 
9 A key process analysed was the “Europeanization” of governance rules, institutions, and 
practices across the EU. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Eds.), ‘Introducing the Mosaic of 
Integration’, European Integration Theory, p. 9; M. G. Cowles, J. Caporaso, T. Risse (Eds.), 
Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2001. 
10 It is in answering these questions that the critical and constructivist approaches in 
International Relations Theory were taken up. See Emmanuel Adler, “Constructivism in 
International Relations” in W. Carlianes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons (Eds.), Handbook of 
International Relations, London: Sage, 2002; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International 
Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik 
Jorgensen and Antje Wiener, “The Social Construction of Europe”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1999, pp. 528-544.   
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Since the beginning of the European integration, the efforts for formulating a 
theoretical account have occurred. For instance, Ernst B. Haas explained the initiation 
of the six West European countries, a new form of supranational co-operation after 
the Second World War by neo-functionalist theory.11 Neo-functionalism with the core 
concept of spill over was mainly concerned with the process of integration more than 
end-goals, that is, how an integrated Europe would look.12  
On a number of occasions, the supranationalists argue that the Commission 
has even had a profound effect on the outcomes of “history-shaping” and frame-
setting IGCs (Inter Governmental Conferences) and European Council meetings. In 
addition, the institutionalists claim that treaty-based frameworks, which are the main 
focus of intergovernmentalists, need to be translated into practical politics through 
day-to-day policy making, and the Commission is one of the key actors, when it comes 
to this sort of crucial follow-up work.13 
After the mid-1960s, in the face of supranationalists, intergovernmentalism 
has been situated at the heart of the European integration theory.14 
Intergovernmentalism is drawn from classical theories of International Relations, most 
notably from realism or neo-realism. It sees and analyses integration as a zero-sum 
game and as an interstate bargaining. 
By the 1990s, the debate on the transfer of sovereignty from the member 
states to Brussels replaced by a new divide between rationalist approaches, such as 
liberal intergovernmentalism and rational choice institutionalism, and constructivist 
approaches, which emphasized the potentially transformative potential of the EU.15 
Liberal intergovernmentalism -whose framework of analysis includes domestic and 
international interactions16- is based on assumptions drawn from the rational actor 
                                                 
11 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957. 
12 Mark A. Pollack, “Theorizing The European Union: International Organization, Domestic 
Polity, or Experiment in New Governance?”, Annual Review of Political Science, 8, 2005, pp. 
357-398; Carsten Strøby Jensen, “Neo-functionalism”, in European Union Politics, (Edited by 
Michele Cini), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 80-92. 
13 Morten Egeberg, “The European Commission” in European Union Politics, p. 136. 
14 Michele Cini, “Intergovernmentalism”, in European Union Politics, (Edited by Michele Cini), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 93. 
15 Mark A. Pollack, “Theorizing The European Union: International Organization, Domestic 
Polity, or Experiment in New Governance?”, Annual Review of Political Science. 
16 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, 
International Organization, 42(3), 1988, pp. 427-460; Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and 
Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 31(4), 1993, pp. 473-524; “Liberal Intergovernmentalism and 
Integration: A Rejoinder”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 33(4), 1995, pp. 611-628; The 
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model, that it is influenced by the supposition that states behave rationally. This 
“means that the actions of states are assumed to be based on utilizing what are 
judged to be the most appropriate means of achieving their goals”.17 
According to the intergovernmentalists (especially the liberal 
intergovernmentalists), the Commission has an important role to play in first pillar 
policies. Nevertheless, the pretension of liberal intergovernmentalists is the authority 
it exercises as an agenda setter and overseer of implementation at the national level is 
merely a derived and delegated authority.18 “The Commission may facilitate 
intergovernmental co-operation, but it has no real power basis of its own, as the 
Commission’s powers are decided upon and framed by the member states within 
treaty negotiations”.19 
2. The Evolution of the Commission and its Functions 
The first European Commission was set up in 1952 with the creation of the ECSC; 
under the name of High Authority which was a new type of institution responsible for 
both legislation and execution. Although these were not very fertile in this short 
period of ECSC and High Authority but it was the basis of the Commission. It 
resembled the French administration in terms of its structure and technocratic 
character20, and by the establishment of the European Commission in 1958, the 
functions of High Authority, the executive organ of the ECSC, was changed.  
Walter Hallstein was the first president of the Commission (1958-1967) who 
mainly shaped the existence of the Commission and fulfilled the setting up of 
Commission departments and the fortification of staff quickly, in order that policy-
making could get under way.21 In the period of 1958-62 the Commission was more 
concerned with promoting the Community concept than with seeking an 
unambiguous institutional identity for itself. “It did assert the political nature of its 
own role and it did try to increase its powers, but it did so within the basis institutional 
                                                                                                                                  
Choise for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, London: UCL 
Press, 1999; Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration. 
17 Neill Nugent, “The leadership capacity of the European Commission”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 2(4), 1995, p. 609. 
18 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choise for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht. 
19 Morten Egeberg, “The European Commission” in European Union Politics, p. 135. 
20 S. Mazey, “Conception and Evolution aof the High Authority’s Administrative Services (1952-
1956): From Supranational Principles to Multinational Practices” in E. Volkmar Heyen (Ed.), 
Yearbook of European Administrative History 4, Early European Community Administration, 
Baden Baden: Nomos, 1992, p. 43. 
21 Michelle Cini, The European Commission: Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU 
Administration, p. 37. 
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framework laid down by the treaty and failed to propose measures designed to 
change the institutional system to its own advantage”.22 Although, in the first few 
years of the Community’s existence, despite the most administrative and 
organisational problems the policy issues continued. 
After the establishment of institutional structure, the Commission has started 
to take shape by stages, in point of its functions and responsibilities. In spite of the 
changes of its functions in the process (from 1958 up to now), the Commission has 
always had an important role in the EU.  
As an important milestone in the Commission’s shaping process, the 
Luxembourg Compromise of January 1966 brought to an end the so-called "empty 
chair" crisis that France having refused to take its seat in the Council since July 1965. 
This appeared to set limits on both, the integration process and the independence and 
initiative of the Commission. Even if the rhetoric was retained, it introduced a period 
of disenchantment with supranationalism in practice.23  
It is described precisely in the Treaty of the European Union and reinforced by 
the Commission’s house rules that the European Commission has a constitutional 
obligation to set the legislative agenda in the European Union (Article 211, Treaty of 
the European Union). The Commission, unique among international institutions and 
unparalleled among executives in national democracies, has exclusive formal 
competence to initiate and draft EU legislation.24 
As an organ of the EU, the Commission has several functions and 
responsibilities. It can be said that the Commission is a think-tank and policy 
maker/initiator, manager and administrator, defender of the legal order, consensus-
builder, mediator and broker, mobiliser, guardian of the legal framework.25 In another 
words, the Commission proposing and shaping legislation, administering and 
implementing Community policy, managing the budget, conducting external relations, 
policing Community law and pointing the way forward.26 With regard to the 
                                                 
22 Christoph Sasse, “The Internal Functions of the Commission”, in Sasse, C., Poullet, E., 
Coombes, D. and Deprez, G. (eds), Decision Making in the European Community, London: 
Praeger, 1977, p. 185. 
23 Geoffrey Edwards and David Spence, “The Commission in Perspective”, in Edwards, Geoffrey 
and Spence, David (Ed.), The European Commission, London: Cartermill, 1997, p. 1. 
24 Liesbet Hooghe, “Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International 
Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission”, International Organization, 59(Fall), 
2005, p. 863. 
25 Michelle Cini, The European Commission: Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU 
Administration; Neill Nugent, The European Commission, London: Palgrave, 2001. 
26 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction To European Union, p. 223. 
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interaction between the member states and the Commission, the following three 
functions are more important than the others.  
i. Executer: The Commission is the EU’s executive body in spite of it has 
only limited authority and ability to execute EU policies. This authority can be divided 
into two parts that are, some of these authorities are given to the Commission by the 
Council, and some of them are its own authorities. At the beginning it was a discussion 
matter that the Council would give an authority to the Commission according to which 
criteria, but the article 145 of Treaty of the EC (Article 202 Treaty of the European 
Union) put this entitlement in a rule. In order to this article the implementation 
authority of the rules that are in the Councils’ decisions will be given to the 
Commission as a principle.  
The Council took the decision (date 13 July 1987 and number 87/373) 
unanimously, concerning the Commission’s executive authority, which is called 
“Commitology” in the EU literature. The European Parliament declared its desire to be 
more active in the implementation process of the decisions which taken by co-
decision procedure, when the Maastricht Treaty had come into force. Thereupon, the 
Commission prepared a proposal in accordance with the modus vivendi which was 
signed on 20th December 1994 between the Council-the Commission and the 
European Parliament (OJ C 102, 4.4.1996). Consequently the decision dated 13th July 
1987 was abolished and the new Commitology decision was taken on 28th June 1999 
by number 99/468 (OJ, L 184, 17.7.1999).  
Commitology is an important point that exhibits how an authority is divided 
into three. “When performing its executive functions, the Commission is controlled by 
the member states through ‘comitology’”.27 In other words, the member states do not 
want to give this authority to the Commission itself.28  
ii. Initiator: In accordance with the article 211 of Treaty of the EU, the 
Commission prepares the regulations of the Council and the Parliament. This authority 
is quite important that some writers call the Commission as “engine” in this 
framework (e.g. Burban 1997). It decides when regulation is necessary and how it 
should be devised. The Council of Ministers, which represents national governments, 
and the European Parliament, which is directly elected, may request the Commission 
to draft an initiative, but the Commission can, and sometimes does, refuse. The Treaty 
                                                 
27 Hussein Kassim, “The Institutions of the European Union”, in Colin Hay and Anand Menon, 
European Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 192. 
28 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction To European Union, p. 227-229. 
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also instructs the Commission to serve the European interest. It also requires the 
Commission to be independent from any national government.29 
iii. Guardian: The Commission is responsible for defending the European 
legal order, ensuring that member states and in some cases, companies and 
individuals, comply with the European rule of law.30 This means that under article 226 
of Treaty of the EU, the Commission may bring a member state before the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) for alleged non-fulfilment of treaty obligations. Member states 
constantly fail to live up to their commitments, and the Commission betweenwhiles 
institutes judicial proceedings.31 Owing to this function of the Commission, some 
scholars call it a “watchdog (chien de garde)” (e.g. Prof. Pierre Henri Teitgen).32 
This obligation of the Commission includes two dimensions. The Commission 
has to detect any kind of implementation deficit as a supervisor at first, and secondly 
it has to solve this deficit which essentially involves an enforcement mechanism.33 
The other milestone of the Commission’s evolution is the White Paper 
(reforming the Commission) which spells out the approach the Commission is taking 
as it operationalises its reform ambitions and also sets out the key themes that will 
structure the reform process.34 According to the White Paper the Commission has to 
be independent, accountable, efficient, transparent35 and guided by the highest 
standards of responsibility. 
In its report, the Commission declares its expectations and aims that a strong, 
independent and effective Commission is essential to the functioning of the European 
Union as a whole and its standing in the world. Substantial improvement in structures 
                                                 
29 Liesbet Hooghe, “Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International 
Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission”, International Organization, p. 863; 
Neill Nugent, “The Deepening and Widening of the European Community: Recent Evolution, 
Maastricht and Beyond”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 30(3), 1992, 311-328. 
30 Michelle Cini, The European Commission: Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU 
Administration, p. 25. 
31 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Union, p. 233. 
32 J. L. Burban, Les institutions européennes, Paris: Vuibert, 1997; Michelle Cini, The European 
Commission: Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU Administration, p. 25-28. 
33 Michelle Cini, The European Commission: Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU 
Administration, p. 26. 
34 Morten Egeberg, “The European Commission” in European Union Politics, p. 134; Neill 
Nugent, The European Commission, London: Palgrave, 2001, p. 58-60; Hussein Kassim and 
Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos,  “The European Commission and the future of Europe”, Journal 
of European Public Policy, 14(8), 2007, pp. 1249–1270.  
35 See: John Peterson, “Playing the Transparency Game: Consultation and Policy-Making in the 
European Commission”, Public Administration, 73(Autumn), 1995, pp. 473-492. 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
253 
 
and in systems is important for fulfilling the tasks established by the Treaties requires. 
The Commission’s effectiveness is inhibited now by working practices, conventions 
and obligations that have accumulated over decades. “Administrative reform will help 
the Commission to fulfil its institutional role as motor of European integration. It is 
thus a political project of central importance for the European Union”.36 
As is seen at times and in different kinds of proposals, drafts or reform 
projects, the Commission wants to be independent and powerful for working ease, yet 
the member states always share out the authorities of the Commission with the other 
institutions as much as possible, albeit they show themselves such as willing for 
delegation of authority. If they want to obtain integration of the European Union in all 
fields the member states will need a powerful, independent and supranational 
Commission. Due to their national interests, they do not enable to strengthen the 
Commission.  
3. The Relationship between the Officials and the Member States 
 
By looking at the attitudes of commissioners/officials, the impact of the member 
states and the Commission can be understood, whether they decide neutrally during 
the preparation of proposals or they are under pressure and affected by the member 
states.  There are some important studies and surveys which investigate the 
behaviours of commissioners, especially during the controversial commission 
proposals, which demonstrate the strong and enduring coalitions between member 
states (national governments) and the officials of the Commission.37 Commissioners’ 
country role informs their actions more so than their duties (as a commissioner) or 
ideological affiliations.38 
The commission has been variously theorized as a supranational actor with 
decision-making processes that are insulated from the interplay of national interests 
                                                 
36 European Commission, Reforming the Commission, Consultative Document, Communication 
from Mr Kinnock in agreement with the President and Ms Schreyer, CG3 (2000) 1/17, 18 
January, Brussels: European Commission, 2000, p. 5. 
37 Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace, The Council of Ministers, 2nd Ed., London: 
Macmillan, 2006, p. 227; Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 
London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 1999, p. 474; Robert Thomson, Jovanka Boerefijn, and Frans N. 
Stokman, “Actor alignments in European Union decision Making”, European Journal of Political 
Research, 43, 2004, pp. 237-261; Vincent Wright, “The National Coordination of European 
Policy Making”, in Jeremy Richardson (Ed.), European Union: Power and Policy Making, 
London: Routledge, 1996, p.152. 
38 Morten Egeberg, “Executive Politics as Usual: Role Behaviour and Conflict Dimensions in the 
College of European Commissioners”, Journal of European Public Policy, 13(1), 2006, pp. 1-15.  
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and as an agent of national interests.39 On the other side, as noteworthy findings show 
that, the practice can be different as it is seen from some research.  
Liesbet Hooghe40 examines the supranational and intergovernmental 
dimensions of the commissioners’ positions in her work. According to one of her 
studies, the effect of national governments on the commission officials and the three 
factors (prior experience of living abroad, socialization in the workplace, and learning 
in the political system of their country of origin) may influence them. In one of her 
work she evaluates the findings consequently:  
Top commission officials are embroiled in a fierce struggle among political 
actors for control over EU authoritative resources. One would expect them to 
actively defend the power of the commission. If not, one would think that 
national governments successfully control them as agents serving national 
interests. However, variation in views among top officials is not easily 
understood in terms of principal agency. Commission officials are not simply 
supranational activists or intergovernmental agents. Rather, when they enter 
their office in the morning, they bring with them views on European 
integration that have matured as a result of experiences from various 
institutional contexts.41  
On the basis of her surveys it can be seen that the senior officials of the 
Commission are not insulated and they are aware of the fundamental issues that 
divide Europe’s parties, public and governments. As active participants in these 
debates they interpret, live and help reshape European governance day by day.42 
A recent survey demonstrates the commissioners’ attitudes during the 
decision process are important as well. Thomson’s survey is about the prime 
                                                 
39 Robert Thompson, “National Actors in International Organizations the Case of the European 
Commission”, Comparative Political Studies, 41(2), 2008, p. 187-188. 
40 Liesbet Hooghe, “Supranational Activists or Intergovernmental Agents? Explaining the 
Orientations of Senior Commission Officials toward European Integration”, Comparative 
Political Studies, 32, 1999, pp. 435-463; “Images of Europe: Orientations to European 
Integration among Senior Officials of the Commission”, British Journal of Political Science, 
29(2), 1999, pp. 345-367; The European Commission and the integration of Europe: Images of 
Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; “Several Roads Lead to 
International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European 
Commission”, International Organization, 59(Fall), 2005, pp. 861-898. 
41 Liesbet Hooghe, “Supranational Activists or Intergovernmental Agents? Explaining the 
Orientations of Senior Commission Officials toward European Integration”, Comparative 
Political Studies, p. 460-461. 
42 Liesbet Hooghe, “Images of Europe: Orientations to European Integration among Senior 
Officials of the Commission”, British Journal of Political Science. 
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responsibility of commissioners in 70 controversial commission proposals introduced 
during the Santer and Prodi Commissions. He reaches three results after the 
investigation: 
…First, the division of policy responsibilities among commissioners has a 
significant impact on the level of agreement between the commission and 
member states’ positions… Second, this finding implies that commissioners’ 
country affiliations are an important guide to their behavior. This contrasts 
with the view of commissioners as being insulated from national pressures... 
Third, decision rules in the council condition the commission’s policy positions. 
When the unanimity rule applies in the council, the commission must appeal to 
all member states because all states must prefer or be indifferent between the 
commission’s proposal and the disagreement outcome.43 
The above results indicate that, according to commissioners, member states’ 
interests are more important than the European Union’s interests. 
4. Conclusion  
 
From a theoretical perspective, two different approaches can be seen formulating the 
European integration process. Supranationalists look at the EU as idealists, which the 
popularity of this theory increases when the integration process succeeds – e.g. 
period of the ECSC, EURATOM and EEC’s establishment during the 1950s and early 
1960s. On the contrary, when the national interests differ from European goals, as it 
was from the 1960s through the early 1980s, intergovernmentalism comes into 
importance by its realist approach and since the “empty chair” crisis, 
intergovernmentalism has gained more supporters. The analysis (the level-of-analysis) 
of the intergovernmentalism is an important factor for its attractiveness in this point 
that, it analyses both national and international dimensions of the integration. 
Thus, the Commission, as a supranational organ, cannot be independent from 
member states in the issues that are based on interstate bargaining. On the other 
hand, all member states do not have the same ideas and considerations about 
European integration. The UK wants not a very strong European Union, whilst 
Germany wills a strong integration. On this point, member states might not desire a 
powerful and independent commission.  
Secondly, in the evolution of the Commission the member states have not 
allowed the Commission to have sole authority. Despite the recent progresses in the 
                                                 
43 Robert Thompson, “National Actors in International Organizations the Case of the European 
Commission”, Comparative Political Studies, p. 187-188. 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
256 
 
Lisbon Agenda (Reform Treaty), they have always shared out its authorities and rights 
to the other organs.  
From the third perspective, it can be seen that, both the member states 
always struggle for taking advantages in the Commission, particularly during the 
controversial proposals, by lobbying and the officials take decisions accordance with 
their national identities. Therefore the Commission’s neutrality and independence 
suffers.  
Finally, this essay demonstrates that, by looking from three perspectives, in 
spite of its important and independent functions, the Commission is affected by the 
member states strongly and it is only has been as powerful as the member states have 
allowed it to be, so far. 
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Abstract  
 
This article describes and analyses the phenomenon of corruption and the functioning 
of public administration in Albania, which are considered among the key challenges in 
the process of European integration. Albania has made significant progress to adapt 
its legislation to EU standards in the field of anti-corruption but the enforcement of 
this legislation and the strengthening of rule of law still remain big challenges.  
There are some noteworthy positive steps taken by the Albanian government 
during the last two years, such as the reform in the procedures of admissions to the 
public universities, the new procedure on e-procurement, the decentralised 
procedure for the registration of new business entities and efforts to reduce fiscal 
evasion. 
However, all the Albanian governments, including the current one, have failed 
to implement civil service law. The established Department of Public Administration 
and the Civil Service Commission have been constantly under the pressure and 
influence of the executive.   
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I. Preconditions for European Integration and the Rule of Law  
 
Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain”.  All the citizens of the countries affected by high corruption are very 
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well aware of the consequences of this social plague and its negative impact in their 
lives. Whether the above definition is accurate or not, we will get far more involved in 
establishing mechanisms against corruption than in finding a more accurate definition. 
Combating corruption and strengthening public administration in Albania are 
challenges and preconditions for European integration and the rule of law. 
Albania signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU on 
12 June 2006 and became member of NATO on 4 April 2009 at the Strasbourg-
Kohl Summit. The articles of the SAA which are directly related to corruption and 
public administration are the following ones: 
i. Article 78 on reinforcement of institutions and rule of law. 
ii. Article 85 on fighting corruption both in the private and public sector in 
particular linked to non-transparent administrative procedures and against 
fiscal fraud. 
iii. Article 111 on efficient and accountable public administration, the 
implementation of transparent and impartial recruitment procedures and 
human resources management at the central and local levels. 
The combating of corruption and improving the capacities of public 
administration have been among the main recommendations made by EU 
institutions and other international actors. These issues are considered short-term 
priorities under the chapter of political requirements for democracy and the rule of 
law, as defined by the European Partnership with Albania1.  
According to all surveys conducted so far with Albanian citizens, corruption is very 
high. Allegedly, the officials who come to power through politically motivated 
appointments justify corruption practises and abuse of power with the fact that after 
the next power rotation they will not be in these positions anymore, regardless of 
their work performance. The experience after 90’s has indicated that the most 
severe punitive measure against state employees accused of corruption has been 
their job dismissal. Then they undisturbed run their private businesses, to resume 
again official positions when their political party comes to power again. As Bogdani 
and Loughlin note in their book on European integration” In Albania, corruption has 
become so systemic and routine that is almost impossible to get anything done 
without it. What is worse, corruption has become an accepted fact, a moral norm as 
something you do not have to be ashamed of”2.  
                                                 
1 Council Decision 2008/210/EC of 18 February 2008 on the principles and conditions 
contained in the European Partnership with Albania and repealing Decision 2006/54/EC, 4. 
2 Mirela Bogdani and John Loughlin, Albania and the European Union, European Integration 
and the Prospect of Accession, Dajti 2000, Tirana 2004, 58-59.  
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The public sectors most affected by corruption are the health sector, the 
judiciary, police, property agencies, licensing and registration services and utilities.  
A 2009 Survey of the Institute for Development Research and Alternatives 
(IDRA) provides a grey panorama of the public perception of corruption in Albania. 
“The general public perception that corruption among public officials is a widespread 
phenomenon has not changed over the years. It remains solidly high. However, there 
is a decrease in the number of respondents who said that corruption among public 
officials is “widespread” from 57% in 2008 to 50.5% in 2009”3. 
A Report of Transparency International published in September 2008 assesses that 
Albania has made significant improvement with regard to the fight against corruption 
compared to 2007. “In Albania, where the CPI [Corruption Perceptions Index] score 
rose from 2.9 in 2007 to 3.4 in 2008, the current government has been vocal about 
anti-corruption reforms … which appear to be showing initial results. An official task 
force created to fight corruption and economic crime has increased the number of 
officials prosecuted and sentenced for corruption, also building confidence among 
the public that corruption can be punished in Albania.”4 However, it seems that 
corruption is still high, though it is more camouflaged among the public officials.  
The Civil Service Law and Labour Code regulate the status of the public 
administration employees. The majority of the state employees still remain subject of 
the Labour Code. Starting from 2003 the Albanian government has applied some 
formal recruitment procedures based on the civil service law, but it is obvious that 
this is just to legitimate the employed staff on a politically motivated basis and 
informal relations as openly accepted by high state officials. Moreover, the 
performance appraisal system is quite sporadic, promotion or demotion on duty and 
disciplinary measures do not respect in many cases the laws and sub-legal acts. 
“Personnel are not competent and properly trained and are subject to high turnover. 
The “political bureaucrats” prevail over the model of Weberian rational 
administration”5.   
The strengthening of state institutions and the rule of law is still in a critical stage in 
Albania. Apparently, there is political will to make reforms, but in practice the law is 
not fully enforced and informal relations are still highly influential.   
 
                                                 
3 Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA), Corruption in Albania: 
Perceptions and Experience, Survey 2009, Feb 2009, 11. 
4Transparency International, the global coalition against corruption. Persistently high 
corruption in low-income countries amounts to an “ongoing humanitarian disaster”, Berlin, 23 
September 2008, 23. 
5 Mirela Bogdani and John Loughlin, Albania and the European Union, European Integration 
and the Prospect of Accession, Dajti 2000, Tirana 2004, 51 
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Ii. Combating Corruption 
 
It seems that Albania has made good progress with regard to the harmonising of its 
legislation in the field of anti-corruption with EU and international standards. So far, 
Albania has ratified: 
i. the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption with the additional Protocol6, 
ii. the Civil Law Convention on Corruption7, 
iii. the United Nations Convention against Corruption8, 
iv. the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters 
and its additional Protocol9, 
v. the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and its 
second additional Protocol10, 
vi. the International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the 
Prevention, Investigation and Repression of Customs Offences11, 
vii. the European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal 
Judgements12, 
viii. the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime13.  
Starting from 2000, Albania has established a series of state institutions responsible 
to fight corruption and strengthen the public administration. Such institutions 
include the High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets, the People’s 
Advocate, the Civil Service Commission, the General Directorate on the Prevention of 
                                                 
6 Albania ratified Criminal Law Convention on Corruption with the law no 8778, date 
26.04.2001. and its Additional Protocol with the law no 9245, date 24.06.2004.    
7Albania ratified Civil Law Convention on Corruption with the law no 8635, date 07.06.2000. 
8Albania ratified UN Convention against Corruption with the law no 9492, date 13.03.2006.  
9 Albania ratified European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters and 
its additional protocol on 04.04.2000 which entered into force on 07.05.2000 
10Albania ratified European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters and its 
additional protocol with the law no 8498, date 06.10.1999 and ratified its second protocol with 
the law no 8863, date 18.04.2002. 
11Albania ratified International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the 
Prevention, Investigation and Repression of Customs Offences on 26.03.2001 
12Albania ratified European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgements on 
31.10.2001  
13Albania ratified the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime with the law no 8646, date 20.07.2000 
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Money Laundering and the Competition Authority. There were consolidated other 
institutions which used to exist before 2000, like Department of Public 
Administration, State Supreme Audit and Internal Audit Units. However, the 
institutional capabilities are still limited and the performance of these institutions 
needs significant improvement. The Progress Report of the European Commission on 
Albania for 2008 appraised the further efforts of the Albanian government against 
corruption as compared to 2007: “Perception of corruption has improved; 
nonetheless, corruption remains a particularly serious problem in Albania …The 
government has had some success in the fight against petty corruption and bribery. A 
number of low to middle-level officials were dismissed for bribery ... However, a 
more systematic approach is needed to tackle corruption overall, particularly 
widespread bribery in the judiciary, police, health and customs sectors”14. 
The SAA establishes that the parties shall cooperate on fighting and 
preventing criminal and illegal activities, such as corruption, both in private and 
public sectors, in particular linked to non-transparent practices and fiscal fraud (Art 
85)15. The double invoicing in the private sector is a phenomenon in Albania that has 
resulted in high fiscal evasion. Despite the measures taken by the Albanian 
government during the recent years which consist in imposing referential prices for 
specific commercial goods, adopting a fiscal package which includes laws on tax 
procedures16 and laws on national taxes17 and the support provided by USAID on the 
enforcement of the amended legislation,  this has not fully prevented this 
phenomenon.   
 
a) Strategies  
 
The National Plan for the Implementation of the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (NPISAA) 2007-2012 gives in detail the measures to be taken by the 
Albanian government to fulfil the conditions of the SAA. The Ministry of Integration is 
the main institution coordinating and monitoring the National Plan. The other 
ministries and central state institutions are to report at the beginning of every month 
on the implementation of this Plan to this ministry. The NPISAA dedicates a special 
                                                 
14Commission of the European Communities, Albania 2008 Progress Report, Brussels 
05.11.2008, COM (2008) 674, 10-11.  
15Council of the European Union, 8164/06, COWEB 76, Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
between the European Communities and their member states of the one part and the Republic 
of Albania of the other part, Brussels 22.05.2006, 80  
16 Law no 9920, date 19.05.2008 ‘ On the tax procedures in the Republic of Albania” 
17 Law no 9975, date 28.07.2008 “ On the national taxes” 
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chapter to the fight against corruption and defines the legal and institutional 
framework, addressing priorities and the responsible state organs.  
The National Strategy for Development and Integration 2007-2013 (NSDI) identifies 
challenges, vision and strategic priorities and policies in the anti-corruption field and 
public administration. “In the medium term (2007-2010) 
i. the recommendations made in the 2005 evaluation report by the Council of 
Europe Group of States Against Corruption will be followed up;  
ii. legislation will be approximated with all the standards enshrined in the 
conventions against corruption of the Council of Europe and the United 
Nations; 
iii. administrative barriers will be gradually reduced; 
iv. and the power to discover and punish corruption cases will be 
strengthened”18. 
The Anti-Corruption Strategy 2008-2013 provides its focal points in the sector 
reforms such as: strengthening of the internal audit in the public sector; 
consolidation of standards in the business sector; consolidation of the civil service; 
reformation of the public procurement system; reform in the health and education 
sectors as well as the tax and customs administration; decentralization of the public 
services and fight against corruption at the local level”19.  
 
b) Institutions  
 
There are several state institution in Albania responsible to fight corruption, which 
cover different areas of responsibility.  
The Anti-Corruption Task Force20 is led by the Prime Minister and is 
composed of members of the Council of Ministers and representatives of the 
dependent institutions that cover mainly the management of public finances, control 
and audit. The main functions of the Anti-Corruption Task Force are: to determine 
strategic priorities and concrete measures to fight and prevent corruption; to ensure 
inter-institutional cooperation for the fight against corruption and the 
                                                 
18 Republic of Albania, Council of Ministers, National Strategy for Development and Integration 
2007-2013, March 2008, 13 
19 Republic of Albania, Council of Ministers, Cross-Cutting Strategy for prevention, fight on 
corruption and transparent governance 2008-2013, October 2008, 6, “The Strategy, with its 
priorities and reforms, shall be based on the general platform of a comprehensive and 
integrated approach on the fight against corruption, with a balanced combination of 
prevention, investigation, penalization and public participation”. 
20The decision no 794, date 19.12.2005 of the Council of Ministers “On the establishing of Anti-
Corruption Task Force. 
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implementation of good governance programmes. According to a decision21 of the 
Council of Ministers, the Anti-Corruption Task Force should be convened every two 
months. The Internal Administrative Control and Anti-Corruption Department22 is an 
internal control mechanism for the Council of Ministers and its subordinated 
institutions. The Department verifies and exercises audits on all the ministries, 
central institutions subordinated to the Prime Minister office and Ministries, the 
Prefect, and business companies with full or partial state capital. The General 
Secretary of Council of Ministers approves the audit plans and its consequent 
changes. The respective minister or the head of the institution under the Prime 
Minister’s office has to inform the Prime Minister on the enforcement of the 
recommended measures within 10 days of receipt of the Department’s report.  
In fact, the Department has kept a low profile and, as has been mentioned 
above, it is responsible only for the auditing of the central state institutions. There 
does not exist a special website of this Department, only a short description and the 
relevant staff of it are included in the Council of Minister’s website and no statistical 
information or reports are made public. Some toll free numbers for the citizens to 
denounce corruption made available by the Council of Ministers by the end of 2005 
and onwards (0800 0808 and 0800 0909) were initially attractive to the public, but 
there is no statistical information on the results of these operations.   
Following the approval of the new law on the state police23, the Economic 
Crime Units were transformed in Economic and Financial Crime Units established at 
the regional level. The new law provides for special investigative methods on criminal 
and financial investigations to be carried out by police officers. The Economic Crime 
Units had poor results in fighting criminal activities in this sector and suffer lack of 
capabilities as well. One of the reasons for their poor performance is the lack of 
proper qualifications and practical skills of the staff to detect economic and financial 
crimes. The police officers working in the economic and financial crimes unit need 
more specialised training. Many of them especially in the regional police directorates 
of the rural districts do not have economical or financial education backgrounds.  
                                                 
21The decision no 794, date 19.12.2005 of the Council of Ministers “On the establishing of Anti-
Corruption Task Force. 
22The Decision no 94, date 15.02.2006 on the approval of regulations for the functions and 
procedures of the Internal Administrative Control and Anti-corruption Department, The 
mission of this Department is to make the administrative investigation of the law enforcement 
and denunciations on abusive, corruptive and arbitrary practises, to identify the staff of the 
public administration which, with their action or inaction  have committed violation of laws 
and sub-legal acts, to make recommendations on certain issues, including the disciplinary 
measures against the persons responsible of these violations.  
23Law no 9749, date 04.06.2007 “On the State Police” 
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A Special Anti-Corruption and Economic Crime Unit (Joint Investigation Unit) 
reporting to the General Prosecutor’s Office became operational in September 2007 
with the assistance of the European Commission and the United States. This Unit was 
established following a Cooperation Agreement among the General Prosecutor’s 
Office, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance and the National Intelligence 
Service. Currently, the office facilities of the Unit are located in the Tirana 
Prosecution Office. It has a staff of over 30 employees, including prosecutors, judicial 
police officers, tax and customs officers and investigators. The duties and 
responsibilities of the Unit include the prevention, investigation and prosecution of 
about 50 penal offences related to corruption, abuse of power, falsification of 
documents, money laundering, fiscal evasion, etc. On 17th October 2008, the 
Government of the United States and the Government of Albania signed a second 
bilateral agreement to implement the “Stage II” Millennium Challenge Corporation 
Threshold Programme, which among others foresees the creation of Joint 
Investigation Units in six cities to investigate corruption cases24.  
The public opinion has not been happy with the fight against corruption and 
organised crime from the Prosecution Office. Taking advantage of this situation, the 
right wing majority immediately after coming into power in 2005 sought the 
dismissal of the General Prosecutor, but it did not find the consensus of the 
opposition, which claimed that the majority wanted to change the head of this 
independent institution to appoint their affiliated person. After the dismissal of the 
General Prosecutor by the Albanian Parliament in December 2007, which was made 
without the consensus of the opposition, there has been some discussion as to 
whether the head of this institution should be appointed by the legislative or the 
executive power25. Currently, the right wing government majority is not happy with 
the performance of the General Prosecutor in charge, claiming that it did not start 
criminal prosecution against any Socialist Party official accused of corruption in the 
previous government, but it is targeting only the officials of this government.  
The functioning of the Courts for Serious Crimes in the first and second 
instance, including Prosecution Office for Serious Crimes established in 2004 in 
Tirana, is a step in the right direction that has produced some results, but needs to 
be further consolidated. 
During the recent years, the reformation of the judiciary system has been 
considered an imperative, given that this is perceived as one of the most corrupt 
                                                 
24USAID in Albania, Millennium Challenge Corporation Albania Threshold Agreement, 2008, at 
http://albania.usaid.gov/gj2/41/category/MCC_Albania_Threshold_Agreement.htm.  
25According to the Constitution of Albania, the President of the Republic with the consent of 
the Assembly appoints the General Prosecutor. 
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sectors. The opposition has offered consensus for the approval of some laws, such as 
the law for the organization of the judiciary power26, the law on the organization and 
functioning of High Council of Justice 27 (HJC). After 2006, HJC came up with high 
profile measures and decisions aiming at the increase of transparency of the judicial 
system and the fight against corruption. Worth mentioning the ongoing recruitment 
procedures for 22 chief judges of the first instance and appellate courts28 in 
compliance with the new law on judicial power which provides the limitation of their 
mandate, approval of the decision on the professional and ethics appraisal system of 
the judges29, taking operational measures to make more transparent the recruitment 
procedures of judges under its jurisdiction and disciplinary measures as well. “For the 
first time in the history of judicial power, the HCJ will start to apply debate, 
transparency and justification of its deliberations through reasoned and written 
decisions for the appointment of chief judges. HCJ assess that only voting procedure 
is not sufficient for a transparent process”30. The executive has been active in this 
process through the Ministry of Justice. However, HCJ has drawn the attention of the 
public for some legislative initiatives of the government in the judicial sector without 
sufficient consultation by the HCJ. The article of the new law on the judicial power 
which grant extra competencies to the chancellors on the appointment and dismissal 
of the judicial secretary and administrative personnel was appealed by the national 
association of judges to the Constitutional Court which abrogated it as 
unconstitutional31. The co-existence and operating of the Inspectorate of the HCJ and 
the inspection teams of the Ministry of Justice has been deemed as overlapping of 
competencies and sometimes encroachment of the executive in the independent 
judicial system.  
The High Inspectorate for Declaration and Audit of Assets (HIDAA) established 
in 2003 is the ain responsible authority for the implementation of the law on the 
                                                 
26Law no 9877, date 18.02.2008 for the organization of the judicious power in the Republic of 
Albania 
27Law no 8811, date 17.05.2001 amended with the law no 9448, date 05.12.2005 on the 
organization and functioning of High Council of Justice. 
28High Council of Justice, “Vacant positions for 22 chief judges, reasoned and motivated 
decisions for the appointment of chief judges, Supreme Court accept the request of HCJ for the 
‘suspension” of GABA case”, press release, date 28.03.2008, www.kld.al.  
29Decision 193/2, date 11.05.2006 amended with the decision 207/2, date 07.02.2007 of the 
High Council of Justice. 
30High Council of Justice, press release, date 28.03.2008, www.kld.al.  
31Constitutional Court, decision no 20, date 09.07.2009 on the civil lawsuit of the national 
association of judges on abrogation of the articles 37/2 and 38/a and b of the law no 9877, 
date 18.02.2008 on the organization of judicial power. 
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declaration and audit of assets of elected persons and certain public officials32 and the 
law on prevention of conflict of interests in the exercise of public functions33. 
According to statistical information provided by HIDAA, the overall number of subjects 
(elected persons, public officials on duty and former public officials) that have 
declared their private interests is increased constantly. “On 18 June 2009, HIDAA filed 
criminal charges against 6 officials for refusal to submit the declaration of private 
interests which is half of the number of the subjects charged last year (11). This action 
was taken following the administrative measure of fine imposed on 27 subjects who 
did not fulfil their legal obligation in May 2009”34.  However, the refusal to make 
declaration form is not a serious problem in Albania rather than the tendency to 
conceal the real properties in the submitted declaration forms. The fact that a 
considerable part of business properties are not registered makes more difficult to 
detect the assets owned by the public officials. The law on declaration and audit of 
assets does not foresee the further steps to be taken by HIDAA in case the relevant 
institutions do not take the required measures against the staff that has refused to 
make the declaration of private interests. The 2009 Corruption in Albania IDRA Survey 
ranks HIDAA among the least helpful institutions on the contribution to fight 
corruption together with the religious leaders and central government35.    
Regarding the state institutions mandatory to fight corruption in Albania, 
could be considered two options; either to establish a new special state institution 
against corruption or to grant more competencies to the Department of Internal 
Administrative Control and Anti-Corruption. The latter has not produced the 
expected results in the way that is functioning currently. Also, the further 
strengthening of the Special Corruption and Economic Crime Unit under the 
Prosecution Office is an indispensable factor for the investigation and prosecution of 
financial and corruption-related crimes.  
 
 
 
                                                 
32Law no 9049, date 10.04.2003 “ On the declaration and audit of assets, financial obligations 
of elected persons and certain public officials” amended with the law no 9367, date 
07.04.2005, law no 9475, date 09.02.2006 and with  law no 9529, date 11.05.2006. 
33Law no 9367, date 07.04.2005 on the prevention of conflicts of interests in the exercise of 
public functions amended with law no 9475, date 09.02.2006 and law no 9529, date 
11.05.2006.  
34High Inspectorate for Declaration and Audit of Assets, press release, 18 June 2009, at 
www,hidaa.gov.al.         
35 Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA), Corruption in Albania, 
Perceptions and Experience, Survey 2009, Feb 2009, 13. 
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III. Improving Capabilities of Public Administration 
 
a- Background information 
 
The Labour Code36 still governs the work relations for the most part of the public 
administration in Albania. Generally, there are no written employment contracts 
provided for the public administration subject to the Labour Code and it is 
considered that the incumbents are hired permanently until there is a violation of 
this law. It makes politically-based appointments easier following every power 
rotation. Since 2000 the left wing government started to apply some formal 
procedures for the recruitment of the staff based on the civil service law. The process 
was not transparent and was overwhelmed by the lack of trust and favouring the 
candidates affiliated with the government. The right-wing government that came in 
power after 2005 took the advantage of restructuring many state institutions to 
release from duty a number of state employees allegedly affiliated to the left wing 
and hired new staff on a politically motivated basis offering them initially a 
temporary contract in order to apply the formal recruitment procedures later. The 
restructuring of state institutions that foresees removal from the civil service of the 
redundant staff as provided in article 23 of the Civil Service Law37 was the legal 
ground to change the staff in the public administration. The changes in the public 
administration after 2005 affected senior positions and often the middle level staff in 
almost all the central and local institutions. This is reflected in the Albania 2008 
Progress Report of the European Commission. “Appointments have continued along 
party lines in contravention of the Civil Service Law. The authority of the DPA 
[Department of Public Administration] requires strengthening in order to implement 
the official recruitment, job classification and promotion criteria consistently. Full 
enforcement of the Civil Service Law and adoption of the Strategy for public 
administration reform will be key to progress in this regard”38.  
The trust of the public in state institutions is still very low. It requires a strong 
political will together with deep reforms to change this opinion that has been created 
during the whole transition period in Albania for about 20 years. In general, it is 
remarked that the governments start reforms in their first year of governance and 
then get stuck for different reasons, such as corruption, lack of consensus with the 
opposition, weak public administration etc. “Albanian citizens’ trust in institutions 
                                                 
36Labour Code of Republic of Albania approved with the law no 7961, date 29.04.1995 
37Law No. 8549, date 11.11.1999 on the status of the civil servant. 
38Commission of the European Communities, Albania 2008 Progress Report, Brussels 
05.11.2008, COM(2008)674, 8 
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continues to be very low. On overage, the score of the trust for all institutions is 44.3 
points [on a 0-100 scale where 0 means “No trust at all” and 100 means “Trust a lot]. 
The Property Restitution and Compensation Agency (28.5), trade unions (33.5) and 
political parties (33.7) are the least trusted institutions in 2009”39. 
“The public administration sector will be strengthened and consolidated in 
accordance with the public service principles, on the basis of meritocracy and 
performance. The government will improve professional qualifications in this sector 
through an open and competitive process of recruitment, career advancement and 
motivation and civil servants’ professional training ... The civil servant status will 
encompass the majority of the public administration bodies40”. So far, these 
commitments provided in the NPISAA have still remained theory and are not 
enforced in practice. Also, the National Strategy for Development and Integration 
envisions the modernisation of the public administration as one of the strategic 
goals. “The public administration will be able to confront the challenges of 
developing and integrating the country, based on meritocracy and professionalism: 
there will be full compliance with the Civil Service Law”41. 
Formally, the vacant positions are continuously advertised on the website of 
the Department of Public Administration and names of some hired staff appear on 
the daily national newspapers following the recruitment procedures. However, there 
is no doubt that there is no transparent or competitive recruitment procedure in 
place, but just the granting of civil service positions to the staff already employed on 
a political basis or based on informal relations. Career advancement and motivation 
are not based on the regular performance appraisal of the staff but on other non-
transparent criteria.  
 
b- Legal Framework  
 
The current legislation pertaining public administration is at a satisfactory level, the 
main problem consists in its enforcement.  
The law on the status of civil servants42 approved at the end of 1999 laid 
down some good foundations for strengthening the public administration under its 
jurisdiction. The work relations for some categories of state employees are regulated 
                                                 
39 IDRA, Corruption in Albania, Perceptions and Experience, Survey 2009, 14 
40 Republic of Albania, Council of Ministers, The National Plan for the Implementation of 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement 2007-2012, Tirana, September 2007, 17 
41 Republic of Albania, Council of Ministers, National Strategy for Development and Integration 
2007-2013, March 2008, 13 
42The law no 8549, dated 11.11.1999 ‘On the status of the civil servant” 
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by certain laws like the ones on the state police43, diplomatic service44, local 
government authorities45, army46, state intelligence service47 etc. The law on the 
status of civil servants oversees the establishment and functioning of the Civil Service 
Commission, functioning of the Department for Public Administration, classification 
of civil servants and hiring in the civil service. The ad hoc committee in charge of 
conducting the recruitment process is composed of five members, one from the 
Department of Public Administration, two members of the relevant central or local 
institution that proposed the filling of the vacant position and two professors from 
the university or experts in this field.  The recruitment procedures for the new staff 
provides that the direct supervisor to whom that civil servant should report has the 
right to choose one of the three best-ranked candidates presented by the ad hoc 
committee. Given that it is not required that the best candidate be employed, it 
seems a shortcoming of the law on civil servants. However, if this law is correctly 
applied, then it does not represent a serious problem. 
The Code of Administrative Procedures (CAP) stipulates the right to complain 
through an informal request against an administrative act or refusal to issue this act 
initially to the direct supervisor or to the institution that has made the violation 
within thirty days of being informed about the violation48. The state institutions 
including the independent organs have not fully utilised their competence to issue 
sub-legal acts inherent to the CAP. Probably this is related to the deficiencies in its 
enforcement. Gent Ibrahimi, a legal expert shares the same concern. “It is worth 
noting that there exists a huge discrepancy between the elevated standards 
                                                 
43Law no 9749, date 04.06.2007 “On the State Police” 
44Law no 9095, date 03.07.2003 on the foreign service of the Republic of Albania 
45Law no 8652, date 31.07.2000 on the organization and functioning of local government. 
46Law no 9210, date 23.03.2004 on the status of military officer of the armed forces in the 
Republic of Albania and the law no 9171, date 22.01.2004 on the ranks and military career in 
the armed forces of Republic of Albania.  
47Law no 8391, date 28.10.1998 on the national intelligence service amended with the law no 
8479, date 29.04.1999. 
48Code of Administrative Procedures of the Republic of Albania approved with the law no 8485, 
date 12.05. 1999 provides also that citizens have the right to request the revoking, abrogating 
or amending of an administrative act through a formal request within one month of being 
informed. CAP establishes the obligation of the relevant institutions to notify the parties to a 
proceeding, to award a hearing to all parties, to be expeditious (30 working days) in decision-
making, to communicate decisions to all parties and to give reasons for administrative 
decisions. 
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introduced by the CAP and actual levels of implementation in the ground”49.  There is 
a low awareness of citizens on the rights evolved from the CAP, still it is not a regular 
practise in Albania to address to a lawyer or a legal expert on the legal remedy of a 
case.  
The law on the prevention of conflict of interest50 was amended twice during 2006. 
After the right wing government came into office at the end of 2005, the newly 
appointed directors of the state institutions were conditioned to give up from their 
owned businesses in order to obtain public functions. The new officials accepted de 
jure to transfer the ownership of their businesses to their relatives but in fact they 
continue to manage these businesses. The law on the rules of ethics in the public 
administration and the law on the prevention of conflicts of interests define the 
cases for the gifts and favours made to the public officials and the procedure of 
reporting. Also, the latter prohibits the former official in a period of two years after 
leaving office to represent any person or organization in a conflict or commercial 
relationship with the Albanian public administration for the duty that he performed 
or is in continuation of it. 
The law on the right to information over the official documents51 approved in 1999 
provides that the public authority decides whether or not to accept the request for 
information within 15 days from its submission and informs in writing the interested 
person. Following this, the state authority should provide requested information to 
the relevant persons within 40 days from the acceptance of its request. The People’s 
Advocate is the responsible authority for the implementation of this law.  
b- Institutions  
 
Department of Public Administration (DPA) is the main responsible state authority 
for developing civil service policies, organising the recruitment procedures for civil 
service, restructuring of the central state institutions and issuing general instructions 
related to performance appraisal, job description, and salary structure. The DPA was 
                                                 
49Gent Ibrahimi, Administrative Procedures in Albania;Main features and drawbacks, 
December 2005, 5, at www.sigmaweb.org/dataoecd/58/53/35936539.pdf.  
50Parliament of Albania, law no 9367, date 07.04.2005 on the prevention of conflicts of 
interests in the exercise of public functions amended with law no 9475, date 09.02.2006 and 
law no 9529, date 11.05.2006 
51 Parliament of Albania, law no 8503, date 30.06.1999 on the right to information over the 
official documents. 
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initially established within the Prime Minister’s office in 1994 by a special decision52. 
Its activity was regulated by the civil service law later in 1999. At the end of 2005, the 
government transferred DPA from the CoM to the Interior Ministry on the grounds of 
a better management. 
The performance appraisal system of the civil servants and state employees 
in general is not fully in place yet. The deficiencies in this regard are accepted by the 
Department of the Public Administration as well. “The supplementary staff or the 
changes made in the subordinated institutions structures do not correspond to the 
detailed job descriptions for the changed positions as well as for divisions and 
clarification of role of each unit. This happens because in most cases, there are 
missing job descriptions in these institutions”53.  
The promotion in duty, demotion and other disciplinary measures of civil 
servants or other state employees, in many cases does not take in consideration 
regular performance appraisals but is made mainly on other criteria like informal 
relations, political connections, immediate appraisals and verbal deliberations. The 
Departments of personnel in each institution needs to be conceived in that way to 
serve a non-politicized public administration. 
The Training Institute of Public Administration (TIPA) was established in June 
200054 and runs its activities under the direct supervision of the DPA. The structure of 
the TIPA includes three Departments of General Training, Fiscal Training and Local 
Governance Training; the latter was established in March 200855. The Institute is 
funded by the state budget but its programmes are also supported financially by 
international donors as well. There is noticed an increase of training sessions 
organized by TIPA over the recent years56. 
The Civil Service Commission is a supervisory body for the implementation of 
civil service law addressing complaints of the affected civil servants”57. The Civil 
                                                 
52Decision no 443 of the Council of Ministers “About the creation of public administration”.   
53Department of Public Administration, 2008 Annual Report, 13. 
54The decision of Council of Ministers no 315, dated 23.06.2000 “ On the creation and 
functioning of the Institute for Training of Public Administration and training of civil servants” 
55 Order no 19, date 18.02.2008 of the Albanian Prime Minister on the establishing of Local 
Governance Training Department within ITAP.  
56 Training Institute of Public Administration, 2008 Annual Report, 6, provides that: 72 Training 
sessions were conducted  in 2003 (1225 participants), 84 in 2004 (2100 participants), 146 in 
2005 (2360 participants), 113 in 2006 (1791 participants), 270 in 2007 (4489 participants) and 
273 in 2008 (5050 participants. www.itap.gov.al  
57Law no 8549, dated 11.11.1999 “On the status of civil servants”, 6, the competencies of the 
CSC are: to resolve individual appeals of decisions concerning hiring in the public services, 
probationary periods, promotions, literal transfers, appraisals, disciplinary measures and the 
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Service Commission (CSC) started its functioning with the full staff of 5 members and 
the Technical Secretariat as an administrative body in February 2001. The CSC 
members are appointed by the Assembly for a mandate of seven years on the 
proposal of: two by the Council of Ministers, one by the Supreme State Audit and 
two by the Local Government Units. The members of the CSC enjoy the same 
immunity as the members of the High Court. The Commission elects its chairman 
among its members and reports to the Assembly on annual basis and whenever 
requested. The CSC membership is not compatible with the membership in the 
steering organs of the political parties, is employed full time and should not have a 
second job during his/her mandate.  
The political rotations in Albania bring consequently the change of the head 
of CSC as it was the case in 2007. This has a negative impact on the performance of 
this institution58.   
  The civil service law does not foresee the measures taken by the CSC against 
the state institutions, which does not enforce its decisions. “Although the law on the 
civil service stipulates that the decisions of CSC are binding on the state institutions 
(article 8), this law does not provide the means to enforce this decision. Despite the 
efforts made during 2007, the scale of enforcement of CSC decisions has still been 
low”59.  A lack of trust in the Civil Service Commission is present; therefore many 
cases of dismissal are addressed directly to the court. On the other hand, most of the 
state employees are subject to the Labour Code so they cannot rely on the CSC.  
According to some information, the establishing of administrative courts, which is 
expected to happen following the approval of the pertaining law, may cause the Civil 
Service Commission to close, keeping into account its poor performance during the 
recent years and possible overlapping of state institutions.  
The institutions of Civil Service Commission and Department of Public 
Administration should be strengthened and freed from political interferences. The 
                                                                                                                                  
rights of civil servants. CSC monitors the management of the civil service in all the institutions 
under the scope of this law. When irregularities are uncovered, the CSC shall warn the 
incumbent institution giving a term up to two months to correct the illegality. The CSC shall 
resolve the individual appeals within 30 days from the day the complaint was filed. 
58 Civil Service Commission, 2007 Annual Report, Tirane 2008, 3, “During the first half of 2007, 
a considerable number of the submitted complaints were examined beyond the deadline of 30 
days as provided in the law. A deadlock period in the decision making of the CSC happened in 
the third quarter of the reporting year following the resignation of the Head of CSC and the 
subsequent actions after this resignation, had a negative impact that resulted in the exceeding 
the legal deadline of the complaints review”, at  www.kshc.gov.al 
59Civil Service Commission, 2007 Annual Report, Tirane 2008, 21 
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amendment of Civil Service law is required in order to include at the maximum 
extent, other categories of state employees outside its jurisdiction. Another idea can 
be to award more autonomous power to the Department of Public Administration. 
 
Iv. Response on the Part of Albania In Combatting Corruption 
Corruption is seen as one of the most serious illnesses of the democratic system in 
Albania and the public agrees that in addition to the mechanisms against it, criminal 
prosecution of all public officials involved in corruption is another indispensable 
solution. Sometimes, it seems that the public has lost confidence in the other 
sanctions and remedies against the corruption and does not trust the statistical 
information of the government regarding the number of officials prosecuted for 
bribery and corruption. There were some opinions that Albania has adopted laws 
that foresee more severe sentences against corruption than in some other countries 
but the margin of these sentences for example from fine to seven years 
imprisonment create possibility for corruption in the judicial sector. This shortcoming 
was addressed in 2004 through amending the Criminal Code that foresees both 
imprisonment and fines particularly against the active and passive corruption of 
public officials, active corruption in the private sector and illegal competition through 
the exerting of violence60. 
“A Special Corruption and Economic Crime Unit established within the office 
of the General Prosecutor have led to the arrest of a number of high-level officials. In 
September 2007, nine officials were arrested on corruption charges including the 
Deputy Minister of Public Works, Transport and Telecommunication and the General 
Director of Roads in connection with key public tenders for the reconstruction of 
national roadways”61. After nine months imprisonment, all the arrested officials of 
Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Telecommunication were released with the 
exception of the General Director of Roads. In November 2007, the Secretary General 
of Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was arrested together with two other officials 
in this Ministry on corruption charges in a public tender. Also, several mayors of 
communes, numerous university professors, medical doctors and tax officials were 
arrested on bribery charges from 2006 to 2008. The amendments to the Albanian 
Criminal Code in 2004 foresee derogation for the persons that had promised or 
                                                 
60 Criminal Code of the Republic of Albania approved with the law no 7895, 27.01.1995 
amended with the law no 9275, date 16.09.2004, articles 186, 189, 245, 245/1, 248, 260,  
61Freedom House Report on Nations in Transit, 2007 Country Report on Albania, June 2008, 73 
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offered remunerations or other undue advantage if these persons file criminal charge 
against their accomplices and assist in the criminal proceeding62.  
Albania has continuously amended the Criminal Code and Criminal 
Procedural Code in accordance with UN Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime and UN Convention against Corruption. After 2005, there is a noticeable 
increase of arrest in flagrancy of the public officials for bribery using the 
interceptions of conversations and communications as provided in the Criminal 
Procedural Code amended in 200463. However, it did not have the expected outcome 
on the reduction of corruption and bribes as the public officials started to be more 
careful and having trust only in reliable persons, which has encouraged the 
strengthening of strong political clans and their connections. “The Council of Europe 
and UN Conventions require law enforcement officials to use special investigative 
techniques that are compatible with the parties’ domestic law”64. The amended 
Criminal Procedural Code has foreseen some techniques to detect corruption- 
related and organized crimes like infiltration of the police agent, interception of 
communication etc., but the relevant institutions are still short of special equipments 
and adequately trained staff.  
The immunity of the high officials has been another legal barrier to start criminal 
investigations against them for corruption. The initiative of the government majority 
after 2005 parliamentary elections to approve a law in which the Members of 
Parliament would not enjoy immunity status in case of investigations against 
corruption was not supported by the opposition, the latter were afraid that this 
initiative was politically motivated against its supporters. During the first half of 
2008, the Albanian Parliament decided to lift the immunities of two MPs holding the 
                                                 
62Criminal Code of the Republic of Albania approved with the law no 7895, 27.01.1995 
amended with the law no 9275, date 16.09.2004, article 245/2, provides that persons involved 
in corruption who report their accomplices can benefit reduction up to exemption of the 
conviction from the court depending on the moment of filing criminal charge and 
consequences of the penal offence as well. 
63Criminal Procedural Code of the Republic of Albania approved with the law no 7905, 
21.03.1995 and amended with the law no 9187, date 12.02.2004. 
64Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Corruption-A Glossary of 
International Criminal Standards, 2007, 69, the techniques to detect corruption cases may 
include the use of undercover operations that allow a law enforcement agent to infiltrate a 
criminal organisation to gather evidence. When investigating a close-knit group for an outsider 
to penetrate or survey or where physical infiltration is unacceptably risky, law enforcement 
may need to resort to electronic surveillance e.g. interceptions of communications, listening 
devices, hidden cameras. 
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functions of Minister of Public Works and Minister of Defence to open the way for 
the investigations from the Prosecution Office on the tender procedures of Durres-
Morine highway under construction and the explosion of military ammunitions depot 
in Gerdec/Tirana. “Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish or maintain, in accordance with its legal system and constitutional 
principles, an appropriate balance between any immunities or jurisdictional 
privileges accorded to its public officials and the possibility, when necessary, of 
effectively investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating offences established in 
accordance with this Convention”65.  
Recently, the left-wing opposition has showed some signs to agree the bill on 
the lifting of immunities of the high rank officials including MPs but the legal experts 
say that it requires the prior amendment of the Constitution, which is not likely to 
happen soon. The approval of the new law on Prosecution Office in December 2008 
with the consent of the opposition and the legal assistance provided by specialized 
international agencies in Albania was a step in the right direction.  
The anti-corruption rhetoric and some measures taken by the Albanian 
government after 2005 against corruption are not having the expected results. Along 
with the criminal proceeding against officials accused of corruption, it needs to apply 
the administrative measures and sanctions as well.  
a-Cooperation of the public with the state institutions  
The cooperation of the public with the state institutions is another weak point of the 
fight against corruption and crime in Albania. A special law in this regard was 
approved lately in 200666 which needs to further be completed by sub-legal acts.  
The Department for Witness Protection and Justice Collaborators as a special central 
institution in the State Police and the Commission for Evaluation of Special Measures 
of Witness Protection and Justice Collaborators were established following the law 
on witness protection in Albania approved on 200467. This Commission is headed by 
the Deputy Minister of Interior and composed by one judge, one prosecutor and 
another judicial police officer appointed respectively by High Council of Justice, 
General Prosecutor and General Director of State Police. The law on witness 
                                                 
65United Nations Convention against Corruption adopted by UN General Assembly on 31 
October 2003, Resolution 58/4, article 30, paragraph 2.   
66 Law no 9508, date 03.04.2006 ‘ On the cooperation of the public in the fight against 
corruption” 
67 Law no 9205, date 15.03.2004 “ On the Justice collaborators and witness protection” 
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protection foresees the temporary protection measures and extraordinary protective 
measures but given the poor state budget, it is not fully put in place.  
Starting from the 1997 unrest in Albania, the intimidations against the witnesses in 
Albania became a phenomenon. During recent years, the security situation has been 
improved significantly and such intimidations are not very visible but still existing. 
The phenomenon of blood feud conflicts and the influence of customary traditional 
rules, especially in mountainous areas make it difficult to implement the law on 
witness protection and especially to provide for testimonies in the court because of 
the following consequences. “Each State Party shall take appropriate measures 
within its means to provide effective protection from potential retaliation or 
intimidation for witnesses in criminal proceedings and, as appropriate, for their 
relatives and other persons close to them”68.The law on the cooperation of the public 
against corruption aims to encourage whistle blowers by denouncing public officials 
for corrupt behaviour69. This law foresees the possibility of a monetary reward to the 
person who made the denunciation if the provided information is true and the 
denounced public official is penalised. Also, it requires that the institution that 
receives the denunciation should respect the principle of confidentiality, ensure the 
anonymity of the whistle blower and guarantee protection for him/her”70.  
According to the article 281 of Criminal Procedural Code, the public officials are 
obliged to submit a written report on a suspected criminal offence to a prosecutor or 
judicial police officer. The lack of cooperation of the public with the police or justice 
bodies to report crimes has been a major concern in Albania because of the 
prejudices coming from the communist system as well. During that period, the 
persons who reported to the police and secret services against certain people were 
politically motivated, so the majority of the community got distanced, and they had a 
very poor reputation. The Albanian society has not given up to such mentality, so in 
general the people do not report to the relevant authorities for different crimes but 
consider it as only a state obligation. On the other side, they do not feel sure that the 
state institutions will keep this information confidential. Until several years ago, 
many police operations failed because of leaked information from the police ranks. 
“Each State Party shall consider incorporating into its domestic legal system 
                                                 
68United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime adopted in Palermo, 2000, 
article 24, paragraph 1.  
69 Law no 9508, date 03.04.2006 ‘ On the cooperation of the public in the fight against 
corruption” 
70Law on the cooperation of the public in the fight against corruption”, article 12. 
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appropriate measures to provide protection against any unjustified treatment for any 
person who reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent 
authorities any facts concerning offences established in accordance with this 
Convention”71. 
The establishing of proper mechanisms to encourage citizens in reporting 
corruption to state authorities and increase cooperation of the public with state 
institutions through the involvement of civil society representatives would help to 
identify corruption cases and address them.   
 
b- Some examples of good governance reforms 
 
Some examples of good governance reforms undertaken by Albanian government 
during the recent years are worth mention.  
One of them is the reform in the education sector for the admission in the 
public universities in 2006. As a result of this reform, the students finalising high 
school studies can sit exams in their own schools, which are then evaluated by 
anonymous teams from the Ministry of Education. The students no longer need to 
travel to Tirana to sit their exams in overcrowded auditoriums with the risk of the 
exam tests being disclosed for corrupt interests.  
Since April 2008, the new procedures and regulations on e-procurement 
were fully applied and have had a positive impact on the increase of access and 
transparency to all the tender applicants. Although the number of internet visitors is 
still not high in Albania (according to some surveys 15%), the practise to get the 
required forms online helps to create equal opportunities for all applicants and to 
avoid favourite companies. Direct procurement procedure has finally been 
prohibited.            
A good initiative undertaken by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Energy 
and supported from USAID was establishing of the National Registration Centre 
(NRC)72 and National Licensing Centre (NLC)73. Starting from September 2007, the 
procedure for registration of new businesses is transferred from a multi-phase 
process going through the court to an administrative process through one stop shop 
                                                 
71United Nation Convention against Corruption, 2000, article 33 
72 National Registration Centre was established in September 2007 in accordance with the law 
no 9723, date 03.05.2007 following the initiative of the Albanian government through Ministry 
of Economy, Trade and Energy (METE) and  supported by “Stage I” Millennium Challenge 
Corporation Threshold Programme (MCCTP) administered by USAID, at www.qkr.gov.al.  
73 National Licensing Centre was established in June 2009 in compliance with the law no 10081, 
date 23. 02.2009. It is a central public institution subordinated to the METE, it was established 
with the support of “Stage II” MCCTP administered by USAID, at www.qkl.gov.al.  
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at the service windows of the NRC established at the regional level. This reform also 
encourages e-registration of new businesses. It reduces in one day the approval of 
the registration of new businesses if the required documents are submitted. Also, it 
applies the silent consent rule (positive silence) if the applicant is not notified on the 
suspension of the application within the same day of the documents’ submission. 
The establishing of National Licensing Centre helps to reduce significantly 
administrative barriers and costs of the business entities in the licensing process 
through one-stop shop and expedited and transparent procedures. A number of 
licenses and permits for services in the private sector were liberalized and removed. 
“Albania’s economic freedom score is 63.7, making its economy the 62nd freest in the 
2009 Index. Its level of economic freedom increased by 1.3 points during the past 
year and it has improved in three of the 10 freedoms. Comparatively, Albania’s 
freedom level is on par with that of other developing Balkan states like Croatia and 
Macedonia … However, Albania’s overall score is reduced by weak property rights 
and pervasive corruption”74. Also, 2010 Doing Business Report of the World Bank on 
Albania recognises the progress made by this country during the recent years with 
regard to the applied procedures and regulations.  “Albania is ranked 82 out of 183 
economies (countries) in the ease of doing business”75.  
In the beginning of 2007, the Albanian government took a decision to modify 
the tax on the personal incomes from the progressive tax to a flat rate one. Also, the 
corporate income tax was reduced from 20% to 10% effective January 1, 2008. The 
aim of these decisions was to increase registration of private sector employees in the 
social security scheme and reduce the fiscal evasion. This reform started to produce 
some positive results, however, it needs to make more efforts to reduce significantly 
the number of employees working in the black market.  
The establishment of mechanisms and reforms against corruption produce 
more results than the penal proceedings of the corrupt officials. The shortening of 
bureaucratic procedures, rotation of the staff in sensitive positions and the staff 
assignment in the different tasks that are not predictable to them reduce the 
potential for bribery.   
 
 
 
                                                 
74 Freedom House, 2009 Index of Economic Freedom on Albania, at 
http://www.heritage.org/index/country.cfm?id=Albania  
75 World Bank and International Finance Corporation, Doing Business 2010-Country Profile 
Albania, 5. In the 2009 Doing Business Report, Albania was ranked 89 out of 181 countries in 
the ease of doing business.   
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V. Fighting against corruption versus strengthening public administration  
 
The issues of fighting against corruption and strengthening of public administration 
are correlated because it is obvious that they have an impact on each other. 
Normally, the state employees recruited on politically motivated basis seems more 
inclined to the corruption practices and feel more protected from the state 
sanctions. On the other side, precedents of unpunished corruption cases discourage 
the honest part of the public administration.    
Unlike in the anti-corruption field, the Albanian governments so far have not 
expressed clearly and openly their political will about the full implementation of civil 
service regulations. Modernization of the public administration is formally 
incorporated in the approved national strategies but it is not considered as a political 
priority. The pressure coming from the party militants to get jobs in the public sector, 
high unemployment and unsustainable private sector particularly in the rural areas 
might be some reasons to remove this priority from the political agenda of the major 
political parties. Both the government and the opposition overlook this issue or 
mention it occasionally in the public speeches being afraid that they risk losing the 
support from the grassroots level. The implementation of the civil service law is not 
an open debate among the main political parties but just dismissal of the state 
employees affiliated to their party.  
The conception of being a “civil servant” to serve the community, receiving 
as a payback a fair salary and not for personal benefits and corruption affairs is not 
imprinted in the memory of the most state employees in Albania. Nevertheless, a job 
in the public administration remains a special favour offered to a certain number of 
people because there is still not an empowered and sustainable private sector. 
However, the transition period in Albania has been a “gold mine” for a considerable 
number of former state employees who were deeply involved in corruption and 
latter left public service unscathed establishing their businesses and still benefiting 
from their connections with the public administration.  
So far, the Albanian politicians have not shown to be fully committed to 
enforce the civil recruitment procedures, performance appraisal and other relevant 
regulations because it might endanger their clientelism practices. “In a country like 
Albania, where unemployment is high, the ability to influence “hiring” in a 
clientelistic way is a source of great power. In this country where private economic 
activity is limited and public funds are very important, the scope for patronage is 
enormous”76. 
                                                 
76Mirela Bogdani and John Loughlin, Albania and the European Union, Tumultuous Journey 
towards Integration and Accession, I.B.TAURIS, London 2007, 150 
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The weak public administration is one of the major deficiencies that is 
hampering European integration of the country and making life difficult for the 
citizens. A strong political will, which has been lacking up to now, is essential in order 
to begin the full enforcement of civil service law and gradually shape a modernised 
public administration. 
The fight against corruption has been declared as a priority during the 
electoral campaign of 28 June 2009 general elections in Albania by the main 
parliamentarian parties. It reflects a common concern of the broad public. These 
political platforms need to be vested and transcribed in deep reforms specified in 
each sector and require strong political will, cooperation among parties and 
professional capabilities to succeed.  
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The Need For Coordination Of Pension Systems In Balkans 
with a focus on Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo1 
 
 
1. Social policy context 
 
This paper will treat one of the social challenges facing the Western Balkan countries 
in the process of European integration, the need for coordination of the old age 
pension systems. Along with the economic cooperation, the social security 
coordination is an important aspect for the European integration of Balkan countries.   
After 2000, the social policy has taken a special attention in EU agenda, reflected on 
the EU assistance projects for Western Balkan, with a regional approach. It was 
related even with the progress done by the Balkan countries in the process of EU 
integration. Macedonia is become a candidate for EU membership, whereas Albania 
after signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the EU, is applying for 
being a candidate country. Kosovo is enjoying the independence2 and is in the process 
of state building, under the international assistance, but at the same time is inspiring 
for EU integration.  
 
Social policy developments, especially the reformation of pension systems reflect 
internal transition policies in each country, policy transfer from international 
organizations after the fall of socialism regimes, and increasingly, the influence of EU 
integration processes. On the other side, pension system not only reflects the changes 
of the whole social system, but it is one of the instruments to influence the changes. 
Especially it can put incentives for the labour market participation for both, males and 
females, mobility of the labour force, etc.  
                                                 
1 Some of the findings from a study on “Sustainability of pension system in Balkan”, supported 
by ERSTE Foundation, 2009. 
2 On 17 February 2008, the Kosovo Parliament adopted the Declaration of Independence. 
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Building up new pension schemes or remodeling the existing ones to respond the new 
social and economic realities in the Balkan countries was one of the priorities in the 
strategic objectives for each country. Social state is sanctioned on the basic legislation 
– Constitution and the guaranteeing the social rights remains the priority on the 
strategic objectives. Therefore, the process of decision making in this domain should 
be balanced between the social needs and economic development priorities.  
 There are used different approaches and established a variety of pension 
schemes in Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia. The Albanian old-age pension system is 
based on the typical Bismarck model, which is actually under process of reformation 
even in the origin country of Germany. The Kosovo old-age pension system was built 
as a quite new system based mainly on the Beveridge model. In the Macedonian 
system, there are combined two ways of financing the old-age pension schemes 
developed in the European countries: pay-as-you-go and the capital funded, so it is 
following more the Swedish model. Why such different approaches when Albania, 
Kosovo and Macedonia have common general indicators such as: small number of 
population, relatively young population, more than 50 per cent of the population 
under 35 years old, high level of unemployment, low GDP per capita, etc. 
Table 1. General indicators on Western Balkan Countries 
 Croati
a 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovi
na 
Serbi
a 
Monteneg
ro 
Macedon
ia 
Kosov
o 
Albani
a 
Populations 
in 2007 (in 
millions) 
4.4 3.8 7.4 0.6 2.0 2.1 3.2 
Population in 
2030 ( 
projection in 
millions ) 
4.2 3.7 7.5 0.6 2.0 * 3.5 
Population/k
m2 of land in 
2007 
79 75 96 45 79 189 110 
Fertility rate 
in 2006 
1.38 1.18 1.43 1.64 1.41 3.21 1.37 
Under 35 
years old in 
2006 (in %) 
42.7 47.6 42.3 49.2 50.4 * 58.6 
Over 55 years 
old in 2006 
5.7 3.1 6.6 4.2 3.8 * 2.5 
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(in %) 
GDP (per 
capita in 
euro),2006 
7.700 2.542 3.43
4 
2.519 2.432 940 2.099 
National debt 
(in % of 
GDP),2006 
40.9 21.3 37.0 38.0 37.6 * 59.7 
Employment 
rate, 2006  
55.6 35.0 49.9 34.8 39.6 28.7 49.7 
Unemployme
nt rate, 2006 
11.1 31.1 21.0 30.3 36.0 44.9 14.1 
Women’s 
employment 
rate, 2006 
49.4 24.0 40.6 27.6 30.7 11.8 38.8 
Average age, 
2005 
40.6 37.1 36.6 35.1 34.2 * 28.6 
Life 
expectancy, 
2006 
75.4 74.8 73.2 72.8 73.6 69.0 75.9 
Infant 
mortality, 
2006 
5.2 7.5 7.4 11.0 11.5 12.0 7.4 
*no data available                                   
 Source: Krohnert –Hobmann-Klingholz, Europe’s Demographic Future, Berlin 
Institute for Population and Development, 2008, page 325. 
Our societies have the advantage to make use of the EU experiences to construct 
their modern systems of pensions, as they are opened to the influences of the EU 
developments. On the other side, Balkan countries are no longer entirely free to 
prevent each other pension system from competing on its own territory with the 
system it has built. The social security in Western Balkans traditionally has been 
closely linked to employment status, both in the previous system and even in the 
reformed system. With the transition to a market economy the employment status of 
large sections of the populations changed: from employed in state sector now are 
unemployed, and are trying to find a way to a kind of self-employment or family 
business. On the other side, the growth of the informal economies has had a negative 
impact on the reformed pay-as-you-go social security systems. 
  The regional approach in analysing the pension system is used based on the 
fact that Balkan countries are facing the same challenge to build at the same time the 
democratic regimes, free markets, legal and social states. Despite recent economic 
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growth, the countries of the Western Balkans have low levels of GDP per capita, 
compared to European countries. These countries also have great difficulty connecting 
to the global economy. Deindustrialisation has destroyed jobs and led to high level of 
SME and self-employment in Macedonia, and even more in Albania. Unemployment, 
informal economies, low incomes and households who depend heavily on remittance 
incomes are the common features of these countries. 
 Low inflows of international capital, low export competitiveness and 
widespread poverty cannot allow the Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo to face the 
competitiveness with the global economy in such opened systems. These countries 
did realize the need for the regional co-operation, which is very crucial for their 
development. The economic cooperation and relations between the Balkan countries 
underline the importance of enhancing the free mobility of other productivity factors, 
such as labor force, which is looking to find a place in the regional market. Free 
movement of the labor force can be facilitated with the coordination of social security 
and the guaranteeing the pension rights, wherever the people decide to live during 
their retirement.  
 The importance of common issues/challenges and the complexity of pension 
systems are raising the question for their coordination, using the EU experience in 
Open Method of Coordination. 
 
2. Pension reforms  
 
Pension system inherited from the former Yugoslavia as well the Albanian pension 
system were a Defined Benefits system, where retirees receive benefits based on the 
number of working years as well as on the basis of their salaries. The pensions were 
fully indexed to wage growth, so that the living standards of the elderly were 
sometimes better than the living standards of the working age population. Pensions 
aim was protecting the social status, and their replacement rate varied from 70% to 
80% of wage, after 20-40 working years. Retirement ages were less than 60 for men 
and 55 for women. In addition, special privileges were granted for a wide range of 
workers, like miners, allowing them to retire earlier, with no reduced amount of 
benefits. The system was financed on a pay as you go basis (PAYG), mainly centrally 
administered. 
 After 1990s, all Western Balkan countries have adopted pension reforms in 
order to relieve pressure on the state budget from increased social demands. Under 
the assistance of international organizations, mostly of the World Bank, several 
countries have introduced partially privatized three pillar pension systems, in the 
environment of underdeveloped capital markets. The term “three pillar” pension 
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scheme is connected to the three pillar model advocated by the World Bank in the 
report Averting the old age crisis, published in 1994. The three pillars consist of:  
1. A mandated, unfunded and publicly managed defined benefit system. 
2. A mandated, funded and privately managed defined contribution system; 
3. A voluntary retirement system.  
 In principle, the reform of pension systems reflects political choices, historical 
traditions and the specific economic challenges faced by the different countries. In 
many Western European countries the term second pillar is often associated with the 
supplementary pension schemes set up under collective labor agreements. In some 
countries such collective schemes have a semi public character and the affiliation of 
the employers and employees may be rendered obligatory by law. In other countries 
the collective schemes are set up on a strictly private basis, while participation is not 
necessarily obligatory. The main characteristics of the second pillar pensions are:  
- obligatory for the participants; 
- based upon the capitalization method as opposed to the pay-as-you-go 
principle;  
- managed by funds which operate under private law;  
- based upon the defined contribution principle. 
 Such characteristics are typical for the second pillar pension schemes 
introduced in Croatia Macedonia and Kosovo, while Albania, Serbia, and Montenegro 
are still remodeling the existing pension systems.  
 Due to low employment rates, grey economy and a poor record in 
contribution collections, the PAYG pension system in Albania, as well as in other 
countries of the Western Balkans are under severe strain. Even private companies and 
self-employed operating in the formal economy often pay based on the minimum 
wage, which means that many people will receive just the minimum pension. Second, 
it means that Health Funds, Pension Funds and Employment Funds often operate at a 
deficit and must be supplemented by governments’ already stretched budgets, 
reducing resources for other social expenditures. Despite the fact that pensions are in 
low levels, the pension expenditures have been expensive absorbing about 9% of GDP 
in Macedonia, and 5% of GDP in Albania.  
 Pro-market privatised three-pillar pension reforms have been introduced in 
Croatia, Macedonia and Kosovo, creating a mandatory individual savings scheme. In 
this kind of schemes, which is linking benefits with contributions, it will be more 
difficult for the government to create privileges for special categories, like in the 
former system, (for example for miner, military forces, etc.). The main challenge for 
Balkan countries in transition is the ‘informal’ employment. This is one of the factors 
for remodeling the pension systems from wage-oriented model to the defined 
contribution pension system. In the three pillar pension system, it is combined the 
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pay–as-you-go method of financing with other methods, for developing self-
supporting schemes, as well as to share the responsibilities between the state, 
employers and their employees.  The state has to make sure that the insured 
persons are objectively informed about the consequences of their choices, for 
example for specific pension funds or investment arrangements. 
 Public pension schemes have only been subjected to some marginal 
parametric reforms in Albania, Serbia, and Montenegro. “Given the risks inherent to 
the three pillar pension systems which have already been introduced in the region, 
countries which have not yet introduced such schemes - Albania, BiH, Montenegro, 
and Serbia - may be well advised to pursue further reform, and focus on improving the 
effectiveness of existing pay-as-you-go pension systems, rather than rushing headlong 
into the partially privatised systems”.3  
 
 
 
Country  Starting  First pillar  Second Pillar  Third Pillar  
Albania  1993 
1995  
PAYG DB -21.6% 
Mandatory + 
Voluntary 
Supplementary 
for senior civil 
servant and 
military forces  
 PAYG  
Voluntary 
Private 
Pensions 
Kosovo   2002 
2007  
Social Pension 
40 Euro + 35 = 
75 Euro/15 years  
Fully Funded 
5:5 =10% 
Mandatory <55 
Voluntary 
Fully 
Funded 
pensions  
Macedonia  1993 
March 
2002 
January 
PAYG DB-12,35% 
remain in the 
Mandatory 
Voluntary  
2005 - Fully 
Funded 6.65%  
Mandatory – all 
employed after 1
st
 
Voluntary 
Fully 
Funded  
                                                 
3 EJSS article – Bartlett & Xhumari 2007. 
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2008  January 2003 
Voluntary -others 
 
 Increasing the coverage as well as the replacement rate remains the main 
challenges of the pension system in Balkan. The redistributive element is still stronger, 
like in the previous regime. Common challenge for all Balkan states is that pension 
systems to be better suited to the market condition, to increase work incentives; to 
give priority the insurance principle; comparing with the income redistribution; to 
encourage payment of the contributions in higher levels, and consequently the higher 
benefits in return.  
 
Today EU is emphasizing new principles as social solidarity and social inclusion. All the 
social actors, even the vulnerable groups need to be involved in the policy making 
process. This idea comes out after a long history of the organizations of the interested 
groups, which today are ready to come in the game of political process with new ideas 
to protect the interest of the groups they represent. How it can happen in our 
societies, where the social awareness is still underdeveloped and the representatives 
of groups not yet cristalized? 
 
 
 
3. EU Integration - the need for coordination of pension systems in Balkan 
 
Being the EU integration as the main priority for Balkan countries is facilitating the 
use of the EU experience and objectives on pensions. 
 Along with the importance of bilateral agreements in social security within 
Balkan countries, the coordination of the first pillar of the pension system will be very 
soon in the main agenda of social policy. Which are some of the main characteristics 
of the first pillar of the old age pensions in some of the Balkan countries?  
 
 
Table 2. Comparative data on the first pillar of the old age pensions, 2007 
Countries Average 
monthly 
pensions (€) 
Replacement 
rate (%) 
Pension 
contribution 
rates (%) 
Share of 
pension 
expenditure 
in GDP (%) 
Number of 
beneficiaries/ of 
the over 65 years 
old population 
Albania 50 43.4 – urban 
27 – rural 
21.6 5.5 130% of the over 65 
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Croatia 257 34 20.0 14 n.a yet 
Macedonia 38-80% 42 21.2 9.6 n.a yet 
Montenegro 91.70 56.7 24.0 17 40,000/ 48.2% of 
the over 65 
83% - male 
Serbia 90 
70- farmers 
61 22.0 10.5 385,000 70% of the 
over 65 
211,000-farmer 
Kosovo 45 - basic 
85 - with 15 
years insurance 
  
10.0 – second 
pillar 
3.54 100% - there is a 
basic pension 
 
 The social security is an instrument which provide safeguard against 
the risks of the uncertain economic development, such as temporary or permanent 
dropping out of the workers from the labour market. As long as the market is 
globalized, the instruments such as social security are globalized as well. So, 
common rules need to be established to guarantee the social rights of the labour 
force wherever they decide to work and live in their retirement, for today and for 
tomorrow.  
 What is happening in Balkan countries is that they are moving in the 
adverse direction. If today the EU states are discussing how to coordinate the 
pension schemes established hundred years ago, the Albania, Macedonia and 
Kosovo have had similar pension systems during the socialist regimes, and now 
are reforming it in a diversified way that may create problems for the free 
movement of people and services, when the Shengen will be established. How is 
the pension system responding to the free market, free trade, free movement of 
the labour force and services in the Balkan region, to better accommodated in the 
flexible environment? 
  How the pension system is responding to the diversified social structures, 
demographic and family changes? Should the pension system strengthen the values 
such as equality through the high redistribution instrument aiming in poverty 
alleviation, in such countries dominated by self-employment, or it has to function for 
income replacement based on contributive principle and social justice? If the EU today 
is looking for new forms of social solidarity, does the redistributive element, as the 
main feature of the previous socialist system need still to be strengthen? Does the 
                                                 
4 Studies on ‘Social Protection and Social Inclusion’ in the Western Balkan countries: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/enlargement_en.htm#studies 
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pluralistic political system, implemented in the governance of social security through 
tripartite governing bodies, and the new labour relations are in conformity with such a 
high level of redistribution in public pension system? The main question is how to 
organise social protection systems in such a way that they help, in particular, to 
guarantee that everyone has the resources necessary to live in accordance with 
human dignity, which mean that active population to pay as much as they can provide 
incomes necessary for elderly and to have enough for themselves. These are crucial 
questions for the future developments of the pension systems. 
 The pension institutions are in the process of remodeling to increase their 
sustainability and adequacy of benefits, to be flexible in new realities, which are in 
rapidly changes and to be in conformity with required standards in the process of EU 
integration. The process of EU Integration of the Balkan countries has put in the 
agenda social protection and inclusion when pension is one of the priorities. The ILO 
Convention 102/1952 on the Minimum Standards of Social Protection must be the 
underline principle on the strategic objectives for the development the sustainable 
social protection systems. This is another tool for integration of pensions with other 
social benefits, respecting the rules on coverage and adequacy of benefits.  
 The focus is the need for coordination of the old age pension systems in 
Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo, in the process of European integration of such 
countries. How the European experience is used in the co-ordination of the pension 
system. The EU integration process of Balkan countries has created the natural 
environment for more regional cooperation in economy, which is expecting to bring a 
free movement of the labor force and the need for guaranteeing their social rights. 
 
4. OMC-learning from each other, from the best experiences in region 
 
The coordination of the first pillar of the pension schemes in the Balkan and the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC) may be used to share the best experiences on 
pensions. The regional economic cooperation, extending opportunities for the Balkan 
citizens who are moving and working in different countries of the region would 
require improvement in legal framework of the pension systems, and bilateral 
agreements between governments and the respective agencies responsible for 
administration of the pension schemes. 
 EU aims at preparing candidate and pre-candidate countries in the Open 
Method of Coordination on social inclusion and, from 2006, social protection.5 Joint 
                                                 
5 European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Social 
protection and inclusion policies. Antonia CARPARELLI, Head of Unit EMPL E2: Conference on 
EU social protection and inclusion strategy, March 4, 2009 Tirana. 
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Inclusion Memoranda’ (JIM) process outlines the principal challenges in relation to 
tackling poverty and social exclusion, and from 2006, in relation to three main fields: 
pensions, health and long-term care. 
 
Overarching Objectives are: 
• Social cohesion, equality between men and women and equal opportunities 
for all through adequate, accessible, financially sustainable, adaptable and 
efficient social protection systems and social inclusion policies. 
 
• Effective and mutual interaction between the Lisbon objectives of greater 
economic growth, more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and with 
the EU's Sustainable Development Strategy. 
 
• Good governance, transparency and the involvement of stakeholders in the 
design, implementation and monitoring of policy. 
 
 In 2002, EU social policy cooperation started with the 10 countries which 
acceded in 2004. Learning process on both sides is based on the Social Protection & 
Inclusion Studies.6 
 
 Relating the ‘Pre-Candidate’ Countries co-operation on social protection is still 
in a preparatory phase. A series of seminars on the EU Social Protection and Social 
Inclusion Process, the latest March 4, 2009 in Tirana, as well as in other countries. 
Studies on ‘Social Protection and Social Inclusion’ are supported for all the Western 
Balkan countries.7 
 
 The public and even the social partners as well Academia are not enough 
informed about what the concepts of coordination of social security schemes and 
overall European social security policy imply and the rights and obligations after the 
accession. 
 
                                                 
6 The current 3 Candidate countries: Croatia-JIM signed in March 2007, second JIM follow-up 
period 2009-2010, Turkey -JIM process launched in late 2004, but not yet signed, and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia -accession negotiations have not yet started, JIM 
process not yet launched. 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/enlargement_en.htm#studies, which are used 
as a point of reference. 
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 In the Regional level –Integrated social protection will increase the choices, to 
promote access to stable employment and the pension rights connected with it. Social 
Security Coordination Network in Balkan is started with the Regional Co-ordination 
Centre on Social Policy in Skopje. It needs much attention to develop and support the 
comparative studies in the context of the EU integration of the Western Balkan 
countries. For sure that importance of an integrated approach, of public and private 
pension schemes, not only to make a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty 
among elderly population, but also to ensure adequate pensions is the main priority. 
In this difficult road our countries need to develop transparency with contributors and 
beneficiaries, more information and awareness of the public on what is going on with 
reforms of the pension system.  
 I am emphasizing the application of the OMC in Balkan countries, as an 
instrument to share and learn from the each other experience, mainly on pension 
schemes, and more concretely: 
 
What can learn Albania from the experience of other countries in reforming the 
pension system? 
 
 Building the trust on pension system by reducing the redistributive elements 
 Introducing the tax incentives for employer schemes  
 Replace abusive support for self-employed in agriculture with productive 
incentives – the same rules of game 
 The state to guarantee for all elderly a minimum income by knowing the 
insurance periods in service work at home as well as the coefficients for 
difficult jobs 
 The guarantee pension from the compulsory pension scheme at the level of 
40% average replacement rate – ILO Convention 102/1952 (Ratified,2005) 
 Improve adjusting mechanism to differentiate the benefits according the 
contributions and maintain the social status, fix in law the time of indexing. 
 Sanctioned by law the rights of migrant workers and bilateral agreements 
 Encourage the second pillars, may be financed out by the employers 
 Introducing insurance/allowance child benefits   
 
What can learn Kosovo? 
 
 Building the trust on the actual pension system, introducing or not a PAYG 
system for differentiating the pensions according to contributions 
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 Investing the pension savings in producing & exporting the energy in the 
country, aiming to increase the economic development and employment.  
 Fix by Law the rules of indexing 
 
What can learn Macedonia? 
 
 Sharing the responsibility between the state, employer and the employees in 
contribution 
 Economic Cooperation in Region for Investing the pension savings and 
increasing the employment  
 No conditions (at least five years of insurance) for survivor pensions 
 Gender approach – unify the rules  
 
             Reaching the strategic long-term social and economic stability, social policy aims 
not only social protection of the citizens, but also to influence the development of human 
potentials, changing of people's mentality to respect the rule of law. Citizens should learn 
that democracy is the respect of human rights, and that democracy can be reached with 
solidarity in the contributive pension system. 
 
The main efforts need to be concentrated on the sustainability of the existing pay-as-
you-go system. Decreasing the dependency ratio and increasing the replacement rate, 
remain the main challenges of the pension system today in Balkan countries. The 
influence of global market and price liberalisation eventually lead to a lowering of 
social standards. There is necessary to give shape a credible, effective and modern 
pension policy which is directly influencing all generations: young generation as 
contributors, and the old generation as beneficiaries. 
 
Democracy in social policy implies the possibility that certain social interests be ever 
more broadly represented in the decision-making structures of the social policy. But 
interests are represented when groups and individuals are aware of them. The public 
information and awareness of all citizens for their rights and responsibilities to the social 
legislation will encourage the active participation of all actors in building sustainable 
social security systems. A conclusion from the history of social policy is that has been the 
pressure of the interested groups and of the social partners, one of the factors of the 
progress of the social programs. We need only to use this experience in our specific 
conditions, in our movement from collective consciousness and mechanic solidarity to 
individualism and organic solidarity. Understanding the social security institutions and 
the process of their developments is a source of power for everybody, because the way 
how it is functioning is of the interest for all members of our society. 
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The Energy Community of Southeast Wurope: Finding New Approach for Enhancing 
the Regional Cooperation 
(an alternative to EU Enlargement?) 
 
 
The regional integration process is seen positively by the EU as a way to keep the 
Balkans on the path of development without making them immediately member 
states. EC used neo-functionalism and the spill-over effect as guiding principles in this 
process and it created the Energy Community of Southeast Europe. However, a new 
approach is needed in order to develop this idea properly and that is the neo neo – 
functionalism. ECSE’s course of development depends on many factors that may or 
may not have positive spill-over into other areas and with that become the stepping 
stone of deeper regional integration. 
 
Key words: Energy Community of Southeast Europe, Western Balkans, Neo 
functionalism 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Torn by the promises made to the countries of the Western Balkans (further in the 
text WB) that the door to their entrance in the EU is open and the fatigue caused by 
the enlargement in 2004 combined with the problems of the adoption of the new 
treaty, left the EU on a crossroad.  
Fighting with its own problems the EU was trying to keep the region on the 
tracks of further development by finding some solution that does not include 
immediate membership. In this light the “Solomon” solution was something already 
done in the EU: creating regional community between the old enemies in some highly 
technical area that connects them. The EU duplicated the old Coal and Steal 
Community in the Balkans and in 2005 created the Energy Community of Southeast 
Europe (further in the text ECSE). This is the first legally binding treaty since the 
beginning of the 1990’s between the countries that were at war in that period.  
For creating this kind of community, the EU relied on the well known neo-
functionalist method. Although this method has been criticized a lot and eventually 
thrown away by all influential thinkers (even by its pioneer Ernest B. Haas) still, many 
in the Commission are guided by it and believe that it can show results if it is 
implemented in other regions too. 
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However, not everyone agrees about the effectiveness of neo-functionalism and 
rightfully so. As every other theory this one too has its flaws and it is especially 
questionable if it can be applied at the Balkan circumstances.  
 The paper will evolve within these lines, while discussing in the end the future 
possible solutions for enhancing the regional cooperation in the Balkans and the 
implementation of a new theory called neo neo functionalism.  
 
2. The Creation Of The Energy Community Treaty, Its Structure And Duties. 
 As it was mentioned in the introduction:  
“The guiding ideas for the Commission officials involved in designing the 
institutional set-up were explicitly taken from the early experiences of 
European integration and referred to the neofunctionalist model of regional 
integration… Europe, started the initiative for an integration process in a 
technical sector, and provided for the institutional capacity for possible spill-
over into other policy fields. As one Commission official involved argued: 
“We try to get everybody to agree on a common position and a common 
way forward…”1 
 
The signing of the Energy Community Treaty took place in. This Treaty is based on the 
Thessaloniki Agreement and the Athens Memorandum of Understanding. This 
memorandum was signed in 2002 and was based on “the principles, which are set out 
in the Stabilisation and Association process, of cooperation between the European 
Union and the countries of the region, and of the necessity for co-operation between 
countries of the region”2. With this, the creation of the national energy authority 
body, national independent regulatory body, transmission system operators and 
distribution system operators in each country signatory of the Memorandum was set. 
It was all done with one purpose, to create an integrated regional energy market in 
which there will be fair competition and fair prices for the customers. The countries 
that signed this Memorandum also signed the ECSEE and they are:  
 EU Member States: Austria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia; 
 Regional members: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey, Kosovo; 
                                                 
1 Renner Stefan “The Energy Community of Southeast Europe: A neo-functionalist project of 
regional integration” European Integration Online Papers, 25.02.2009, page 7 of 21.  
2 Memorandum of Understanding on the Regional Electricity Market in South East Europe and 
its Integration into the European Union Internal Electricity Market (“The Athens Memorandum 
- 2002”), page 2. 
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 Observers: Moldova.3 (before the creating of ECSEE, observers were also 
Austria, Hungary, Slovenia and Italy which later, when the Energy Community 
was created, joined the other regional members. Now only Moldova left as an 
observer country-author’s remark) 
The obligations coming from the Treaty are “…to unbundle generation, transmission, 
and distribution, while establishing independent sector regulators and transmission 
system operators (TSO’s)”4 which was supposed to be finished by 2005. How this 
process will be developing, will be supervised by the organs created and those are:  
   1. Ministerial Council 
     2.  Permanent High Level Group  
     3.  Energy Community Regulatory Board (ECRB).  
     4.  Fora. 
     5.  Secretariat. 
The instant benefits that can come out of this project are: “…increased reliability in 
electricity supply; lower operating costs; reduced needs for additional capacity 
investments, especially in generation; improved opportunities for intra- and 
interregional trade, including peak load by hydro producers in the region; and lower 
prices for the end-customers.”5  
Going along these lines, how the pace of development is going and what has the neo-
functionalist method got to do with it, will be discussed in the next part. 
 
3. The Role of Neo-Functionalism in the Creation And Development of Ecse. 
 
First an extensive definition of what neo-functionalism represents. It is:  
“A theory of regional integration that places major emphasis on the role of 
non-state actors – especially, the “secretariat” of the regional organization… 
regional bureaucrats in league with a shifting set of self-organized 
interests…exploit the inevitable “spill-overs” and “unintended consequences” 
that occur when states agree to assign some degree of supra-national 
responsibility... According to this theory, regional integration is an 
intrinsically sporadic and conflictual process, but one in which, under 
conditions of democracy and pluralistic representation, national 
governments will find themselves increasingly entangled in regional 
                                                 
3 BRIEFING NOTES, Energy Community of South Eastern Europe, page 1. 
4 Kathuria Sanjay, Western Balkan Integration and the EU, an Agenda for Trade and Growth, 
The World Bank, page 101. 
5 Harry G. Broadman, James Anderson, Constantijn A. Claessens, Randi Ryterman, Stefka 
Slavova,Maria Vagliasindi, and Gallina A Vincelette, Building Market Institutions in South 
Eastern Europe, Comparative Prospects for Investment and and Private Sector Development, 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/the World Bank, page 210.  
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pressures and end up resolving their conflicts by conceding a wider scope 
and devolving more authority to the regional organizations they have 
created...”6 
 
The European Union is known for its customs to exports not only goods and services 
but also policies. This is called External Governance or Europeanization7. As a highly 
successful polity and a leading democratic force in the world it is easy to impose its 
directives in its relations with other non-EU countries that seek for cooperation. That 
is why on the path to the EU every potential candidate has to adopt the acquis 
communitaire as a most important precondition for becoming a member. 
 However, the case with the Balkans has been rather complicated. After the 
promise that the region will not be left out of the enlargement process (Thessaloniki 
2003) and after the enlargement fatigue occurred (2004 and 2007), the EU 
“first…continues with the pre-accession strategy in a similar mode to that…of…Central 
and Eastern Europe. Here, however, the Union faces a fundamental commitment 
deficit without a clear timeframe for a future EU-membership…Secondly…the EU not 
only offered EU-membership, but insisted on a regional rapprochement of the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia.”8   
Here is where the theory of neo-functionalism comes to stage. Its pioneer is 
Ernest B. Haas (1958) which upgraded the functionalism of Mitrany (1943). This theory 
has been the leading one behind the creation of the European Union. It all started 
with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, where, as 
known, the old enemies united in a highly technical area with one supranational body 
overlooking the coal and steel industry. With time the competences spilled over to the 
other areas (ex. the social and political) and the end result (which by no means will be 
the final one) is the EU as we have today.  
 It is clear that the EU is going for the rule “one size fits all” and trying to inflict 
this theory to the WB with the creation of the Energy Community.  What they are 
hopping to achieve is to start to unite the old enemies in the strictly technical area of 
the energy production, distribution and policy and hopefully with time “through an 
                                                 
6 Schmitter C. Phillipe “Neo Neo Functionalism” Wiener, Antje and Thomas Diez, eds. European 
Integration Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, July 2002, pages 2 and 3. 
7 Europeanisation in political science has been referred to very generally as 'becoming more 
European like'. More specifically than this, it has been defined in a number of ways. One of the 
earliest conceptualisations of the term is by Ladrech (1994, 69) who defines Europeanisation as 
‘an incremental process of re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the extent that EC 
political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics 
and policy making.’ 
8  Renner Stefan 2009, page 5 of 21.  
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increased level of interaction, social interests and loyalties that hitherto have been 
directed to the national authorities will shift to supranational authority.”9  
 The issues that arise from the implementation of this theory in the Balkans 
and why it might not be applicable are few but relevant. First, “…the counties of 
Southeast Europe did not create their own rules for the regulation of their own energy 
sectors…but committed themselves to adopt the relevant EU legislation.”10  Second 
issue is the power that the Energy Community has as such (including the not yet 
determined obligations of the Secretariat which is imagined to be replica of the EC). 
By now the ECSE “…is largely concerned with monitoring and supporting the 
participating parties in implementing the relevant acquis communautaire on energy, 
environment and competition.”11 Thirdly, the issue of not having an established court 
may well decide the future development of this community. It is widely known the 
importance that the European court of Justice had on the development of the EU. It 
“…has been a major influencing factor in making the constitution of the EU more 
supranational by laying down rules.”12 
  Last but not least is the prevailing nationalism and unresolved issues in the 
Balkans. The future status of Kosovo and the deteriorating situation in Bosnia, the 
development of Serbia, the issues that Macedonia has are just a few of the major 
problems left to be dealt with in the time to come. When the world economic crisis 
and the enlargement fatigue are added to this then the prospect of the ECSE does not 
look good as it once did.  
 
Since the neo-functionalism does not have satisfactory answers to the issues 
mentioned above it is time to contemplate other theories that might have a better 
explanation of where this regional integration is heading towards. One such theory 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
4. Neo neo functionalism and its application in the ecse case.   
 
Neo neo functionalism was presented by Philippe C. Schmitter as a correction to the 
neo-functionalism. This theory does not claim that all regional organizations created 
will grow into something bigger per se. Its answer to whether “spill-over” into new 
tasks or level of authority will occur is: it depends! Not that it has to happen or that it 
will automatically happen. It depends on many conditions that may or may not take 
place and no one can predict weather they will.   
                                                 
9  Hofer D. Stephan 2007, page 4.  
10 Hofer D. Stephan 2007,  pages 12 and 13.  
11 Renner Stefan 2009, page 14 of 21. 
12 Structure of the EU 2: Institutions of the Supranational Level II, 
http://www.dadalos-europe.org/int/grundkurs4/eu-struktur_2.htm 
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What Schmitter is explaining is that every organization has to pass through two types 
of cycles: 
1. Initiating and 
2. Priming. 
“During the initiation cycle(s), the probability that a given national actor will 
push a spillover policy is relatively low…if only because initial insecurity and 
mistrust of partners is likely to make all negotiators more cautious.. As 
regional processes begin to have a greater effect, national actors may 
become more receptive to changing the authority and competences of 
regional institutions.”13  
 
This is the case because every country is reluctant to give up some of its sovereignty 
and authority at the beginning and transfer it to an organization which can undermine 
its position at home and with its neighbors.  
Following this, there are three possible ways of development of the ECSE:  
1. Greater integration; 
2. Collapse; 
3. Continued dealing with technicalities which has to end up in one of the 
previously mentioned stadia.  
In which way the organization will develop, as it was mentioned before, is not likely 
predictable. It can exist just for satisfying the technical needs of the countries’ 
signatories or if one of the actors is ‘weakly affected by…the development of regional 
identity…but highly sensitive to perceptions of inequity on comparative rate of 
return…”14 the spill back strategies will kick in and the organization will collapse. If on 
the other hand the priming cycles have kicked in “the most likely strategy to prevail…is 
the ‘spill over’. Herein lays the core dynamic of neo (and neo-neo-) functionalism – 
namely, that the regional processes…will dispose national actors to resolve their 
inevitable dissatisfactions by increasing both the level and the scope of common 
institutions.”15 
 However, the efforts to prove that these processes most definitely will occur 
in the case of the ECSE can satisfy the current climate in the region and the EU but it is 
most certainly a dangerous ground to walk on. “Only regional integration experiments 
that make it through the priming cycles are likely to transform themselves into 
something qualitatively different. They will have exhausted the potentialities inherent 
in functionally integrating their economies and dedicate more and more of their 
                                                 
13  Schmitter C. Phillipe, 2002, pages 31 and 32.  
14  Schmitter C. Phillipe, 2002, page 32. 
15  Schmitter C. Phillipe, 2002, pages 32 and 33.  
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efforts to functionally integrating their polities.”16 Since the Energy Community, 
created in 2005, has not come to the stage of the priming cycles (even tough the 
countries are well acquainted with themselves and are quite similar in cultural, 
economical and political sense), it is highly questionable if it ever will. The levels of 
distrust are still high (having in mind the conflicts of the 1990’s) and even now the will 
to join the EU is far bigger then the will to cooperate regionally. 
 
5. Conclusion. 
 
The Energy Community of Southeast Europe has a great potential to reunite the 
former enemies just like the Coal and Steal Community did for Western Europe. It was 
made in the ‘halls’ of the Commission as some sort of a plan B for the delayed 
accession but with a clear agenda – to keep the Western Balkans on the path of the 
reforms. 
 Its institutions are replica of the EU institutions and the main topic is highly 
technical area which unites the countries in one market which is crucial and where 
benefits are rather mutual then individual. The ECSE functioning and good governance 
will soon have positive effects, which will ‘spill-over’ into other areas directly or 
indirectly connected.  
 This was the plan of the EU. However there are some important obstacles that 
negate its validity in the said case. The facts that there is no court which can push the 
integration forward with its precedents, like the EU’s case, or that the nationalism and 
ethnic dividedness are still prevailing in the region work against the confirmation of 
neo-functionalism in this specific case. 
 For that reason this paper argued that more appropriate theory for 
explanation of the ECSE would be the neo neo – functionalism which unlike its older 
version does not state that the regional community would definitely grow into 
something bigger and would have positive spill over effects on other areas. The main 
point here is that it all depends! It has to pass first the initiating cycles to come to the 
priming cycles where countries and well interconnected and then there is a possibility 
to discuss deeper regional integration. Since the EU is the only highly complex man-
made polity out there, the question of whether this community will develop in the 
same way remains open. 
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Abstract 
 
Knowledge and innovation have become the key to competitiveness and economic 
success. In the pursuit of economic competitivenes, the ability to achieve success in 
the market depends from the labor competitiveness and innovation. Europe realizes 
an innovation policy as a shared vision with the priority of building a knowledge-based 
economy. Also, one of the most important determinants of the competitiveness of the 
workforce is the country's education system.  Paper explains the EU activities related 
to achieving a knowledge-based society and a competitive workforce. The national 
innovation policies of the EU-member countries are being developed within the global 
and European development directions, but at the same with regard to the specific 
characteristics of the national economies, especially to the primary drivers of the 
technological export breakthrough on the global market. After opening remarks, we 
propose some theoretical starting points. The next part of the article provides some 
international comparisons and discusses the situation in the Republic of Macedonia. 
After receipt of some current problems in Macedonia, the paper ends with 
suggestions for improving the future situation. The two-level model (national 
innovation policy and knowledge-based society) seems like the most appropriate 
approach for Macedonia both with regard to the robustness of the tasks that should 
be performed in the next development phase and to the going in the direction of the 
new economic and social changes in EU. 
 
Key words:  knowledge, innovation, competitiveness, the European Union, Macedonia 
 
Introduction 
 
When a society becomes knowledge-based, it faces challenges on a variety of levels. 
How and why knowledge is produced and shared, where it is produced, how 
knowledge spillovers affect new knowledge creation and parameters of use, changes 
in strategic decision making in knowledge-based environments and how public policy 
can and should adapt all are crucial issues. Today, we are living in a chaotic transition 
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period to a new age defined by global competition, rampant change, faster flow of 
information and communication, increasing business complexity, and pervasive 
globalization. The pace of change has become so rapid that it took a different type of 
firms to be dominant and marked entirely new era of business. The rapid 
development of the knowledge sphere of the rich countries today is one of the most 
notable mega-trends in the evolution of human civilization.  
 
In the new economy, the knowledge component of products and services has 
increased dramatically in importance and has become the dominant component of 
customer value. The shift to knowledge as the primary source of value, makes the new 
economy led by those who manage knowledge effectively – who create find, and 
combine knowledge into new products and services faster than their competitors. 
More over, the capability to innovate and to bring innovation successfully to market 
will be a crucial determinant of the global competitiveness of nations over the coming 
decade. Undoubtedly, there is growing awareness among policymakers that 
innovative activity is the main driver of economic progress and well-being as well as a 
potential factor in meeting global challenges. The actualization of the "knowledge and 
innovation factor" as a solution to the general problems of economic growth is a very 
important and controversial subject of economic policy in Macedonia. 
 This paper aims to provide empirical and theoretical analyses of issues relating 
to creation and use of knowledge and inovation in the knowledge-based economy. 
First, we provide some theoretical argumentations. Then, we discuss about knowledge 
and innovation policy as a main strategic tools for achieving growth and 
competitiveness in the European Union. Last, but not the least, we investigate the 
past and current situation on this matter in the Republic of Macedonia and then the 
paper ends with some suggestions for improving its future situation.  
 
v. Theoretical Framework 
 
Knowledge-based economy is one in which the creation and use of knowledge and 
ideas or inovation have a crucial role in the acquisition of wealth. Even more 
significant, Europe realizes an innovation policy as a shared vision with the priority of 
building a knowledge-based economy. Having this in mind, we present some 
theoretical argumentations behind this concept. Referring to the overall growth of all 
countries and especially, in addition to the concern of the growth in the economies in 
transition, EU suggests that if they want to increase their competitiveness, they should 
develop their competitive advantages at the national level in order to face with 
competitive pressures, primarily coming from EU countries (Radosevic, 2003).  
 The role of innovation in the success of the nation and the industry is best 
introduced and expressed by thefamous economist Michael Porter. Porter used a 
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diamond shaped diagram as the basis of a framework to illustrate the determinants of 
national advantage. (Porter 1990, p.73) Porter argues that competition takes place 
around the creation and assimilation of knowledge and insists that the nation's 
competitiveness depends on the potential of national industry to innovating and 
developing. Porter also argues that national success of different countries may be a 
combination of many factors. He flatly rejects the widespread belief that government 
policy would like an active exchange rate policy and antimonopoly stimulation of the 
economy. Instead, he refers to the examples of industries that have succeeded in 
global level and argues that companies achieve their competitive advantages by  
innovation activities (Porter 1990, p.74). According to him, the innovation is not only 
the introduction of new technology (which results in new products), but also it relates 
to innovation processes and innovation in organizations (eg, new processes within 
companies). However, he emphasizes that the international dimension - effects of 
innovation (eg, innovated products) must be placed on the international market. 
Porter believes that the successful innovations arise when companies are under 
strong competitive pressures and despite the fact that their innovation activities can 
run into criticism and great obstacles. The maintenance of competitive advantage is a 
continuous process of improvement and upgrading because competitors are able to 
imitate any competitive advantage. 
 Creation and use of knowledge is the second relevant factor that has 
important role in the generation of growth and acqusition of wealth in the globalized 
societies. General knowledge and education system are becoming one of the most 
significant factors in the present conditions of the world economy. Today, 
globalization creates a need, the societies to be based on the knowledge. Key 
determinant of a knowledge-based economy is human capital, or its essential 
knowledge, expertise and capabilities. In the traditional industries, most of the jobs 
require the employees to know to do routine tasks. In the knowledge-based economy, 
fast changes are forcing workers to acquire new knowledge, expertise and abilities 
and to upgrade them during their whole working life. Also, one of the most important 
determinants of the competitiveness of the workforce is the country's education 
system. Education allows the country to shift the scale of development and tranfer the 
production of simple products to complex ones. Educated workers more easily accept 
the new technologies and also develop their own ones. 
 Barro, Sala&Martin (1995) showed that the level of education of the 
workforce (measured by years of schooling) and public sector allocation for education 
is closely linked to the growth rate of real income per capita. High competentent 
workforce depends from the quality of the education regarding the population. 
Bassani and Scarpetta (2001) found a high level of cohesion between the increased 
level of education and economic growth of the country. According to their research, 
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any additional year of education of the population allows individual countries to 
increase production per capita for 4-7%. 
 However,  the value of formal education should not be overestimated. Most 
of the researchers agree that human capital is an important determinant of 
competitiveness and economic development (return on investment in education is 
higher than the return of any other investment), but not a guarantee of development 
as the country with the best human capital does not necessarily achieve the best 
development results.  In general, a large number of people with (outdated) academic 
education is not a true indicator of the competitiveness of the workforce. Workforce 
can easily be under-educated or unapropriate-educated or some employees may not 
possess the knowledge necessary for successful economic competition. In the 
conditions of rapid technological development, school diplomas and academic 
degrees do not guarantee economic success of individuals or even society as a whole. 
So the company can not rely only on those who have completed the educational 
process or on the labor market as the most important source of new knowledge and 
skills. It is therefore important to develop long- term educational and training 
programs and adult education, and ensure the participation of the entire population 
in it. 
 In many developing and as well in transition countries, existing systems of 
education are costly and ineffective, but unfortunatly, there is no simple way of 
improving them. Today employees must be able to create, analyze and transform 
information, effectively communicate, organize and coordinate business activities. 
They should develop communication skills and information knowledge as well as 
ability and willingness to further teaching and training. The biggest challenge for these 
countries is not only a question of how to gain the hardware, but to provide 
knowledge and know to use modern technology. Educational systems must not only 
encourage the acquisition of knowledge and skills related to specific tasks, but rather 
should be focused on developing the skills of decision making and problem solving, 
and training for future self-teaching and participation in the education system. The 
pursuit of competitiveness of the workforce is particularly important to tertiary 
education because it directly affects the productivity and competitiveness of the 
national economy and improving life standards (World Bank, 2002). In short, the 
educational structure of population and employees conformity with the economic 
needs, is becoming a crucial determinant of competitiveness and economic 
development. 
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2. Knowledge and Innovation Policy: Main Strategic Tools for Achieving 
Growth and Competitiveness in the European Union 
 
In the era of globalization, the growth and development should be achieved through 
expanding the possibilities of gaining information and using communication 
technologies, which has led EU to set long-term determinants in order to become the 
most competitive economy in the world based on knowledge.  
The World Bank (World Bank, 2002) proposes many measures in order to assist 
countries in determining a strategy for transition toward knowledge-based society and 
economy.  
 Economic and institutional systems that provide support for 
application of existing and acquire new knowledge and enterprise 
development.  
 Educated and skilled population that successfully creates, shares and 
uses knowledge.  
 Dynamic information infrastructure to facilitate effective 
communication, exchange and process information.  
 An effective innovation system of firms,  research centers, universities 
and other organizations that would  increase the volume of knowledge in the 
world, customized and conformity with local needs and facing the creation of 
new technologies. 
 
The transition to knowledge-based society is the way to join the world of EU global 
competitors. In 2000, The European Council has adopted the Lisbon Strategy, where 
the main goals for the next ten years have been set for the purpose of  becoming the 
most competitive and knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth, with greater opportunities for employment, better jobs and higher 
social cohesion. 
 At the Lisbon summit, it was expressed a strong view that innovation should 
be the basic mechanism of the transition to a knowledge-based society (Council of 
European Union, 2002). Therefore, innovation policy has become one of the main 
strategic tools for achieving the competitiveness of industry and thus for the 
maintenance and stimulation of economic growth in the EU. The EU approach to the 
innovation policy has more aspects. The elements of innovation policy refer to the 
industrial policy and company policy development, where the emphasis is on small 
and medium-sized enterprises. This position can be seen in the Lisbon strategy (such 
cases the Official Document Lisbon Summit of the Council of Ministers), in which it is 
proposed establishment of a European areas of research and innovation, creating a 
friendly atmosphere for the establishment and development of innovative 
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enterprises. Likewise, the small and medium-sized enterprises should be the key 
drivers of the innovation. As a mean of achieving these goals, EU proposes key link by 
the creation of the innovation network between companies and financial market, 
research and development, research and education institutions, advisory services and 
technological market. The important determinant of the strategic opportunity to 
strengthen innovation in the EU is evident in the next events. During the summit in 
Barcelona in 2002, the European Council reviewed progress on the basis of the Lisbon 
strategy, confirmed the commitment to encouraging innovation and called for 
research activities which has made a significant stimulation of research and 
development and innovation activities in the EU (European Commission, 2003). In 
conclusion,  the Council has expanded the requirements for the expenditure 
dedicated to exploring the formulation and development (goal is for 2010, reach 
about 3% of GDP, with 2 / 3 of investment should come from the private sector). 
 Furthermore, EU sent a call for strengthening research business research and 
development through an integrated strategy that covers the increase in competition, 
better access to capital for more risky ventures, as well as better protection of 
intellectual property rights and dissemination of technology. The statement of the 
Commission on innovation policy in 2003, was also an extension based on the 
conclusions of the Lisbon strategy (European Commission, 2003). The statement calls 
for a wider definition of the concept of innovation, with the aim that the policy does 
not omit the less obvious or less well-known forms of innovation activities. It is also 
required interaction of innovation policy with other policy areas, eg industrial policy, 
which should increase the success of the innovation policy. 
 The key factor for industrial competitiveness is actually stated in the 
'Industrial policy of innovation in the enlarged Europe' and is highlighted together 
with the knowledge and entrepreneurship (European Commission, 2003, 2004). The 
statement says that the European industry must become more innovative by ongoing 
installation, training and improving their products, processes and services. It is 
emphasized that the entrepreneurs need to develop innovations. The Green Paper on 
entrepreneurship innovation is considered one of the key challenges. (European 
Commission, 2003). 
 The strategy is focused on competitiveness and cohesion of the EU by 
increasing the innovation economy and creating more jobs and better jobs. The 
implementation and achievement of the strategy should be set in a way that suits the 
conditions at the national level of the relevant countries. It was agreed that the 
European Council will meet regularly and discuss implementation strategies and 
propose measures of its improvement. The process of economic growth and social 
cohesion in the EU was the subject of discussion at meetings of the European Council 
in Stockholm in 2001, Barcelona 2002 and in Brussels 2003. (European Council, 2004). 
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 The results at the EU-15 level are mostly positive, but there are big differences 
between the competitive and technologically leading countries (Finland and Sweden) 
and countries (or regions) that are lagging behind them (such as Greece or Italy, it is 
not) and who are trying to reach an advanced society. The second group did not easy 
accept  most of the technical and technological changes, so there are serious troubles 
in the adoption and implementation of changes in all segments of society. 
 In 2002, the Educational Council has aimed to improve education and 
workforce competitiveness through the adopted Work Program. The program has 
three primary goals: improving quality and effectiveness of education and training 
systems in the EU, access to education and training of the entire population and the 
opening of a broad education and training classes. To achieve different goals women 
have proposed various measures such as developing skills for the knowledge society, 
ensuring the general availability of ICT, massive admission to the scientific and 
technical studies, buliding strong European cooperation, etc. 
 For all of these goals it is necessarily to keep in mind the future needs of the 
labor market and to achieve the development of knowledge, expertise and abilities of 
employees and the rest of the population, necessary for a knowledge-based economy. 
Countries that have properly prepared their people for active participation in the 
global knowledge and information economy will achieve substantial benefits and so 
their population. So the goal - the creation of agile and capable workforce that is 
willing to take risks, self-reflect, process information and solve problems, team work - 
is becoming a clear and unquestionable. It is unknown only the way to achieve this. In 
addition, there is no simple model or a model suitable for all countries.In addition to 
the concern of the growth in the economies in transition, EU suggests that if they 
want to increase their competitiveness, they should develop their competitive 
advantages at the national level in order to face with competitive pressures, primarily 
coming from EU countries (Radosevic, 2003). 
 
3. Knowledge and Innovation policy in the Republic of Macedonia 
 
During the 90s, the strategies for achieving and maintenance of long-term economic 
growth in the Republic of Macedonia have disregarded the meaning of knowledge 
development and innovation activities. Public policy innovations appeared only at the 
end of the 90s, while the institutional research systems development have not yet 
been completely restructured. Growth and innovation in this economy generally 
depends on the setting up research and development, the ability to absorb and spread 
of technology and demand - today and taking advantage of generated elements. This 
all together forms a conceptual framework of the national innovation capability. 
Elements of the national innovation capability are(1) absorption is the potential ability 
to absorb new knowledge and the adoption of imported technologies. (2) exploring 
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the potential of research and development is not only an important task of generating 
new knowledge, but also the mechanism for its absorption. (3) expansion is a key 
mechanism for the collection of economic benefits from investments in research and 
development and enjoyment to strengthen absorptive capacity. (4) innovation is the  
key mechanism that initiates the process of creating wealth in the research and 
development activities, absorption and dissemination (Radosevic, 2003).  
 In the world of global competence, the winners are already known, those are 
the economies whose export is the basis for inovations. Republic of Macedonia, 
already has the status of candidate member for EU integrations- this status explicitly 
demonstrates that this kind of EU changes are more than necessary. Thus, facing the 
magnitude of the changes that have taken place in the European countries, it must be 
mobilizied all corresponding institutions concerned with organized approach towards 
knowledge, information, and innovations as key points of the reorganization of the 
economy and the society, which is neccessary for achieving higher step of the 
development. Institutionalized research and development decreased during the 
transition due to declining share of public sector expenditure for research and 
development in GDP because of the lack of technological improvement in businesses. 
Funding research and development of the industry varied from region to region, while 
the intensity of co-operation was given by the industrial structure of the country. Non-
industrialization was quite sudden, while there was the increased share of services in 
the economic structure, crossing the average growth of industrial activities. In general, 
partial loss of government funds, with weak demand caused the neglect of 
modernization and restructuring of research and development. Twenty years since the 
beggining of the Macedonian transition, and still, Macedonia is concerned with the 
implementation of the reforms that are crucial for appionting to the basic 
preconditions for market functioning. The indicators of the macroeconomic 
development, the analysis of the domestic and foreign resources, just confirm the fact 
that the transitional changes are developing very slowly. This is proved with our 
struggling behind the European processes, but not only behind them, also struggling 
behind other EU- member countries in transition.  
 The most important postulate for turning towards the ongoing changes in the 
European surrounding is the growth, as a result of the functional market economy. In 
such an economy, competetion must be based on the qualitative factors of growth. '' 
The ability of a country to mantain rapid economic growth during a longer period of 
time is highly dependent of  the effectivness by which its institutions and policies are 
supporting the tehnological transformation and  the inventivness of the companies. '' 
(Popovska, 2007). 
 The accumulation of problems with the social repercussion, the market 
environment where the price is still considered as predominant tool for strugle with 
the competiton and the social environment with its unsufficient institucional 
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credibility, have slown down the development of the Macedonian economy and the 
implementation of the criteria on which the European market is based. The process of 
privatization has led to productivity's reorganization, but not to complete owners 
transformation, which is noted by the abandoning the classical factors of 
manufacturing and instead keeping the labour intensive one. The Macedonian 
production is mostly based on the raw materials, who by definition, produce relatively 
low-added value in the comparison to the research and tehnologically based 
manufacturing. The investment ability of the Macedonian economy is on the level that 
corresponds with  the need of intensifying of the process of the economic 
reconstitution. In the gross domestic product, gross investments have participated 
with 21,4%, and the investments in fixed assets with 17, 8 %.    
 The creation of innovations is connected with research and development. 
Nowdays, the linear innovative  process is substituted with interactive innovative 
process that is based on various factors on the side of the supply and demand. 
Different actors, institutions, and individuals are contributing in and out of the R&D, 
by all sorts of activities and through different forms of connection. Cooperation is very 
important in creating innovations. In innovative societies, the innovative process is 
mostly dependent on “learning economy”. Republic of Macedonia marks extensively 
lowest level of separating  R&D in comparison to other EU- memeber countries in 
transition ( for example, Slovenia, (1%), but compared to the aspirant  EU- member 
Croatia (over 1%). EU has sat the following goal: structural increase in R&D expences 
in the private sector over 66% in 2010. In EU, the  average participation of the 
business sector is 6,3%( 2000). It is also stricking the struggling behind of R&D 
expences in the business sector in Macedonia. The largest spending is on universities 
(60,2%). What is surprising is the fact that in the period between 2003-2004 only 2 
small, 21 medium and one large enterprise have had R&D investments. The biggest 
part of the R&D expences in the private sector falls to the production of chemicals, 
and chemical products and to the production of farmaceuticals. The potential-human 
resources engaged in R&D, has adversly structure, too. In 2002, on one million citizens 
in Macedonia, 4 researchers and 69 with tehnical profile (FTE- full time equivalent ) 
are registred, while in Croatia the numbers are 1.904 researchers and 440 with 
tehnical profile. The percentage of the researchers is the highest in high education 
(6,1 %), and lowest in the bussiness sector (0.4%). 
 Macedonia lag behind the most of the Central and Eastern European countries 
and even more the EU in all aspects of national inovation capacity. The level of 
innovation corresponds with the level of development of the financial system, as well 
as the degree of competition and macroeconomic stability, or with the share of 
foreign direct investment. In comparison with the EU-15, Macedonia, expressed some 
prefered avoidance of risk, lack of finance for research and development, poorly 
developed links between science or research  and business sectors. However, it turned 
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out that most of the transition countries have the common difficulties in the field of 
innovation policy. Institutional environment for the implementation of innovation 
policy is not well coordinated, human and financial resources are scarce, and the 
potential for companies to absorb knowledge and then apply it is very low. Referring 
to the new EU member countries (Chezh Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland), it is 
evident that they are the countries with the highest number of patents registered by 
residents.(Radosevic, 2003). 
 The scientists and engineers, along with a relatively well-educated workforce, 
are the two good starting points of the national innovation system in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and so as well in the Republic of Macedonia. The national 
innovation system consists of the measures and program policies, technological 
infrastructure and the institutional mechanisms of political control. (Popovska, 2007) 
 Knowledge becomes the most required product in the contemporary world. 
Knowledge production is development and aquiring of new knowledge. Knowledge 
transmission is education and development through training of the human resources. 
Knowledge transfer is dissemination of knowledge, that goes through a lot of actors, 
structures and institutions, and of which connection, the innovative capability of the 
economy and the society in general,  is dependant on. Republic of Macedonia not only 
demonstrates extremely concerning level of potential production of its own 
institutions and individuals, but also it is on one of the lowest position according to 
the representation of modern forms of tehnology transfer –or among the last 
countries in the world, taken into the merits of the index of global productivity.   
Knowledge and innovations hold the ''key'' for succesfull performance on the world 
markets, because only by them, reorganizaton of the economy can be made in the 
direction of tehnological intensive and,  by rule,  highly competetive sectors. In 
Macedonia, in the period of 2000-2004, high tehnologies have participated only with 
1% in the export of the manufacturing sector. Such percentage is registered only in 
the manufacturing sector in Albania. All the other EU members countries in transition 
note higer percentage (2004):  Estonia– 14%, Hungary– 29% (over the EU percentage), 
Latvia, Leetonia and Slovakia – %, Romania – 3%, Slovenia 6%, Czech Republic-13%, 
Poland – 3% and Bulgaria 4%, and in Croatia - 4%. This "result" in Macedonian export 
can not be justified just with the bad economic conditions inherited from the period 
before the transiton, but primarily it is a result of the " slowness syndrome" of the 
transitional changes, i. e the long process of creating basic preconditions for market 
functioning. To change this position, it should be implemented the following features: 
higher education and training, effectivness of the markers, quality of the services, 
skilled labour force, financial funds, and tehnological readiness etc (Popovsk, 2007). 
 Referring to the general knowledge and education system, we can withdraw 
the following characteristics. According to OECD (2003), we can specify significant 
problems of the Macedonian educational system: the lack of emphasis on developing 
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the ability to analyze issues and solve problems, weak links and areas of education 
and underdevelopment of life learning education. Although in Macedonia, there are a 
number of projects regarding the strategy of education, they are still not well 
implemented or realized, and they are not some significant reforms that have been 
undertaken on this level. 
 According to Pecakovska and Lazarevska (2009), “Macedonia has alarmingly 
low pre-school enrolment rate with serious barriers for expanding pre-school 
coverage; very high early school leaving (ESL) rates with poor vertical and horizontal 
transition from one to another education subsystem and ill competence- based 
curricula reform; disturbingly high percentage of low achievers in reading and low 
percentage of people with upper secondary education; insufficient tertiary education 
participation rate with low, but increasing number of MST graduates and very low 
level of participation of adults in continuous education and training. These attributes 
suggest continuously poor performance of Macedonian education and training system 
in the process of accession”. 
 The existing organization of curricula and the way the educational process  is 
placed on provides only passive knowledge and teaching that does not allow 
Macedonia to acquire highly technical, technological and social knowledge, expertise 
and skills required in a competitive economy. There is a huge number of compulsory 
subjects, and a sufficient number of elective as well. Also there is a serious lack of 
flexibility and low level of local influence on the development of curricula. 
 The similar is the problem with primary and secondary education, because 
there is a lack of differentiation. Instructional programs are designed to make the 
young population to continue their education in high school, and not to continue their 
education in the craft expert and schools. Teaching programs are inadequate. 
Therefore, for the most capable and motivated students, most of the subjects are too 
easy, and for those less capable and less motivated quite difficult. 
 Number of people who graduated in the last decade increased with 4404 in 
2003 year to almost 7835 in 2007 year. The largest increase in the number of 
graduates was recorded in economic and social sciences. However, still there is a great 
lack of competent managers,  macroeconomists, financial analysts, modern, educated 
leaders and entrepreneurs, experts on international commodity and financial market, 
experts on public administration, specialized lawyers for work and social law, tax 
system, international law. The reason for these problems is probably the lack (or 
weak) connectivity between the market demand and content of educational 
programs.(State Statistical office, annual report, 2007) 
 Macedonian educational system slowly moves from a system with classical 
discipline and teaching methods to a system that meets the needs of democracy with 
a globally integrated free market. The new sustem should include the concepts like 
problem solving skills, creativity, communication skills and flexibility. The relevant 
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Macedonian educational institutions must perform specific analysis and implement 
many changes to their educational system. 
 An important part of the competitiveness of national economies is actually 
the level of knowledge and expertise of workers. Macedonia does not have the 
necessary workforce skills and abilities that must have one modern competitive 
economy and the education and training systems have not implemented yet the 
necessary measures to reduce the inneficiencies. Possible EU accession of Macedonia 
sets further demands to improve the education system. Macedonia workforce must 
be redirected to the industry and business knowledge-based economic growth and to 
stimulate innovation, and employees should be able to quickly change jobs, manage 
them and work environment and to participate in life learning process. Students and 
employees need to learn to work together, building team spirit, proper social behavior 
and personal development while allowing inclinations and talents. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the previous arguments for the purpose of this research and after receipt of 
some current problems in Macedonia, the paper ends with suggestions for improving 
the future situation.  
 
 Republic of Macedonia has an unsatisfactory level of production, investment, 
innovation i.e. technological ability of its economy. The lagging behind the 
other transition economies implies increased complexity of the tasks which 
Macedonia has to perform within its efforts for gaining EU- membership 
status. The fast approaching to the phase where the increased efficiency is 
essential for the growth and the exports, supposes generation of conditions 
for a competition with new products, new processes, modern marketing, new 
managerial approach, by generation of creative ideas gradually transforming 
themselves into “learning organizations”. 
  The educational system should be changed in the way of providing more 
different educational opportunities to the participants of all ages, reformed 
curricula and establishing stronger links with the needs of the economy. It is 
necessary to improve the ability of solving problems, develop teamwork, 
increase the learning ability, improve the communication and technical skills 
etc. The reform of the curriculum should include many instruction manuals for 
the teachers and teaching materials, changing teaching methods and a new 
way of measuring educational results. In addition, the selection and training 
for the profession of vocational education should move into more classes and 
expand the circle of specialization. The educational system should be flexible 
and practicable to avoid and reduce early school leaving. We should increase 
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the internal differentiation, finding and providing the informal ways of 
acquiring knowledge and skills and improve knowledge of foreign 
languages.The curricula should systematically analyzed and modernized. 
 The pedagogical practices in schools and universities should be changed, so it 
could help to make disciples and students to become more responsible and to 
increase their initiatives by system of rewarding. They should be directed  to 
new different ways of analyzing and solving problems by implementing more 
practical work and case studies. 
 The educational system should be based on the decentralized management 
especially in the field of funding, employment, curriculum, assignments etc. 
Local authorities and universities should gain more autonomy and 
responsibility, instead of  the Ministry of Education. At the same time, schools 
and local authorities should develop managerial abilities to effective handling 
the schools. Schools and universities should be accountable for their results, 
and their results should be measured as an indicator of the success of the 
reforms. Increased expenditures for education without proper increased 
accountability will not give the desired results. Therefore, the Ministry should 
establish the standards, but the schools should be held accountable for 
educational results and also have freedom to do it. State has an obligation to 
determine the proper framework for fostering innovation and accountability 
of tertiary education institutions and it should develop easier entrance 
faramework for the private educational institutions on the market. The radical 
changes in curriculum, materials and pedagogical methods in case of 
Macedonia will have to conduct intensive training of already employed and 
new teachers to introduce new teaching methods, teaching materials and 
methodology for testing. Teachers and teaching should be mandatory and 
they should be trained to improve teaching methods and procedures, using 
information and communication technology and expanding their knowledge. 
These training programs should be interactive so that teachers and educators 
could each other exchange their ideas and experiences. 
 The two-level model (national innovation policy and knowledge policies) 
seems like the most appropriate approach for Macedonia both with regard to 
the robustness of the tasks that should be performed in the next development 
phase and to the takes that result from our going in the direction of the new 
economic and social changes in EU. 
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Onofrio ROMANO 
 
Albania and Apulia Contribution to European Identity 
 
Abstract 
 
The contribution focuses on the identity issue with reference to the European 
integration process.To this aim, the case of the Southern Adriatic area – covering the 
Italian South-East and South western Balkans (namely Apulia and Albania) – will be 
highlighted. This region shows many reasons of interest for the whole process of 
European integration, as it represents a kind of hinge between Western civilization 
and the East, Europe and the Mediterranean, North and South of the World. Our 
thesis is that, despite the different traditions, cultural heritage, histories, political 
dominion etc., the societies facing on the two sides of the lower Adriatic sea share 
common core attitudes. They were forged on the basis of a similar existential 
framework: the secular (or centuryold?) condition of marginalisation in relation to the 
hubs of political power. So, the lower Adriatic inhabitants have acquired a particular 
skill to win the grace of the ruler in office, whoever he was, building, at the same time, 
a hidden orb in which to preserve their authenticity, their original cultural references. 
This framework has produced, in the long run, an anti-identitarian people’s 
constitution, i.e. an “anthropology of the absence”, consisting of two complementary 
dimensions: mimicry and the vernacular order. This ensures both the merger of 
dissimilarities and the preservation of an impregnable singularity. The anthropology of 
the absence still emerges strongly in relation to the new political focus with which this 
region relates nowadays: the European Union. 
The implemented policies aimed at cohesion and integration of the peripheral 
regions are here systematically diverted to reproduce life forms consolidated over the 
centuries, which escape the fundamental canons of the Western-European model of 
society. But, far from being included as a disease, the attitude developed in the lower 
Adriatic could represent a useful suggestion for Europeitself, always faced with the 
problem of its unresolved identity. 
 
Anomic Europe 
 
For a long time we have been crushed between the anvil of "imaginary socialism" and 
the hammer of "real socialism". EU today is likely to melt in the same impasse. All 
kinds of discourse have been produced on the idea of Europe, on its identity dress. 
Almost all European intellectuals have exercised their imagination on it, devoting at 
least one book to what Europe could and should be. 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
325 
Then, on the other hand, at a sidereal distance, “really existing” Europe arises, 
that of Brussels celestial bureaucracy, which enacts its regulation protocols on every 
detail of our life, going from the welfare regimes down to the size of bananas. Despite 
the complete separation of their orbits, the imagined Europe and the real Europe are 
two sides of the same inconsistency, two expressions of the same impossibility, of the 
same basic cultural manque. Furthermore, both expressions are completely separated 
from the people, i.e. the really existing society of Europeans. 
            As Pasquale Serra (2004) points out, if we deeply look at the highest summits 
of thought concerning Europe, we will almost always face something like anti-Europe 
theories, in which it is decreed that any sovereign political entity is an obsolescent 
tool. Europe coincides with a horizon in which all differences are only waiting to melt 
into a neutral form of universalist atomization. 
According to Massimo Cacciari (1994), for example, the “European spirit” is 
nothing more than the celebration of the endless process of eradication, of unlimited 
emancipation from any "form", even those who have ferried modernity (the State, 
socialism, liberalism, etc.). Europe is the cradle of the West, literally understood as 
"the land of the sunset" of any communitarian garrison. Balibar (2001; 2003), in the 
same wake, looks at Europe as the place of "evanescent mediation", where to 
experience the endless deconstruction of citizenship in favour of a transnational 
civilization freed from the "violence" of borders and differences. Antonio Negri (Hardt, 
Negri 2000) rediscovers Europe as the eligible land where his amorphous multitude 
will exercise its a-finalized and unlimited constituent power, enemy of every form of 
sovereignty. Habermas, finally, in his apology of juridical globalism, replaces the 
European political project with the cosmopolitan right. 
           More precisely, the vocation to pluralism (of persons, nations, cultures, 
jurisdictions, institutions, etc.) included in the idea of Europe is the most faithful 
translation of the identitarian logic of “unlimited accessibility” (Romano 1993), 
belonging to the code of western modernity. The neutral device aimed at encouraging 
the unlimited creativity of individuals in the selection and development of their life 
projects, is the same adopted by Europe in its equidistance from any cultural 
specificity encompassed, not opting for anyone of them, but just recognizing the right 
of each one to self promotion, within the limits of respect for the others. This neutral 
and universalistic (or pluri-versalistic) strategy has an almost inevitable outcome: if, in 
principle, the exclusive promotion of a single model of existence is banned – in order 
to ensure the coexistence of all models of life – the policymaker can only engage in a 
culturally anonymous work of generalized expansion of the system, which basically 
corresponds to the growth of intangible and material resources that guarantee the 
access to life’s chances individually chosen. From this device arises the fetishism of 
economy, i.e. the paroxysm of the unlimited valorization, detached from any cultural 
orientation. 
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            The cultural dimension, denied by the neutralist device, melts in a folkloric 
(Latouche 1996) or aesthetic (Cassano 2003) orbit, losing all sovereignty on the social 
sphere. From the same mechanism stems the “really existing” Europe of the celestial 
bureaucracies: the abolition of sovereignty (in the name of the golden principle of 
“unlimited accessibility”) leads to replace politics with governance, with the neutral 
administration and the technical expertise, separated from any cultural reference. 
            Thus, the European project is already depleted. The elusiveness of European 
features threatens also the integration process, especially of those areas which are 
more remote and less homogeneous with European history. The case of Southern 
Adriatic, from this point of view, is very interesting. Our ambition is to show that its 
imperfect integration, far from being an anomaly to be remedied, could give some 
precious suggestions in order to de-strand Europe from the anomic drying neutralism, 
restoring it to a great political vision, without sacrificing its pluralistic vocation. he 
Southern Adriatic also allows us to re-found Europe starting from the real social 
practices, found on site, and not from abstract intellectual constructions. A Europe 
based on what it really is and not on what it should be. 
 
2. Noman’s land 
 
In this brief exploration we will be led by one of Ulysses’s masks, the one employed on 
meeting Polyphemus, the Cyclops. The invention of the pseudonym “Noman”, the 
cunning of the “disappearing identity”, enable Odysseus to experience the 
magnificence without succumbing to it, allows him to beat an infinitely more powerful 
being. The identity simulation, which may be extended to a symbolic abolition of 
oneself, can be found in many inner suburbs of the Mediterranean. The lower Adriatic 
(including the Italian south-east and south-western Balkans) is, without any doubt, 
one of them. 
           Historically - and not just geographically - it is a very particular area, placed at 
the crossroads between Eastern and Western civilization, and between Northern 
efficiency and Southern stasis. Both Apulia and Albania have been for centuries (and, 
in some ways, they still are) extreme outskirts of flourishing civilizations and 
grandiloquent empires, dwelling at a sidereal distance from the centres of power. This 
peripheral condition has produced an anti-identitarian people’s construction, i.e. an 
anthropology of the absence. Based on a double movement: mimicry and the 
preservation of the vernacular, i.e., of its static circuit of social reproduction. 
          The mimetic approach is employed to gain the favour of the representatives 
of History, namely the colonizers in office. The lower Adriatic inhabitant has 
developed a special ability to wear the signs of conversion to the various historical 
mainstreams that have crossed its moorlands. Exemplary in this sense is the religious 
history in Albania. Its pagan lower layer has been oppressively encircled by the 
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universalistic and monotheistic religions: the Catholic one in the North, the Christian 
Orthodox in the south, and the Muslim in the Centre. The Albanians have thus 
alternated their faiths, depending on the best offer of prebends attached to 
conversion. Already in the eighteenth century, Lady Montagu wrote that in the North 
of the country, to be sure not to err, villagers went to the mosque on Friday and to 
church on Sunday (Baldacci 1925). To better tolerate the bitterness of the faith 
practices, the Albanian Muslims have even come to build an autocephalous sect, the 
Bektasci, auto-assigning them some discounts on fasting during the Ramadan, the 
opportunity to freely consume pork meat and alcohol, the lack of central spiritual 
directions, and so on... 
            Under the mimetic peel, the lower Adriatic inhabitants have been able to 
cultivate their own eternity, a lifestyle modelled on a tragic mood, confident in the 
sense of death and self-annihilation, removed from the historical flow and from the 
expressive swelling of identity, based on the mere reproduction of life, alien to any 
form of projectivism, expansionism, development (even in the purely economic 
sphere). 
            Two cardinal institutions of the lower-Adriatic anthropology witness this 
posture: “tarantism” and “revenge”. The phenomenon of Tarantism, that originally 
connotes the area of Salento in Apulia (though similar practices can be found in other 
orbits of the Mediterranean), fits in a typical logic of dépense, allowing the resetting of 
the substances of removed-remorse (called to epiphany by the bite of the poisonous 
tarantula) through special collective dancing rites (De Martino 2005). It is a cyclical 
dynamics of emptying and cleansing of the self, in which the subject disappears to 
himself, acknowledging his submission to the removed forces. On this horizon, the 
accumulative, controlling and operating individuality, typical of western civilization, 
cannot have any citizenship. Revenge fits in the segmental structure of the Albanian 
anthropological warp and it is codified in its customary law, whose most known 
transcription is contained in the Kanuni by Lek Dukagjnit (Resta 1997). 
             A hostile act revenged by the murder of the author obliges all members of the 
victim’s clan to return the courtesy by killing a male member of the murderer’s clan. 
And so on ad infinitum, until virtually the mutual extinction of the opponents’ clan. 
The endless cycle of revenge strengthens a special closeness to death, which becomes 
a constant presence in the Albanian collective body. The inexhaustible pursuit of a 
break-even point in the accounting of bloodshed (the state of equilibrium in the blood 
balance) immobilises the community within a static circuit which inhibits the 
citizenship bond and its expansive potential. 
             Mimicry and the circular (a-historical) existence seriously undermine the logic 
of economic exploitation mirroring a twofold strategy for the resolution of the 
problem of livelihood: the practice of parasitic capture of resource flows from the 
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colonizing powers (attached to mimicry) and the vernacular self-production 
(horticultural scale cultivation, harvesting of nature wild fruits, 
wild animal breeding, etc..) in accordance with the preservation logic of the social 
reproduction static circuit. 
           These features are not outdated materials but rather stand out in full force 
during the end of the Fordist modernity. 
          The new imperial centre (EU), with which the lower Adriatic area has to relate, 
through the poisoned gift of the integration and cohesion policies, imposes a 
development model based on the 
classic canons of the exploitation of human, material and intangible resources, whose 
fruits would be later used in the free market competition. 
            If the lower Adriatic had undertaken this path, today the area would sink in a 
poverty state. Its competitive position, in fact, would be suspended between the 
firepower of the big Western companies – whose productivity is supported by 
unsurpassed research and innovation targets – and the dumping of the productive 
factors remuneration (work above all) led by the emerging Eastern countries. A deadly 
flattening, that would have condemned the area to economic marginality and, in 
social terms, to the abyss of the relative deprivation. A recipe universally distributed 
aimed at enhancing local production entirely circumvents the problem of the territory 
placement into the international economic space, hierarchically structured. In this 
space, the lower Adriatic would have played a gregarious role, that is the storage area 
of the lower productivity working phases. Beyond all purposes, EU de facto imposes 
its neighbours a kind of subordinate integration. 
            On the contrary, both sides of the lower Adriatic have gained life and 
consumption standards that, from a purely material point of view, is perfectly aligned 
with the standards of most developed Western countries. Against EU directives, the 
area has developed an alternative pattern of cohesion, founded on the canon of 
orbital integration. Participation in the dominant system (and in its benefits) is not 
insured by the exploitation of tangible and intangible territory resources, but mainly 
by picking up the resources produced elsewhere, flowing in the globalization circuits. 
This abduction economy takes on different characters on the two sides: more hidden 
in Apulia and more visible in Albania. 
 
The orbital integration 
 
In Apulia, the orbital integration was developed, starting from the end of World War 
II, in the new political landscape of the Democratic Republic. The so-called “phase 
leap”, classically themed in southern literature, is the first indicator: the Italian 
Mezzogiorno shifted from a predominantly agricultural economy to a services one, 
bypassing the manufacturing stage. It is impossible to show the statistical details here, 
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but it is well known that the services sector is largely oversized if compared to 
physiological parameters dictated by the agricultural-industrial complex to be served, 
thus the speculation shadow emerges. Its growth was decisively fuelled by patterns of 
political achievement, unrelated to market competition (Trigilia 1993). The political 
mediation has not only directly ferried towards the periphery copious resource flows 
in a purely welfare logic, but has deeply structured all sectors of the real economy. 
First of all, agriculture: more and more rarely its output has undertaken market 
destinations, becoming a mere virtual caution to win public subsidies, which are now 
the largest part of agricultural income. 
            Big industrial plants have been dropped from above, eliminating the network 
of local small firms, but without gaining a real rooting in the socio-economic context 
and finally crashing against the crisis of the “glorious thirty years”. According to 
Tonino Perna (1992 and 1994), the specificity of southern dynamism must be found in 
the extra-profit vocation, that has produced a vast nebula of high productivity 
economic ventures, placed halfway through the illegal sector and the mere financial 
speculation. 
            In this framework, applicable to all the Italian Mezzogiorno, Apulia was 
marked by some specific connotations. First of all, the criminal hand has acted in less 
invasive and less structured ways. Here, the political achievement has reached greater 
efficiency. The resource flows coming from the centre (Rome) have been better 
catalyzed (due to the consolidation of politically articulated systems of communication 
between local political staff and national government ranks) and better spent 
(Romano et al. 2003). The economy of the most dynamic areas in the region has been 
led by sectors dependent on public regulation and investment: constructions, private 
health care, banking, financial services controlled by representatives of local 
governments. The market achievement can only be found in the residual areas of the 
small speculative trade, taking advantage of an ancient trade tradition, that is very 
difficult to reintegrate in the pattern of modern Western capitalism. The case of the 
regional capital (Bari) is very significant: at the beginning of the sixties, we saw a 
promising development of some indigenous manufacturing sectors, especially in 
mechanics. But this vocation was suddenly frustrated, because the entrepreneurial 
energies have been taking the road of easier and quicker horizons of enrichment, with 
the housing industry sack of the city and some other opportunities of political 
appropriation (Viesti 1998). 
              The general crisis of the Fordist model, declined in the Italian Mezzogiorno 
with the “extraordinary intervention” recipe, opened up new scenarios. In the early 
nineties, the bottom-up approach to development led to bet directly on southern 
citizens, by financial support to self-entrepreneurship and to small and medium local 
enterprises operating in the “industrial districts”, and then with the so-called 
“negotiated planning” policy (territorial pacts, programming contracts, etc.). The great 
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hopes raised by this prospect are rapidly shifting in growing disappointment. Support 
tools are more and more detached from their original development goals, becoming 
functional substitutes of the old resource flows assured by the “extraordinary 
intervention”, inefficient in encouraging selfdevelopment, but not in streaming 
resources towards the South (Cerase 2005; Chiarello 2005). 
               Brussels is the new irradiation centre of resources. Apulia is refining high level 
planning skills, in order to catalyze the flows, despite their planned destinations. After 
the huge mistake of selfdevelopment and local development, the usual orbital 
approach comes back: the only one that allows a real integration to propelling centres 
of the new empires. The project aimed at transforming the Italian south-east in a 
privileged hub for eastern goods falls into this newfound speculative perspective: the 
illusion of becoming independent-producers is definitely abandoned. 
Apulia returns to harass the intermediations between those who are the real 
producers. 
            The post-communist Albania has taken the abduction route with an unmatched 
level of dedication. 
             In one of its latest reports, the World Bank defines “impressive” the 
cumulative economic growth of the eagle’s country (since 1990), among the most 
consistent in all the transition countries (WB 2005). In particular, from 1993 to 2004 
the average annual growth of GDP was more than 6% (and we must take into account 
that the period includes the fateful 1997, in which the country experienced a second 
collapse due to the failure of the financial pyramid schemes). This growth is 
miraculous, given that it is immediately clear to whoever sets foot in Albania that the 
country does not produce almost anything. The officially recorded growth is not 
related to the real economy production (agriculture and industry) but with the 
emergence of a “surreal economy” (Romano 2004). The weight of agriculture in GDP is 
around 24% (against 35% recorded in the nineties), the industry is stuck at 9% (we 
should go back to 1938 to find the same value): before the regime’s fall, industry 
assured more than 50% of the national income. All efforts made by international 
bodies (including EU) to support the revitalization of agriculture and industry were 
vain. 
              According to the World Bank, the determinants for the impressive growth of 
Albania are to be found, first of all, in the “reallocation of resources from low 
productivity sectors like agriculture to high productivity sectors (services, 
construction)” (WB 2005, p. 1). Pressed by decades of overcommitment during real 
socialism, Albanian people refused further working coercions softly imposed by 
international agencies to encourage development, undertaking, on the contrary, in 
sectors with a high productivity or a high speculative rate. Construction, first of all. It is 
difficult to calculate its contribution to GDP (although officially it is around 9%), since 
most of the assets remain in a grey area: we must take into account that around the 
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major urban agglomerations many informal suburbs arose. The contribution of 
services to GDP shows an exponential growth during the transition and it is now 
around 60% (INSTAT 2005). The services are physiologically justified as serving 
production, but it is clear that this is not the case. They are used primarily to manage 
the orbital flows of the abducted resources. 
              The official figures, however, make no sense. Albanian economy sails far 
beyond the recordable production, the formal/real economic circuit. The glaring 
inconsistency of average wages and salaries compared with the living cost (very close 
to that of Southern Italy) witnesses a decisive pressure on goods demand, not 
explainable with the inner production and coming from dimensions not intercepted by 
the collectors of official data. Most of the Albanians livelihood sources are not 
recordable by official statistics. 
               The orbital integration of Albania is based on three major currents of 
economic extra-version: migrants’ remittances, trafficking (legal, illegal, purely 
financial) of the holding companies that play a role in global affairs, provisions of 
international donors (Romano 2004). 
               The weight of remittances on the national economy is difficult to be 
calculated, since most of the flows escape detection. People living at home now stand 
around 3,100,000, and only between Greece and Italy approximately one million legal 
migrants are distributed, who regularly transfer part of their earnings to relatives back 
home. We can infer that almost the entire population is assisted from outside. There 
is no family in Albania that does not have at least one member residing abroad. But 
the resource flows from migrants do not entirely explain the extraordinary growth 
pace in Albania. 
               The decisive boost probably comes from the illegal sector, that since the 
beginning has marked Albanian dynamism. Prostitution, illegal migration and drug-
dealing were the ridges along which a sort of primitive accumulation took place in 
Albania, which has given the big-push to the country. 
                But we must, however, consider that today these trades have put on more 
respectable clothes. 1997 was in this sense a kind of watershed. In that year, as is 
known, the dream of proliferation and redistribution of wealth, in which the entire 
population had been called to participate by the system of financial pyramids, was 
shattered. Since then, the Albanian criminal clans have abandoned the traditional, 
rough and aggressive robes to undertake a new respectable style, well-articulated and 
more refined. Exploiting the resources accumulated in the early years of rampant 
lawlessness, they have been able to set up complex trusts that invest in global affairs 
in a wide range of fields, all connoted by the extra-profit motive: hotel chains, 
construction industry, cruise ships, casinos, shopping centres, major infrastructures 
etc. Speculation on capital movements is now added. These trusts have their holdings 
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in Albania and take deep roots here. They name their emissaries in parliament and at 
all Government levels; they control the press and television networks. 
              The resource flows from international donors are still generous. In this sector 
too, Albania has enjoyed a kind of primitive accumulation, heaping up a series of 
emergencies during the years (until the Kosovo crisis in the late nineties), that have 
catalyzed the international aid. They are no longer merely care flows. Albanian 
authorities have done their best to exploit the strategic collocation of the territory in 
the new, complex geopolitical scenario, building a refined alliances policy with the 
dominant countries (especially U.S.) and receiving in return substantial prebends. 
Later, Albanians have acquired remarkable planning skills in order to stabilize relations 
with the international community. The most striking example is the “business of civil 
society”. In the early nineties, there were almost one thousand NGOs in the country, 
which are no evidence of a particular democratic spirit. Far from it. NGOs have a 
peculiar familistic character, they are alien to internal democracy, the leaders appear 
almost irremovable and interpret the association as their own property (Romano 
2000). NGOs are mirror decoys for larks. They represent only a business investment in 
the new market of sociality. The old social rights are no longer guaranteed by the 
State (in accordance with the structural adjustment recipes by IMF, World Bank etc.). 
Therefore they are replaced by international charity intercepted by local NGOs, which 
have developed over time good skills and good camouflage capacity, apprehending 
the language of international projects and so acceding to donors resources (which, ça 
va sans dire, will never reach the ultimate declared beneficiaries). 
              Next to the abduction economy, tied to mimicry vocation, there are several 
expressions of vernacular preservation. In present Albania we can clearly read both 
approaches. If the extraversion flows produce a kind of urban orbital economy, 
vernacular expressions can be found mainly in the informal suburbs and in the self-
production and self-consumption practices re-emerging in Albanian rural areas. 
            Transition Albania was affected by large flows of internal migration from rural 
areas to major urban centres, under the pressure of land property fragmentation that 
has deeply undermined the opportunity to build a market-oriented agricultural sector. 
Around the town borders, large suburbs 
have sprung up informally, without infrastructure and urbanization works. The 
inhabitants of these areas survive thanks to remittances, but also thanks to small 
businesses that benefit from the proximity of the city. Here some solidarity networks 
re-emerge from a forgotten past. Here a new vernacular society is reborn, focused on 
a merely social reproduction. 
           This is much more visible in the countryside, with the small scale production, 
targeted to mere selfconsumption and to goods exchange along the lines of 
parenthood/clan reciprocity. Only for the mere survival maintenance. The countryside 
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inhabitants are far from the formal market, they live now in their own, invisible orbit. 
A dignified poverty. 
           The eternal double movement (mimicry and vernacular preservation) is back 
to work in Southern Adriatic. It ensures the integration at the centre of the system, 
without obeying to alien lifestyles. 
 
Politics comes back 
 
We do not propose an apology of orbital integration. We do not suggest the case of 
lower Adriatic as a model. Beyond the embarrassment that it evokes for the content 
of lawlessness and barbarism, it is above all hardly sustainable in the long run, as 
emphasized by the World Bank and by most observers. Furthermore, these practices 
are seriously undermined by the standardization directives imposed by EU and other 
international bodies. The stabilization pacts become increasingly stringent and do not 
allow large areas of operation beyond the compulsory development paths. But above 
all, the lower Adriatic experience does not open new perspectives, nor in any way 
undermines the dominant patterns, since it is fed by them. The lower Adriatic route 
also produces huge inequalities, which are only partially absorbed by the reciprocity 
networks and neo-clanic solidarity. Ulysses- Noman does not disturb the Cyclopes’ 
calm, he just stole them what he needs to survive. Therefore, the temptation to 
sanctify this marginalised condition is far from us. We have no reason to hope for the 
eternal reproduction of a world whose enchantment never existed. 
             Anyway, Southern Adriatic witnesses an alternative way of living. Starting 
from it, maybe it is possible to build something else, i.e. starting from its political 
potentials. Is it possible that the coming back of an anthropology of the absence could 
work as a basis for a socio-political alternative to the mainstream, giving meaning and 
specificity to the European project? 
             According to Bauman (1999), the contemporary world is haunted by a major 
paradox: from an individual point of view, personal freedom of western citizens has 
never been so widespread, but at the same time all of us are quite convinced that no 
collective project could determine deep and radical changes in our reality. The forces 
that forge the world appear to be hidden, not subject to the control of collective 
political autonomy. Compared with other ages, in which people lived the thrill, the 
exaltation and also the anguish given by the possibility for a radical, forthcoming and 
sudden change, today we are, on the contrary, haunted by the feeling that, despite 
the level of freedom reached, we are no longer able to imagine and implement great 
projects of transformation, which could overturn current dynamics and forge a world 
ruled by a different vision. We can only navigate at sight. Politics can only engender 
very small changes, because its real role is to aid the state machine to fit in the 
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anonymous flows of reality. Politicians must assure that the ship’s course is 
maintained in the most rational and balanced way. 
             Why big political projects are no more conceivable? Because we have defined a 
horizon locked down by inviolable taboos. The infrastructure of human rights, of 
fundamental individual liberties, the “perpetual veto of autonomist virality” lead to 
the system lock. Autonomy, in fact, is a viral concept. Once in, you can’t limit it with 
devices not legitimated by the autonomy principle. It spreads as a pandemic, building 
wide spaces, intangible by collective autonomy, in favour of individuals. It follows that 
the implementation of any great political vision is structurally prevented 
by the recognition of the molecular autonomy in defining and pursuing an idea of 
“good life”. The recognition of the micro-liberty becomes a veto to great liberty. The 
big forces that determine individual lives remain absolutely untouched, as they are 
considered the prerogative of private will, in the name of viral autonomy, but mainly 
by virtue of the stigma on sovereign power, the only entity able to limit private 
greediness and to implement great objectives. 
            This is the “condominium model”. It spreads anywhere: from suburb to town, 
territorial district, region and so on. The aim is permitting anyone to enjoy his own 
housing plot, assuring that the common appurtenances are well maintained. Infringing 
this spatial split is an intolerable abuse. 
              In order to rediscover the great vision and the great Politics, to experience the 
Cyclopic, we must restart from the “de-thinking” peripheries, where residents are not 
involved in the care of themselves, surviving beyond the identitarian logic. Here the 
exploitation and self-promotion logic gives way to taking, dissipation, dépense. Here 
Politics rediscovers its humus. Only in the desert, the mirage raises, the great vision 
that all envelops. Availability to radical transformation raises only where people 
search self-annihilation to give space to vision. 
              These are not mere abstractions. This political chance is alive nowadays. Two 
of today most interesting political cases arise in Southern Adriatic: the regional 
government of Apulia led by President Nichi Vendola and Tirana city (the capital of 
Albania) led by the mayor Edi Rama. Two weird politicians: a poet and an artist called 
to play top level roles in local governments. 
Beyond any administrative output, it is very interesting to inquire into the deep social 
expectations they have shaped. 
           With Vendola, vision came back to the political domain. Without any planning, 
he has touched the deeper strings of the meridian being. Inexpressible and uncivil 
feelings. He has given a shape to a clamouring and ineffectual agora (far from the 
spirit of good administration of commons), to a mere abandonment in the bliss of 
nature, distrustful towards technologic illusion (that promises safe disposal of other’s 
waste and composting of garbage). He has given shape to the creative antieconomies, 
based on the mere capacity to manage symbols, to sing, to live without working. The 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
335 
Mezzogiorno, thanks to the oblivion in which it has been left in recent years, has 
regained its rebellious spirit, its character untamed by the sirens of neutralising 
rationalism. So, a vision returns to win against the pursuit of objective reality. 
              Vendola has also won a challenge inside the left, against the “conservative 
left” who has reduced politics to mere administration, who has married modern 
rationalism at its twilight, out of time. The left that repeats at all times “that is not 
possible”, that censors all practices that are not included in the homogenizing 
protocols of neutral and rational Europe, the omni-parametric left who rejects all 
visions. Apulia has rebelled to the limitation of horizons, to the diktat that states “a 
communist gay man (i.e. Vendola) cannot climb to Government”, rediscovering 
instead that there is no limit to human political creativity. Vendola has been able to 
give citizenship back to certain scopes ousted for many years by the left. 
              Vendola has stopped the rush to individual self-promotion, redesigning the 
possibility to rediscover the “social chain” protection and a new collective subjectivity 
opposed to anonymous forces that forge the contemporary world. 
              Rama has been able to upset many development processes started by Tirana. 
The post-transition anarchic-capitalism has been translated into the spreading of a 
myriad of kiosks within public gardens along the central boulevards in Tirana. This 
dictatorship of entrepreneurial singularity, also promoted by the international 
agencies and reinterpreted in specific ways by Albanian people, has been defeated by 
a returning sovereign force, embodied by Edi Rama. He has opposed a major political 
project to the viral autonomy veto, involving the whole citizenship, against 
individualist imperium. Rama has given a shared identity back to the town, creating a 
clear aesthetic mood, embraced by citizens. This asset has been implemented thanks 
to some oddness, like the transformation of the old gloomy socialist buildings in 
polychrome paintings. Rama has coloured Tirana buildings diverting some European 
grants from their natural destination, thus exploiting the mimetic mindframe of taking 
and often winning the condominiums’ opposition. In this sense, he has also de facto, 
and not only symbolically, overcome the condominium logic dictatorship, that 
prohibits the epiphany of the supremacy of the collective body. 
            Both cases show the possibility to re-build the community on different bases, 
far from the unlimited individual sovereignty, far from the market-development 
normalisation promoted by EU. Both cases meet once again the vision that shapes a 
new communitarian sense, infringing the collective taboo. 
            This is possible thanks to the rediscovered anthropology of the absence, based 
on the “Noman” path, that allows the Cyclopic experience. A new community that 
stands beyond the individual competition, that has its cardinal point in the collective 
force. A community emancipated by selfpromotion coercion and also by the 
marginalisation tied to the orbital integration (too compromised with the dominant 
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forces). The Southern Adriatic offers its potentials to Europe, helping to overcome the 
Europeism impasses. 
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Determinants of the Female Employment Rate in The European Union in 
Comparison With Non-Europaen Countries 
With a Special Look at The Republic Of Macedonia 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the determinants of the female employment 
rate in the European Union where we have used panel analyses of 27 countries 
members of the European Union from 1995 till 2008. In order to make comparison 
among countries we have included institutional variables like: maternity leave, child 
care facilities, college education, female unemployment rate and part-time 
employment. We expect this variables to have a positive impact on the female 
employment rate except for the female unemployment rate. At the same time we are 
taking in consideration the national employment structure in Macedonia compared to 
the EU countries. 
Key words: female employment rate, determinants, cross-national comparison, 
European Union 
Introduction 
 
Faced with a trend  of overall employment decline and demographic changes 
associated with an ageing of the European labour force, the European Union found 
itself under pressure to undertake certain action toward increasing the overall 
employment rate by creation of new jobs, investing in people and technologies and, 
more specifically, increasing  female employment. 
Confronted with globalization and the challenges of a new knowledge-driven 
economy, the European Council held on 23-24 March 2000 in Lisbon came to an 
agreement for a new strategic goal for the European Union to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. 
Achieving this goal required an overall strategy aimed at:  
 preparing the transition to a knowledge-based economy and society by better 
policies for the information society and R&D, as well as by stepping up the 
process of structural reform for competitiveness and innovation and by 
completing the internal market; 
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 modernizing the European social model, investing in people and combating 
social exclusion;  
 sustaining the healthy economic outlook and favorable growth prospects by 
applying an appropriate macro-economic policy mix. 
This strategy was designed to enable the Union to regain the conditions for 
full employment, and to strengthen regional cohesion in the European Union. The 
European Council needed to set a goal for full employment in Europe in an emerging 
new society which is more adapted to the personal choices of women and men. If the 
measures set out below were to be successfully implemented against a sound macro-
economic background, an average economic growth rate of around 3% was thought to 
be a realistic prospect for the coming years. Among the goals for modernizing the 
European Social Model by investing in people and building un active welfare system 
was creation of more and better jobs for Europe as well as substantial reduction of 
unemployment.( www.europa.eu, summary of legislations).  
The European Council considered that the overall aim was to raise the 
employment rate from an average of 61% in 2000  to as close as possible to 70% by 
2010 and to increase the percentage of women in employment from an average of 
51% in 2000 to more than 60% by 2010. The new goal required Member States to 
consider setting national targets for an increased employment rate, which it was 
argued by enlarging the labor force would reinforce the sustainability of social 
protection systems ( www.europa.eu, summary of legislations) 
  
Table 1.The progress of Total and Female employment rate from 2000 till 2008 in 
percentages 
 
 Employment 
Rate  % overall 
Employment 
rate 
55-64 years old 
%overall 
Female 
Employment 
Rate15-64 
years old 
GDP Growth 
percentage 
change on 
previous year 
EU 
Benchmark 
70% (2010 
target, Lisbon 
summit) 
50% (2010 
target, 
Stockholm 
summit) 
60% (2010, 
Lisbon summit) 
Base line 
scenario of 3% 
per annum, 
Lisbon summit  
1997 60.7 36.4 50.8 2.5 
2000 63.4 37.5 54.1 3.9 
2001 64.1 38.4 55.0 1.9 
2002 64.2 39.8 55.6 1.2 
2003 64.5 41.5 56.2 1.2 
2004 64.8 42.3 57.0 2.3 
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2005 65.4 44.2 57.8 1.8 
2006 66.2 45.3 58.8 2.9 
2007 67.0 46.5 59.7 2.7 
2008 67.3 47.4 60.4 0.6 
 Source: EUROSTAT- European Commission Statistics 
The goals set above were a result of mainly two major trends in the European labour 
market.  The first major trend concerns the changes in the employment pattern and 
the second trend concerns demographic changes in the European population in 
general. In the early 1990’s under two thirds  of the population aged 15 to 64 years of 
age in the EU 12 were economically active, a ratio of 10 points lower then in the 
Scandinavian countries and the US. The labour participation rate varied from just 58 
per cent in Italy and 59 percent in Spain to 73 percent in the UK and over 80 percent in 
Denmark. Overall, there has been a tendency of decline in the participation rate of the 
under 25 years of age reflecting the growth of full-time schooling and training as well 
as decline in the participation rate among the low – skilled older workers especially for 
males mainly in Finland, France, The Netherlands and the UK (Adnett, 1996) 
Important impact on the labour market, especially the supply side. In the last 
three decades the working- age population has grown more slowly in Europe then 
elsewhere, averaging around half the 1.2 percent increase found in the OECD as a 
whole. Increased life expectancy at birth, as well as fall of fertility rates, have 
contributed to a rise in the share of older age groups in the population. Life 
expectancy in the EU has risen by about 5 years for males and nearly 7 years for 
females since 1960. Over the same period the fertility rate, live birth per 100 women 
aged 15 to 64 years has fallen from 2.6 to 1.5, with only Ireland having rate above 2. 
As a result, 15 percent of the European population in the early 1990’s were aged 65, 
with a predicted rise to nearly 20 percent by 2020. Concerning the workforce around 
34 percent of the EU labour force will be aged over 45 by 2005, with the ratio 
exceeding 40 percent in Scandinavia (Adnett, 1996). 
Based on the trends in the early 1990’s Johnson and Zimmermann (1993) have 
concluded that the increased ageing in Europe is likely to increase labour cost, reduce 
labour supply and increase the vintage of human capital. The potential combination of 
raising the proportion of retired people, falling activity rates and  persistent high 
employment has caused concern about the ability of European economies to finance 
existing state pension. For that purpose, Austria, France and Germany have made 
policy changes to discourage early retirement (Adnett, 2007) 
While there was tendency for a decline in male participation rates in European 
labour markets as well as in the USA, female participation rates have been slowly 
increasing, for all levels of educational attainment, especially amongst those within 
the prime working-age aged of 25-49 years, the child–bearing and child–rearing age. 
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In the early 1990’s women accounted over 40 percent of the labour force in most 
European countries. However, the rates of progress toward the European average of 
40 percent has been uneven, e.g. around 48% in Sweden, 45 percent in the UK and 
only 35 percent in Italy. In the early 1990’s the southern Member Countries, Greece, 
Spain and Italy had relatively low rates of female participation but at the same time 
have had among the highest rates of increase. The steady change in the pattern of 
employment, i.e. the increased female participation rate during past decades, is partly 
the result of a significant shift in the demand for female employment, especially after 
the Great Depression when low-skilled men where substituted with cheap yet 
educated females. The burst of predominately female employing industries and 
occupation had their impact as well. However, female decision to supply work is 
mainly determined by the household formation, fertility and house hold dissolution 
which as stated above have been subject to radical changes in the past few decades. 
 
Literature review  
 
In general there are two main approaches employed across studies of female 
employment across countries. The first approach examines the level of female 
employment itself, focusing on the labour force participation rate and the number of 
hours worked such as part-time to full-time category. The second approach explores 
the determinants of female employment. While the determinants selected for analysis 
vary from study to study, they may include one or more of the following three types of 
variables: (1) individual level ( micro variables, such as number of children in 
household); (2) institutional level ( macro) variables, such as the size of the welfare 
state and (3) a combination of individual and institutional level variables. Warnecke, 
L.T ( 2008). While single-country level studies use micro-level variables, macro-level 
variables focus on family policies as diverse social, political, institutional and cultural 
constraints  of the average female participation rate. 
   Institutional determinants  became important determinants of female 
employment after the global economic crisis in the 1970’s when high levels of 
government intervention  via social welfare system was needed because of  the 
rampant inflation, unemployment and slow growth. Family policies include parental 
leave, child benefits and child care subsidies as part of the welfare system in one 
country. Developed countries have some form of family policy guidelines, but there 
has been little convergence among advanced industrial societies ( Gaulthier 2002, 
Albert and Standing 2000, Orloff 1993, 1996, Nelson 1994). EU 15 countries are 
countries with different welfare systems. According to Esping-Andersen’s Welfare 
Regime Typology( 1990) where European employment models are grouped into 
liberal, Scandinavian ( or social - democratic)  and continental models. The new 
Member States, which still seem in search of an appropriate model, are called “ 
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transition model” models. The same typology has been used by Bosch, Rubery and  
Lenhdorff (2007) in their report on the recent trend influencing female participation. 
 
Maternity and parental leave. 
 
Parental leave, maternity leave and child leave boost female participation by helping 
women to reconcile work and family live (Ruhm, 1998).Since in most countries 
maternity and parental leave are focused on motherhood ( and fatherhood), it is 
important to  note that only paid leave time can truly support the woman’s role as 
mother. Long parental leave, especially not accompanied by job-guarantee may cause 
difficulties for women to  trying to return to the labour market ( Ondrich et al, 1998; 
Edin and Gustavsson, 2001) at the same time causing negative impact on the salary of 
return mothers (Ruhm, 1998 and OECD 2002,a) Spain is among the countries with the 
longest and most generous maternity leave policies in Europe, i.e,  16 weeks, all  each 
paid at 100% of the woman salary up to a maximum level ( Eurostat 2004). However, 
longer maternity leave supports the position of women as dependent wives by taking 
maternity leave longer then 16 weeks where participation rate begins to drop ( 
Juamote 2003). In 1992, the European Commission passed a pregnancy directive, 
sating that all members countries of the EU must provide a minimum of 14-week paid 
maternity leave. However, while some countries provide only the minimum 14-week 
program ( Belgium, Germany, Portugal), other countries provide substantially more 
generous maternity leave programs eg. United kingdom with 26 weeks, Italy 20 
weeks, Denmark and Finland 18 weeks (DiCioccio and Wunnava, 2008) 
 
Child care 
 
The analysis of child care policies impact on female  labour supply necessitates 
consideration of two  of dimensions : availability and cost ( Vuri and Del Boca, 2007). 
Since child care policies differ among European countries (Esping-Andersen’s Welfare 
Regime Typology,1990), availability and cost tend to have different impact on female 
labour supply decision. ( Vuri and Del Boca, 2007). For example, Wronhlich ( 2004) 
comparing West and East Germany has found significant bur very small effects of child 
care cost on mother’s labour supply while Gustafsson and Stafford (1992) revealed 
significant relationship only in particular areas of Sweden; Chiuri (2000)  found non 
significant relationship between cost and female labour decision.  
However, studies done by Heckman 1974; Blau and Robins 1988; Conelly 
1992; Ribar 1995; Averet et al. 1997; Vitanen 2005,  have found that child care cost 
are very significant determinants of the demand for childcare services and 
employment decision ranging from -0.02,  Ribar 1995 to low of – 0.82, Averet at al, 
1997. ( Vuri and Del Boca, 2007).  A reduction in child care cost increases the 
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probability of mother’s part time employment but has a less significant effect on the 
probability of working full time.( Del Boca, 1993). The burden of child care cost was 
mainly eased through childcare provision recommended by the European 
Commission, which according to Del Boca and  Viuri  (2007) in the Italin labour market, 
was above the needed level. There is a common lack of subsidies in the Southern 
European countries among them Spain. Warnecke, L.T ( 2008).This lack of subsidies 
for 0-3 age grouped force mother to take longer parental leave which decreases 
women’s likelihood to return back to the market work leading lower wages and flatter 
lifetime earning pattern ( Mincer and Polachek 1974). 
 
Fertility rate and presence of young children at home ( under 6 years old). 
 
In many studies, presents of children is taken as strictly exogenous variable in the 
employment equations which rules out  feedback effects. Following the strategy 
proposed by Carrasco (2001) we relax this assumption and allow for endogeneity. 
According to Michaud and Tatsiramos (2008) current employment is likely to depend 
on the number of children in the household which is the result of past fertility 
decision. Similarly the decision to have a child my depend on current employment 
 
Gross Domestic Product per capita 
 
GDP and employment rate have a positive correlation with another words there is a 
simultaneity because both have effect to each other. Most of the studies have shown 
that for each percentage increse in GDP per capita there will be increesed in goods 
and services as well as creation of new vacancies leading to higher overall 
employment. For egsample, according to Polozani (2008), if there is an average 
increase for 10 years of 4.1% in GDP there will be 1.4 percent in employment. It is 
often assumed that female spouse’s primary responsibility is child rearing and 
household management, especially at the children’s younger ages. Such assumption is  
reinforced by the fact that in the formal labour market male earnings potential 
exceeds female earnings potential ( even in the 21st century). Thus having relatively 
young children at home becomes de facto constraint for women in perusing paid 
employment( Cebula and Coomb, 2007).Accordingly Female participation rate is 
hypothesized to be a decreasing function of presents of small children at home. 
According to Troske and Voicu ( 2009), women with higher education have fewer 
children and work more before the birth of the first child, but children have larger 
negative effects on their level of labour market involvement. The coefficient of – 1.429 
for children aged between 0 and 1, indicates that children lower women’s level of 
labour market involvement by reducing the attractiveness of work relative to non 
work and the attractiveness of full time and full time part year work relative to part 
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time. The sign may be relative to females with older then six years old children. ( 
Cebula and Coomb, 2007).The coefficient for older children are still negative in sign 
but smaller in absolute value indicating that the effect declines it the aged of the child. 
Same conclution was found by Falzone (2000), where he number of children and 
having younger ages of children, husband income increase the probability that 
married women to work part time rather full-time. Tax incentives to split income – 
and thus work hours-between spouses also positively influence the choice of married 
women between inactivity and part-time participation ( OECD, 1990).  
 
College education 
 
Females with high or College education expect a relatively higher return with college 
education which makes it more likely that she will be in the labour force seeking to 
receive this return. Further more, the absence of significant gender discrimination, 
greater levels of education attainment theoretically afford females a greater range 
possibilities and a greater choice of superior ( more “ desirable”) employment, e.g, 
higher paying jobs, thereby creating an incentive to enter the labour force. Studies by 
Gerner and Zick ( 1983), Rexroat ( 1990) and Miller and Xiao ( 1999) have found that 
higher education attainment exercises a positive impact on female labour force 
participation. According to Troske and Voicu ( 2009),education is the strongest 
determinant of women’s labour supply. The coefficients of  0.142 and for women with 
13 -15 years of education and coefficient of 0.188 respectively, for women with 16 
years of education, suggest that women with higher education are relatively more 
likely to work fulltime. 
 
Female unemployment rate 
 
To control the labour market conditions and the expectation of obtaining gainful 
employment in 2008 we can include female unemployment rate in 2007 in each 
member country of the EU 15.This measure provides the marginal female with a more 
precise likelihood of gaining employment to the extent that there still exist 
occupations that are predominantly performed by women. To the extent that 
unfavorable labour market conditions exist in the current period, discouraged females 
will drop out of the labour force in the next period. Therefore there is a negative 
relationship between female participation rate and the unemployment rate. ( Cebula 
and Coomb, 2007). According to Hotchkiss (2006), who has investigated the changes 
in female participation rate for women aged 25 to 54 in period of 1975 to 2005, weak 
labour conditions ( i.e higher unemployment rates) provide downward pressure upon 
the female employment rate.  
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Case of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 
 
Formar Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as a candidate member of  the European 
Union , has faced the same situation concerning the female employment and  above 
all female social status. Female status has became an  increasing problem that started 
to preoccupied the official state institution  that begun to undertake steps to regulate 
this problem by establishing certain legislation.   
Women had been  marginalized in public, social  and political life, paid less for 
work of equal value and find themselves victims of poverty and unemployment more 
often than men. The legal status of women had become an increasing problem to the 
point that had raised the question of equality of both sexes in all spheres of public, 
political and private life leading to another question of female employment.  
                For that purpose Republic of Macedonia has started a continuous 
development processes toward gender equality. However, in the practice there are 
still obstacles to the implementation of gender equality. In 1997, the Government of 
republic of Macedonia established the Gender equality Promotions Unit, within the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Policy. The aim of this unit is a promotion of women in 
accordance with international conventions and documents ratified by republic of 
Macedonia. 
               According to the data given in Table.2, activity rates, male and female 
employment rates between 1996 and 2005 were very unequal. While the male rate 
reached 41.2% in 2005, only 26.6% of women of working age were employed, and 
rates were particularly low for older women.  
 
 
Table 2.  
Employment Rate 
%  
        Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total employment 
rate 37.4 34.4 35.9 35.9 35.8 38.6 35.8 34.5 32.8 33.9 
Female 
employment rate 27.4 24.4 26.3 27.1 27.2 30.9 28.1 27.7 25.4 26.6 
Male    
employment rate                          47.5 44.6 45.4 44.6 44.7 46.3 43.5 41.3 40.2 41.2 
 
Analyzing the structure of employment by level of education, age and 
ethnicity we can come to the following conclusion. The employment rates according 
to level of education show that the lowest rates are found among those having 
primary education or less, while the highest are for people whose education was of 
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university level. There are significant disparities which have been increasing over time, 
the total for people without education went down from 13.4% in 2001 to 6.7% in 
2005. 
According to age, particularly for the younger and the older age groups the 
activity rates for workers aged 15-19 decreased from 18.4% (61.6%) in 1999 to 14.5% 
(50.9%) in 2005; for workers aged 65 and above from 9.0% to 4.8% between 2001 and 
2005, while the activity rates for workers between 45 and 64 years of age have 
increased slightly over the same period. 
In respect of ethnic minorities, by the LFS 2000 labour force survey: the 
participation rate of women of ethnic Albanian origin was 11.3%, compared with 
51.1% for ethnic Macedonians (national report), and with 62.3% for men of ethnic 
Albanian origin. Other ethnic groups, such as the Roma, display a significant gender 
gap as well. Data from the 2002 census show major differences in ethnic groups’ 
participation rates: the Macedonians display the highest rate, of 58%, followed by the 
Vlachs (54.7%), the Roma (54.2%), the Serbians (47.3%), and the Turks (44.3%). Ethnic 
Albanians have the lowest participation rate (37.9%), due to the extremely low level of 
activity among Albanian women, as already highlighted. There are, however, other 
factors that influence women’s labour force participation rates, and these must be 
addressed if we are to achieve the goal of gender equality in access to paid work. 
Even though the legal status of women has improved over the last thirty 
years, effectively equality in employment  is still far from being reality. According to 
ETF Country plan 2009, activity and female employment rates are still very low 
compared to EU averages (50.4% and 32.3%, respectively, for females aged 15-64 in 
2007). The gap between employment rates of men and women is high and amounted 
to 16.5% in 2007. Females are also more affected by unemployment than males: 
surveyed female unemployment amounted to 35.8% in 2007. This pattern of female 
employment can be attributed to the nature of most of the jobs available, but also the 
stereotyping in the choice of the education or job profile, the traditional role of men 
and women in society, lack of facilities for the care of children or elderly people, as 
well as gender-biased recruitment practices by employers. 
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Table.3 Recent data on the female employment rate 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Employment 
rate (15-64), female: 
proportion of the 
female population 
aged 15-64 that is in 
employment 1) 
29.3 30.9 30.9 34.5 32.0 31.3 28.9 30.1 30.7 32.3 32.9 
 Employment 
rate (15+), female: 
proportion of the 
female population 
aged 15+ that is in 
employment 2) 
26.3 27.2 27.1 30.9 28.1 27.7 25.4 26.6 27.0 28.4 28.8 
 Employment rate- participation of the number of employed in the working  
       age population, aged 15 years and over   
 (according to the recommendations of International  Labour Organization - ILO) 
 Employment rate - participation of the number of employed in the working  
 age population, aged 15 - 64 years  
(according to the recommendations of  Europe Statistical Bureau - EUROSTAT) 
 Source: Labour Force Survey, State Statistical Office of Macedonia 
 
 
With respect to the employment rate, Republic of Macedonia should be 
focused on qualitative and quantitative reforms of the employment structure 
according to the gender equality issue by providing equal access to education for both 
men and women, their education, emancipation and enhancement of the inters of 
women for the economic, social and political life and elimination of all barriers which 
obstacle women representations in social life. 
 
Descriptive statistics and model specification for European Countries 
 
In this study we empirically test the effect of selected institutional variables on a 
county’s female employment rate by conducting a dynamic panel estimation. Dynamic 
panel data models estimate the effects on some observed outcome of other variables 
of interest, which may be exogenous or potentially endogenous, conditional on both 
unobserved individual heterogeneity and one or more lags of the dependent variable1. 
Dynamic panel estimation is need when the sample has few time period a many 
cross-section unit. At the same time the dependent variable depends on own past 
values while the independent variables may be endogenous or predetermed Roodman 
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(2006). Accordingly, a panel data of 25 out of 27 EU countries are going to be used in 
time period of 13 years starting from 1995 until 2008.  
 
Female employment rate i,t = αi, +  β1employment rate i, t-1 + β2 maternity leave i,t 
+ 
β3  childcare facilities i,t  +  + β4 fertility rate i,t+  β5 college education it + β6female       
unemployment rate i,t + β7 part-time employment, i,t +ℰi,t 
The chosen variables in the model given above have been considered in the literature 
as possible determinants of the female employment rate. The dependent variable is 
the Female Employment Rate as a percentage of the total female population over 15 
years age and up to 64 years age.  
The independent variables are as follows: 
Maternity leave – maternity leave is defined as the number of paid weeks a 
women is entitled in case of normal birth. This variable is expected to have a positive 
effect upon the female participation rate. However, long parental leave may have 
negative effect because women with longer leave are less likely to return to work ( 
Juamote,2003).  
Child care facilities – because of lack of data and at the same time differences 
in  definitions of child care facilities across countries, in this analysis a proxy variable is 
going to be used,  the participation rate of 4 year old children in pre-school education. 
This indicator presents the percentage of the 4 year olds who are enrolled in 
education-oriented pre-primary institutions which provide education-oriented care for 
young children. They can either be schools or non-school settings, which generally 
come under authorities or ministries other then those responsible for education. It is 
expected to have a positive sign.  . 
Fertility rate – the fertility rate is defined as the mean number of live children 
born to a women during her lifetime. Traditionally, high fertility rate has a negative 
impact upon female employment. However, due to institutional changes in form of 
subsidies, child care programs, possibility of part-time working, the sign of the effect 
might have changed past decades. 
It is important to recognize the mutual dependence between the labour 
supply of married women and fertility, i.e. the endogeneity in either life cycle models 
or static models of female labour supply. Even though children can be exogenous to 
the hours of work decision for married women, according to Xie (1997) children are 
endogenous to the female participation decision where children under six have 
dramatic negative impact on female employment. Therefore a negative relationship 
can be expected. 
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College education -  In order to estimate the effect of education upon female 
employment, a percentage of educated female  tertiary education is used, irrespective 
of fields of education such as mathematics, science, computing, engineering, 
manufacturing and construction.  
1The basic characteristics of the linear dynamic panel model are displayed in the 
following equation: Yit =βYi,t-1 + (αi + ℰit).It is a fist-order dynamic panel model, because 
the explanatory variables on the right-hand side include the first pag of the dependent 
variable (Y i,t-1)where the group-specific random effect (αi) control for all unobserved 
effects on the dependent variable that are unique to the country and  
Greater levels of educational attainment theoretically afford females a greater range 
of employment possibilities and a greater choice of superior (more “desirable”) 
employment, e.g. higher paying jobs, thereby creating an incentive to enter the labour 
force. Therefore we can expect a positive relationship between the percentage of 
female population with college education and female employment (Gerner and Zick, 
1983, Rextorat, 1990, and Miller and Xiao ,1999) 
do not vary over time i.e captures specific ignorance about country i and an error that 
varies all over countries and time  (ℰit) capturing the genera ignorance of the 
determinants of Yit  
Female unemployment rate – The female unemployed rate is female 
unemployed persons as a percentage of the female labour force based on 
International Labour Office definition. Unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 
to 74 who are without work and have been actively seeking work. This variable 
captures the labour market conditions and the expectation of obtaining gainful 
employment. Unfavorable market conditions, i.e. a high female unemployment rate 
negatively influences the female employment rate, therefore we can expect negative 
sign in front of the coefficient. 
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Table  4.  Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Abbreviation Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
value 
Min Max 
Maternity leave matleave 8.499553 19.40882 13 52 
Child care  
facilities 
chcare 19.63134 78.06901 29.7 100 
Fertility rate fertrate .2396408 1.481935 1.09 2.13 
College education educ 10.59246 25.88935 2.8 54.2 
Female 
unemployment 
rate 
unemrate 4.745048 9.234056 2.2 30.8 
Part-time 
employment 
Rate 
Part-em 16.14076 23.42764 2.7 75.2 
Gross Domestic 
Product  
gdp 2.367503 2.367503 -4.582 12.233 
 
In order to obtain more valid result we have also include time dummy variable in the 
model which will capture  and place the effect of universal shocks ( business cycle 
effects, demand shock etc.) from the idiosyncratic error term in to the systematic part 
of the model. According to Roodman (2006), contemporaneous correlation, as a result 
of universal time-related shocks, is causing cross-individual correlation in the error 
term thus offering a model that is not reliable. 
 In the (Arellano-Bover/Blundel-Bond regression), a system-GMM approach, 
apart from the dependent variable three other variables were used as endogenous: 
childcare, fertility rate and GDP per capita. The error component regression model 
controls for unobservable characteristics including the tradition, employer 
preferences i.e  stereotype ,work-live balance policies and so on. According to the 
literature, there is high possibility for the tradition to be correlated with the some of 
the independent variables in the employment rate, e.g. in highly traditional counties, 
where the bread –wiener model is dominant the less possibility for supporting the 
female partner in the family  to enter the working market, the higher the female 
unemployment rate, higher fertility rate. However, in such cases the random effect 
estimators are bias and inconsistent which require a GMM estimation.3 
According to Green(2002) and Verbeek (2000), the main advantages of GMM 
is that it does not require distributional assumption of normality and it allows for 
heteroscedasticity which can be over come by the means of “robust estimator”. 
However, GMM does require NO autocorrelation in the error term. If for any reason 
ℰi,t-1 is correlated with ℰi,t-2, ℰi,t-3, etc., then the lagged error terms are not 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
350 
independent of the instruments, which by definition can not be valid. Therefore, 
before interpretation of the system GMM estimation, two tests for instrumental 
validity have been used (1) test for first- and –second order serial correlation among 
the residuals ( m1+m2 statistics)1 and (2) the Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions. 
 
Table 5. Interpretation of diagnostic tests for Arrelano and Bover System GMM 
 
 
              MODEL 
Number 
of 
instrumen
ts 
 
m2 statistics: Ho  no 2nd order 
serial correlation 
m1statistics: Ho  no 1st order 
serial correlation 
Sargan test= Hansen J 
Statistics: 
Ho: correlations are 
sufficiently close to 0; valid 
instruments 
All variables 
treated as 
endogenous 
Max-183  t-stat  5%/10% c.v 
 
2.3167    0.0205 
 
0.1061    0.2687 
 
 
M1: Ho 
rejected 
M2: Ho not  
rejected 
 
 
Ho not rejected- 
prob > chi2 =0.1928 
All variables as 
endogenous 
with 2nd lag in 
level and1st lag 
differences 
 
 
 
Min-86 
 
1.9278   0.0539 
 
1.6056    0.1084 
 
M1 Ho 
rejected 
M2: Ho not 
rejected 
 
 
 
Ho not rejected- 
Prob > chi2 =1.000 
All variables 
endogenous  
with 3th lag in 
level and 2nd lag 
differences 
(1instrument 
more) 
 
 
 
 
111 
 
2.271            0.0231 
 
1.1937           
0.2326 
 
M1:Ho 
rejected 
M2: Honot 
rejected 
 
 
Ho not rejected- 
Prob > chi2 =0.0563 
 
All variables 
endogenous 
with 4th lag in 
level and 3 lag 
differences 
(2 instruments 
more) 
 
 
    135 
 
2.2837   0.0224 
 
1.1487   0.2507 
 
M1:Ho  
rejected 
M2: Ho not 
rejected 
 
 
Ho not rejected-  
Prob > chi2 =0.2050 
 
 
3 GMM is a general method of estimating population parameters from a data sample 
where OLS and instrumental estimations are special cases. GMM is assuming 
population conditions expressed in terms of expectations, i.e, E(ℰt,xt)=0 which is a 
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restriction on the covariance between the error term and the independent variable 
known as conditions.GMM allows use of set of instruments per variable with in the 
data which give a great possibility for resolving endogeneity problems within the 
model.(see GMM estimation of Dynamic panel model) 
4 Arrelano and Bond (1991) GMM estimation require E [Δℰit,Δℰi,t-2]=0 i.e, no second-
order serial correlation in the error term of the first differenced equation, where m2 
statistics test the maintained hypothesis (Ho)  in the equation above. The m1 statistics 
has a subsidiary role by providing information on the robustness of m2 statistics. The 
m2 statistics is unreliable i.e, it may fail to reject- if the error term in levels follow a 
random walk. Thus, if there is first – order serial correlation in the first differenced 
error term where  0<p<1, the random walk in the first –order errors is excluded. 
Therefore, the m1+m2 statistics require first -order serial correlation and NO second -
order serial correlation.  
 
According to the first way of testing instrumental validity, i,e  test for first- and – 
second order of serial correlation among the residuals, in all cases the t-statistics for 
m2 was high where we accept the null for No 2nd- -order autocorrelation in the 
differenced error terms. At the same time we do reject the null of m1 statistics for 1st 
–order autocorrelation in the differenced error terms. 
Concerning Sargan/Hansen test, as second test for instrument validity, to low 
and two high p-values can be indicative of weak instruments Roodman (2007). Also 
there is the problem of “ to many” instruments where the Sargan test grows weaker 
the more instruments were test and unable to reject the null of instrument validity. In 
this study, p values obtained in most of the cases were above the apparently very high 
rule of thumb a threshold of p=0.25. According to the statistics presented in the table 
only the forth case of estimation provided p value near to the rule of thumb suggested 
by Rodman, p =0.2050  . Even we do accept the null of valid instruments we still had 
to deal with the problem of two many instruments. 
There is no clear guidance from the literature on how many instruments are 
“too many” (Roodman, 2009), although >xtabond2< does give a warning when the 
number of instruments is larger then the number of cross-sectional units. One of the 
ways to limit the instrument count is by collapsing them, i.e creating instruments for 
each variable only. At the same time there has been a growing evidence that that 
panel data is likely to exhibit cross- sectional dependence which may arise due to 
spatial dependencies, economic distances, common shocks” thereby causing errors to 
be “ correlated across the entire cross section” ( Sarafidis, et al., 2006). The   evidence 
of 2nd  no order serial correlation might implies possibility of no heterogeneous error 
cross sectional dependence. 
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Table 6. The Difference – in Hansan test(≡ C-statistics) 
 
C-statistics 
 
Chi2                       p value Ho: instrument 
validity 
Hansen test of over 
identified restriction 
Chi2=4.52    Prob>chi2=1.000 Not rejected 
Difference in Hansen test of 
exogeniety of instruments 
 
Chi2=5.17    Prob>chi2=0.819       Not rejected 
Comparison of both tests 
 
Chi2=0.65     Prob>chi=1.000 Not rejected 
 The p values given above were compared to the conservative threshold 
suggested by Roodman which is p=0.25 
According to the statistics presented in table the system GMM instruments for levels 
are valid, in which case we can accept the” steady-state” assumption required for 
system estimation and there is no undue problem with cross-sectional dependence. 
Based on the diagnostic test, where we did not have 1st order correlation and and 
have  2nd order correlation, at the same time valid instruments (Sargan/Hansen) we 
can say that this is a sensible mode. At the conventional 5% critical value all of the 
coefficients were statistically individually significant, apart from the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable. All of the signs in front of the coefficients are as expected 
i.e, there is high level of persistency between lagged dependent variable and 
dependent variable in level as well as a negative relationship between female 
employment rate and increase in female unemployment, long maternity leave and 
high fertility rate . 
Table 7. Interpretation of the model  
 
 
SYSTEM  MODEL 
 
Regressors Coefficient 
with Robust 
SE 
Economic interpretation 
Employment rate 
(Lagged)  
 
0.96* 
On average, the female employment rate in 
current period 96% depends form the 
employment rat in period from the last 
period t-1, ceteris paribus.(high level of 
persistency) 
 Child care facilities 0.07 On average, 1% increase in 4 year olds in pre-
school education in current period, will 
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 increase the employment rate by 7%, ceteris 
paribus 
Fertility rate  
-0.59 
On average, increased average of birth in 
current period, will decrease  the 
employment rate by 59%, ceteris paribus 
Maternity leave  
-.0013 
On, average, 1week  increase in maternity 
leave in the current period  will decrease 
employment rate by 1,3%, ceteris paribus 
Education  
0.10 
On average, 1% increase in the female 
tertiary graduates will increase employment 
rate  by 10%,ceteris paribus. 
Female unemployment rate -0.04 On average, 1% increase in the female 
unemployment rate will decrease the 
employment rate by 4%, ceteris paribus 
Part-time employment 0.05 On average, 1% increase in the female part-
time employment will increase female 
employment rate by 5%, ceteris paribus 
GDP 0.23 On average 1% growth in GDP will lead to 
23% increase in the female employment rate 
Constant term 3.71 The constant term has no theoretical 
meaning 
 The 
coefficients with asterisk is statistically insignificant.  
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have investigated the question of what determines the female 
employment rate in the European Union where a sample of 25 countries was used in 
period of 13 years starting from 1995.We have employed a system GMM model 
where the preferred model consist 4th lag in levels and 3th lag in differences. The 
main findings can be summarized as follows. 
Current employment rate is highly influenced i.e determined by the previous year 
employment rate. According to this study the employment rate 96% depends from the 
rate t-1 which suggest a high level of persistency. Apart from the previous 
employment rate fertility rate and Gross Domestic Product growth and tertiary 
education also have great influence upon the employment rate. In this sample high 
birth rate have substantional impact on the employment rate causing almost 60% 
drop in the employment rate. Even though  child care facilities and maternity leave 
had smaller impact upon the employment rate, in many countries e.g UK where ther 
has been increase capacity in childcare facilities the employment rate had increase 
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substantially while the length of maternity leave could have negative impact like in 
this case but rather small. 
Compared to European countries education is also one of the most important 
determinants of the employment rate in FYROM. According to level of education show 
that the lowest rates are found among those having primary education or less, while 
the highest are for people whose education was of university level. Apart from the 
education also the tradition has very large impact upon the employment rate. 
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Macroeconomic Challenges for Macedonia toward European Union and European 
Monetary Union membership – Copenhagen and Maastricht Criteria 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we have analyzed the major macroeconomic challenges that Macedonia 
might face for becoming part of European Union countries, which are related to the 
capacity of Macedonian economy for meeting the prerequisites specified by European 
Commission in Copenhagen and Maastricht. In the context of Copenhagen criteria, 
using data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, we have 
analyzed the ability of Macedonian economy to cope with competitive pressures 
within EU structure. For this purpose, the main challenges of Macedonia toward EU 
membership are: strengthening the competition, strengthening of suitable capacity of 
human capital in the country, strengthening of non – bank financial institutions, 
reduce the shadow economy and built up a better infrastructure. The challenges that 
Macedonia has to solve will certainly result in progress related to market economy 
functionality and better prerequisites for strengthening private sector 
competitiveness. In the context of Maastricht criteria, using data from International 
Financial Statistics (IFS), National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia (NBRM) and 
State Statistical Office of RM, the study is focused on the Treaty provisions with regard 
to development in prices, fiscal balances and debt ratio, exchange rates and long term 
interest rates. In this respect, economic developments in Macedonia are reviewed 
from a backward – looking perspective, covering in principle the past ten years. 
Economic convergence of Macedonia as a country under review in this paper is, also, 
examined in the context of the regular two – year cycle, which is in line with the 
requirements of article 122 (2), in conjunction with the article 121 (1) of the Treaty of 
the European Commission. In order to capture the convergence criteria, in the context 
of the influence of the real exchange rate, the study attempts to explore the pass 
through effect of exchange rate on inflation. We use quarterly data from 1998 to 2008 
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and employed Vector Autoregression and Granger Causality test of exchange rate on 
inflation. The results show that changes in exchange rate ‘are causing’ changes in the 
producer prices and retail prices, thus confirming the high import dependability of the 
domestic production. 
 
Key Words:  Economic Convergence, Macedonia, European Union, European 
Monetary Union 
 
Introduction 
 
Enlargement is one of the most powerful policy tool of European Union. Its function is 
to provide stability and security for integrated nations. The present enlargement 
agenda covers Western Balkan Countries, such as FYR Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Turkey. The integration motives of these countries are based on their 
willingness to participate in European financial resources, thus enabling these 
economies to provide financial recourses from integrated markets. In this paper we 
have analyzed the major economic challenges of Macedonian economy toward 
European Union (EU) and European Monetary Union (EMU) membership. These 
analyses are based on the capacity of Macedonian economy to meet the respective, 
Copenhagen and Maastricht membership criteria. Therefore, within the framework of 
EMU membership the analysis of economic performance of Macedonia are highly 
hypothetical, since the country is not a member of the European Union and it is far 
away from fulfilling all legal issues to join EU soon. However, in our paper, we offer 
the first preliminary assessment concerning monetary integration. The duration of 
Macedonian integration into EU structure, depends on the extent to which the 
country is capable to fulfill the economic criteria.  
The paper is structured as follow. After the introduction, we analyze the 
economic criteria for EU and EMU membership. Within this part, a comparative 
analysis, in regards to Macedonian approximation toward European Union with other 
candidate countries is analyzed. For this purpose, using transition indices from 
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), we have examined the 
key economic criteria, which are in line with Copenhagen requirements. To examine 
the economic convergence between Macedonia and EMU‟s Maastricht criteria, the 
study is focused on the analysis, based on the Treaty provisions with regard to 
development in prices, fiscal balances and debt ratio, exchange rates and long term 
interest rates. In the context of the methodology, the paper was prepared to a great 
extent in accordance with the Methodology of Regular Reports of the European 
Commission and Annual Convergence Reports of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
Additionally, in order to capture the convergence criteria, in the context of the 
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influence of the real exchange rate, the study attempts to explore the pass through 
effect of exchange rate on inflation, which is developed in section four. The last part 
of the paper encompasses conclusions, as well as the policy recommendations for 
Macedonia with the objective toward meeting the membership criteria, identified by 
the European Commission in Copenhagen and Maastricht.  
 
2.1 European Union and the Copenhagen Criteria 
 
The Enlargement of the European Union is a very significant mechanism in order to 
integrate the European Union. Therefore, there have been many enlargement events 
since 1970s until the latest in January 2007, where, Bulgaria and Romania joined the 
Union. However, after every enlargement occurred, the question of the possibility of 
other countries around the continent of Europe which have a good relationship with 
the EU to join the European Union has been raised up. . 
For candidate countries, to become an EU member, they must complete the 
Copenhagen Criteria1, which defines the rules for a country to be eligible for becoming 
EU member. These criteria imply the functioning of market economy, the existence of 
democratic institutions, able to preserve democratic governance and human rights, 
and that the state accept the obligations and intent with the EU. Because of these 
criteria, many candidate countries find difficulty to access the European Union. 
Therefore, to be more understandable, before one country could join the European 
Union, it has it has to meet the following criteria as fully stated, the Copenhagen 
Criteria2 
As concern to economic criteria for membership into European Union and 
European Monetary Union, they are static and do not speak much of economic quality 
and there is a lack of academic explanation (Efendic A, 2005). These criteria, do not 
discuss the effect of fulfillment on different countries, having in mind the fact that no 
country has the same economic environment. Economic criteria defined in 
Copenhagen, can be viewed through the following sub criteria3 
 
1. Equilibrium between demand and supply is established by the free interplay of 
market forces; prices, as well as trade, are liberalized; 
                                                 
1Pusca, Anga. European Union: Challenges and Promises of the new Enlargement. New York: 
IDEA and CEU press. 2004, pp.31-32   
2Glenn, John K. EU Enlargement. In: Cini, Michelle (eds) European Union Politics. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 2003,pp. 216   
Financial Affairs, Progress towards meeting economic criteria for accession: the assessment 
from the 2004 regular reports, November 2004, p. 6-7 
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2. Significant barriers to market entry (establishment of new firms) and exit 
(bankruptcies) are absent; 
3. The legal system, including the regulation of property rights, is in place; laws 
and contracts can be enforced; 
4. Macroeconomic stability has been achieved including adequate price stability 
and sustainable public finances and external accounts; 
5. Broad consensus exists about the essentials of economic policy; 
6. The financial sector is sufficiently well developed to channel savings towards 
productive investment. 
7. The existence of a functioning market economy, with a sufficient degree of 
macroeconomic stability for economic agents to make decisions in a climate of 
stability and predictability; 
8. A sufficient amount, at appropriate costs, of human and physical capital, 
including infrastructure, education and research, and future developments in 
this field; 
9. The extent to which government policy and legislation affect competitiveness 
through trade policy, competition policy, state aids, support for SMEs; 
10. The degree and the pace of trade integration a country achieved with the 
Union before enlargement. This applies both to the volume and the nature of 
goods already traded with Member States; 
 
In order to understand the economic criteria, we have to raise the question, whether 
these criteria are useful for national economies, or are they a wasted opportunity to 
implement their own national strategies. However, for a candidate countries, on their 
way to EU membership, one of the challenges, is the achievement of real 
convergence, which means that the income per capita and the living standard of the 
candidate country under observation, should come closer to the average of less 
developed EU members (Efendic, A, 2005), thus providing long run economic benefit 
for national economy, in a sense of providing long term sustainable and stable growth 
in the conditions of macroeconomic stability. On the other hand, non fulfillment of 
economic criteria for EU membership by candidate country is a wasted opportunity 
for the country on its way toward EU membership and is a sign of poor economic 
performance from national economy point of view. 
 
2.2 Macedonia in the context of Copenhagen criteria for EU membership 
 
The economic criteria for EU membership are related with the long run achievement 
of real convergence, which analyses the catch up process of candidate countries and 
integrated countries, with regard to income per capita and standard of living of the 
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country under observation. Real convergence can only be achieved in conditions of 
macroeconomic stability. Achievement of economic criteria specified by the Treaty of 
European Commission, represents support for transitional supports.  For this purpose, 
the analysis of economic criteria for EU membership, in this paper, will be based on 
transition indices, using data from European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. The Copenhagen criteria are related to the ability of Macedonia to 
fulfill the conditions with regard to well functioning market economy. For this 
purpose, we have used the transition index for the period (1998 – 2008). 
Within the framework of transition indices, price liberalization indices range 
from 1 to 4, with 0.3 decimal points added or subtracted for + and – rating 
representing the lowest and the highest degree of price liber alization for a country 
under review.  As can be seen from the graph, Macedonia does fulfill the conditions of 
price liberalization and at the same time can be compared with other integrated 
countries, within EU structure 
 
 
Chart 1: Transition Indices for Macedonia, 2008 (Source: EBRD, 2008) 
Equilibrium between demand and supply is established by the free interplay of market 
forces; prices, as well as trade are liberalized.   According to National Strategy of 
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Macedonia for European Integration, with regard to price liberalization policy, 
Macedonians plan is to determine the futures price policy based on two elements 1) 
The number of products and services whose prices are controlled should continue to 
fall and 2) future liberalization of currently controlled prices should be announce in 
advance, with detailed time schedule for their adjustment. This will increase the 
transparency level, with regard to prices, thus decreasing the imperfect information 
between economic agents. The expected result, to be achieved from this policy, is 
reduction of expected inflationary effects and increases the competitiveness in the 
real sector. This is especially true for energy prices.  
With regard to foreign trade liberalization, according to transition indicators, 
Macedonia recorded excellent results, where the respective indexes, are both, 4.33, 
showing that Macedonian economy is being opened in the trade area, which has been 
achieved through establishing a free trade zone in the region in accordance with the 
Stability Pact. The favorable movement on the foreign exchange market, that lead to 
increase of trade liberalization, during the year of 2006, was  due to the gradual 
liberalization of the capital account, the admission to Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA), the acquiring of the status of candidate country for joining EU 
and the higher credit rating, as well as the aggressive policy of the Government for 
attracting foreign capital in the country (tax reduction, international promotion of the 
country). These conditions improved the economic cooperation of Macedonia with 
the countries of EU structure, thus increasing the liberalization degree of foreign trade 
of Macedonia.  
The legal system, including the regulation of property rights, laws and 
contracts that can be enforced’ is the criterion that is certainly a huge challenge for 
Macedonia in the future regarding the implementation of necessary reforms in 
relation to improving the current situation in the country. “Being aware of the fact 
that appropriate legislation is a necessary condition for an efficient transition from a 
centrally-planned to a market economy, all countries in the region started at the very 
outset of transition with a comprehensive reform of their legal and regulatory 
systems. In this regard, Macedonia has adopted 
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n  
1998 3,00 4,00 2,00 4,00 4,00 1,00 2,67 1,67 1,67 
1999 3,00 4,00 2,00 4,00 4,00 1,00 2,67 1,67 1,67 
2000 3,00 4,00 2,33 4,00 4,00 2,00 2,67 1,67 2,00 
2001 3,00 4,00 2,33 4,00 4,00 2,00 2,67 1,67 2,00 
2002 3,00 4,00 2,33 4,00 4,00 2,00 2,67 1,67 2,00 
2003 3,00 4,00 2,33 4,00 4,33 2,00 2,67 1,67 2,00 
2004 3,33 4,00 2,33 4,33 4,33 2,00 2,67 2,00 2,33 
2005 3,33 4,00 2,33 4,33 4,33 2,00 2,67 2,00 2,33 
2006 3,33 4,00 2,67 4,33 4,33 2,00 2,67 2,33 2,33 
2007 3,33 4,00 2,67 4,33 4,33 2,33 2,67 2,33 2,33 
Aver
age 3,15 4,00 2,36 4,15 4,18 1,87 2,71 1,91 2,09 
Table 1. EBRD Transition indices for Macedonia (Source: EBRD Transition Report, 
2008) 
 
We observe that Macedonia registers a relatively good index in the area of small scale 
privatization (4.00), while conditions on large scale privatization are much worse. The 
biggest problems, for Macedonia are in the competition policy area, where the 
average index for the period 1998 – 2008 is 1,87. Also the average indexes of overall 
infrastructure reform (2.09), securities markets and non bank financial institutions 
(1,91), and banking sector and interest rate liberalization (2,71) do not show good 
functionality indicator for Macedonian  market economy.  
 
2.3 Macedonia, candidate countries for EU membership and new integrated 
countries 
 
For the period under review 1998 – 2008, Macedonia recorded the best results in 
terms of price liberalization, trade and forex liberalization, small scale privatization 
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and to some extent in the area of large scale privatization. These results are showing 
that Macedonia intends to increase the openness degree, in order to benefit from the 
financial resources of integrated countries 
Average 1998 – 2008 
EBRD index 
(1- 4) 
Mac
edo
nia 
Bulgari
a 
Roma
nia 
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ge of 
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EU 
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(B+R) 
Albania Bosnia 
and 
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+ C) 
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Price 
liberalizati
on 
4,15 4,24 
 
4,33 
 
4,25 4,00 4,00 
 
4,00 
 
4,00 
Trade and 
Forex 
System 
4,18 4,33 
 
4,33 
 
4,33 4,27 
 
3,39 
 
4,27 
 
3,97 
Small – 
scale 
privatisatio
n 
4,00 3,66 
 
3,63 
 
3,64 4,00 
 
2,72 
 
4,33 
 
3,68 
Large – 
scale 
privatisatio
n 
3,15 3,69 
 
3,33 
 
3,51 2,90 
 
2,42 
 
3,18 
 
2,83 
Enterprise 
restructuri
ng 
2,36 2,51 
 
2,21 
 
2,36 2,09 
 
1,85 
 
2,82 
 
2,25 
Competitio
n Policy 
1,87 2,48 
 
2,42 
 
2,45 1,82 
 
1,24 
 
2,39 
 
1,81 
Overall 
Infrastruct
ure reform 
2,09 2,84 
 
3,09 
 
2,96 1,93 
 
2,08 
 
2,72 
 
2,24 
Banking 
reform and 
interest 
rate 
liberalizati
on 
2,71 3,30 
 
2,89 
 
3,09 2,45 
 
2,51 
 
3,60 
 
2,85 
Securities 
Markets 
and Non 
Bank 
Financial 
Institution 
1,91 2,33 
 
2,27 
 
2,31 1,67 
 
1,42 
 
2,63 
 
1,90 
Average 
2,40 2,67 2,59 2,62 2,28 1,96 2,72 2,32 
Source: Transition report 2008, EBRD, London 
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Table 2: EBRD indices for Macedonia, candidate countries and new member  
 
countries. Source: own calculation, using data from EBRD 
 
According to transition indices, we observe that biggest problems, for Macedonia are 
in the competition policy area, where its average index for the period under review is 
1,87. This index is also the smallest one in comparison to respective average individual 
indexes of candidate countries. Also the average indexes of overall infrastructure 
reform (2.09), securities markets and non bank financial institutions (1,91), and 
banking sector and interest rate liberalization (2,71) do not show good functionality 
indicator for Macedonian  market economy.  However, when considering the 
Macedonian capability to cope with competitive pressures, it is important for this 
analysis to compare the Macedonian indices with respective indices for both, 
transition countries that have become full members and candidate countries aiming 
to become members of EU.  
 
1. The average value of Macedonian index of 2,40 is lower than the average 
value of new EU members index (2,62), and higher than the average value of 
candidate countries index (2.32), meaning that, the lag of Macedonian 
transition indices amounts to a total of 8.3%, in comparison to the average 
value of new EU members index. On the other hand, with respect to 
candidate countries, Macedonia has an advantage in terms of transition 
indices. Its average value is higher for 3.3%, than the average value of 
candidate countries indices.  
 
2. In comparison to the average indices of the candidate countries, Macedonia 
has the best result in the area of price liberalization and trade and foreign 
exchange market, thus reaching the EU standard. Macedonia has also good 
results in the value of the index measuring small scale privatization. 
Macedonian results on small scale privatization (4.00), are somewhat better 
than the average of new EU entrants (3.64), with the lag being the smallest 
compared to candidate countries, such as Croatia (4.33). As concern to the 
case of large scale privatization, Macedonia lags well behind new EU entrants, 
and has recorded positive advantage with respect to candidate countries.  
 
Macedonia in the context of Maastricht Criteria 
 
The framework for analysis of economic convergence between Macedonia and EMU 
Maastricht criteria is based on the Treaty provisions and their application by the 
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European Central Bank (ECB) with regard to developments in prices, fiscal balances 
and debt ratios, exchange rate and long – term interest rates, together with other 
relevant factors. Second, it is also based on a range of additional backward and 
forward – looking economic indicators which remain useful for examining the 
sustainability of convergence in greater details. The analysis of economic convergence 
for Macedonia is built on principles set out in reports published by the European 
Central Bank (ECB).  
 The Convergence criteria have to be met on the basis of actual data. 
Moreover, it is emphasized that convergence must be achieved on a lasting basis and 
not just at given point in time. In this respect, economic developments in Macedonia 
are reviewed from a backward - looking perspective, covering, in principle, the past 
ten years. Economic convergence of Macedonia as a country under review in this 
paper is, also,  examined in the context of the regular two – year cycle, which is in line 
with the requirements of article 122 (2), in conjunction with the article 121 (1) of the 
Treaty of the European Commission. This helps to better determine the extent to 
which current achievements are the result of genuine structural adjustment, which in 
turn should lead to a better assessment of the sustainability of economic 
convergence. The examination of economic convergence for Macedonia is assessed in 
line with the provisions of article 121 of the Treaty. The cut – off date for the statistics 
included in this convergence paper is 18 April 2008. The statistical data used in the 
application of convergence criteria have been provided by European Commission (see 
also the statistical annex and the tables and charts), National Bank of the Republic of 
Macedonia (NBRM), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). For monthly data on exchange rates, the period 
considered in this report ends in March 2008. Data for fiscal balances cover the period 
up to 2008.  
In order to accede the European Monetary Union Macedonia has to proof 
nominal and real convergence, in line with the five convergence criteria. The nominal 
and real convergence criteria include. 
1. The criterion on price stability – uniformly low and stable inflation is the 
fundamental criterion. Inflation rate must not exceed by more than 1.5 
percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States 
in terms of price stability.  
2. Uniformly low and stable long-term interest rates is the second criteria. An 
inflation-prone country could possible squeeze down inflation temporarily, on 
the last year before admission – for example, freezing regulated prices – only 
to relax the effort afterwards. In order to weed out cheaters, a second 
criterion requires that the long term interest rates must not exceed the 
average rates observed in the three lowest inflation rate countries by more 
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than 2 percentage points. The economic rational is: Long-term interest rates 
reflect markets‟ assessment of long-term inflation. 
3. A stable exchange rate, derived from uniformly low and stable inflation rates 
is the third criteria. The examination of exchange rate stability against the 
euro focuses on the exchange rate being close to the ERM II central rate, while 
also taking into account factors that may have led to an appreciation, which is 
in line with the approach taken in the past.  
4. The ratio of the planed or actual government deficit to GDP, or the annual 
flow of public sector debt must not exceed the reference value of 3% of GDP 
value.  
5. The ratio of government debt to GDP, or the total stock of public sector debt, 
national debt, must not exceed the reference value of 60% of GDP value. 
Moreover there is an interesting link between the public finance criteria four 
and five regarding to real GDP growth. Hence, it connects both real and 
nominal convergence of the economy.  
 
2.1 Descriptive Assessment: Examination of Economic Convergence 
3.1.1  Price Developments 
 
Regarding the price stability criteria, during the period April 2006 – May 2007, 
Macedonia had annual average inflation rate below the reference value (2.6%), 
whereas during the period April 2007 – May 2008, the country registered annual 
average inflation rate of 4.4$  which was above the reference value of 3.2%.  
HICP Inflation for Macedonia   
 September 
2003 to 
August 
2004 
April 2005 
to March 
2006 
April 2006 
to March 
2007 
April 2007 
to March 
2008 
     
HICP Inflation* 0,8 0,9 2,6 4,4 
Reference 
Value** 
2,4 2,6 3 3,2 
Euro Area*** 2,5 2,3 2,1 2,5 
Source: State Statistical Office of    
Republic of Macedonia (SSO) and Eurostat  
Table 3: Inflation in Macedonia, during the reference periods, measured by  
Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices 
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Looking back over the last past ten years, inflation rate measured by consumer price 
index has been rather volatile, averaging 1.82 on an annual basis, over the period 
1998 to 2008. Looking at recent developments, CPI inflation followed a downward 
trend from 2001 to 2004. The process of disinflation during the years of 2001 – 2004 
reflected a number of important policy choices, most notably the orientation of 
monetary policy towards the achievement of price stability, which is the primary 
objective of monetary policy. 
 
 
 
Chart 2 – CPI – Inflation for the Republic of Macedonia 
Source: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia. NBRM 
 
During the period from 2004 to 2008, inflation rate in Macedonia, registered 
upward trend. In 2008 the CPI inflation rate was 8.3% which is above the convergence 
criteria. The main factors underlying behind this increase in inflation were higher food 
and energy prices, adjustments in excise duties and strong demand pressures, which, 
in turn, are generating price and wage pressures (NBRM Annual Report, 2008). 
Looking ahead, the latest available inflation forecasts from major international 
institutions range from 2.7 to 5.2 for 2009. Risks to these inflation projections are on 
the upside and are associated with larger – than – expected increases in energy, food 
and administered prices.     
 
 
 
Inflation Forecasts   
Average Annual Inflation Forecasts for 2009   
EBRD (Nov 2008) 3,5  
European Union (April 2008) 2,7  
IMF (October 2008) 3  
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United Nations (DESA)* (October 2008) 5  
Economicst Intelegence Unit (August 2008) 5,2  
Viena Institute (June 2008) 3  
Department of Economics and Social Affairs (DESA)  
Source: EBRD - Transition Report 2008   
 
Table 4: Inflation forecasts 
 
However, the catching – up process is also likely to have a bearing on inflation over 
the coming years, given that GDP per capita and price levels are still significantly lower 
in Macedonia than in the euro area. However, it is difficult to assess the exact size of 
this impact.  The inflation stabilization shall be mainly expected in 2009.  
 
3.1.2 Fiscal Developments 
 
Macedonia is not subject to an EU council decision on the existence of an excessive 
deficit. With regard to the budgetary performance, Macedonia has a fiscal deficit to 
GDP ratio below the convergence criteria of 3% specified in the treaty. The amount in 
the reference year of 2007 was 0.6% to GDP, whereas in 2008 it declined further 
down to -1.5% to GDP. 
 
                  
Chart 3: Government Balance as a % of GDP 
Source: National Bank of Republic of Macedonia 
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General Government Fiscal Position 
(as a % of GDP) 
200
2 
200
3 
200
4 
200
5 
200
6 
200
7 
200
8 
              
General Government surplus 
(+)/Deficit (-) (EBRD) -5,7 -0,6 0,4 0,3 -0,3 0,6 -1,5 
Reference value (Convergence 
Reports 2002 - 2007) -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 
General Government Gross Debt 
(EBRD) 42,9 39,0 36,6 39,5 32,9 25,5 25,6 
Reference value (Convergence 
Reports 2002 - 2007) 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Source: EBRD, Convergence Reports 2003,2004,2005,2006,2007 
Table 5: Fiscal Developments over the reference periods 
 
As concern to the Macedonian general government debt to GDP, the results 
are not so worrying. Macedonian government debt to GDP was above the reference 
value during the period from 1998 up to 2003, and this ratio has declined since 2004, 
up to 2008, registering amounts below the reference value. In 2007 this amount was 
52% whereas in 2008 it increased slightly to 53%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 4: Government debt as a % of GDP for the period 1998 - 2008 
Source: National Bank of Republic of Macedonia (NBRM) 
 
3.1.3 Exchange Rate Developments 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
373 
 
Regarding the exchange rate criterion, Macedonian currency does not participate in 
ERM2, but trades under fixed exchange rate regime. 
 
Exchange Rate Developments over the reference period 
April 
2006 
April 
2008 
Membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) No No 
Average Exchange Rate, 2007, 2008, MKD / EUR 61,1625 61,3856 
Source: NBRM 
 
Table 6:  Exchange Rate over the reference period 
 
Overall, in the two years reference period, from 19 April 2006 to 18 April 2008, the 
Macedonian denar was not subject to significant depreciation pressures, thus 
confirming the objective of NRBM to maintain price stability. 
 
   
 
Chart 5: Exchange Rate over the reference period 
Source: NBRM 
 
The Macedonian exchange rate targeting strategy is considered as an effective 
instrument for maintaining price stability. In 2003 the exchange rate regime in 
Macedonia was managed float. According to Article 18 of the Foreign Exchange Act in 
Macedonia, the exchange rate of the Denar was established freely on the basis of 
demand and supply of foreign exchange at the foreign exchange market.  
Years 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
DEN/EU
R 
60,6
2 
60,7
9 
60,9
6 
61,0
7 
61,2
9 
61,3
1 
61,1
8 
61,1
7 
61,1
8 
61,2
2 
Source: NBRM 
Table 7. Exchange Rate over the last ten years 
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Nevertheless, the Denar exchange rate against the Euro serves as the intermediate 
target of monetary policy, so money supply and interest rates are dictated by the 
exchange rate target, which since mid-1997 has been set at 61 Denars to one euro and 
more or less maintained at that level (Daviddi and Uvalic, 2003). Effectively, therefore, 
the central bank has been maintaining a stable Denar exchange rate against the euro 
(Bisev and Petkovski, 2003). Accordingly, to stable Denar exchange rate, the NBRM in 
2004 maintained stable and low interest rates, thus enabling it to participate in the 
foreign exchange market through foreign exchange transactions of NBRM. 
                    
 
Chart 6 Exchange Rate over the last ten years 
Source: NBRM 
 
In 2008, the world financial turmoil that damaged the global market reflected also on 
the domestic economy causing macroeconomic disturbances in the state. Therefore, 
the strategy of monetary policy, due to these circumstances, was carried out to 
enhanced inflation pressures and constant deepening of external misbalance. In the 
first months of 2008, due to the increase on general price level, i.e increase of world 
price of food and oil, created pressures on the foreign exchange market. (NBRM, 
Annual Report, 2008)  
In 2009, the strategy of de facto fixed exchange rate will continue to apply for 
the purpose of maintaining the price stability as final monetary objective. Having in 
mind the expected reduction of domestic demand, due to lower domestic investment, 
and lower inflows of private transfers in the economy in view of the global economic 
crisis, the stabilization of the foreign exchange rate market is expected to be the 
biggest and the most serious challenge in the 2009 monetary policy.  
3.1.4 Interest rate developments 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
375 
 
As concern the convergence of long term interest rate, Macedonia is below the 
reference value, starting from the April 2007 up to March 2008. 
 
Long Term Interest Rate 
April 2006 
to March 
2007 
April 2007 
to March 
2008 
Three months government securities in %, three months 6,25833 5,3 
Reference Value (Convergence Reports), April 2007, April 2008) 6,4 6,5 
Euro Area (Convergence Reports), April 2007, April 2008) 4 4,3 
Source: NBRM, Convergence Reports, own calculation     
Table 8: Interest Rate developments over the reference period 
  
    However, to achieve a high degree of convergence, Macedonia needs also to 
have good results in terms of GDP growth, substantial decrease of unemployment 
rates, low current account deficit and reasonable inward from FDI –, which points to 
the need to ensure the sustainability of external position. 
 
 
Chart 7 Interest Rate over the reference period 
 
In 2007, the interest rate of NBRM was in the sign of monetary policy relaxation, in 
conditions of favorable movements on the foreign exchange market and constant 
increase in the liquidity on this basis, as well as prudent fiscal policy. 
Long Term Interest 
Rate, 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Three months 
government 
securities in %, three 
months 8,491667 9,941667 6,4 5,757 6,725 
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Source: NBRM 
      Table 9: Interest Rate developments over the last five years, Source: NBRM 
 
Thus the reference interest rate of NBRM during the year was constantly decreasing, 
reflecting on the interest rates on the Money Market and the Treasury bills market. 
The decline was also registered with the banks' lending interest rate, with 
simultaneous increase in the deposit interest rate resulting in narrowing of the banks' 
interest rate spread. 
 
 
 
Chart 8 Interest Rate over the last 5 years 
Source: NBRM 
 
In 2008, the interest rates of the NBRM were market by the monetary policy 
tightening, while the interest rate policy of the banks was mainly focused towards 
savings stimulation (NBRM, Annual Report, 2008). Namely, in conditions of uncertain 
economic environment, increased inflation pressures, growing deficit on the current 
account, strong credit growth in the first several months of the year, as well as 
expectations for more relaxed fiscal policy (which were realized to great extent in the 
last quarter of the year), the NBRM carried out gradual increase in the reference 
interest rate in the first half of 2008 (NBRM, Annual Report, 2008). 
 
3.1.5 Other relevant factors 
With regard to real GDP growth rate (table 15), Macedonia registered upward trend of 
this indicator, especially starting from the year of 2003 up to 2008, where its amount 
was 5.3%. Before this period, the highest level of Macedonian real GDP growth rate 
was registered in the year 2000, at about 4.5%. This result was attributed mainly to 
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privatization of state owned companies and a good position of international 
community investments, into the country’s banking system and insurance companies. 
Regarding the data on GDP per capita (Table 15), one can conclude that 
Macedonian GDP per capita has registered a constant increase, representing a 
relatively good indicator of the level of Macedonian standards of living. However this 
indicator is significantly lower, compared to the average of EU 27, meaning that 
Macedonian standard of living is lower than the standard of living in the EU countries 
(Eurostat, 2008). 
 
4 Empirical Assessment: The Pass through Effect of Exchange Rate on producer 
prices and retail prices.  
 
4.1 Definition of Exchange Rate Pass Through  
 
The pass through effect of the exchange rate on inflation considers the influence of 
the changes in the nominal exchange rate of the inflation through import prices. The 
changes of the exchange rate have a direct influence on the import prices, thus 
influencing afterwards the general inflation level (Besimi, 2004).  Changes in import 
prices are, nevertheless, to some extent passed on to producer and consumer prices. 
We are, therefore, in this paper using a broader definition of exchange rate pass-
through, which is seen as the change in domestic prices that can be attributed to a 
prior change in the nominal exchange rate.  
    
4.2 Econometric Modeling of Exchange Rate Pass Through Effect on 
domestic prices for the period for the period January 1998 – December 
2008 
 
In order to define the influence of the exchange rate on the prices, i.e. inflation, an 
empiric analysis is required. Having in mind the lack of longer time series and given 
the period of transition characterized by larger structural changes, and also the 
impossibility for preparing more complex analysis containing structural models, or co-
integration models, for the needs the following analysis will be provided: Vector Auto 
regression, correlation between the changes in the exchange rate and the prices and 
granger causality of the variables.  
      This part presents econometric analysis of the pass through effect of 
exchange rate on Inflation in Macedonia, for the period January 1998 – December 
2008. We use the EU/DEN rate of exchange to represent the exchange rate. We, 
furthermore, include all stages of the distribution chain, i.e. retail prices and producer 
prices. All the prices are in the form of price indices. The data source is International 
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Financial Statistics and National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia. All the data, apart 
from the exchange rate data, is, furthermore, seasonally adjusted, and all the time 
series are in logarithmic form.     
In order to make a more formal analysis of the pass through effect of 
exchange rate on inflation we apply the methodology of Vector Autoregression (VAR). 
This methodology enables us to analyze the movements of certain economic 
categories through time series, while at the same time avoids the problem of 
endogeneity of variables which is present at the structural econometric models. 
(Gujarati D, 2003). The analyzed period is January 1999 – December 2008.   
 
OLS estimation of a single equation in the unrestricted VAR. Dependet 
variables are listed on the first row. 117 observations used for estimation from 
1999M4  to 2008M12 
  DLNDENEU  DLNRP DLNPPI 
DLNDENEU(-1) -.7228 .41896 .4500E-4 
  (-8.0857)  (-3.12) (-2.034123) 
DLNDENEU(-2)  -.32566 .33085 -.6727E-3 
  (-3.7097) ( 2 .12643)  (-3.51954) 
DLNRP  (-1) -.0013872 -.67227 -.0019764 
  ( -.004)  (-7.5306) (-.44746) 
DLNRP  (-2)  .010192 -.33930 .0040175 
  (  .033871) (-3.7824) (.90516) 
DLNPPI (-1) 
                     
2,43     -1,2102 -.66053 
  (  .38058) (-.63750)  (-7.0320) 
DLNPPI (-2) -46520 -12513 -.34500 
  (-.71151) (-.64201) (-3.5774) 
R-Squared             .38 .34 .33 
R-Bar-Squared         .35 .31 .30 
S.E. of Regression    .84 .25 .01 
F-stat.F(  5, 111)  13.8433[.000]    11.4046[.000]   11.1733[.000] 
Mean of dep. Var.       .7861E-4  -.5998E-4       -.1034E-3    
S.D. of Dep. Var       10472 .31   .014863 
Residual Sum of Square  783578 69633 .01 
Equation Log-likelihood -1425638 -.95698  3507699 
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Akaike Info. Criterion -1485638 -69570 3447699 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion  -1568503 -152435 3364834 
DW-statistic   21716 21617 20218 
System Log-likelihood   2081482 2081482 2081482 
Table 10: Vector Auto regression (VAR). Prepeared in software application: 
Microfit 4.0 
In the specification of the model (table 10), we started with a period of 3 time 
lags (3 months), while the results showed that statistically significant are only the 
changes in the first and the second time lag. Therefore, the VAR results are based on 
only two lags of each endogenous variable.  The model set in this manner gives 
satisfied explanation for the relation between the inflation and the changes in the 
exchange rate, which is evident from the R square4. The pass through effect of the 
exchange rate is significant, with regard to the changes in the prices of the industrial 
producers and to the retail prices (which points to high import dependability of the 
domestic production). Thus, according to the model, it is assumed that 1% 
depreciation of the Denar against the Euro in the analyzed period, ceterus paribus, will 
on average act toward significant increase in the prices in the forthcoming month by 
0,41 % and 0,45% respectively in the prices of the retail prices and prices of industrial 
producers, in the first lag. While in the second lag, the influence of 1% exchange rate 
depreciation will, on average, act toward the increase in the respective pri es, in the 
forthcoming month, by 0,33 and 0,67%, respectively, in the prices of retail prices and 
the prices of industrial producers.  
 
Granger Causality and Wald Test 
 
In order to define the influence of the exchange rate on the prices, i.e. inflation, we 
employed a Granger causality analysis (table 12), which should point out which 
occurrence proceeds the other, and vice versa, i.e. whether the prices follow the 
changes of exchange rate, or vice versa, the exchange rate is stable because of price 
stability. 
             Equation         Excluded    chi2            df Prob > chi2   
               DLNDENEU                LNPPI      .1053      2           0.949     
               DLNDENEU                 LNRP    2.4242      2           0.298     
               DLNDENEU                    ALL     2.7582     4           0.599     
               DLNPPI                LNDENEU     2.4031     2           0.301      
                                                 
4 Actually, it is assumed that the model explains only 10% and 4% of the change in the prices of 
the producers of industrial products and of the retail prices, respectively 
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               DLNPPI                       LNRP     1.5648       2           0.457      
               DLNPPI                           ALL     3.7379      4           0.443      
               DLNRP               LNDENEU      2.9255       2           0.232       
               DLNRP                        LNPPI     2.4281      2           0.297       
               DLNRP                            ALL     5.2926      4           0.259       
Table 11 Granger Causality Wald test. Prepeared in software application. STATA 10.0 
A Wald test is commonly used to test Granger Causality. Each row on the 
Wald table (Table 11), reports a Wald test that the coefficients on the lags of the 
variable in the ‘’excluded’’ column are zero for the variable in the ‘’equation’’ column.  
For example, the large p – value of 0.949 in the first row is evidence that the 
coefficients on the lags of producer prices (LNPPI)  are jointly zero in the equation for 
exchange rate (LNDENEU), indicating that there is insufficient evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis of Granger Causality, that producer prices (LNPPI) does not Granger 
causes exchange rate (LNDENEU). On the other hand, the small p value of 0.2948 in 
the second row favors the hypothesis that coefficients on the lags of retail prices 
(LNRP) are not jointly zero in the equation for exchange rate (LNDENEU), meaning 
that, at 10% level of significance, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of Granger causality that retail prices LNRP does not Granger causes 
exchange rate. (LNDENEU). The small p values in column 4 and 7, indicate that, at 5% 
level of significance, one can reject the null hypothesis that changes in exchange rate 
(LNDENEU) do not proceed (or ‘’do not Granger cause’’) changes in producer prices 
(LNPPI) and  retail prices (LNRP). In other words, the tests shows that changes in 
exchange rate ‘’are causing’’ changes in the producer prices and retail prices. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
With regard to Copenhagen criteria, Macedonia shows good result in terms of price 
liberalization and foreign trade liberalization. This makes Macedonian economy more 
functional and comparable with candidate countries and new candidate countries. 
The indices of  Large Scale privatization and small scale privatization, are somewhat 
better than the average of new countries, within EU structure, with the lag being the 
smallest compared to candidate countries. This makes Macedonian economy capable 
for coping with competitive pressure, within EU structure.  
With regard to Maastricht criteria, compared with the situation for all EU 
countries described in the official Convergence Reports by the ECB and EU-
Commission published in 2008, we conclude our analysis for the situation in 
Macedonia as follows: Macedonia made some progress with economic convergence, 
but there remain important challenges, particularly in the form of rising inflation, 
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long-term interest rates and exchange- rate stability and in particular lowering 
unemployment. In this paper, it should be kept in mind that many tests for Macedonia 
are highly hypothetical, because the country is not a member of the European Union 
and it is far away from fulfilling all legal issues to join the EU soon. However, we offer 
in our paper the first preliminary assessment concerning monetary integration. For 
the reader it is important to keep in mind that issue. 
 
Appendix 
Years 2000 2001 2002 2003 
2004 200
5 
200
6 
200
7 
20
08 
Consumer Price, 
Annual Average 
(%) (EBRD) 5,8 5,5 1,8 1,2 
-0,4 0,5 3,2 2,3 8,4 
Producer Prices, 
Annual Average 
(EBRD) 8,9 2 -0,9 -0,3 
0,9 3,2 4,5 2,5 na 
GDP deflator 
(EBRD) 100 
103,6
1   
107,4
5 
108,9 108 132
,90
8 
139,
674 
14
9,4
46 
Related 
Indicators         
     
Real GDP growth 
rate (EUROSTAT) 4,5 -4,5 0,9 2,8 
4,1 4,1 4 5,1 5,5 
GDP per capita 
in Purchasin 
Power Standard 
(EU27 = 100) 
(EUROSTAT) 27 25,2 25 25,6 
26,6 28,
5 
29,
4 
30.
3 
30,
7 
Unemployment 
rate % of labour 
force (IFS) 
32,25
0 
30,52
0 31,94 36,69 
 
 
37,15
0 
 
 
37,
3 
36,
00 
34,9
2 
33,
21 
Labor 
productivity, 
whole economy  
(GDP/Total 
Employment) 
(IFS) 
356,8
6 312,6 
336,5
8 
356,3
7 
 
 
 
386,6 
 
 
 
386 
382
,8 
380,
2 
38
0, 
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Nominal Efective 
Exchange Rate 99,99 
103,3
4 
105,5
9 
110,3
3 
 
113,4
1 
 
114 
114
,8 
116,
3 
11
7,  
Money Supply 
(M4) (in milions 
of national 
currency - 
denar) - (IFS) na na   81802 
     
Table 13: Measures of Inflation and related indicators 
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The Business Challenges Of Entrepreneurship 
In Transition Economies 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
Increase in globalization and internationalization in markets has created a complex 
business environment for all size firms in open market and also in transition 
economies. We see that there are more obstacles for entrepreneurs in transition. The 
purpose of this research is to examine the leading business constraints of 
entrepreneurship such as institutional environment and market (taxation and 
regulations, financing, policy instability, inflation, corruption, infrastructure, anti-
competitive practice, marketing and managerial practices and bureaucracy) in 
transition economies. This study aims to integrate theoretical field with the empirical 
statistical data. The theoretical and empirical data were collected from literature and 
institutions based on statistical data, indexes and indicators to examine the business 
challenges. Therefore we use the global competitiveness index which is measuring 
nine pillars of competitiveness (institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomy, health 
and primary education, higher education and training, market efficiency, technological 
readiness, business sophistication and innovation). We also use governance indicator. 
We define governance broadly as the traditions and institutions by which authority in 
a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions 
that govern economic and social interactions among them. The six dimensions of 
governance corresponding to this definition that we measure are: 1. Voice and 
Accountability (VA) – measuring perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
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freedom of association, and a free media. 2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
(PV) – measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism. 3. Government Effectiveness (GE) – measuring 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies. 4. Regulatory Quality (RQ) – measuring perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development. 5. Rule of Law (RL) – measuring perceptions 
of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and 
in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 6. Control of Corruption (CC) – 
measuring perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests. BEEPS (Business Environment and Enterprice 
Performance Survey), CPI (Corruption Perception Index) and WBES (World Business 
Environmental Survey) will be used to examine challenges. The WBES team sought to 
accomplish the following objectives: To provide feed back from enterprises on the 
state of the private sector; To measure the quality of governa nce and public services 
including the extent of corruption; To provide better information on constraints to 
private sector growth, from the enterprise perspective; To sensitize client 
governments to the importance of listening to firms and using this information to 
critically assess policies; To establish the basis for internationally comparable 
indicators which can track changes in the business environment over time, thus 
allowing an assessment of the impact of market oriented reforms on private 
enterprises; To stimulate systematic public-private dialogue on business perceptions 
and the agenda for reform. By the help of those data we will determine the 
institutional environment, markets and organizational strategies for entrepreneurs in 
transition economies. As a conclusion we will make proposals for the entrepreneurs in 
the process of European integration. 
 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Business Challenges, Transition Economies, Global 
Indicators 
 
1.Introduction 
 
As globalisation reshapes the international economic landscape and technological 
change creates greater uncertainty in the world economy, the dynamism of 
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entrepreneurship is believed to be able to help to meet the new economic, social and 
environmental challenges. Governments increasingly consider entrepreneurship and 
innovation to be the cornerstones of a competitive national economy, and in most 
countries entrepreneurship policies are in fact closely connected to innovation 
policies, with which they share many characteristics and challenges. Entrepreneurship 
is increasingly recognised as an important driver of economic growth, productivity, 
innovation and employment, and it is widely accepted as a key aspect of economic 
dynamism (Ahmad and Seymour, 2008). The purpose of this research is to examine 
the leading business constraints of entrepreneurship such as institutional 
environment and market (taxation and regulations, financing, policy instability, 
inflation, corruption, infrastructure, anti-competitive practice, marketing and 
managerial practices and bureaucracy) in transition economies. This study analysis 
Transition Economies; CEE plus CIS. Central and Eastern (CEE): Albania, Armenia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Turkey. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. To determine the business challenges of 
entrepreneurship in Transition Economies we use the global competitiveness index 
(GCI), governance indicators (GI), Business Environment and Enterprice Performance 
Survey (BEEPS), Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and World Business Environmental 
Survey (WBES). After examining obstacles we will develop suggestions to 
entrepreneurs in Transition Economies.  
 
2.The Importance and Dynamics of Entrepreneurship  
 
Why is entrepreneurship important? First, entrepreneurship contributes to job 
creation and growth; it is increasingly new and small firms, rather than large ones, 
that are the major providers of new jobs. Second, entrepreneurship is crucial to 
competitiveness; new entrepreneurial initiatives, either starting a new firm or 
reorienting an existing one (e.g. after the transfer of a business to a new owner), 
boost productivity. They increase competitive pressure, forcing other firms to react by 
improving efficiency or introducing innovation. Increased efficiency and innovation 
within firms, whether in organisation, processes, products, services or markets, 
enhances the competitive strength of an economy as a whole. This process offers 
consumers benefits through greater choice and lower prices. Third, entrepreneurship 
unlocks personal potential; an occupation is not just a way to earn money. People 
have other criteria in their career choices, such as security, level of independence, 
variety of tasks and interest in their work. Higher income levels may prompt people to 
fulfil ‘higher needs’, such as self-realisation and independence, through 
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entrepreneurship. Fourth, entrepreneurship and societal interests; entrepreneurs are 
the drivers of the market economy and their achievements provide societies with 
wealth, jobs and diversity of choice for consumers (Brussels, 2003).  
 Some authors state that entrepreneurship is about identifying and acting 
upon (enterprising human activity) opportunities that create value (be that economic, 
cultural or social). Typically, entrepreneurial activities require the leveraging of 
resources and capabilities through innovation, but the opportunities themselves 
always relate to the identification of either new products, processes or markets. This 
point to the following definitions of the entrepreneur, entrepreneurship, and 
entrepreneurial activity; entrepreneurs are those persons (business owners) who seek 
to generate value, through the creation or expansion of economic activity, by 
identifying and exploiting new products, processes or markets. Entrepreneurial activity 
is the enterprising human action in pursuit of the generation of value, through the 
creation or expansion of economic activity, by identifying and exploiting new 
products, processes or markets. Entrepreneurship is the phenomena associated with 
entrepreneurial activity. The definitions suggest that any indicator should include 
reference to the value created by entrepreneurial activity, the changes in resources, 
capabilities and opportunities confronting an entrepreneur, and the business and 
wider environments that will impact activity. The definitions are proposed to guide 
the collection and interrogation of data sets (Ahmad and Seymour, 2008).  
According to other definition entrepreneurship is about people, their choices and 
actions in starting, taking over or running a business, or their involvement in a firm’s 
strategic decision-making. Entrepreneurs are a heterogeneous group and come from 
all walks of life. In Table 1 a number of themes emerge including the risk-taking role of 
entrepreneurs (Aidis,2003); the role of innovation or the creation of something new 
(whether that be a process, product, market or firm); the arbitrage role of the 
entrepreneur; and the process of change, emergence, and creation (Aidis, 2003; 
Bruyat & Julian, 2000; Hartmann, 1959; Schumpeter, 1934; Weber, 1947), with activity 
differentiated from the relatively ‘static’ management (Leitung) (Hartmann, 1959). 
 
 
Table 1: A Superficial Review of Extant Definitions 
Essence of definition Publication 
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Entrepreneurs buy at certain prices in the present and sell at 
uncertain prices in the future.  The entrepreneur is a bearer of 
uncertainty. 
 (Cantillon, 
1755/1931) 
Entrepreneurs are ‘pro-jectors’. 
 (Defoe, 
1887/2001) 
Entrepreneurs attempt to predict and act upon change within 
markets. The entrepreneur bears the uncertainty of market 
dynamics.  
 (Knight, 1921, 
1942) 
The entrepreneur is the person who maintains immunity from 
control of rational bureaucratic knowledge. 
 (Weber, 1947) 
The entrepreneur is the innovator who implements change 
within markets through the carrying out of new combinations.  
These can take several forms: 
· the introduction of a new good or quality thereof, 
· the introduction of a new method of production, 
· the opening of a new market, 
· the conquest of a new source of supply of new materials or 
parts, and 
· the carrying out of the new organisation of any industry. 
 (Schumpeter, 
1934) 
The entrepreneur is always a speculator.  He deals with the 
uncertain conditions of the future.  His success or failure 
depends on the correctness of his anticipation of uncertain 
events.  If he fails in his understanding of things to come he is 
doomed…  
 (von Mises, 
1949/1996)  
The entrepreneur is co-ordinator and arbitrageur.  (Walras, 1954) 
Entrepreneurial activity involves identifying opportunities within 
the economic system.  
(Penrose, 
1959/1980) 
The entrepreneur recognises and acts upon profit opportunities, 
essentially an arbitrageur.  
 (Kirzner, 1973) 
Entrepreneurship is the act of innovation involving endowing 
existing resources with new wealth-producing capacity. 
 (Drucker, 1985) 
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The essential act of entrepreneurship is new entry.  New entry 
can be accomplished by entering new or established markets 
with new or existing goods or services.  New entry is the act of 
launching a new venture, either by a start-up firm, through an 
existing firm, or via ‘internal corporate venturing’. 
 (Lumpkin & Dess, 
1996) 
The field of entrepreneurship involves the study of sources of 
opportunities; the processes of discovery, evaluation, and 
exploitation of opportunities; and the set of individuals who 
discover, evaluate, and exploit them. 
 (Shane & 
Venkataraman,   
2000)  
Entrepreneurship is a context dependent social process through 
which individuals and teams create wealth by bringing together 
unique packages of resources to exploit marketplace 
opportunities. 
 (Ireland, Hitt, & 
Sirmon, 2003) 
Entrepreneurship is the mindset and process to create and 
develop economic activity by blending risk-taking, creativity 
and/or innovation with sound management, within a new or an 
existing organisation. 
 (Commission of 
the  European 
Communities, 
2003) 
Source: Aidis, R. (2003), “Entrepreneurship and Transition Economies”, TI 2003-015/2, 
Tinbergen İnstitute Discussion Paper, 1-31. 
 
3. Categories for Entrepreneurship Indicators 
 
An enterprise is a legal entity possessing the right to conduct business on its own. The 
OECD’s Entrepreneurship Indicators Project has built a framework for addressing and 
measuring entrepreneurship was seen in Figure 1 (Ahmad and Hoffman, 2007).  
 
 
 Figure 1:  
Topic categories for entrepreneurship indicators 
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Source: Ahmad, N. and A. Hoffman (2007), A Framework for Addressing and 
Measuring Entrepreneurship. Paris: OECD Entrepreneurship Indicators Steering Group. 
OECD’s project describes and presents a framework that reflects both the 
determinants, outputs and most importantly manifestations (performance indicators) 
of entrepreneurship.  (Ahmad and Seymour, 2008). In our study we use indicators and 
indexes which cover institutional environment and market (taxation and regulations, 
financing, policy instability, inflation, corruption, infrastructure, anti-competitive 
practice, marketing and managerial practices and bureaucracy) in transition 
economies. Those indicators and indexes are Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Global 
Competitiveness Indicators (GCI), Governence Indicator (GI), Business Environment 
and Enterprice Performance Survey (BEEPS) and World Business Environmental Survey 
(WBES). 
4. Transition Economies 
In our study we will examine CEE and CIS countries as a Transition Economies. Central 
and Eastern (CEE): Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Turkey. 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
Transition Economies = CEE plus CIS (Batra, Kaufmann and Stone, 2003).  
 
5. The Business Challenges For Entrepreneurs in Transition Economies  
 
The performance of the transition economies has fallen short of expectations for 
several reasons: Advanced western economies did unusually well in the 1990s, which 
raised the bar for perceptions of economic success; the economic problems 
associated with the transition were widely underestimated; and policymakers made a 
number of questionable choices (Svejnar, 2001:2). In figure 2 we see the most 
problematic factors for doing business in Transition Economies. These factors are 
corruption, infrastructure, bureucracy, tax regulations and rates, policy instability, 
poor work ethic, financing, inadequately educated workforce, inflation etc (Kaufman, 
2005). 
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Figure 2: The most problematic factors for doing business in Transition Economies  
(The Case of Albania) 
Source: Kaufmann Daniel (2005), Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption, 
World Bank 2005 
 
The most important challenges are corruption, infrastructure, bureucracy, taxation 
and financing. The other types of of barries for entrepreneurships (aspecially SME’s) 
are: Learning foreign environment, Doing market analysis abroad, Purchasing legal 
consulting services, Translation of documents, Adaptation of products to foreign 
markets, Travel expenses, Higher business and financial risk, Higher business and 
financial risk, Establishing foreign distribution and marketing networks, Accessing 
information other markets, Lack of information, Knowledge and experience in 
international markets, Understanding overseas markets, Identifying foreign business 
opportunities, Inability to contact potential overseas customers, Distance of foreign 
markets, Transmitting information across geographic space, Regulatory requirements 
on product standards, Intellectual property rights protection, National competition 
policies, Legislative and regulatory frameworks, Telecommunications infrastructure, 
Research and education policies, Entrepreneurship abilities, Managerial abilities 
(Kaufmann, 2005).  
 SMEs types of entrepreneurship in transitional economies have had limited 
experience in international trade. During the central planning period large enterprises 
were favoured over SMEs. There were restrictions to private SMEs and their 
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international trading activities. Therefore, SMEs were not much exposed to foreign 
competition or exporting activities before making the transition to market economies. 
In addition, SMEs in transitional economies face higher transaction costs and have 
more limited access to credit and other inputs. As a result, they have greater difficulty 
penetrating export markets (Kaufmann, 2005). The barriers encountered by SME at 
different stages are then classified into formal, informal, environmental and other 
categories (based on institutional theory). The authors find that as the transition stage 
moves into the advanced stage, SME owners become increasingly more concerned 
with human resource (labour) and skill development (training) then at the initial 
stages seen in Table 2 (Aidis, 2003:31).  
 
Table 2: The SME Barriers at Different Transition Stages 
 
Source: Aidis, R. (2003), “Entrepreneurship and Transition Economies”, TI 2003-015/2, 
Tinbergen İnstitute Discussion Paper, 1-31. 
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There is an increased need to develop internal business capabilities to deal with 
increasing competition as well as business growth such as specific consulting and 
business training programmes. Three formal constraints: taxes, policy instability and 
legal regulations form a barrier for business development throughout the transition 
stages. Access to finance also continues to be a barrier to businesses throughout the 
three transition stages but it seems that the types of financing needed is affected by 
transition stage. In the primary or secondary stages the emphasis lies on the need for 
micro-credit and short and long term bank loans, the more advanced stages 
necessitate more sophisticated financing such as venture capital and stock listings 
(Aidis. 2003).  As Pissarides (2004) has indicated, it is important for financing 
opportunities to adapt to the requirements of SME owners as transition progresses, 
allowing for more complex forms of financing including venture capitalists in more 
advanced stages. However, there are different viewpoints as to the sequence of 
funding and institutional building needed for SME development (Aidis, 2003:16). 
Insufficient knowledge about Internet applications is an important barrier to the 
adoption of e-business practices among SMEs For Slovenia, Poland, Romania and 
Cyprus. Research indicates that many SME managers consider the Internet is useful 
but mostly for the operations of big companies. As a result, they do not see 
compelling reasons for e-business adoption in SMEs (Damaskopoulos and Evgeriou, 
2003:138). Ukrainian business environment is not favorable for the innovations. High 
taxes and corruption create non-favorable conditions for innovations in SMEs. Many 
companies reported taxation and legislation among the main barriers to innovations 
(Egorov and Voytovich, 2001:1455). 
 The business barriers classified into five part. These are institutional barriers: 
Bureaucracy, Too many licences, Accounting standards. Political instability, Frequent 
changes in laws and regulations, Frequent changes in government, Non-transparency 
of laws/regulations, Operation of commercial law, Operation of the financial system, 
Inadequate measures against corruption. Internal barriers: Large severance pay, High 
labour costs, High dismissal costs. External barriers: Late payment, High social security 
payments, High profits tax. Financial barriers: Cost of credit, High collateral 
requirements, Bank charges. Insufficient finance for expansion, High burden of 
taxes/contributions, Insufficient demand. Social barriers: Lack of state support, Lack of 
support from LA, Lack of support from Chamber (Barlett and Bucklic, 2001:193-195). 
Under the light of surveys conducted by EBRD and Word Bank; taxes, financing and 
policy insability can be observed in the top four obstacles in the transtional countries 
(Estrin et al,2005). 
 The survey asked respondents to rate how problematic were a set of general 
constraints for the growth and operation of their firm. Table 3 presents the ranking of 
responses for the world, by regional groups and by individual region to the following 
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question: “Please judge on a four-point scale how problematic are the following 
factors for the operation and growth of your firm.” Four constraints stand out (based 
on a simple average for the overall world sample): taxes and regulations, financing, 
policy uncertainty/instability and inflation. Indeed, if we were to focus on a simple 
average for the overall world sample, the following constraints stand out: taxes and 
regulations, financing, policy uncertainty/instability, and inflation (Batra et al., 2003). 
 
 
Table 3: Leading Constraints 
 
 
Source: Batra, Geeta, Daniel Kaufmann and Andrew H. W. Stone (2003), The Firms 
Speak: What the World Business Environment Survey Tells Us about Constraints on 
Private Sector Development, World Bank October, 2003, p.5 
 
Yet such worldwide average results mask crucial differences across regions, and 
particularly between industrialized and developing countries. For OECD, newly 
industrialized East Asian countries, and transition economies, the leading obstacles 
identified by the firms where indeed taxes and regulations, financing, policy 
instability, and inflation. However, for developing regions as a group (Africa; Latin 
America and the Caribbean, LAC; Middle East/North Africa, MENA; South Asia; and 
East Asia) the leading constraint is corruption, followed by inflation, financing, policy 
instability, and infrastructure. Surprisingly, in Transition Europe (CIS and CEE), 
although corruption is quite prevalent in the region and an important problem for 
about half the firms, it is not among the top four constraints (Batra et al., 2003). 
 The second leading general constraint (Table 4) for the global sample is 
financing firms in Central and Eastern Europe are most likely to identify it as seriously 
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constraining, followed by those in CIS countries, and then those in Africa, South Asia 
and Latin America. Globally, while financing is identified as the second leading 
constraint by small and medium enterprises, it ranks as fourth for large enterprises 
(Batra et al., 2003). Svetlicic et al (2007) has supported this findings. Their study 
examined differences in outward foreign direct investment (FDI) activity between 
small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) and large enterprises in five Central 
European economies (CEEs). In conclusion they have found that the access to 
finanacal resources is more difficult for SME’s than large firms. 
 
Table 4: Financing Constraints (percent of firms rating constraint “major” or 
“moderate") 
 
Source: Batra, Geeta, Daniel Kaufmann and Andrew H. W. Stone (2003), The Firms 
Speak: What the World Business Environment Survey Tells Us about Constraints on 
Private Sector Development, World Bank October, 2003, p.5 
 
The fourth leading constraint is policy uncertainty and instability (Batra et al., 2003). 
Meyer et al (2005) argued that according to the foreign investors; instability and 
uncertanity are major obstacles related to new rules and regulation. Firms’ views of 
this constraint vary widely by region (Figure 3). At one extreme, more than 70 percent 
of firms in South Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and Developing East Asia report 
policy instability as seriously constraining, with firms in Latin America, MENA, and CIS 
close behind. By contrast, only 26 percent of firms in East Asia NIC and China 
identified this constraint as “major” or “moderate”, and also only 37 percent of firms 
in OECD countries did so (Batra et al., 2003). 
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Firms differ by region in the particular dimension of policy instability that troubles 
them. Over 70 percent of firms in CEE, over 60 percent of firms in CIS countries and 
Developing East Asia, and about half of firms in LAC find economic and financial 
policies unpredictable. In CEE and Africa, nearly three quarters of firms rated changes 
in rules, laws and regulations affecting them as being unpredictable, while two-thirds 
of firms did so in CIS. With regard to advance notification of changes in laws and 
policies affecting them, 68 percent of firms in CEE, 60 percent of CIS firms, and 57 
percent Latin American firms responding reported that they were “seldom” or “never” 
notified in advance of changes affecting them. Finally, there is a question of whether 
government considers businesses’ views in the formulation of legal and policy changes. 
In Transition Europe, MENA and Latin America the majority of firms suggest that this is 
relatively rare (Batra et al., 2003). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Policy Instability by Region (percent of firms responding 3 or 4 seriously 
constraining) 
 
Source: Batra, Geeta, Daniel Kaufmann and Andrew H. W. Stone (2003), The Firms 
Speak: What the World Business Environment Survey Tells Us about Constraints on 
Private Sector Development, World Bank October, 2003. 
 
Corruption is identified as a serious constraint by over 70 percent of firms in South 
Asia and nearly as many in Developing East Asia and MENA (Figure 4). Sixty- four 
percent of firms in Africa, almost 60 percent of those in Latin America and about half 
in the CIS and Central and Eastern Europe report it a serious impediment. This 
contrasts with the much lower share (about 20 percent) of firms in NIC East 
Asia/China5 and in OECD countries that rate it as a “major” or “moderate” obstacle. 
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Further, in many of the developing countries, the majority of firms reported that it 
was common “in their line of business to have to pay some irregular ‘additional 
payments’ to get things done”. The data on firms’ reported percentage of total 
revenue paid every year in bribes clearly and positively correlate with the data on the 
degree to which firms find corruption constraining.  
 
 
Figure 4: Indicators of Corruption by Region (percent of firms that responded 
“always,” 
“mostly,” or “frequently,” as opposed to “sometimes,” “seldom,” or “never”) 
 
Source: Batra, Geeta, Daniel Kaufmann and Andrew H. W. Stone (2003), The Firms 
Speak: What the World Business Environment Survey Tells Us about Constraints on 
Private Sector Development, World Bank October, 2003. 
An important manifestation of weak governance is the extent to which 
registered firms operate unofficially. Related to this is the degree to which firms 
comply with tax laws. While there are variations from region to region, about half the 
firms in the global sample indicated that they report no more than 80 percent of their 
revenues (Batra et al., 2003). 
 
6. The Impact of EU Accession 
 
Eight transition countries became members of the EU in May 2004 (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Czech R., Slovak R., Poland and Slovenia). A number of authors 
argue that EU accession will be a win-win situation for both the existing member 
countries as well as the new accession countries (Mayhew 1999; EIU 2003; Knaack and 
Jager 2003). To be sure, EU market integration will increase overall business 
possibilities. Depending on the size of business, EU accession effect closely 
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entrepreneurship operations. In table 5, we summarize a number of opportunities and 
threats corresponding to EU membership for SMEs type of entrepreneurship.  
 
Table 5: EU Membership Opportunities and Threats for SME Development 
 
Source: Aidis, R. (2003), “Entrepreneurship and Transition Economies”, TI 
2003-015/2, Tinbergen İnstitute Discussion Paper, 1-31. 
 
EU accession lead to opening border, market integration and new export 
opportunities which bring in turn unexpected competitive pressures in domestic 
markets. Local SMEs are likely to be promoted less than large sized enterprises and 
multinationals by EU market changes. Therefore SMEs will need new management 
skills and new technical standards which will increase their costs, investment in higher 
product and process standards. Adoption of new laws may seem attractive however 
corrupt behaviors could affect the uneven implementation and enforcement of these 
laws (Aidis, R., 2003). Trade, investment patterns and infrastructure developments 
provide better opportunities for connection between Southeast Europe with the EU.  
Although Southeast Europa has poor rail and road transport infrastructure due to 
history of political disintegration, most of Balkan countries transportation connection 
to the EU is much better than other countries in the region. Therefore infrastructure 
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investments will be benifical to ensure crossborder co-operation and nurture 
conditions for increased economic growth and political integration (IBEU, 2004). 
 
Subject to the integration to EU, higher living standards will reduce the new member 
country’s low labour cost advantage and increased mobility within the member 
countires will encourage qualified workers to work in old EU members where the 
wages are higher. For example Lithuania encounter a shortage of qualified workers for 
the construction and service sectors In general, without government intervention, the 
winners in EU integration will be large enterprises and the losers will 
disproportionately be SMEs. However, internal firm-level development also plays a 
decisive role. As Smallbone and Rogut comment (Aidis, R., 2003):  
 
… firms that are already proactively managed, and with an existing presence in foreign 
markets, are in the best position to take advantage of any new foreign market 
opportunities. In comparison, firms that are focused on regional or domestic markets 
niches, and in which managers are complacent or dismissive about any market 
integration effects impacting on their businesses, may be in for a shock. 
 
7. Examining Entrepreneurship in Transition Economies: Indicators and Indexes  
 
The Business Environment and Enterprice Performance Survey (BEEPS) 
 
The Business Environment and Enterprice Performance Survey (BEEPS) is based on the 
firm level data which measure the corruption experience of firms. BEEPS was designed 
to unbundle corruption so different types of corruption transactions are determined 
which have dissimiliar causes and results. A comparision is made on the both the 
extent and type of corruption experienced by foreign versus domestic firms, as well as 
among different types of foreign firms by means of BEEPS. Two types of corruption; 
state capture an dpublic procurement kikcbacks are focused by the researchers of 
survey. State capture: defined as the extent to which firms make illicit private 
payments to public officials in order to influence the formation of laws, rules, 
regulations or decrees by state institutions, and Public procurement kickbacks: 
defined as illicit private payments to public officials to secure public procurement 
contracts (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2002).  
 
The BEEPS survey provides the first empirical measures of state capture. Firms were 
asked to disaggregate the types of bribery in which “firms like yours” have been 
engaged. Those that report having made private payments to public officials for the 
purpose of influencing the 
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content of laws, decrees or regulations are designated as captor firms. Similarly, firms 
were asked if they had made private payments to public officials to obtain public 
procurement contracts, though this question was only asked of the subset of firms 
that already identified themselves as having trade with the state. Thus, a group of 
kickback firms can be identified from the larger sample. Table 6 presents the data on 
the share of captor firms and kickback firms in each country.  
 
Table 6: Measuring the Types and Level of Corruption in Transition Economies 
 
 
 
 Source: Hellman Joel S., Geraint Jones and Daniel Kaufmann (2002), Far From Home: 
Do Foreign Investors Import Higher Standards of Governance in Transition Economies? 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=386900 
 
The data in table 6 allow us to see that the highest share of captor firms is in 
Azerbaijan; on the other hand, the lowest share takes place in Uzbekistan; the highest 
share of kickback firms is in Albania; on the other side, Belaraus has the lowest level. 
In addition, table 6 provides a measure of the average share of bribe payments by 
firms as a share of their annual revenue. Once again Azerbaijan firms come first in 
avarage share of annual firm revenues paid bribes.  
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7.2. The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 
 
The World Bank’s World Business Environment Survey (WBES) suggests what is 
required to develop the business environment, based on what businesses themselves 
say about conditions they need to grow and the obstacles they struggle. A standard 
core enterprise survey was applied in a roughly parallel way in all 80 countries 
throughout the world, (at least 100 firms were surveyed in each country) plus the 
West Bank and Gaza to evaluate business conditions in a large, crossregional set of 
member countries, by the World Bank Group and partner institutions. It uses a 
uniform methodology and parallel parameters for sample structure. The conditions 
WBES sought to assess include: the conditions for private enterprise growth, focusing 
on local economic policy, governance, regulatory, infrastructure and financial barriers, 
and services to businesses. The survey represents an important step toward 
standardizing evaluations of the conditions for private investment in developing and 
transition countries around the world. The survey enables to make regional 
comparisons of investment climate and business environment conditions. The WBES 
explores how a variety of firm characteristics, such as size and type of ownership, 
affect their experience and perceptions of constraints. Using a multivariate regression 
approach gives us insights into the influence of firm characteristics on their response 
to key potential obstacles to business operation and growth, to control for country 
effects (Batra, Kaufmann and Stone, 2003).  
 
WBES prevents universal generalizations. It suggests enourmous variance different 
kinds of constraints. Even though two countries may have important regulatory or 
governance  restrictions, the elements may be  rather diffrent in each country; hence,  
generalization should be avoided. 
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Table 7: Effect of Firm Characteristics on Obstacle Severity: Results of Least Square 
Estimates
 
 
Source: Batra, Geeta, Daniel Kaufmann and Andrew H. W. Stone (2003), The Firms 
Speak: What the World Business Environment Survey Tells Us about Constraints on 
Private Sector Development, World Bank October, 2003 
 
This survey also discourages universal generalizations. Rather, it’s value lies precisely 
in shedding light on the enormous variance in the nature and severity of different 
types of constraints across countries and regions, as well as between firms of different 
characteristics. 
This variance implies that the global generalizations regarding the severity of a 
particular constraint are of limited value. It also suggests the importance of 
“unbundling” generic clusters of constraints. Although two countries may have severe 
regulatory or governance constraints, for example, the components may be quite 
different in each country. The detail afforded by the survey also suggests that 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
403 
 
generalizations about firm size and formality may benefit from a nuanced analysis of 
actual conditions (Batra, Kaufmann and Stone, 2003). 
 
7.3. Governance Indicator  
 
Governance Indicators (GI) have been developed to define in depth and measure 
governance. Covering more than 200 countries, these GI are based on more than 350 
variables and obtained from dozens of institutions worldwide, including the survey. 
The Governance Indicators capture six key dimensions of institutional quality or 
governance, and measure, through two indicators each, the political, economic, and 
institutional dimensions of governance described above. The following six dimensions 
are (Kaufmann, 2005): Voice and accountability—measuring political, civil and human 
rights. Political instability and violence—measuring the likelihood of violent threats to, 
or changes in, government, including terrorism. Government effectiveness—
measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service 
delivery. Regulatory burden—measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies. 
Rule of law—measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Control of corruption—
measuring the exercise of public power for private gain, including both petty and 
grand corruption, and state capture. These indicators have been available since 1996, 
and we released the last installment for 209 countries, with data up to the end of 
2004. 
Table 8: Significant Changes in Governance Worldwide in Short-term, 1998–2004        
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Source: Kaufmann Daniel (2005), Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption, 
World Bank 2005. 
 
7.4. The Global Competitiveness Indexes 
 
After several years of rapid and almost unhampered growth, the global economic 
landscape is changing. Rising food and energy prices, a major international financial 
crisis, and the related slowdown in the world’s leading economies are confronting 
policymakers with new economic management challenges. Today’s volatility 
underscores the importance of a competitiveness supporting economic environment 
that can help national economies to weather these types of shocks in order to ensure 
solid economic performance going into the future. A nation’s level of competitiveness 
reflects the extent to which it is able to provide rising prosperity to its citizens. Since 
1979, the World Economic Forum’s annual Global Competitiveness Reports have 
examined the many factors enabling national economies to achieve sustained 
economic growth and long-term prosperity. Their goal over the years has been to 
provide benchmarking tools for business leaders and policymakers to identify 
obstacles to improved competitiveness, stimulating discussion on strategies to 
overcome them. For the past several years, the World Economic Forum has based its 
competitiveness analysis on the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), a highly 
comprehensive index for measuring national competitiveness, which captures the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic foundations of national competitiveness (Schwab 
and Porter, 2008). 
 
Schwab and Porter (2008) define competitiveness as the set of institutions, policies, 
and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. The level of 
productivity, in turn, sets the sustainable level of prosperity that can be earned by an 
economy. In other words, more competitive economies tend to be able to produce 
higher levels of income for their citizens. The productivity level also determines the 
rates of return obtained by investments in an economy. Because the rates of return 
are the fundamental drivers of the growth rates of the economy, a more competitive 
economy is one that is likely to grow faster over the medium to long run. The concept 
of competitiveness thus involves static and dynamic components: although the 
productivity of a country clearly determines its ability to sustain a high level of income, 
it is also one of the central determinants of the returns to investment, which is one of 
the key factors explaining an economy’s growth potential. 
  
The determinants of competitiveness are many and complex. For hundreds of years, 
economists have tried to understand what determines the wealth of nations. This 
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attempt has ranged from Adam Smith’s focus on specialization and the division of 
labor to neoclassical economists’ emphasis on investment in physical capital and 
infrastructure, and, more recently, to interest in other mechanisms such as education 
and training, technological progress (whether created within the country or adopted 
from broad), macroeconomic stability, good governance, the rule of law, transparent 
and well-functioning institutions, firm sophistication, demand conditions, market size, 
and many others. Schwab and Porter (2008) group all these components into 12 
pillars of economic competitiveness: These are Basic requirements (Institutions, 
Infrasructure, Macroeconomic stability, Health and primary education), Efficiency 
enhencers (Higher education and training, Goods market efficiency, Labor market 
efficiency, Financial market sophistication, Technological readiness, Market size), 
Innovation and sophistication factors (Business sophistication, Innovation). In table 9 
we see global competitiveness index rankings and 2007-2008 comparisons. 
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Table 9: Global Competitiveness Index rankings and 2007–2008 comparisons 
Source: Schwab, Klaus and Michael E.Porter (2008) The Global Competitiveness Report 
The Global Competitiveness Report (2008 World Economic Forum) 
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7.5. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
 
A country or territory’s CPI Score indicates the degree of public sector corruption as 
perceived by business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly 
clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). In table 10 we see Corruption Perception Index of 
Transition Economies. 
 
Table 10: 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index of Transition Economies (out of 180) 
 
Country 
Rank 
Country 
/Territory CPI 
CPI Score 
2008 
Standard 
Deviation 
Confidence 
Intervals* 
Surveys 
Used** 
26 Slovenia 6.7 0.5 6.5 – 7.0 8 
27 Estonia 6.6 0.7 6.2 – 6.9 8 
45 Czech Republic 5.2 1 4 .8 - 5.9  8 
47 Hungary 5.1 0.6  4.8 - 5.4  8 
52 Slovakia 5.0 0.7   4.5 - 5.3  8 
58 Turkey 4.6 0.9  4.1 - 5.1  7 
58 Lithuania 4.6 1  4.1 - 5.2  8 
58 Poland 4.6 1  4.0 - 5.2  8 
62 Croatia 4.4 0.7  4.0 - 4.8  8 
67 Georgia 3.9 1.2  3.2 - 4.6  7 
70 Romania 3.8 0.8  3.4 - 4.2  8 
72 Bulgaria 3.6 1.1  3.0 - 4.3  8 
72 Macedonia 3.6 1.1  2.9 - 4.3  6 
85 Montenegro 3.4 1  2.5 - 4.0  5 
85 Albania 3.4 0.1  3.3 - 3.4  5 
92 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
3.2 0.6  2.9 - 3.5  7 
109 Armenia 2.9 0.4  2.6 - 3.1  7 
109 Moldova 2.9 1.1  2.4 - 3.7  7 
134 Ukraine 2.5 0.5  2.2 - 2.8  8 
145 Kazakhstan 2.2 0.7  1.8 - 2.7  6 
147 Russia 2.1 0.6  1.9 - 2.5  8 
151 Belarus 2.0 0.7  1.6 - 2.5  5 
158 Azerbaijan 1.9 0.4  1.7 - 2.1  8 
166 Uzbekistan 1.8 0.7  1.5 - 2.2  8 
166 Kyrgyzstan 1.8 0.2  1.7 - 1.9  7 
 
Source: Lambsdorff, 2008 (transparency.org/surveys/#cpi or www.icgg.org)  
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Slovenia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia’ CPI score are above 5.0. 
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’ CPI score are below 2.0. We can say that 
corruption is an important constaint for entrepreneurs in transition economies. In 
figure 6 we see some key constaints to business, by region. 
 
 
Figure 6: Some key constraints to business, by region: Responses from firms in Survey 
2005 
 
Source: Kaufmann Daniel (2005), Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption, 
World Bank 2005 
 
According to figure 6 Corruption is the most important constraint in transition. The 
other important constraints are bureucracy and tax regulation and then infrastructure. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Institutional environment and market conditions are important for entrepreneurs all 
over the world. In our study we try to determine the most important constraints for 
entrepreneurs in Transition Economies by using indicators and indexes. We see that 
bureucracy, tax regulation, financing, infrastructure and corruption is the most 
important constraints in transition. Our researches show that all size of 
entrepreneurship (SMEs, Multinational, National Enterprise etc.) is important to 
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growth of the transition economies. Beside this business owner characteristics is 
important as well as environment and the role of the state for entrepreneurs in 
transition.      
 
The role of government will be of crucial importance in the transition economies. 
Government will be required to put in place the necessary market oriented structures 
and institutions that will facilitate the establishment, nurturing and growth of SMEs. 
Bureaucratic regulations and corruption need to be tackled as a matter of urgency. 
Government and its agencies will be increasingly required to play a facilitatory rather 
than production role within the economy, one that embraces the market, private 
ownership and entrepreneurialism. Increased participation of SMEs in the global 
economy will also be essential and in this regard policy should aim at: encouraging the 
upgrading of skills and technology; providing information on market opportunities; 
facilitating access to small business finance; facilitating networking amongst SMEs 
and, where appropriate with large domestically owned enterprises as well as TNCs. 
The obstacles facing SMEs in the transition economies are immense, but the process 
of globalization will require their improved competitiveness and product quality if 
they are to survive let alone fully participate and benefit from it (Kaufman, 2005).  
 It is expected that the harmonisation of regulations will improve the overall 
business environment but it can also result in additional compliance costs. SMEs tend 
to have lower absorption capacity, therefore increased regulatory costs result in 
increased prices for consumers thus reducing overall competitiveness. Some EU 
regulations will have less impact on SMEs such as environmental protection which will 
primarily impact large-scale manufacturers especially those producing chemicals, 
metals, machinery and equipment. However, increased workplace health standards 
will have a broader impact on all enterprises regardless of size. 
 There is an increased need to develop internal business capabilities to deal 
with increasing competition as well as business growth such as specific consulting and 
business training programmes. The obvious policy conclusion is that governments 
wanting to promote the outward internationalization of SMEs should: Deregulate 
economic infrastructure and simplify administrative procedures for doing business 
abroad; Provide information on conditions for doing business abroad on a regular 
basis, offering online platforms for small businesses in foreign countries and 
institutions; Improve SMEs’ access to financial resources and adjust 
internationalization support programs to SMEs’ needs; Simplify accounting systems 
and create financial and fiscal frameworks that alleviate the difficulties faced by SMEs 
and encourage innovative activities; Improve cooperation between business and 
research and educational institutions to stimulatespillovers and a more adaptive 
education system; Introduce educational methods and programs that enhance 
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innovation and entrepreneurship and develop holistic internationalization training 
programs; Initiate R&D support instruments, such as tax rebates, research grants, and 
the provision of infrastructure;  Promote technology transfer by launching networks 
between large companies, SMEs, and research organizations; Facilitate an adoption of 
e-commerce and e-government; Provide assistance, training, and consultant services 
to managers and smallbusiness owners. (Svetlicic, Jaklic and Burger, 2007: 54-55). 
SMEs need to develop their creativity, adaptability and their orientation to capitalising 
on market opportunities, meeting customer satisfaction, taking advantage of the 
weaknesses of rivals, and developing supplier-oriented relationships. Flexibility, 
innovativeness, and continuous performance improvement within a cluster are factors 
that are becoming the elements of a new strategic approach to building a competitive 
advantage and developing SMEs. 
 Managerial responses also important in EU integration for Transition. Partly 
from normative standpoint but also based on actual behavior the following 
managerial responses do address: Be innovative, open to new concepts, accept a risk; 
React quickly to the market need for western and western-like product; Apply frugal 
marketing, don’t commit resources without assessing the expected outcome of one’s 
activities; Keep prices moderate-the affluent segment in TE is limited in scope. Don’t 
allow prices to fluctuate excessively; Consider market niches-especially for smalller 
companies looking for improved margins; Diversify sources of supply to enhance the 
selection in terms of quality and quantity and build a wider base of providers. 
Purchasing is also a part of marketing; Build image, develop an active brand policy. 
Stay close to your customer base; Maintain consistency with respect product/service 
quality, nature of operations, marketing style; Develop exporting and implement 
marketing adaptations it requires; Use consultant to save time and resources 
(Sternquist and Paliwoda, 1996). 
 In general, without government intervention, the winners in EU integration 
will be large enterprises and the losers will disproportionately be SMEs.  
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Abstract 
 
As a candidate country, Turkey has benefited from the EU Assistance under IPA for the 
period 2007-2013. Number of projects implemented in Turkey was totally 2 312, so 
far. It is a fact that applicants (NGOs, Government Institutions, SMEs) face some 
problems during the preparing and implementation of the projects. Therefore, the 
aim of this study is to share experiences of Turkey with other countries, explain 
distribution of assistance component by component, and give examples from 
successful implications in practice. 
Keywords: EU, Grant, Project, Turkey 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Turkey was one of the first countries, in 1959, to seek close cooperation with the 
European Economic Community (EEC). This cooperation was realised in the framework 
of the Ankara Agreement that was signed in 1963 (Anonymous, 2009a). After 23 years 
of “association agreement”, Turkey applied for full membership of the European 
Community (EC) in 1987 and signed a Customs Union agreement with the EC in 1995 
(Akca, 1996). Application of Turkey for membership to the European Union (EU) was 
accepted by the European Council in Helsinki in 1999. Turkey started to negotiations 
with the EU in 2005.  
 The EU finances every year thousands of projects from social services to 
enterprise support and regional development. All projects have a single objective: 
preparation for the EU membership (Anonymous, 2009b). Many projects were 
implemented in Turkey under the EU Assistances. Municipalities, Associations, 
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Chambers, Unions, Universities and SMEs have faced some difficulties related to 
projects (preparation, implementation, etc). Therefore, the aim of this study is to 
share experiences of Turkey with other countries, explain distribution of assistance 
component by component, and give examples from successful implications. 
 
2. Financial Assistance Of The Eu And Turkey 
 
Before joining the EU, a country must have a functioning market economy, as well as 
the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU (EC, 
2009). Until 2002 Turkey had received support under the MEDA programme and 
through two regulations to support the customs union and economic and social 
development. For the period to 1999 the key aim of assistance to Turkey had been to 
accompany the process of structural reform, as for other Mediterranean partners. 
Following the Helsinki European Council in 1999, a pre-accession orientation was 
introduced to the financial assistance programmes with Turkey. Assistance continued 
to be available for structural adjustment, in co-ordination with the international 
financial institutions, but assistance also began to focus on institution building, 
investment, and supporting the participation of Turkey in Community programmes 
and agencies (CFCU, 2009). Cumulative EU Assistance to Turkey for the period 2000-
2006 is summarised in Table 1.   
 
Table 1. Overview of EU Assistance to Turkey 2000-2006  
 Cumulated EU Assistance (€) 
Political Criteria 115 432 505 
Energy 11 404 000 
Telecommunications 3 460 000 
Social Policy 36 931 075 
Transport 12 603 000 
Environment 45 350 000 
Internal Market 28 920 295 
Agriculture 119 427 100 
JLS 30 904 750 
Economic Social Cohesion 461 969 294 
Community Programmes & CSD 218 161 722 
Public Administration 33 594 325 
Customs 44 490 954 
Other 72 871 000 
Total Allocations 1 235 520 000 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
415 
 
Source: ABGS (2008).  
 
Since 2007, all the EU assistance to the countries now with a prospect of EU 
membership has been brought under a single heading, the Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA). This brings a new focus to EU assistance for enlargement 
(EC, 2009). IPA replaces the 2000-2006 pre-accession financial instruments PHARE, 
ISPA, SAPARD, the Turkish pre-accession instrument, and the financial instrument for 
the Western Balkans, CARDS (Europa Media, 2006). The beneficiary countries are 
divided into two categories, depending on their status as either candidate countries 
(Turkey, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) under the accession 
process or potential candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo) under the stabilisation and association process. IPA 
is made up of 5 Components, each covering priorities defined according to the needs 
of the beneficiary countries. Two components (transition assistance and institution-
building, cross-border cooperation) concern all beneficiary countries. The other three 
components (regional development, human resources development, rural 
development) are aimed at candidate countries only (Europa, 2009). The total pre-
accession funding for the current financial framework (2007-2013) is € 11.5 billion. 
Allocations per country, decided so far for the period 2007–2012, are shown in Table 
2. 
 
 
Table 2: EU Financial Assistance under IPA in 2007-2012 (€ million)  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007-2012 
Turkey 497.2 538.7 566.4 653.7 781.9 899.5 3 937.4 
Croatia 141.2 146.0 151.2 154.2 157.2 160.4 910.2 
Macedonia  58.5 70.2 81.8 92.3 98.7 105.8 507.3 
Serbia 189.7 190.9 194.8 198.7 202.7 206.8 1 183.6 
Montenegro 31.4 32.6 33.3 34.0 34.7 35.4 201.4 
Kosovo 68.3 184.7 106.1 67.3 68.7 70.0 565.1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 62.1 74.8 89.1 106.0 108.1 110.2 550.3 
Albania 61.0 70.7 81.2 93.2 95.0 96.9 498.0 
Multi-country support 109.0 135.7 160.0 157.7 160.8 164.2 887.4 
Total 1 218.4 1 
444.3 
1 
463.9 
1 
557.1 
1 
707.8 
1 
849.2 
9 240.7 
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EU Financial support for Turkey is increasing rapidly year by year. The funds are 
available in institutional development, cross border cooperation, regional 
development, development of human resources and rural development (Table 3).  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: IPA 2007-2010: Turkey Allocations according to Components 
Components 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 256.7 256.1 233.2 211.3 230.6 250.9 
Cross-border Cooperation 2.1 2.9 9.4 9.6 9.8 9.9 
Regional Development 167.5 173.8 182.7 238.1 291.4 350.8 
Human Resources Development 50.2 52.9 55.6 63.4 77.6 89.9 
Rural Development 20.7 53.0 85.5 131.3 172.5 197.9 
Total 497.2 538.7 566.4 653.7 781.9 899.4 
 
Table 4 shows performance ranks of the bodies that implemented projects. Although 
no grant may exceed 50 % of the total budget of the Project, more than one-fourth 
(28.29%) of the projects were carried out by SMEs. Municipality ranks the first in 
terms of grant amount.  
  
Table 4: Performance Ranks by Bodies 
Bodies 
Number of 
Contracts 
% 
Grant Amount 
(€) 
% 
SMEs 654 28.29 47 767 998.55 16.69 
Associations 341 12.75 22 864 342.42 7.99 
Municipalities 291 12.59 88 954 261.97 31.08 
Chambers 245 10.60 21 621 672.99 7.56 
Foundations 145 6.27 13 193 492.47 4.61 
Unions 95 4.11 8 915 097.73 3.12 
Villages Service Unions 76 3.29 21 209 560.35 7.41 
Universities 73 3.16 11 790 188.04 4.12 
Others 68 2.94 7 178 457.09 2.51 
Cooperatives 66 2.85 5 126 019.66 1.79 
Farmer Groups 65 2.81 5 311 118.70 1.86 
Special Provincial Administration 50 2.16 15 546 737.78 5.43 
Colleges 38 1.64 3 771 978.42 1.32 
Villages 35 1.51 5 001 661.91 1.75 
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Trade Unions 33 1.43 3 717 152.01 1.30 
Vocational High Schools 21 0.91 1 454 950.59 0.51 
Public Bodies 12 0.52 2 615 333.86 0.91 
Primary Schools 4 0.17 131 433.41 0.05 
Total 2312 100.00 286 171 457.95 100.00 
Source: MFIB (2009).  
 The EU supports reforms and development in key sectors and EU funds are 
allocated on a project basis. Among the large range of immediate beneficiaries are 
ministries and other governmental organizations, municipalities, civil society, small 
and medium size enterprises (SMEs), the unemployed and vulnerable groups, school 
children and farmers (Anonymous, 2007). Number of projects implemented in Turkey 
are totally 2 312. Detailed information about these projects is given in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Grant Contracts Signed Between CFCU and Applicants in Turkey 
 Number 
Duration 
(month) 
EU Funds (€) 
Co-
Financing 
(€) 
Grant 
Amount (€) 
Nuts II (AKKM) 510 9.48 
64 294 
978.95 
20 620 
844.32 
84 915 
823.27 
Bridges of Knowledge 28 10.61 
2 061 
340.65 
--- 
2 061 
340.65 
Eastern Anatolia 
Development 
309 10.70 
29 047 
351.96 
--- 
29 047 
351.96 
Eastern Black Sea 
Development 
213 11.24 
18 000 
000.00 
6 000 
000.00 
24 000 
000.00 
GAP Flood Mitigation 37 13.22 
11 799 
999.87 
3 199 
999.96 
14 999 
999.83 
ISKUR-2002 245 10.41 
23 967 
487.22 
7 989 
162.67 
31 956 
649.89 
ISKUR-2006 101 11.40 
11 996 
116.03 
3 998 
705.23 
15 994 
821.26 
Cultural Rights 25 8.80 
1 462 
633.38 
--- 
1 462 
633.38 
Cross Border Cooperation-
2003 
9 9.67 456 190.20 --- 456 190.20 
Cross Border Cooperation-
2004 
13 9.00 462 646.11 --- 462 646.11 
Cross Border Cooperation-
2005 
13 9.15 454 242.63 --- 454 242.63 
Cross Border Cooperation-
2006 
17 9.59 620 666.90 --- 620 666.90 
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CSD Programme 119 15.24 
19 294 
805.56 
--- 
19 294 
805.56 
CSD (EU-Turkey Chambers) 22 11.68 
2 248 
788.39 
--- 
2 248 
788.39 
Supporting Civil Society 47 5.53 399 997.69 --- 399 997.69 
Strengthening Civil 
Society-2004 
34 5.44 675 356.24 --- 675 356.24 
Strengthening Civil Society 21 7.33 499 836.23 --- 499 836.23 
Nuts II (SKE) 396 9.61 
36 205 
649.61 
12 068 
549.13 
48 274 
198.74 
Social Dialogue 26 9.08 
1 672 
732.67 
--- 
1 672 
732.67 
NGO-2003 11 11.45 483 719.16 --- 483 719.16 
NGO-2005 93 10.68 
5 277 
641.30 
--- 
5 277 
641.30 
Sustainable Development 23 9.43 912 015.89 --- 912 015.89 
TOTAL 2 312 10.28 
232 294 
196.64 
53 877 
261.31 
286 171 
457.95 
Source: MFIB (2009). 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Benefits of the EU grant projects: 
 EU grant schemes can be an opportunity for an organisation that does not 
have enough finance but willing to implemend a project directed to its aims 
(solution of problems, creating awareness, human resource development, 
etc). 
 In the past, some projects implemented by SMEs and NGOs were failed due to 
weak control system of the government. However, EU financed projects are 
controlled strictly by the CFCU and Delegation of the European Commission to 
Turkey. This leaded to efficiency of the projects. 
 If aims of public, private and NGOs are to be successful, they should prepare 
detailed project and submit it to authorities. This reality was understood by 
everybody. 
 Coordination between NGOs and government organisations is weak in Turkey. 
EU grant projects provide a platform for NGOs and public institutions to work 
together. 
 Some organisations in Turkey have prepared common projects with foreign 
partners in the EU. This leads to knowledge transfer, establishment of 
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Friendship Bridge among countries, organising socio-cultural activities 
together, recognising and accepting each other even if they have different 
religious and cultural features, etc.   
 
 
Difficulties faced by project implementation bodies are as follows: 
 Not having enough technical knowledge about how to prepare and implement 
an EU grant project: Especially majority of the NGOs established in less 
developed regions have difficulties when they decide to carry out a grant 
scheme. Therefore, majority of them are in the control of private consultancy 
agencies. This can be an obstacle for NGOs when private consultancy agents 
decide type, budget, and duration of the project. Although field of activity of 
NGOs are different each other, consultancy agents prepare a project and sell it 
to many NGOs without taking into account their working area. When NGOs 
submit a wrong project subject that is not written in its certificate (articles), it 
is not accepted by the contract authority (CFCU). Another problem is that 
NGOs must pay money to them for project preparation. This is an obstacle for 
NGOs because they are non-profit organisations. 
 Strict rules and intense work: If an organisation does not have a qualified 
project team, achievement of project activities is sometimes difficult. 
Documents related to project activities must be prepared in Turkish/English. 
Technical and financial reports (bimonthly, midterm and final) should be 
submitted to authorities regularly.  
 Being against the EU: Some people are against the EU and its financial 
support. They think that EU supports NGOs to break peace of the country. This 
idea is common especially among radical people (chauvinist, socialist, etc).    
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The Balkan Countries in the Process of European Integration:  
Is there a Convergence Process? 
 
Abstract 
Balkan countries have been rapidly changing since 1990’s. In spite of some Balkan 
countries (such as Turkey and Greece) were relatively stable in 1990s, there was war 
in Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Some former 
socialist countries (Bulgaria, Slovenia and Romania) and Greece became full member 
of EU, after the rugged process. The others have been struggling for this aim. In this 
process, all Balkan countries have some political, economic and social challenges. The 
aim of this paper is to investigate whether or not economic convergence among 
Balkan countries in the process of European Integration in the period of 1997-2007. To 
test convergence, we use approach of Barro and Sala-i Martin.  Our study indicates 
that there is no convergence among Balkan countries in the process of European 
Integration in the period of 1997-2007. 
 
Key words: Balkan Countries, European Integration, Convergence, 
Divergence. 
Introduction 
Balkan countries have been rapidly changing since 1990’s. In spite of some Balkan 
countries (such as Turkey and Greece) were relatively stable in 1990s, there was war 
in Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Some former 
socialist countries (Bulgaria, Slovenia and Romania) and Greece became full member 
of EU, after the rugged process. The others have been struggling for this aim. In this 
process, all Balkan countries have some political, economic and social challenges. We 
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are interest in economic challenges about Balkan countries, especially deal with level 
of per capita income of these countries in this study.  
Mostly Balkan countries have low per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product). For 
example Albania has $1677 per capita GDP in 2007; Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
$2044; Bulgaria has $2401; Macedonia has $2061; Montenegro has $2269; Romania 
has $2595 and Serbia has $1780. Exclusively Greece ($15052), Croatia ($5794), 
Slovenia ($13333) and Turkey ($5053) have relatively bigger than aforementioned 
countries’ per capita GDP. It is normally expected that EU (European Union) 
membership process support to improving per capita GDP. In the next stages, we 
search this expectation about Balkan countries.  
This paper is organized as follows: the next section describes concept of convergence. 
Section 3 explains literatures about convergence. Section 4 introduces the data set. 
Section 5 gives estimation results about beta (absolute and conditional) convergence 
and sigma convergence. The last section provides some concluding remarks. 
What is convergence? 
Convergence concept is defined as poorer economies tend to grow at faster rates than 
richer economies. According to this concept all economies should in the long run 
converge in terms of per capita income and productivity. It is supposed that 
developing countries have the potential to grow at a faster rate than developed 
countries.  
The issue of economic convergence at national and regional level has been worked by 
a lot of researchers in recent years. There are two concepts of convergence as β-
convergence and  convergence. The seminal articles of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 
1992, and 1995) and Mankiw et al. (1992) and then numerous studies have 
investigated β-convergence and -convergence between different countries and 
regions.   
β-convergence is being investigated in two parts. These are absolute β-convergence 
and conditional β-convergence. If all economies are structurally identical and have 
access to the same technology, they are characterized by the same steady state, and 
differ only by their initial conditions. This is the hypothesis of absolute β-convergence. 
The concept of conditional β-convergence is used when the assumption of similar 
steady-states is relaxed. Note that if economies of countries have very different 
steady states, this concept is compatible with a persistent high degree of inequality 
among countries. 
At the same time, there is β-convergence in a cross-section of economies if we find a 
negative relation between the growth rate of income per capita and the initial level of 
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income. If poor economies (or regions) tend to grow faster than rich countries (or 
regions), there is absolute β-convergence. The concept of conditional β-convergence 
is used when the assumption of similar steady-states is relaxed (Sala-i Martin 1996-a).  
-convergence can be defined as follows: A group of economies (or regions/provinces) 
are converging in the sense of  if the dispersion of their real per capita GDP levels 
tends to decrease over time. This form uses two different types of variables: Standard 
deviation and the coefficient of variation of the log of per capita income (Rey and 
Montouri 1999). The existence of β-convergence will tent to generate -convergence 
(Sala-i Martin 1996-b). We can say that β-convergence is necessary but not enough for 
-convergence.  
Because of the aim of this study estimates whether existence of β-convergence, we 
shows only details belong to β-convergence. β-convergence is represented as follows: 
,
ln ln( ), ,
,
y
i t T
yi t i tyi t
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
where ,yi t  is the per capita income of country (or region/province) i  at year t ,   is 
constant and   is coefficient. If β has negative sign, this situation shows 
convergence.  The growth rate between period t and t + T is the dependent variable 
and the log of per capita income in the initial t  period is the independent variable.  
Estimating β<0 from the above cited equation, we can conclude that less developed 
economies show faster economic growth rate. Thus, 
If β <0
0
0
y Absoluteconvergence
y Conditional convergence





 
 
 
According to absolute convergence concept, it is accepted that whole countries have 
same conditions as technologic level, institutional structure and saving rate. But 
conditional convergence approach includes new variables (for example, in our study: 
urban population as % of total, foreign direct investment net inflows as % of GDP) that 
reflect differences between economies.  
We examine conditional convergence and explanatory variables are inserted on the 
right hand side of the equation (1). We investigate the period of 1995-2001 following 
the empirical works of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992, and 1995) and we use 
equation (2): 
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where 
( , )i tU is the urban population (as % of total) in the country i at year t, ( , )i tF is the 
foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows (% of GDP) in country  i at year t. 
 
Literature  
Chatterji (1992) showed that there are two mutually exclusive convergence clubs—
one for the 'rich' and one for the 'poor' where the division between rich and poor is 
endogenously determined. Neven and Gouyette (1995) estimated convergence in 
output per head across regions in the European Community, for the period 1975-
1990. Their study indicates that the distinction between the north and the south of 
the European Community is likely to be more relevant in the analysis of growth 
patterns than the distinction between the centre and the periphery.  Furthermore the 
population of the southern regions responds much more slowly to wage and 
unemployment differences.  
Quah (1996) occur that geographical factors are found to matter more than national – 
macro ones; but both are important for explaining inequality dynamics in regional 
convergence process of Europe.  Barro et al. (1995) found that samples of open 
economies, such as the US states, converge only slightly faster than samples of more 
closed economies, such as the OECD countries. Bernard and Jones (1996) investigated 
the sources of aggregate labor productivity movements and convergence in the U.S. 
states from 1963 to 1989. Carlino and Mills (1996) obtained evidence for convergence 
for the U.S. states and regions during the 1929 to 1990 period after allowing for a 
break in the rate at which the various states and regions were converging in 1946. An 
important finding of this research is that the US states and regions achieved per capita 
earnings convergence by 1946. Chatterji and Dewhurst (1996) examined to test 
whether the counties and regions are converging in terms of GDP per capita in 
movements in the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of English and Welsh 
counties and Scottish regions for the period 1977 to 1991 and for six sub-periods.  
Rey and Montouri (1999) provided new insights as to the throughout the system of 
states, thereby complicating nature of regional income convergence patterns in the 
transitional dynamics of the overall convergence US period 1929-1994. Their study 
presented the first detailed evidence on the role of spatial effects in a regional income 
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convergence study. Bazo et al. (1999) applied β and  convergence approach to the 
analysis of regional dynamics and convergence in the European Union (EU).  
Soukiazis and Castro (2005) test convergence in living standards, productivity, 
investment and unemployment among the European countries by using panel data 
estimation techniques. Their study shows that the Maastricht rules and the Stability 
and Growth Pact have not been as significant as the European authorities would 
expect and even in cases where the Maastricht criteria had positive effects, these 
were modest. Mora et al. (2005) offer an optimum definition of convergence clubs. 
Their results show that European regions with high specialization in low-tech 
industries in 1985 present non-significant conditional convergence, whereas regions 
with lower specialization and situated further from the core experience higher rates. 
Markandya et al. (2006) investigate the relationship between the energy intensity in 
12 transition countries of Eastern Europe and that in the EU15 countries. 
Le Gallo and Dall’erba (2006) suggested a general framework that allows testing 
simultaneously for temporal heterogeneity, spatial heterogeneity and spatial 
autocorrelation in β-convergence models and their study based on a sample of 145 
European regions over the 1980-1999 periods. The estimation results indicate the 
formation of a convergence club between the peripheral regions of the European 
Union.  
Ramajo et al. (2008) estimated that by using a spatial econometric perspective, the 
speed of convergence for a sample of 163 regions of the European Union (EU) over 
the period 1981–1996. Their estimations indicate that over the analyzed period, there 
was a faster conditional convergence in relative income levels of the regions belonging 
to Cohesion countries (5.3%) than in the rest of the regions of the EU (3.3%). Kocenda 
et al. (2008) empirically examine the fiscal convergence of the recent ten European 
Union (EU) members using the Maastricht fiscal convergence criteria. The findings 
show poor fiscal performance in the European Union in general, suggesting that 
monetary unions do not necessarily encourage fiscal convergence for its members.  
Pfaffermayr (2009) contrasts the spatial Solow model and Verdoorn's model on 
regional growth processes for 212 European regions covering the period 1980–2002. 
Estimation results this investigation demonstrate that in both models the speed of 
convergence also depends on the remoteness and the income gaps of all regions. 
Descrıptıon of data set 
Our dataset comes from the World Bank1 WDI (World Development Indicators) 
Online.  WDI (World Development Indicators) Online represents for each Balkan 
country the level of per capita income over 1997-2007, urban population (as % of 
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total) of the country in 1997 and foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows (% of 
GDP) of a country’s in 1997. This period that we use (1997-2007) is limited by data 
availability. Our study includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey. But Kosovo 
is excluded in this study. 
We select two variables (urban population and foreign direct investment) as 
explanatory variables. In the integration process to market economy, many countries 
are competing with each other to take more foreign direct investment. On the other 
hand, after Socialist system, it is being waited that urban population is increase.  
Empirical results 
Beta Convergence 
To test absolute β convergence, regressions are estimated between the rate of growth 
of per capita income between 1997-2007 in the countries and the logarithm of their 
initial (1997) level of per capita income. Table 1 shows summary of the absolute beta 
convergence regression.  
 
Table 1: Summary of the convergence regression (*) for the period of 1997-2007 
 
 1997-2007 
Coefficient -0.006 
t-value -1.262 
R square 0.15 
Significant 0.239 
(*)Results are through OLS - SPSS 
 
 
Empirical results indicate that the sign of β coefficient is negative, but it is statistically 
not significant during the period of 1997-2007. It means that divergence process 
stopped among Balkan Countries, however there is not any convergence process in 
this period.   
The urban population (as % of total) of the country in 1997 and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) net inflows (% of GDP) of a country’s in 1997 have been used as 
explanatory variables and introduced on the right hand side of the convergence 
equation. Adding explanatory variables did not make any differences for the evidence 
on convergence in regression 1 (see Table 2). 
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Urban population (as % of total) has negative coefficients but it is very close to zero. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows (% of GDP) has positive coefficient. 
Therefore, the results of conditional convergence analysis show the absence of 
convergence between Balkan Countries. 
Table 2: Convergence regressions (1997-2007) (*) 
 Regression 1 
(Absolute Beta 
Conv.) 
Regression 2 
(Conditional Beta Conv. with 
explain. variables) 
Constant 0.089 
(0.043) 
0.103 
(0.037) 
Log of initial per 
capita 
-0.006 
(0.239) 
-0.003 
(0.547) 
Urban  -0.0008 
(0.174) 
FDI  0.002 
(0.397) 
R square 0.150 0.381 
(*) The significant values are in parentheses.  Results are through OLS (Ordinary Least 
Squares) – SPSS. 
 
1 www.worldbank.org, The World Bank Group 
Sigma Convergence 
β-convergence is necessary but not enough for -convergence. In the results of 
regression analysis, we haven’t found any evidence for β convergence (absolute or 
conditional). These results have been also giving a signal for absence of  convergence 
in this period.  
Standard deviation and variance is use to test whether or not sigma convergence. 
Theoretically increasing of standard deviation over time is showing that exist of 
divergence. If values of standard deviation are decreasing over time, there is 
convergence process.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for per capita GDP in the period of 1997-2009(*) 
Years N Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
1997 11 3329.17 3290.66 10828461.73 
1998 11 3437.94 3385.69 11462903.92 
1999 11 3473.66 3538.36 12520021.03 
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2000 11 3629.42 3685.08 13579871.53 
2001 11 3719.46 3815.14 14555312.44 
2002 11 3870.03 3955.10 15642863.96 
2003 11 4028.48 4108.33 16878385.23 
2004 11 4240.27 4265.95 18198412.99 
2005 11 4432.07 4414.71 19489720.31 
2006 11 4664.83 4598.64 21147541.93 
2007 11 4914.78 4794.05 22982945.93 
(*)Results are through SPSS. 
 
Standard deviation value is (3290) in initial year, but its value is (4794) in the last year.  
According to Table 3, the values of standard deviation are increasing over time. 
Consequently there is divergence process in this period. We obtain similar results with 
beta convergence in Table 3 and Figure 1.  
In addition to this, Figure 2 shows the values of variance that coherent result with 
standard deviation.  It also shows divergence.         
Figure 1: Standard Deviation in the period of 1997-2007 
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Figure 2: Variance in the period of 1997-2007 
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Concluding remarks  
The main purpose of this study was to find whether or not convergence process 
among Balkan Countries in the process of European Integration in the period of 1997-
2007. 
Our results indicated that the sign of β coefficient was negative, but it was statistically 
not significant during the period of 1997-2007. According to these results, divergence 
process stopped among Balkan Countries, however there was not any absolute 
convergence process in this period. The results of conditional convergence analysis 
showed the absence of convergence among Balkan Countries.  
Besides the values of standard deviation are increasing over time. For this reason, we 
stated that there was divergence process in this period.  
Consequently, we found that EU membership process hasn’t been positively affecting 
Balkan countries in terms of improvement of per capita GDP for the period of 1997-
2007.  
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Abstract 
 
In literature and surveys, the issue of economic impacts and consequences of 
potential immigration from non-EU countries like Albania to the EU labor market have 
been much debated especially in the EU side. According to the theories of migration, a 
major incentive to migrate is a real income or wage differentials between regions or 
countries. Also, the economic impact of immigration on wages and employment levels 
will obviously differ with the skill levels of migrants. If migrants mainly are unskilled 
and native workers skilled, like in the case of emigration from Albania to the EU 
especially to the neighbors and main receiving countries of Greece and Italy, we can 
easily say that Albanian and the EU workers are complements because of Albanian 
immigrants and the EU native workers are not substitutes in production. So, an 
increase in the number of Albanian immigrants raises the marginal product of the EU 
natives, shifting up the demand curve for the EU native-born workers. This increase in 
the EU native productivity raises the EU native wages. Moreover, some EU natives 
now see the higher wage rate as an additional incentive to enter the labor market, 
and the EU native employment also rises. On the other side, the empirical literature 
on this issue does not agree on the size of the potential immigrants from Albania to 
the EU labor market. Although, it is not clear what the sources were or the methods 
used to arrive at these estimates, there is reason to believe that the figures for the 
main countries such as Greece and Italy are very probable. According to the historical 
background size of the Albanian migrants to the especially Greece and Italy the size of 
migration after accession is estimated between 600 thousands and 1.1 million.  
 
Key words: immigration, Albania, the European Union, labor market, wages and 
employment 
 
1. Introduction 
The subject of potential migration flows from Albania and its effects on the EU labor 
market after free movement of labor is a considerable issue in Albania-EU future full 
membership process. In 1997 Albania was included in EU’s ‘Regional Approach’ 
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programme, predecessor to today’s ‘Stabilisation and Association Process’ (SAP) 
(European Council, 1997; 1999). Under the terms of the SAP, the EU offers Albania the 
possibility of future EU membership (European Council, 2000: Art. 69). 
On 12 June 2006, Albania signed in Luxembourg the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) and the Interim Agreement with the EU. As of December 2006, the 
Interim Agreement for trade and related isses has come into force. According to the 
European Commission, the implementation of the Interim Agreement has been 
successful. The Government of Albania has prepared and is implementing the National 
Plan for the Implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement as the 
main monitoring instrument of the political, economic, legal and institutional reforms 
and is consederd an integral part of the National Strategy for Development and 
Integration.  
The SAA is the instrument which will enable gradual integration of Albania into the 
European Union. The Agreement creates the necessary framework for strengthening 
the rule of law, increase its effectiveness, and assist institutional and economic 
reforms with the aim to raise the standards of living for all citizens. Through this 
Agreement, Albania aims to attain the standarts that will guarantee its status as a 
candidate state and subsequently association with the European Union.  
The SAA envisages the principle of national treatment, according to which an Albanian 
worker, legally employed in the territory of an EU member state, must be treated 
equally to the citizens of this EU member state with respect to working conditions, 
remuneration or dismissal. Further, the spouse and children of a legally employed 
worker in the territory of an EU member state, when they reside legally in this state, 
have the right to education and labor market acess in this member state during the 
period of that worker’s authorised stay of employment. However, access to 
employment for Albanian workers in the European market is limited because they 
remain at the willingness of the EU member states, which recognise free movement of 
worker through bilateral agreements, which they sign with Albania (IMF, 2008). 
The issue of the impact of emigration from Albania to the EU after free movement of 
labor on the EU countries’ labor markets is now being heatedly debated in Albania-EU 
membership process. In fact, the entrance into the EU means the removal of all 
barriers to free movement of labor.  According to the European opinion pools, the 
European labor market may be flooded with millions of unskilled non-EU workers. If 
substantial and uncontrolled, these immigration flows could lead to important 
disturbances in the EU labor market. The direction of migration flows will also be 
impacted on by the location of existing Albanian migrants especially in Greece and 
Italy. 
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Each of the EU annual reports goes deep into the technical details of inadequate 
legislation and procedures not yet conforming to EU norms. What is however lacking 
is empirical data on the evolution of migratory movements. One feature common to 
all reports is a blatant EU-centrism, completely neglecting the side-effects of 
migratory movements on the EU’s partner country Albania. ‘Progress’ is defined more 
or less in terms of the permeability of Albania’s borders and corresponding EU-style 
legislation, essentially disregarding the context of its implementation. Often there is a 
resort to vague statements leading to similarly vague suggestions: “Albania appears to 
have made progress regarding the control of illegal migration/trafficking towards the 
EU […], but events […] in early January demonstrate that further efforts are needed 
[…] However, border management continues to require substantial improvement” 
(European Commission, 2005: 35). 
 In this paper, we try to answer some current questions on this immigration 
impacts in the light of theory and empirical literature as follows: Will accession to the 
EU generate uncontrolled massive migration flows of Albanian migrants to the EU 
countries? How the wages and employment opportunities of the EU native workers 
will respond to migration from Albania to the EU labor market?  Are high wage level 
and skilled the EU workforce and Albania’s low skilled unemployed workforce perfect 
substitutions or complements? And, who will benefit and who will lose from 
immigration or will both sides win? This paper summarizes what we know about the 
impact of potential emigration flows from Albania on the EU labor market after free 
movement of labor and it also presents a survey of theoretical and empirical literature 
on this issue.  
2. Reasons to Migrate and the Labor Market Impact of Immigration: Theoretical 
Approach 
2.1. Decision to Migrate 
(a) The neoclassical approach 
The neoclassical approach to migration analysis can be traced back to Smith (Smith, 
1776) and Ravenstein (Ravenstein, 1889:214-301). The basic assumption of this model 
is that individuals maximize their utility subject to a budget constraint. The central 
argument evolves around wages. Hicks proposed that “differences in net economic 
advantages, chiefly differences in wages, are the main causes of migration” (Hicks, 
1932:76). Migration mainly occurs because of geographical differences in the demand 
and supply of labor markets. Regions with a shortage of labor relative to capital are 
characterized by a high equilibrium wage, whereas regions with a large supply of labor 
relative to capital are faced with low equilibrium wages. This wage differential causes 
a migration flow from low wage to high wage regions. 
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In response to this migration flow, the supply of labor in the high wage region 
increases; subsequently, the wage in this region falls. Similarly, due to migration, the 
supply of labor in the low wage region decreases and the wages in this region rise. The 
migration flow ends as soon as the wage differential between the two regions reflects 
the costs of movement from the low wage to the high wage region. As a result, the 
model argues, labor migration emerges from actual wage differentials between 
regions, i.e. the larger the wage differential the larger the migration flow (Bauer and 
Zimmermann, 1999:13). 
(b) Geographic migration as a human capital investment 
 
Sjaastad introduced the human capital model to migration research (Sjaastad, 
1962:80-93). This model, which probably became the most influential and widely used 
approach, treats migration as an investment decision of an individual. Practically all 
modern analysis of migration decisions uses this hypothesis as the point of departure 
and views the migration of workers as a form of human capital investment (Borjas, 
2008:322). Workers calculate the value of the employment opportunities available in 
each of the alternative labor markets, net out the costs of making the potential move, 
and choose whichever option maximizes the net present value of lifetime earnings.  
 Depending on their skill levels, individuals calculate the present discounted 
value of expected returns of their human capital in every region, including the home 
location. Migration occurs, if the returns, net of the discounted costs of movement, 
are larger in a potential destination region than the returns in the country of origin. 
The costs of movement not only include money costs like travel expenses, differences 
in the costs of living, and foregone earnings while moving, but also psychological costs 
arising, for example, from the separation from family and friends. It should be noted 
that every individual evaluates the returns and costs in a different way, depending on 
personal characteristics such as age, gender, and schooling (Bauer and Zimmermann, 
1999:15). 
We can calculate net present value of migration using this equation (McConnell et al., 
2003:279; Ehrenberg and Smith, 2009:325; Borjas, 2008:322): 
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In equation, if Vp is greater than zero, implying that the expected earnings gain 
exceeds the combined monetary and net psychic investment costs, the person will 
migrate. If, conversely, Vp is smaller than zero, the person will remain in his or her 
present job and location. All else being equal, the greater the annual earnings 
differential (E2 – E1) between the two jobs, the higher will be the present value of the 
net benefits (Vp), and the more likely it will be that an individual will migrate. 
 
(c) Family migration 
In the theories discussed above, migration theory focuses on treating migration as a 
problem of individual decision-making. A different approach challenges many of the 
foregone conclusions by postulating that families or households typically make 
migration decisions. Mincer examines the influence of an increased labor force 
participation of wives on the migration decision of families (Mincer, 1978:749-773). 
Household size and the number of working family members increase the sources of 
costs and benefits from migration. Those family members who do not move on their 
own initiative often have to face reduced earnings and employment possibilities in the 
labor market of the destination country. Therefore, a family will only migrate, if the 
gains of one family member internalize the losses of the other family members. 
Mincer, shows that increases in the labor force participation rates of women lead to 
increased interdependence of the partner's migration decision, which results in both 
less migration and more marital instability. Increased marital instability, in turn, 
encourages migration as well as an increase in women's labor force participation. 
Furthermore, migration should decrease with increasing family size (Bauer and 
Zimmermann, 1999:17-18; Borjas, 2008:329; Ehrenberg and Smith, 2009:332). 
 
2.2. The labor market impact of immigration  
(a) A simple model of the labor market impact of immigration  
The simplest model of immigration assumes that immigrants and natives are perfect 
substitutes in production. In other words, immigrants and natives have the same types 
of skills and are competing for the same types of jobs (Ehrenberg and Smith, 
2009:340-342; Borjas, 2008:181-184; McConnell et al., 2003:287-293; Borjas,1995:3-
22; Borjas,1994:1667-1717).  
 The impact of immigration on this labor market in the short run (with capital 
held fixed) is illustrated in Figure 1. As immigrants enter the labor market, the supply 
curve shifts out, increasing total employment from N0 to E1 and reducing wages from 
W0 to W1. Note that fewer native-born workers are willing to work at this lower wage, 
so the employment of native workers actually falls, from N0 to N1. In a sense, 
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immigrants “take jobs away” from natives by reducing the native wage and convincing 
some native workers that it is no longer worthwhile to work. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Short-Run Impact of Immigration When 
Immigrants and  
Natives Are Perfect Subsitutes 
 
The short run impact of immigration when native workers and immigrants are perfect 
substitutes, therefore, is unambiguous. As long as the demand curve is downward 
sloping and capital is fixed, an increase in immigration will move the economy down 
the demand curve, reducing the wage and employment of native-born workers. 
 Of course, the assumption that native workers and immigrants are perfect 
substitutes is questionable. It may be that immigrant and native workers are not 
competing for the same type of jobs. For instance, immigrants may be particularly 
adept at some types of labor-intensive agricultural production. This frees up the more 
skilled native workforce to perform tasks that make better use of their human capital. 
The presence of immigrants increases native productivity because natives can now 
specialize in tasks that are better suited to their skills. Immigrants and natives thus 
complement each other in the labor market.  
 If two groups are complement in production, an increase in the number of 
immigrants raises the marginal product of natives, shifting up the demand curve for 
native-born workers. As Figure 2 shows, this increase in native productivity raises the 
native wage from W0 to W1. Moreover, some natives who previously did not find it 
profitable to work now see the higher wage rate as an additional incentive to enter 
the labor market, and native employment also rises from N0 to N1.   
    
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
438 
 
 
Figure 2: The Short-Run Impact of Immigration When 
Immigrants and  
Natives Are Complements 
 
In the short run, say that immigrants and natives are perfect subsititution, the supply 
curve shifts to the right and the wage falls to W1. Immigration initally shifts out the 
supply curve. As a result, the wage falls and over time, capital expands as firms take 
advantage of the cheaper workforce, shifting out the labor demand curve.  
In the long run, the demand curve also shifts to the right and it must shift by a 
sufficient amonut to bring the labor market back to its pre-immigration equilibrium. In 
the end, the wage is again equal to W0. Note that, at this wage, the same number of 
native workers is employed as was employed prior to the immigrant influx. The long-
run effects of immigration when immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes are 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
    
 
Figure 3: The Long-Run Impact of Immigration When Immigrants and Natives Are 
Perfect Substitutes 
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(b)The economic benefits from immigration 
Immigrants may have an adverse impact on the job opportunities of the native 
workers whose skills resemble those of the immigrants. Immigrants can also make an 
important contribution to the receving country. To assess the net economic impact of 
immigration, it must be calculated the magnitute of these contributions (Ehrenberg 
and Smith,2009:340-342; Borjas, 2008:193-195; McConnell et al., 2003:287-293; 
Borjas, 1995:3-22; Borjas, 1994:1667-1717).  
 Consider the short-run suply-demand analysis presented in Figure 4. The 
supply curve of labor is given by S and the demand curve for labor is given by D. For 
simplicity, we assume that the labor supply curve is inelastic, so that there are N 
native-born workers. Competitive market equilibrium implies that the N native 
workers are employed at a wage of W0.  
 The labor demand curve is given by the value of marginal product schedule, so 
that each point on the demand curve tells us the contribution of the last worker hired. 
As a result, the area under the demand curve gives the total product of all workers 
hired. Hence, the area in trapezoid ABNO easures the value of national income prior 
to immigration. 
 What happens to national income when immigrants enter the country? If we 
assume that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes in production, the supply 
curve shifts to S’ and the market wage falls to W1. National income is now given by the 
area in the trapezoid ACM0. The figure shows that the total wage bill paid to 
immigrants is given by the area in the rectangle FCMN, so that the increase in national 
income accruing to natives is given by the area in the triangle BCF. This triangle is the 
immigration surplus and measures the increase in national income that occurs as a 
result of immigration and that accrues to natives. 
Why does an immigration surplus arise? Because the market wage equals the 
productivity of the last immigrant hired. As a result, immigrants increase national 
income by more than what it costs to employ them.  
 The analysis in Figure 4 implies that if the demand curve is perfectly elastic (so 
that immigrants had no impact on the native wage rate), immigrants would be paid 
their entire value of marginal product and natives would gain nothing from 
immigration. Therefore, the immigration surplus exists only if native wage rates fall 
when immigrants enter the country. Therefore, immigration redistributes income 
from labor to capital. In terms of Figure 3, native workers lose the area in the 
rectangle W0BFW1, and this quantity plus the immigration surplus accrue to 
employers. Although native workers get a lower wage, these losses are more than 
offset by the increase in income accruing to native-owned firms. 
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Figure4: The Immigration Surplus 
 
How to calculate immigration surplus? Recall that the formula for the area of the 
riangle is one-half  times the base times the height. Figure 4 then implies that the 
value of the immigration surplus is given by  
  
Immigration surplus= ½ X (W0 – W1) X (M – N)  
 
This formula can be rewritten so as to obtain the immigration surplus as a fraction of 
national income. After rearranging the term in the equation, we get 
    
Immigration surplus = ½  X (% change in native wage rate) 
National Income           X (% change in employment) 
         X (%  labor’s share of national income) 
 
 
Where labor’s share of national income is the fraction of national income that accrues 
to workers1. 
                                                 
1 For example,  immigrants have increased labor supply by about 10 percent in the United 
States. A 10 percent immigrant-induced increase in supply lowers the wage by about 3 to 4 
percent. Finally, it is well known that labor’s share of national income is on the order of 0.7. 
This implies that immigration increases the real income of natives by only about 0.13 percent 
(or 0.5X0.035X0.10X0.7) The gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States is around $12 
trillion, so the economic gains from immigration are about $15 billion per year (Borjas, 1995, 3-
22). 
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This estimate of the immigration surplus is a short-run estimate. In the long run, 
neither the rate of return to capital nor the wage is affected by immigration. As a 
result, the long-run immigration surplus must be equal to zero. Immigrants increase 
GDP in the long run, but the entire increase in national income is paid to immigrants 
for their services. Ironically, in a constant-returns-to-scale economy, the economic 
benefits  from immigraiton can only arise when workers in the receiving country are 
hurt by immigration. Equally important, the larger the adverse wage effects, the 
greater the economic benefits (Borjas,2008:195-196). 
 
3. Emigration from Albania to the EU: A Survey of Theoretical and Empirical 
Literature 
(a)A brief historical background of Albanian migration 
As widely documented in previous studies (Carletto et al. 2004; INSTAT 2004; King et 
al. 2005; King and Vullnetari 2003), Albania is a country on the move, with massive 
levels of both internal and international migration (Azzari and Carletto 2009: 2-3). 
When the communist government eventually fell, the end of the controls on internal 
and external migration and the collapse of the centrally planned economy unleashed a 
demographic shift at an unprecedented pace, as individuals and entire households 
started migrating to the cities or leaving the country altogether. By many accounts, 
within a decade the number of Albanians abroad swelled to at least 600,000 
individuals (King and Vullnetari 2003) or as high as 800,000 (Barjaba 2000). More 
recent estimates increase the figure to over 1 million (Government of Albania 2005). 
After the collapsing of communist system, migration flows can be broken down into 
the 1991-1992 stream, which was wholly uncontrolled, when approximately 300,000 
Albanians left the country; the 1992-1996 stream, when a similar number migrated, 
most illegally, despite the temporary improvement of the economy and better border 
controls; and the 1996-1997 stream, immediately after the collapse of various 
pyramid schemes, which wiped out the savings of hundreds of thousands of people. In 
the national unrest that followed, a combination of unemployment, poverty, and 
economic hardships led to the migration of around 70,000 people within a few 
months. Finally, since 1998, a gradual improvement in economic, political, and social 
conditions and favorable immigration policies in two key receiving countries, Greece 
and Italy, have increased legal migration and reduced illegal flows (Barjaba, 2004; 
Vullnetari, 2007). 
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 (b)The size and structure of current immigration flows from Albania to the EU: 
Related data 
Albanian contemporary migration is taking place under very different circumstances 
than the other sending countries of migration. In particular, its massive concentration 
over a short period of time as the country moved almost overnight from total closure 
to large-scale out-migration, marks Albanian migration as a significant and unique 
case. Albanian migration movement described as ‘a new migration order’ and a 
‘laboratory for the study of migration and development’. Taking into account these 
circumstances and special features, post-1990 Albanian emigration is a ‘new’ type of 
international migration.  
Based on research and studies carried out throughout the first post 
communist decade, Barjaba first suggested an ‘Albanian model’ of emigration in 2000. 
This model has the following features: it is intense (a rate of emigration much higher 
than any other Eastern bloc country); it is largely economically driven – a form of 
‘survival migration’; it has a high degree of irregularity, with many undocumented 
migrants; it displays lots of to-and-fro movement, especially with Greece; and it is 
dynamic and rapidly evolving, especially as regards new destinations and routes of 
migration (Vullnetari 2007: 40).  
 By the present day, approximately 25 percent of the total population, or over 
35 percent of the labor force, has emigrated. The country has approximately 900,000 
emigrants, now residing mainly in Greece (600,000), Italy (200,000), and most of the 
remainder in other Western European countries, the US, and Canada. Albania's 
migration flow has, since the early 1990s, been five times higher than the average 
migration flow in developing countries.  
In 2000 the Albanian Department of Emigration within the Albanian Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs estimated that, by 1999, there were 800,000 Albanians living abroad 
(Barjaba 2000). The majority of them, 500,000, were in Greece, 200,000 were in Italy, 
and the remaining 100,000 in other European countries and in North America. These 
figures combined documented and an estimate of undocumented migrants: in Italy 
documented migrants were in the majority; in Greece, until recently, most Albanians 
were undocumented. Some of the figures presented were likely to be underestimates, 
given the mobility of Albanian migrants, especially within Europe, and the rapid 
evolution of new migration channels and routes in recent years. Although it is not 
clear how these estimates were calculated, they are the most cited that apply to this 
period (1990-99), and they have remained largely unchallenged. 
 A second and – in a sense – more reliable source of data on emigration was 
provided by the results of the 2001 Albanian Census (INSTAT 2002). The Census 
revealed an estimated net loss due to emigration of more than 600,000 between 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
443 
 
1989-2001, calculated by the census residual method (calculating net emigration as 
the residual of inter-censal population change, minus the net difference between 
births and deaths). This figure, however, excluded short-term migration of less than 
one year’s duration, and thus, much emigration to Greece, which is temporary.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
More recently, the Government of Albania has published revised estimates, which put 
the number of Albanians abroad at over one million by 2005 (Government of Albania 
2005: 36). Although, it is not clear what the sources were or the methods used to 
arrive at these estimates, there is reason to believe that the figures for the main 
countries such as Greece and Italy are very probable.  
 
 
Country                                                                                           
1999                    2005 
Greece  500,000  600,000  
Italy  200,000  250,000  
USA  12,000  150,000  
UK  5,000  50,000  
Germany  12,000  15,000  
Canada  5,000  11,500  
Belgium  2,500  5,000  
Turkey  1,000  5,000  
France  2,000  2,000  
Austria  2,000  2,000  
Switzerland  1,000  1,500  
Netherlands  ?  1,000  
TOTAL  742,500  1,093,000  
 non-migrants  migrants   
Individual characteristics % of 
females  
age  
years of schooling  
 
Education levels 
adult years of education max 
  
 
0.69  0.35  
36.6  31.5  
9.8  10.1  
  
 
9.23  
 
8.36  
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Table 1: Estimates of Albanians living abroad 
Source: Barjaba (2000) and Government of Albania (2005). 
 
The data in table 1 show a clear  increase of 350,000 in the number of Albanians living 
abroad between 1999 and 2005. It might be the case that they emigrated during these 
years, but not necessarily. Not knowing how these figures have been calculated makes 
it difficult to draw such conclusions. One thing is for certain: they and the document 
they appeared in – the National Strategy on Migration – indicate an increased 
awareness on the side of the Government of Albania about the issue of emigration. 
Besides an increase in numbers, these figures also indicate a shift in the relative 
importance of various destination countries. Although Greece and Italy remain the 
main receiving countries, other destinations such as the USA, the UK and Canada have 
become attractive to an increasing number of Albanian emigrants. (Vullnetari, 2007: 
35-36). The flows of (current) migrants have fluctuated considerably, more than 
doubling in the aftermath of the collapse of the notorious pyramid scheme in 1997, 
peaking in 2000 at about 50,000 new migrants per year, and steadily decreasing after 
that (Azzarri and Carletto 2009: 4). 
 The potential for migration from Albania remains high due to such push 
factors as unemployment and poverty. Around 30 percent of Albanians are currently 
below the poverty line, and half of them live in extreme poverty, subsisting on less 
than $1 per day. The unemployment rate remains high, despite a recent slow decline. 
In addition, illnesses are a major concern and access to medical care is scarce, 
especially in rural areas. Four out five poor people live in rural areas, and the poverty 
rate among young people is higher than average. Approximately 40 percent of the 
poor live in larger and younger households. These mostly economic hardships have at 
different points combined with episodes of political instability to boost migration 
flows. This was especially true in the period 1997-1998, when labor migration was 
coupled with forced migration (Barjaba 2004).  
adult years of education  11.08 10.12 
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Table 2 gives further evidence on some of the contrasts already noted, and introduces 
new variables into the analysis. Permanent migrants are generally younger, male and 
slightly more educated than the average adult left behind. They are also more likely to 
come from female- and single-headed households.  As expected, migrants come from 
larger households (in 1990) which, largely as a result of migration, are now 
significantly smaller. Similarly, households with migrants are on average less 
educated, partly as a result of the migration of the more educated members in the 
household. Also, migrant households are significantly older, following the migration of 
the younger members in the family. Finally, households with a migrant are also 
wealthier, as illustrated by the different poverty indicators, although clearly the 
causality direction is ambiguous. 
As of education levels of Albanian migrants, the larger numbers of less 
educated individuals are migrating in recent years. Interestingly, female migrants are 
on average more educated than men, particularly in the 1990s; the gap narrows 
somewhat after 2000. The breakdown of the education trends by main destination 
and place of origin of the migrants reveals some interesting differences. The general 
downward trend in educational levels does not concern the flow of permanent 
migrants moving from Tirana and going to destinations beyond Greece and Italy. For 
this particular group of migrants only, educational levels of migrants have remained 
stable over the years, at levels significantly above the rest going to Greece and Italy, 
and originating from other parts of Albania (Azzarri and Carletto 2009: 8-9). 
 
Table 2: Characteristics and education levels of permanent migrants 
 
               
 
 
 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
446 
 
 (c)Evaluation of potential immigration impact on the labor market in the EU:  wages 
and employment levels 
 
According to the theories of migration which we argued above, a major incentive to 
migrate is a real income or wage differentials between regions or countries. It has 
been clearly said that there are very important wage differentials between Albania 
and its neighbor EU countries of Greece and Italy. Average real wages in Albania are 
low and highly attractive to migrate to high real wage levels of EU countries. Also, we 
have to point out that the economic impact of immigration on wages and employment 
levels will obviously differ with the skill level of migrants. If migrants mainly are 
unskilled and native workers mainly skilled, like in the case of emigration from Albania 
to the EU especially Greece and Italy, we can say that native and immigrant workers in 
the production are not substitutes. According to the data which show much of 
Albanian migrants are unskilled, we can easily say that Albania and the EU workers are 
complements. In other words, Albanian immigrant workers and native the EU workers 
have not the same types of skills and are not competing for the same types of jobs 
because of Albanian immigrants workers are mainly unskilled or lower skilled while 
the EU native workers are mainly high or upper skilled.  
 
As we mentioned above, Albanian immigrants and the EU native workers are 
complement in production, an increase in the number of Albanian immigrants raises 
the marginal product of the EU natives, shifting up the demand curve for the EU 
native-born workers. This increase in the EU native productivity raises the EU native 
wages. Moreover, some EU natives who previously did not find it profitable to work 
now see the higher wage rate as an additional incentive to enter the labor market, 
and the EU native employment also rises. On the other hand, the migration of highly 
skilled workers cannot be regarded as an unwanted phenomenon for Europe, while 
Albania could face a significant loss of efficiency or human capital.   
 
In this subject, we can only state that because of Albanian and the EU workers are 
complements, so the impact of immigration on wages and employment condition in 
the EU labor market will be same direction. An increase in the number of immigrants 
raises the marginal product of natives, shifting up the demand curve for native-born 
workers.  This increase in native productivity raises the native wage. On the other 
words, the potential size of migration from Albania to the EU labor market especially 
to Greece and Italy will increase the wages of native workers in the EU and also, some 
natives who previously did not find it profitable to work now see the higher wage rate 
as an additional incentive to enter the labor market, and native employment will rise. 
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4. Conclusion 
EU state policies that affect Albanian migration are currently mainly inspired by a 
philosophy of stopping, controlling, and reducing migration flows, as opposed to 
favoring and liberalizing channels of legal migration. These policies are feeding a legal 
and institutional asymmetry in the global migration system, since they have resulted 
in an increase in illegal channels and flows of migration. In sending countries such as 
Albania, labor migration is considered an economic and social phenomenon, while in 
receiving countries it is considered a risk to public safety. Due to the EU's increasingly 
restrictionist policies, the flow of regular immigrants from Albania to Italy and Greece 
is currently declining (Barjaba 2004).  
 The effect of migration on wages and employment levels could differ with 
the skill levels of the migrants and labor demand in the EU, especially in receiving 
countries of Greece and Italy. Theoretically, if migrants mainly are unskilled and native 
workers mainly skilled, like in the case of emigration from Albania to the EU Member 
States, we can say easily Albanian and the EU workers are complements. So, an 
increase in the number of Albanian immigrants raises the marginal product of the EU 
natives, shifting up the demand curve for the EU native-born workers. This increase in 
the EU native productivity raises the EU native wages. Moreover, some EU natives 
who previously did not find it profitable to work now see the higher wage rate as an 
additional incentive to enter the labor market, and the EU native employment also 
rises.  
 On the other side, it is very difficult e m p i r i c a l l y  to forecast the level as 
well as the structure of this additional migration after accession. The literature on 
this issue does not agree on the size of the potential immigrants from Albania to the 
EU labor market. Although, it is not clear what the sources were or the methods used 
to arrive at these estimates, there is reason to believe that the figures for the main 
countries such as Greece and Italy are very probable. According to the historical 
background size of the Albanian migrants to the especially Greece and Italy the size of 
migration after accession is estimated between 600 thousands and 1.1 million. Such 
migration could contribute to mitigating the possible reduction of the growth 
potential of the EU due to its ageing population. There are perceptions that a 
possible substantial and uncontrolled increase in migration to the EU could lead to 
serious disturbances in the labor markets of some of the present EU States 
especially in Greece and Italy. In  addition  to  the  general  conditions  for  economic  
growth  and  employment,  the  actual migration flows are influenced by pull factors 
such as wage differentials between Albania and the receiving countries but also by 
push factors, such as the labor market situation in Albania itself.    
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 As a result, considering this number of potential migrants, we can easily say 
that the public fears concerning the occupation of the European labor markets 
especially in Greece and Italy by the Albanian immigrants seems to be exaggerated. 
We can clearly state that estimations show the potential number or size of migration 
after possible accession of Albania to the EU. Unfortunately, these estimations do not 
show the impact of this potential size of migrants on the EU labor market like 
especially the effects of immigration on wages and employment opportunities. Up to 
now in literature we do not have any empirical study or result which gives the impact 
of this size of potential migration on wages or employment opportunities of native 
workers in the EU labor market. 
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USA and European Security and Defence Policy  
 
Abstract 
American political leaders and security experts are ambivalent about the European 
Union’s project to build a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to the extent that 
they are paying any attention to it at all. For the past half century, US political leaders 
have expressed support, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, for a more cohesive Europe 
that could act, effectively and confidently, as America’s partner on the European 
continent and in the wider world. Yet when Europeans have actually moved to establish 
truly ‘common’ foreign security and Defence policies, they have often been faced with 
American concerns that such coherence may become inward-looking and exclusive or 
based on ‘lowest common-denominator’ consensus-building within the EU, and thus 
weaken the primacy of the NATO Alliance or impede US leadership and freedom of 
manoeuvre. This ambivalence is reflected in the official attitude of both the Clinton and 
Bush Administration toward ESDP, which has been that of conditional support. The 
Clinton Administration’s support was conditioned by what Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright termed the ‘three D’s’: no discrimination against non-EU NAT members, no 
decoupling of European and North American security, and no duplication of NATO’s 
operational planning system or its command structure. ‘No duplication’ was never 
defined, nor was it ever intended to mean that the EU should not develop certain 
capabilities that already existed in the Alliance; indeed many of the Clinton 
Administration’s efforts, such as the NATO Defence Capability Initiative, sought to prod 
the Europeans into developing precisely such capabilities. This distinction has been lost 
on many analysts.i 
 
The U.S-Europe relations and the Defence Capabilities 
The U.S. possesses a unique military capability including nuclear weaponry, enjoys 
the most powerful economy for the time being, and it has worldwide interests. For many 
nations the U.S. are the world policeman and the guarantor of their security either in a bi-
national relationship or as part of a multinational framework or alliance. For other 
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nations, the U.S. represents a hegemon with global self-centred interests. In regard to 
Western Europe, the U.S. significance is multidimensional. First, the U.S. has twice sorted 
out European triggered World Wars. Second, the U.S. saved the majority of the Western 
European countries from the NAZI-regime. Third, the U.S., in its capacity as the backbone 
of NATO, guaranteed Western Europe’s survival during the Cold War. Fourth, the U.S. 
sponsored the German reunification, and last and least, the U.S. took action in the Balkan 
Wars during the 1990s when Europe was not willing and prepared to tidy up its own 
backyard. As a consequence, U.S. interest in Europe and the related EU development is 
quite high. Due to the historical experience of the 20th century the U.S. interest in Europe 
can be described as scepticism about European maturity and the related possible 
consequence for the U.S. to have to sort out European affairs once again. 
On the other hand, U.S. global interests cannot be secured in the highly unstable and 
unpredictable environment of today’s world without support of allies. Even for a 
superpower, the global challenges at hand and in the future are too big and too complex 
to be addressed and successfully resolved unilaterally. Unified in its core beliefs and 
values and based on a common European stamped cultural heritage, the U.S. and Europe 
are natural allies. Thus, the U.S. interest in a stable, reliant, and mature Europe should be 
self-evident. 
A third aspect of U.S.–EU relations is dominated by the growing power of the EU, 
which may eventually present a challenge to the global hegemon, the USA. This multi-
facetted, complex relationship between the U.S. and the EU, however, causes severe 
problems in today’s political arena. Looking at the 2004 Republican Party Platform,ii the 
European Union is mentioned in contrary to the European friendly 2000 Republican Party 
Platformiii only once. “We hail the President’s success in achieving unprecedented 
cooperation with Europe at NATO, through the European Union, and with individual 
nations in combating terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
building peace and democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, and advancing the cause of 
freedom, democracy, and opportunity throughout the broader Middle East and North 
Africa.”iv Although it is crystal clear that a party platform is not the substitute for actual 
political action of the Bush Administration, it clearly points towards possible trajectories 
of actual U.S. government work. From a European perspective, thus, there could not be 
clearer evidence that the current U.S. Administration does not see the necessity of close 
U.S.- European cooperation. In mentioning discrete European nations as they contribute 
to the U.S. security related interests in the world, especially the U.S. Global War on 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
453 
 
Terrorism and the Iraq war, an impression arises that one aim of this administration 
might be to divide the European nations and thus destabilize the EU in order to retain 
political influence on selected European countries.v Reasons for that behaviour could be 
the frustration about insufficient European political and military support in the ramping 
up phase of the ongoing Iraq war and in its execution and the related post-war 
operations or, as some European media and politicians’ state, imperial hubris. Whatever 
the true reasons for that approach to Europe may be, the U.S. has to make a deliberate 
and conscious choice how to proceed in future in U.S.–EU relations.  
An Important Concern Remains Military Gap  
Capability gaps have been a constant irritant throughout NATO's history, 
most acutely during crises and conflicts. During various Cold War crises, including 
those centered on Berlin and Cuba and on NATO nuclear force modernization, the 
most prominent capability gap resided in European dependence on U.S. nuclear 
forces and commitments. While the Alliance remains a collective Defence 
organization, in post-Soviet, post-Cold War conditions its main operational tasks 
have included embargo and no-fly-zone enforcement, humanitarian relief, large-
scale interventions (Deliberate Force in 1995 and Allied Force in 1999), and 
peacekeeping (in Bosnia since 1995 and in Kosovo since 1999). Americans resent 
European “dependents” telling the United States how to run Alliance operations, 
while Europeans resent dependence on U.S. capabilities. The U.S. resentment has 
never been great enough to place the Alliance's future in jeopardy, and the 
European resentment has never been great enough to motivate European govern-
ments to substantially improve their capabilities through increased spending and 
other measures. In its current and prospective form, however, the gap could lead 
to unhealthy divisions of labour, new resentments and burden-sharing debates, 
industrial “fortress” competitions, a weakening of Alliance cohesion, and/or 
marginalization of the Alliance.  
As far as unhealthy divisions of labour are concerned, two hypothetical risks are 
often highlighted: that the Europeans might find themselves increasingly responsible 
for manpower-intensive operations with a high risk of casualties, while the 
Americans would carry out the high-technology lower-risk standoff precision attacks 
and intelligence functions; and that the EU would take on the low-end crisis 
management and peacekeeping tasks, while the Americans would conduct the more 
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demanding interventions and thus bear the main responsibility for collective 
Defence.vi 
In short, the gap has significant implications for the conduct of military 
operations and for transatlantic relations. There is no shortage of U.S. members of 
Congress willing to accuse the Europeans of being “free-riders” and to deplore NATO 
arrangements that seem to subsidize America's economic competitors. In Operation 
Allied Force, the irritations in some U.S. political-military circles regarding NATO's 
“consensus” decision-making system, which requires unanimity, were summed up in 
Lt. Gen. Short's declarations: “It's my evaluation that NATO cannot go to war  in the 
air against a competent enemy without the United States. If that's the case, and 
we're going to provide 70 percent of the effort... then we need to have more than 
one of 19 votes.” In General Short's view, the United States should have told its 
allies: “We will take the Alliance to war and we will win this thing for you, but the 
price to be paid is we call the tune.”vii Of course, from the perspective of some 
Europeans, the United States did call the tune. As a number of other chapters in this 
volume discuss, the post-Kosovo EU decisions to seek a Defence dimension, 
including the December 1999 Helsinki “headline goal” may be attributed in part to 
European frustrations during the Kosovo War with U.S. political dominance, which 
stemmed directly from U.S. preponderance in military capabilities.  
Once the U.S. Secretary of Defence, on the advice of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs, declared that a particular regional commander in chief (CINC) was a 
“supported CINC,” the military assets would start flow ing in that direction. The 
finite character of U.S. capabilities and the risk of U.S. attention being focused 
elsewhere (considerably increased since September 11, 2001) have been recognized 
intermittently during NATO's history, for instance, during the Korean War and the 
Vietnam War. It was also recognized in the years immediately after the fall of the Shah 
in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, when the United States was 
so preoccupied with southwest Asia that the allies became aware that some U.S. 
forces were “dual-hatted” that is, committed to serve as reinforcements in both 
Europe and the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, as the French have pointed out over the 
decades, despite the fact that the United States has remained faithful to NATO for 
over 50 years, the future course of U.S. politics is unpredictable.  
According to some European observers, particularly in France, de facto US 
constraints (via the NAC) on European access to commonly funded NATO assets could 
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become a point of contention in European-U.S. relations. Simplifying access by 
abandoning NATO's consensus principle seems improbable, however. If this principle 
was abandoned, an “easy-access” arrangement for the EU could erode Alliance 
cohesion and lead to potentially risky situations for instance, European-led 
operations utilizing NATO assets without the full endorsement of all the allies.  If the 
contingency became an Article V case (i.e., if it threatened the security of one or 
more members of NATO and therefore constituted a basis for action under the 
mutual-Defence pledge in the North Atlantic Treaty), the European allies would in 
all probability expect U.S. support. However, if the United States is expected to be 
present for the “crash landings,” it will understandably want to be in for the “take -
offs” as well. 
Reduction of Military Gap May Be Difficult 
Efforts to build an ESDI in NATO or an ESDP in the EU have been pursued under 
various labels for the past half-century. Basic obstacles have proved difficult to 
surmount: a lack of political cohesion and unity in Europe, an absence of a shared 
vision of strategic requirements and (on the part of several NATO European 
governments) an unwillingness to spend more than minimal levels on military 
capabilities. 
The reversal of current trends toward reducing Defence spending in most EU 
countries depends on at least three factors: economic growth, threat perceptions, 
and the prominence of social priorities other than national Defence. Whether 
economic growth will lead to increased Defence spending depends in large part on the 
other two factors. As far as threat perceptions are concerned, it is worth recalling 
that the EU's Petersberg Tasks like non-Article V missions in NATO are not vital 
matters of national or collective Defence, but optional interventions. Such inter-
ventions do not provide compelling grounds for increased Defence budgets in most 
NATO countries. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that threat perceptions in 
the EU are not as acute as those in the United States, which helps to explain 
European non-comprehension of the U.S. interest in National Missile Defence (NMD). 
Thus, increases in Western European Defence spending are unlikely. As far as social 
priorities other than national Defence are concerned, the increased demand for 
pensions and health care is likely to constrain Defence spending in all NATO countries. 
According to Paul Hazell, the Director from 1992 to 1998 of the SACLANT: 
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 “In spite of the fact that NATO Defence spending through 2005 is likely to be 
relatively stable, thereafter the prospects look grim. All NATO nations will come under 
increasing pressure to fund the retirement and social security/health costs of a 
growing number of post-World War II 'baby-boomers.' At best, Defence budgets will 
remain level; at worst they could fall to 1 percent of Gross Domestic Product. From 
2005 to 2020, when the pressures on Defence budgets will peak, the need to replace 
major assets that were built at the height of the Cold War will become paramount. 
Because of the reduced budget levels, and the continuing growth in unit costs due to 
technical sophistication and falling production, the build rate for new ships and 
submarines may fall to 25 percent of Cold War levels. This will have a massive impact 
on fleet numbers, and could reduce the U.S. Navy to 150-200 ships.”viii 
The French economist Claude Lachaux has argued that demographic and 
economic factors these “stubborn facts” are likely to constrain West European 
Defence spending more than that of the United States. The first fact Lachaux has 
emphasized is the changing demography of Western Europe: the decline m birth rates 
and the decline in the number of workers relative to the growing numbers of retired 
people receiving government pensions. According to his analysis, the growing 
pension and health care demands of ageing populations will make it difficult for 
European governments to increase spending on Defence: “How will governments be 
able to obtain funds from their parliaments for high-tech armaments if the elected 
representatives of an aged population are only disposed to vote for funds for high-
tech medicine?”ix Other studies have reached similar conclusions about the 
implications of demographic change.x Lachaux's second stubborn fact is the 
cumulative U.S. advantage in spending a greater proportion of GNP on Defence and 
in pursuing greater efficiencies, with fess duplication and more attention to 
procurement, new operational requirements and military R&D. In view of the fact 
that the U.S. federal budget appears well enough balanced to permit Social Security 
reforms and real increases in Defence spending in the coming years, while balanced 
budgets in Europe “appear, for a long time ahead, to be a dream,” Lachaux has 
forecast that the United States will continue to make a greater Defence effort than 
its European allies. 
Finally, Lachaux has highlighted the enlargement of NATO and the EU, in 
conjunction with Balkan reconstruction efforts. Such endeavors also burden the 
economies of the EU countries and promise to limit the funds available for military 
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capabilities improvements. Unless the Europeans can surmount such stubborn facts, 
Lachaux has concluded, “Their speeches on European Security and Defence Identity 
will pass for pure rhetoric.” In short, continued declines in Defence spending in NATO 
Europe are in prospect, except perhaps for Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. 
Since 1992, NATO European Defence spending has dropped 22 percent in real 
terms.xi While US Defence spending declined by 37 percent in real terms from 1985 to 
2000, the United States nonetheless retained many of its capability advantages. An 
increase in U.S. Defence spending in real terms began in fiscal year 2001 and was 
accelerated m 2002.xii Representatives of EU organizations and like-minded European 
officials and experts frequently assert that the EU will be more effective than NATO in 
getting its member states to increase Defence spending or, at least, to gain force 
improvements through more efficient spending. This remains to be seen; a number of 
European observers expect the pattern of US-European capability asymmetries to 
remain essentially unchanged, although marginal improvements may be achieved via 
measures such as a projected pooling of air transport assets by some European 
countries. 
 Britain, France, and the United States are the three nations most determined to 
do something about the U.S.-European capabilities gap. London, Paris, and 
Washington all want to stimulate their European allies and partners to acquire 
improved military capabilities. Their motives are different, of course. Most Americans 
want more capable allies and coalition partners, though some have at times 
manifested reservations about diminished European dependence on the United 
States. The British and the French both seek more political and military options 
under national and/or EU control (and diminished dependence on the United 
States) and the greater influence in defining NATO strategy that would flow from 
increased capabilities. The British have played a leading role in this regard since late 
1998, when Prime Minister Tony Blair announced, in a major change in British policy, 
an unprecedented readiness to bring security and Defence matters into the EU. The 
British nonetheless remain more inclined than the French to think in terms of 
developing the EU's military potential within a broad NATO framework and in close 
cooperation with the United States. The French are more apt to think of an EU 
capability distinct from that of the Alliance and U.S. forces. As in the past, the 
concept of the EU as an autonomous great power what the French call I'Europe-
puissance, commands more interest and respect in France than in any other EU 
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country. Long-standing patterns of capability dependence in transatlantic relations 
appear likely, however, to be prolonged and may well be deepened by factors 
affecting the willingness and ability of governments to spend on military forces, such 
as the low level of threat perceptions in NATO Europe and the imperatives of other 
social priorities in the EU. London, Paris, and Washington therefore face great 
challenges in their attempts to get significant improvements in capabilities. The way 
forward will demand shared determination, transatlantic cooperation and 
coordination, and increased European Defence spending. This appears to be the only 
way to narrow the gap. 
 
U.S. Approaches to ESDP 
The Clinton Administration used the concerns towards ESDP to frame and guide its 
support for a more cohesive and responsive European foreign policy, and above all, for a 
more capable European Defence. The Kosovo war affirmed to American leaders that not 
enough European armed forces were ready for the diverse, rapidly evolving challenges of 
the post-Cold War world. In American eyes, Europe has been sluggish in its efforts to 
manage the shift away from the massed, terrain-based forces necessary for the Cold War 
toward more mobile, deployable and sustainable forces and improved lift, logistics and 
intelligence capabilities. Kosovo underscored European dependence on the U.S. for 
precision-strike capability, surveillance and intelligence assets, refuelling, lift, and high-
end command and control systems. Republican political leaders who were openly 
sceptical and even scornful of ESDP during the Clinton years have, since joining the Bush 
Administration, essentially continued the Clinton Administration’s approach of 
conditional support tied to pressure for improved European military capabilities. 
President Bush basically reiterated the three D’s during his first meeting with other NATO 
Heads of State and Government in Brussels on June 13th 2001: 
 “We agreed that NATO and the European Union must work in common purpose. It is 
in NATO’s interest for the European Union to develop a rapid reaction capability. A strong, 
capable European force integrated with NATO would give us more options for handling 
crises when NATO, as a whole, chooses not to engage. NATO must be generous in the help 
it gives the EU. And similarly, the EU must welcome participation by NATO allies who are 
not members of the EU. And we must not waste scarce resources, duplicating effort or 
working at cross purposes.”xiii 
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Washington's policies concerning these ESDP initiatives have centred on four themes: 
 NATO is the preeminent security organization for Europe; 
 the EU will follow the protocols of Berlin Plus; 
 NATO has the “right of first refusal” to respond militarily to crises; and 
 ESDP developments should not redirect resources from NATO initiatives. 
The right of first refusal by NATO to intervene in a crisis continues to be debated, but 
underscores the theme of NATO's pre-eminence in security concerns. At the Washington 
Summit in 1999, the Alliance declared that Europe would act where the Alliance as a 
whole was not engaged. 
More complex, though, is the evaluation of ESDP through the lens of French designs 
to marginalize U.S. influence in NATO and Europe. While not a prominent aspect, this is a 
fear in Washington that can taint objective review of ESDP developments. However, this 
tends more to slow down U.S. policy than to dictate it. For example, in the planning for 
EU mission Concordia to replace the NATO mission in Macedonia, there were differences 
of opinion between the French and U.S. positions on the chain of command of the 
operation, its headquarters locations and the use and command of NATO's reserve. 
Ultimately the elements of Berlin Plus prevailed and both the U.S. and France moved 
together in agreement. At a different level, the French-led Tevuren Headquarters 
proposal also alarmed Washington and offered further “proof” of French designs to 
minimize NATO. This proposal was in direct violation of the agreed Berlin Plus principles 
and Washington used a lot of horsepower to defeat the proposal. It is likely that the 
French will not want to marginalize NATO because the consensus rule allows the French 
to force modifications of U.S. policy in Europe that may be unattainable in a bilateral 
approach. Thus, the majority of ESDP policy conflicts with NATO will most likely resolve 
themselves over time. 
 
Factors in Determining U.S. Policy toward ESDP 
While U.S. policy may follow the above themes and champion the supremacy of 
NATO in security efforts, several factors must be weighed in formulating a response to 
ESDP developments. First, the early 1990's are still a recent memory for Europeans and 
will continue to drive their will for a capability external to NATO. Add Rwanda and the 
Congo which saw comparatively little U.S. involvement and they have more examples of 
their need to further develop an autonomous capability. Conversely, the U.S. must face a 
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perception by the Europeans that it is the dominating influence within NATO. However, a 
widely held belief among U.S. policy makers is that the Europeans expect and want U.S. 
leadership. It may be more that the Europeans recognize that to get the unique U.S. 
assets, they must allow for U.S. leadership. Inject a little Gaullism and this situation can 
be grating on European pride. 
Another factor is NATO's decision by consensus, where 21 of its 26 members are also 
members of the EU with another 2 members expressing a desire to join the EU. The sheer 
range of issues covered by the EU will invariably cause the 21 NATO and EU member 
allies to provide give and take within the EU. The U.S. should dissuade but not expect to 
completely rule out an inevitable “EU Caucus” within NATO. Kori Schake pointed out the 
potential ills of an EU caucus within NATO: 
The idea of a caucus of member states within NATO could be detrimental both to the 
Alliance and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)... Such division is likely to 
embolden objections and make non-EU members feel they are being pulled into policies 
that they had little influence in shaping. A caucus is likely to make the United States 
defend even more ardently the positions on non-EU NATO states to ensure that they get 
serious consideration by the European Union. A caucus could make consensus building 
more difficult if states were unwilling to compromise on elements that represent hard-
won EU internal consensus. Finally, it could slow the pace of decisions if Alliance 
consultations were prevented until EU states agreed to a position to present in NATO 
counsels.xiv 
The UK has long carried the water for U.S. interests within the EU, but it is unrealistic 
to expect the UK to completely agree with the U.S. on every nuance of policy towards 
ESDP (as it has not in the past). Prime Minister Tony Blair has walked a fine line between 
the EU obligations and acting as the indispensable agent for transatlantic relations and 
participation. However, Blair will not be in power forever and it is inevitable that a policy 
issue will arise on which neither side could reach a compromise. 
Other than the Kosovo operation, NATO's operations have been at the low to mid 
areas of the range of military operations - with tasks not unlike the Petersburg tasks. 
Should the EU develop comparable capabilities and structures to NATO and seek 
operations in Africa, the Middle East or the Caucuses, the Alliance could become 
insignificant - another subset of the EU like the WEU has become. Such a development 
would diminish NATO and reduce the U.S.'s overall influence in European affairs.  
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Another problem besetting NATO is the reluctance of the U.S. to seriously consider 
using NATO forces in a war-fighting event. Partially due to the mismatch in capabilities, 
but more due to the fact that the necessity to achieve consensus at the level of political 
decision making will derive the lowest common denominator approach to war-fighting. 
Operation Enduring Freedom is a prime example, where the U.S. did not consider a NATO 
operation, but rather only sought contributions from allies. 
Perhaps the U.S. should not worry so much over the development of European 
capabilities resident in the EU. While some trumpet ESDP progress to date, real progress 
is questionable. For example, Giegerich and Wallace maintain that the size of the 
combined deployments by EU members (both NATO and non-NATO) almost make up for 
the lack of physical achievement of the Headline Goal 2003.xv Unfortunately for their 
argument, a good number were deployed in NATO operations in which the U.S. also 
participated –therefore bringing in a different and arguably much more robust set of 
capabilities, national caveats and national rules of engagement. But, to the Europeans' 
credit, they have shown they can bring the density of infantry forces required to saturate 
conflict areas for security. In addition, Operation Artemis in the Congo gave a lesson to 
the EU that strategic transport is a real necessity. xvi 
As noted previously, both NATO and the EU have pressed European nations to 
improve capabilities within their organizations. Although the U.S. has recently pushed 
allies for combat capabilities to support the NRF, items for both high and low end support 
such as strategic lift and strategic communications are also in short supply and are high 
cost acquisition items. While calls from both NATO and the EU will help achieve political 
impetus, the requisite increases in Defence expenditures will also be linked to 
governmental monetary and social policies. The United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe's European Population Forum 2004 shows negative population growth and 
projections that up to thirty percent of European nations' population will be comprised of 
pensioners.xvii As Walter Head argues, Europe's elderly dependency ratio of the 
population will exacerbate the “colossal” welfare costs of their nations, thus rendering 
the European nations unable to develop serious military capability.xviii Additionally, an 
Atlantic Council report argues that Europe's economy will remain stagnant through 2020, 
because “prosperity can only be maintained by reducing government expenditures, 
stimulating faster economic growth, and increasing labor utilization.”xix Thus the 
realization of fears that ESDP will enable the EU to become a military peer competitor is 
at least decades down the road. 
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Furthermore, NATO Allies who are also EU members generally have the same pool of 
forces and capabilities that exist for both NATO and the EU. What capabilities are built for 
one would have to serve the other. Therefore, a NATO operation could siphon off assets 
necessary for a potential EU operation and vice versa. While the EU may obtain some 
critical enabler capabilities, it is likely based on budgets to date that those acquired 
capabilities will be low in number and only enough for a single operation. Given that 
NATO has a record of long duration missions, those assets may be unavailable to the EU 
indefinitely. This may lead to a situation where while the Europeans obtain key assets the 
U.S. has pushed for, but those assets are not made available to NATO just to ensure 
availability of scarce resources for a EU operation. Although the Europeans generally are 
wary of any move to relegate the EU to the lower end of the range of military operations, 
the developments to date suggest that they are naturally inclined to follow this path. The 
EU has not proclaimed potential operations beyond the lowered Petersburg Tasks. Robert 
Kagan, in his piece “Power and Weakness,” claims that this is the result of a psychological 
gap between the U.S. and Europe, stating ... the power equation has shifted dramatically: 
When the United States was weak; it practiced the strategies of indirection, the strategies 
of weakness; now that the United States is powerful, and it behaves as powerful nations 
do. When the European great powers were strong, they believed in strength and martial 
glory. Now, they see the world through the eyes of weaker powers. These very different 
points of view, weak versus strong, have naturally produced differing strategic 
judgments, differing assessments of threats and of the proper means of addressing 
threats, and even differing calculations of interest.xx Regardless of the purchase of the 
Eurofighter with precision-guided munitions, it is likely that ESDP will result in lower end 
military capabilities. This is not necessarily bad for the U.S. or for NATO. The EU's 
adjusted goal of rapidly deployable infantry-centric battlegroups by the year  2010 pulls 
together some of the capabilities the U.S. has been seeking in NATO, such as strategic air 
and sea lift, air-to-air refueling, and strategic communications. It may be easier for the 
European nations to receive popular blessing for the necessary Defence budgets if the 
assets are billed for the EU Headline Goal as opposed to a NATO program. However, the 
U.S. could see some relief if the Europeans contributed these assets that are in high 
demand throughout the range of military operations. Additionally, the major resource 
drain in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has been battalion and larger troop 
formations patrolling on the ground in the stability operations phase. These infantry 
formations are just what the U.S. lacks and what the Headline Goal calls for. 
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Infantry formations with strategic lift and strategic communications gained by the EU 
Headline Goal and available for NATO, however, will not alone alleviate the U.S. burden 
in ongoing theater stability operations in Afghanistan or Iraq and in potential stability 
operations in the Caucuses or Africa. Afghanistan provides a good example. While 
political will supported NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in 
Afghanistan and the Europeans were ready to provide Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs), the Europeans did not offer critical enablers such as tactical air support for 
protection, theater lift (fixed and rotary wing) and logistical support. Instead, the 
Europeans looked to the U.S. to fill the majority of those requirements. The U.S. balked at 
providing a good portion of these assets because the Europeans (at least collectively) 
have those assets in their forces and the U.S. was stretched with operations in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq. When the U.S. held back, the Europeans refused to offer the PRTs. 
 
Conclusions 
The U.S. has three policy options toward ESDP: 
1. work to undermine ESDP and keep the Europeans committed to 
NATO as the security organization of choice;  
2. let ESDP grow as it may and fight for NATO to retain its 
competencies;  
3. and shape ESDP by developing a partnership between NATO and 
the EU.  
In the first option, it is unlikely the U.S. has the clout to undermine ESDP lower than the 
Europeans are capable of taking it and would not endear the U.S. to its European Allies. 
In the second option, ignoring the development of ESDP could undercut any programs 
and initiatives in NATO as euros, materiel and manpower are focused on various ESDP-
related initiatives. The remaining option is to embrace ESDP, work with it, and try to 
develop a synergy between NATO and the EU. 
The U.S. position has been to support ESDP, generally within the confines of Berlin 
Plus. This policy seems to continue. By allowing the EU to further develop ESDP in a 
partnership with NATO, the U.S. may have a “partner” for low-end crisis management 
operations, in which the mission handover models in Macedonia and Bosnia could apply 
or in an operation employing NATO military and EU economic and civil assets. 
Additionally, the U.S. may achieve capabilities in NATO that would be otherwise 
unattainable through steady progress in the Prague Capabilities Commitments. 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
464 
 
The predicament in filling the Statement of Requirements and therefore expanding 
NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan should provide three lessons for Washington. First, 
the U.S. will have to understand the allies' perspective that a NATO operation includes at 
least a fair share of U.S. participation, a NATO operation is not just a replacement for U.S. 
forces, and the European allies actually need to participate in crafting the operational 
designs. Second, the U.S. must continue to press for European investments in items 
found in the PCC, as the predominance of those items also support Petersburg Task 
operations. Finally, to offset budgetary reluctance, the U.S. will need to re-examine the 
technology transfer rules to assist European procurement so operational money is 
available to deploy what they do have. As the Global War on Terrorism continues, these 
lessons may prove valuable in getting allies to shoulder more of the burden. 
Having an EU with a fully developed expeditionary capability focused on the 
peacekeeping and lower tasks that also comes with an incorporated civilian component 
could be an important asset for U.S. foreign policy. The transition in Bosnia from NATO to 
the EU and the Kosovo’s situation provides an illustrative example. The new EU mission in 
Bosnia brings the EU Police Training Mission, the economic assistance program for 
development (CARDS) and the military mission all under one policymaking entity. NATO 
will remain engaged in Bosnia with a Defence reform mission as Bosnia strives toward 
NATO membership, and use its capabilities to apprehend the major Persons Indicted For 
War Crimes (PIFWCs). This relieves the U.S. of a long-term peacekeeping mission that 
may continue until the next generation of Bosnians, Serbs and Croats come to power. 
According to U.S, this may be a model needed in future hotspots in a post or pre-conflict 
environment where NATO's high-end capabilities are not necessary.  
 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
465 
 
References 
                                                 
i Madeleine K. Albright, ‘The right balance will secure NATO’s future,’ Financial Times, 
December 7th, 1998; the three D’s were subsequently amended by NATO Secretary 
General Lord Robertson into the three ‘I’s’: indivisibility of the transatlantic link; 
improvement of capabilities; and inclusiveness of all Allies’. 
ii Republican Party, “2004 Republican Party Platform: A Safer World and a More Hopeful 
America,” 26 August 2004; available from 
http://www.gop.com/media/2004platform.pdf; Internet; accessed 24 September 2009.  
iii Republican Party, “Republican Platform 2000 Renewing America's Purpose. Together,” 
available from 
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/conventions/republican/features/platform.00/; 
Internet; accessed 24 September 2009. 
iv  Republican Party, “2004 Republican Party Platform: A Safer World and a More Hopeful 
America (New York: 26 August 2004);” 34.  
v US House of Representatives, “The EU Constitution And US-EU Relations: The Recent 
Referenda In France And The Netherlands And The US-Eu Summit.” Hearing  Before  The  
Subcommittee  On  Europe  And  Emerging Threats  Of  The  Committee  On  International  
Relations  House  Of  Representatives  One  Hundred Ninth Congress  First Session, 
Washington D.C., JUNE 22, 2005, 7, available from 
http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/21975.pdf; Internet, accessed on 04 
October 2009. 
vi David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugier, and Martin C. LibickS, Mind the Gap: 
Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs, Washington, National 
Defense University Press, 1999. 
vii Michael Evans, “General Wanted U.S. to Call the Shots in Kosovo,” The Times, 
London, January 27, 2000. 
viii Paul   Hazell,   “Beyond   2015:  The   NATO Way Forward,” Jane's Navy 
International 104, December 1999, p. 13. 
ix Claude Lachaux, “Alliance atlantique et Europe de la défense: les faits sont terns,” 
Defense Nationale, August-September 1999, p. 82. 
x Anne Swardson, “A Pension Crisis Looms in Europe,”   Washington Post National 
Weekly Edition, May 1, 2000, p.17. 
xi “The NATO Capability Gap,” in Strategic Survey 1999/2000, London: The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2000, p. 19.  
xii For an analysis of the implications of post-9/11 U.S. defense spending, see   
Michael   O'Han Ion,   “Rumsfeld's   Defense   Vision,”   Survival 44 (Summer 2002). 
   Second Internat ional Conference on European Studies                                                                                                  ICES’09 
 
466 
 
                                                                                                                                  
xiii Author’s italics. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Availability with 
President Bush and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, NATO Headquarters, 
Brussels, June 13th 2001. 
xiv Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace "Not Such a Soft Power: the External 
Deployment of European Forces," Survival, vol. 46 no. 2, Summer 2004. p. 177. 
xv  ibid. 
xvi Coleman, David, "Facing the 2 1st Century. New Developments, Continuing Problems," 
Keynote address at the European Population Forum January 2004. Internet. Available 
from <http://www.unece.org/ead/pau/epf/present/ksl/coleman.doc>. Accessed 18 
December 2009. 
xvii Coleman, David, "Facing the 2 1st Century. New Developments, Continuing Problems," 
Keynote address at the European Population Forum January 2004. Internet. Available 
from <http://www.unece.org/ead/pau/epf/present/ksl/coleman.doc>. Accessed 18 
December 2009.  
xviii Walter Head, "The Case Against Europe," The Atlantic Monthly, April 2002. Available 
from < http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200204/mead>. Internet. Accessed 10 
October 2009. 
xix  Atlantic Council, "The Transatlantic Economy in 2020: A Partnership for the Future?," 
Policy Paper, November 2004. p. ix. Internet. Available from <http://www.acus.org/ 
Publications/policypapers/TransatlanticRelations/The Transatlantic Economy in 
2020.pdf>. Accessed 18 December 2009. 
xx Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness." June 2002. Internet. Available from 
<http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html>. Accessed 10 October 2009. 
Address: Epoka University, Rruga e durrësit, Tirana - Albania
Tel:  +355 4 22 32 086,+355 4 22  20 077, Fax: +355 4 22 21 17
Second International Conference on European Studies
9 789995 668174
